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THE  
TATTVA-KAUMUDĪ

(*Vācaspati Miśra's Commentary on the Sāṃkhya-Kārikā*)

Translated into English and containing

A SYNOPSIS OF THE CARDINAL DOCTRINES OF THE  
SĀMĀKHYA PHILOSOPHY

BY

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and with

AN HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION AND CRITICAL NOTES

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## INTRODUCTION

### I. *The Origin of Philosophical Enquiry*

In this world, the end of all activity is happiness. Nobody even in his imagination likes to suffer pain even for a moment. Even those who commit suicide do so only when they are sorely disgusted with the pains inherent in Saṁsāra. Truly has it been said by our elders, "Every one desists from pain; every one desires happiness." But what happiness is cannot be very well explained by those who lack philosophical insight. The enjoyment of sense-objects which people resort to as 'pleasure' day and night and for which they put forth their utmost effort is considered by philosophers as entirely undesirable, mixed as it is always with pain. So the wise leave all worldly enjoyments even as one does honey mixed with poison and seek the highest end of human existence which alone leads to final and absolute happiness; and after they have attained it for themselves, they are moved with pity for the creatures quivering in the well of misery and for their good they apply themselves to the propagation of the truth attained. Thus do the wise explain the Origin of Philosophical Enquiry.

### II. *The Significance of Sāṁkhya Philosophy*

Of all the philosophical systems, Sāṁkhya has been considered by all to be the most ancient. Nobody can gainsay the fact that this occupies a prominent place in all the Śāstras, since this is either supported or controverted by every philosophical system. Therefore, the importance of this Śāstra is recognised by all the systems. Śāṅkarācārya says— "The doctrine, moreover, stands somewhat near to the Vedānta doctrine since, like the latter, it admits the new-

difference of cause and effect, and it, moreover, has been accepted by some of the authors of the Dharma-sūtras, such as Devala, and so on. For all these reasons we have taken special trouble to refute the pradhāna doctrine." (S. B. E., XXXIV, p. 289). So also in the Mahābhārata "we read— "There is no knowledge like that of Sāṅkhya, no power like that of Yoga. You should have no doubt as to Sāṅkhya being the highest knowledge " (S'ānti. 316, 2)

Though the use of the word *Sāṅkhya* is found first of all in the S'vet. Up—तत्कारणं सांख्ययोगाभिगम्यं etc., (VI, 13), yet Sāṅkhya reflections are found even in the R̥gveda and the other Upanisads. This proves the antiquity of this S'āstra. This will be made clear in detail further on.

*Sāṅkhya* is derived from the word *saṅkhyā*. The word *saṅkhyā* is used in the sense of thinking and counting. Cf. "चर्चा संख्या विचारणा" (Amara I V. 3) Thinking may be with reference to basic principles or knowledge of Self. Counting refers to the twenty-four principles and *as'akti*, *atusī*, etc. The double implication of the word has been set forth by Vijñānabhikṣu in his preface to *Sāṅkhya-pravacana-bhāṣya*, by a quotation from the Mbh—

"संख्यां प्रकृवंते चेन्न प्रकृतिं च प्रचक्षते ।

तत्त्वानि च चतुर्विंशतेन सांख्यं प्रसिद्धितम् ॥"

So, *Sāṅkhya* means knowledge of Self through right discrimination. Garbe is of opinion that the word *Sāṅkhya* was originally used in the sense of counting, and it was then applied to the system of Kapila which enumerates the 25 principles. (For details and the opinion of Jacobi, see S. P., p. 189, 2n and pp. 190-191) Jayacandra S'armā says with regard to *Sāṅkhya* in *Saṅskṛta-Candrikā*, a magazine which became defunct long ago, that the Sāṅkhya is tawny, with deep-brown face, and has a big belly. He has a rosary in his hand and a staff, and keeps long nails and hair. (Ādi-purāṇa quoted. VII of 1821 S'aka., Vol. 1 and 2, p. 8) Really

speaking, since the word *Kapila* stands both for a particular colour and for the founder of Sāṅkhya Philosophy, therefore, owing to the similarity of word the writer of the Purāṇa has indulged in conjectures of his own. It appears that the writer of the Purāṇa at the time of writing happened to see some sage with tawny face and corpulent body, and was led to describe his form and colour.

Some scholars, seeing the rejection of *Īśvara* in the Sāṅkhya-system, have maintained that it is *vedaviruddha* or opposed to S'ruti (S. S., p. 21 f.; S. P., 13 ff.). S'āṅkarācārya also, seeing that Sāṅkhya is opposed to *adaita*, avers that Sāṅkhya is not rooted in the S'rutis.

"Although there are many Smṛtis treating of the soul, we have singled out for refutation the Sāṅkhya and Yoga because they are widely known as offering the means for accomplishing the highest end of man and have found favour with many competent persons. Moreover, their position is strengthened by a Vedic passage referring to them, 'He who has known that cause which is to be apprehended by Sāṅkhya and Yoga he is freed from all fetters' (S'Ve. Up. VI, 13), ..... we refute by the remark that the highest beatitude is not to be attained by the knowledge of Sāṅkhya Smṛti irrespective of the Veda, nor by the road of Yoga-practice." (S. B. E., XXXIV, pp. 277-8). In deciding also the *vaidika* or the *non vaidika* character of Sāṅkhya, the great S'āṅkara says—"The scriptural passage which the pūrvapakṣin has quoted as proving the eminence of Kapila's knowledge would not justify us in believing in such doctrines of Kapila (i. e., of some Kapila) as are contrary to scriptures, for that passage mentions the bare name of Kapila (without specifying which Kapila is meant), and we meet in tradition with another Kapila, viz., the one who burned the sons of Sagar and had the surname of Vāsudeva." (S. B. E., XXXIV, p. 291).

Similarly others have also maintained the opposition of Sāṅkhya to Śruti. Truly speaking, Sāṅkhya could be divided into two—one *śeṣ'vara*, the other *nirīś'vara*. Let the theists not take the *nirīś'vara-Sāṅkhya*, propounded in the Kārikā, etc., as rooted in Śruti, but who can take exception to the *vaidika* character of the *śeṣ'vara-Sāṅkhya* as propounded in the Upaniṣads, the Mahābhārata and the Purāṇas? For instance, we come across 'yathā-śruti-nidars'ana as a synonym of Sāṅkhya in —

एतानि नव सर्गाणि तत्त्वानि च नराधिप ।

चतुर्विंशतिरुक्तानि यथाश्रुतिनिदर्शनात् ॥

( Mbh., S'ānti., 310, 25 )

In the 313th chapter of S'āntiparvan, in the section describing the intrinsic, extrinsic and super-natural aspects of the *vibhūti*s of *Prakṛti* many synonyms of the upholders of Sāṅkhya are met with; e g., द्वाद्वाप्यस्तत्त्वदर्शिनः ( p. 1 ) तत्त्वार्थ-दर्शिनः, (2) योगप्रदर्शिनः, (3) संख्यानदर्शिनः, (4) योगानिदर्शिनः, (5) यथाश्रुतिनिदर्शिनः, (6, 7, 8 and 9 ) तत्त्वबुद्धिविशारदाः, (10) यथाशास्त्रविशारदा, (11) तत्त्वनिदर्शिनः, (12) यथावदभिदर्शिनः, (13). Here the word 'Yathāśrutinidars'inah' being repeated four times establishes the *vaidika* character of theistic Sāṅkhya. Moreover, even the atheistic Sāṅkhya is *vaidika* in character, inasmuch as the traditional categories have been borrowed from Upaniṣads, etc. [Jacobi takes the atheistic Sāṅkhya as older, and believes that there has been an attempt for the synthesis of the theistic and the atheistic Sāṅkhyas in the later Upaniṣads, the Bhagavadgītā and portions of the Mahābhārata. *vide*—*Int.* Gott p. 32 ]. Therefore, from the presence of the names of the *ācāryas* of Sāṅkhya in the offering to R̥ṣis, it may be fairly guessed that in olden times, even the most staunch theists undertook the study of Sāṅkhya. ( S s., p/22 ). This could not have been possible if Sāṅkhya was not founded on Śruti.

### III. *Germens of Sāṁkhya in the Vedas, etc.*

The presence of Sāṁkhya categories in the S'rutis in a germinal form corroborates the former guess. We do not mean to say that the principles of Sāṁkhya in their detail are to be sought in the Vedas and Upaniṣads as propounded by Sāṁkhya-Kārikā. That would be as ridiculous as trying to find out the great banyan tree in its minute seed. *Tamas* described in the R̥gveda (X. 129, 3) "तम आसीत्तमसा गूळहमप्रेऽ-प्रकेतं" etc., assumed later on the form of the Unmanifest. This very S'ruti, showing the dissolution of the elements and the elemental world in its cause, the darkness, points to *satkūryacūda*. Sāyaṇa also favours this interpretation in his *bhāṣya* on this verse. Giving this very interpretation elsewhere, the Veda even explains *Aja* (the unborn) as the name of *Pradhāna*—

तमिद्रभं प्रधुमं दध्र आपो यत्र देवाः सुमर्गच्छन्त विश्वे ।

अजस्य नामावध्येकमर्पितं यस्मिन् विश्वानि भुव्नानि तस्युः ॥

(R̥gveda, X. 82, 6)

Chronologically, Jacobi has divided the Upaniṣads into four divisions on account of their variety, their origin in different times, and their subject-matter (Ent. Gott. p. 6 and 19; H. I. P. I, p. 28 ff; I. P. I., p. 141 ff. ).

1. *The most ancient* : as, Bṛhadāraṇyaka, Chāndogya, Taittirīya, Aitareya and Kauṣṭaki.

2. *Ancient* : as, Kāṭhaka, Īśa, S'vetās'vatara, Muṇḍaka and Mahānārāyaṇa.

3. *Modern* : as, Praśna, Maitrāyaṇī and Māṇḍūkya.

4. *Most modern* : the many Atharvāna Upaniṣads.

Among the most ancient ones, in the Br. Up., the Puruṣa is declared to be only a seer, not a doer, devoid of activity in as much as he is without any association with anything (in

reality) as in "स वा एष एतस्मिन् संप्रसादे रत्वा चरित्वा दृष्टुं..... असद्गो ष्यं पुरुष इत्येवमेवैतथागतवक्ष्य" (IV 3, 15 ff). The word *mahat* is indicative of the Sāṅkhya word *Buddhi* in "स यथा सन्धव.....यतो यतस्त्वादरीत लवणमेव वा अर इदं महद्भूतमनन्तमपारं विज्ञानयन एवैतेभ्यो भूतेभ्यः सद्भूतपाय etc." (Br. Up II. 4, 12). The term *Vijñānaghana* expounds the intelligent nature of *Buddhi*. [ Jacobi says that it is very surprising how Sāṅkhya attributes unconsciousness to *Buddhi* which is by nature intelligence. *vide*, Ent. Gott. p. 32. ] In this connection, consult also the *Vātsyāyana Bhāṣya* on the Gautama-Sūtra "शुद्धि-एषलब्धिज्ञानमित्यनर्थान्तरम्" ( 1. 15 ) ]

In the Ch. Up. (VI, 2, 1) having first introduced the theory of *satkāryavāda* in "सदेव सोम्येदम आसीदेकमेवाद्वितीयम्" the Śruti in the same *mantra* mentions the *pūrva-pakṣa* of *asat-kāryavāda* in "तदेक आदुरसदेवेदम आसीदेकमेवाद्वितीयं तस्मादसतः सजायत". It then advances in the next *mantra* *satkāryavāda* that is, ( सतः सजायते ), as a contradiction of the previous statement, *e. g.*, "कुतस्तु सद्यु सोम्येवं स्यादिति होशच कथमसतः सजायेनेति, सत्त्वेन सोम्येदम आसीदेकमेवाद्वितीयम्" ( VI. 2, 2 ). Here the difference from Sāṅkhya-Vedānta is that it accepts the aggregate of effects as *real* and not *unreal* like *māyā*. It maintains that this aggregate of effects exists as a reality in the cause. Thus it clearly expounds *satkāryavāda*. The cause has been signified as *real*. This has also been indicated in the *mantra* यथा सोम्येकेन मृत्पिण्डेन सर्वे मृत्पिण्डे विज्ञानं स्याद्वाचाश्चरन्तं विकारो नामधेयं मृत्पिण्डेण सत्यम्" ( Ch. Up VI. 1, 4 ) Thus arose the *Parināmavāda* of the Sāṅkhyas ( Ent. Gott., p. 14 ). From this reality or existence were produced fire, earth, etc. The expounding of three forms of these objects in "एदमे रोहितं रूपा तेजमस्तदूर्ध्वं, यच्छुद्धं तदर्वा, यस्तृणं तदप्रम्यारागादग्नेरग्रित्वं वाचाश्चरन्तं विकारो नामधेयं त्रीणि रूपाणीत्येव सत्यम्" ( Ch. Up. VI 4, 1 ) is only an earlier form of the *Sattva*, *Rajas* and *Tamas* of the Sāṅkhya philosophy. The redness of fire indicates *Rajas*. Just as

red colour colours cloth, etc., so *Rajas* colours *citta*, because of its property of activity. Even so, the whiteness of water indicates *Sattva*, because white water has the property of purifying things. *Sattva* also purifies the mind with knowledge. The dark colour of *anna* = Earth is an indication of *Tamas*. The dark colour covers everything. Even so, the insentient *Tamas* covers the knowledge born of *Sattva*. [See. *Bāla*, p. 3. What has been propounded by *Sūryanārāyana Sāstrī* in contradiction of this will be found in the Introduction, S N. S.]. This very thing is propounded in the *mantra* "अजमेसं द्योदितयद्रुष्णाम्" (S'v. Up IV 5. *Mahānārāyana Up*, p. 141, *Īsādi*). The *trivṛtkarana* (trebling) *S'ruti* found in the (Ch. Up. VI. 4 and 5) also corroborates this opinion. We also see that the word *trivṛta* has been used in the sense of the three Attributes in "तमेकनेमि त्रिवृतम् etc." (S'v. Up I, 4) also. There the three-foldness of grain, etc., has been indicated by the gross, the medium and the small sizes. It appears that the three-foldness of the Attributes has also been used similarly. *Jacobi* has also accepted this (*Ent. Gott.*, p 32).

The *Sāṅkhya* categories are clearly stated in the later *Upaniṣads*, e. g., in *Katha* "मनसस्तु परा बुद्धिर्बुद्धेर्गत्मा महान् परः (III, 10). *Mahat* is the synonym of *Ahankāra*. Similarly we find *Avyakta* and *Purusa* in "महत्तः परमन्यक्तमन्यक्तात्पुरुषः पर । पुरुषात् परं किञ्चित्सा काश सा परा गतिः ॥" (*Ibid*, III, 11). Prof *Radhakrishnan* believes that the indifference and inactivity of *Puruṣa* have been indicated in "द्वा सुपर्णा सयुजा मवाया समानं वृक्षं परिपस्वजाने । तपोरन्यः पिप्पलं स्वाद्वानि भ्रमन्नन्यां अभिच्यवर्षन्ति ॥" in the *Mundakā Up* (III, 1) [I P. I, 257, 1 n].



योगाधिगम्यम्" (VI. 13), "ऋषिं प्रसूतं कपिलं यत्तमये" (V. 2). In this connection, we shall show later that there is a good deal of controversy about the word *Kapila*. It is again in this Upaniṣad that the words *vyakta*, *avyakta* and *jñā* are found, e. g., "संयुक्तमंतरश्चरमश्चरं च व्यक्ताव्यक्तं भरते विश्वमाशः etc." (I. 8); also "शान्तिं द्वावजातीशान्तिशिवजा लोक etc." (I. 9). *vide* also the Mbh. "अज्ञो जन्तुरनीशोऽयमात्मनः सुखदुःखयोः" (III. 30. 88). This whole verse is quoted in the Gauda. on the 61st Kārikā). Similarly, the use of the words *Pradhāna*, *Prakṛti* and *guṇa* is also found here, e. g. "धरं प्रधानम्" (I, 10), "मायां तु प्रकृतिं विश्वान्" (IV, 10), "देवारमशक्तिं स्वर्गुर्णानिगदाम्" (I, 13), etc. Also, the mantra "तमेकनेमिं त्रिभुतं षोडशान्तं शतार्धं विंशतिप्रत्यराभिः । अष्टकः पञ्चभिर्विश्वरूपकृपाणं त्रिमासंभेदे द्विनिर्मित्तमोहम् ॥" (S'v. Up. I, 4) propounds the categories of Sāṅkhya. The word *trivṛta* refers to the three *gunas*, the word *ṣoḍaśānta* refers to sixteen *vikāras*, the word *śatārdhāra* points to the fifty varieties of *pratyaya-sarga*. Keith's doubt about the Sāṅkhya character of this verse will not bear examination (S. S. p. 11). He has given up the reasonable interpretation and says, "The worth of such identifications must be regarded as uncertain and no conclusive evidence is afforded by them, as plays on numbers are much affected by the Brahmanical schools." But he has not given any different interpretation himself and is, therefore, open to the charge of leaving the present and the relevant in favour of the absent and the irrelevant.

But simply on the basis of the presence of a few technical terms of Sāṅkhya, we should not conclude that a particular Upaniṣad propounds Sāṅkhya doctrines. For instance, in places like "मायां तु प्रकृतिं विश्वमायिनं तु महेश्वरम्" (S'v. Up. I, 10) though there is a technical term of Sāṅkhya, yet it appears that it is only supporting the Vedānta doctrine. Therefore, seeing that Sāṅkhya comes closely after Vedānta in these Upaniṣadas, Jacobi declares that there cannot be

any two opinions among scholars with regard to the fact that the rise of the Sāṃkhya and Yoga systems lies between the most ancient and the ancient Upaniṣads. (Ent. Gott p 21).

Among the modern Upaniṣads, the mention of *Sattva*, *Rajas* and *Tamas* by name, the exposition of the five subtle elements, the enunciation of the five gross elements and reference to the Sāṃkhya categories of *ksetrajña*, *raṃkalpa*, *adhyavasūya*, *abhimāna* and *linga* clearly show that these Upaniṣads come after the formulation of the Sāṃkhya system. As—“तमो वा इदमेहमास, तत्पश्चात्तत्परेणोरितं विषमत्वं प्रयात्येतद् रजमो रूपं.....मोक्षोऽयं यश्चेतनमात्रः प्रतिपुरुषं क्षेत्रज्ञः संकल्पाध्यवसायाभिमानर्जिगः प्रजापतिः etc.” (Mātrāyaṇī, Up. IV, 5), “पञ्चतन्मात्राणि भूतशब्देनोच्यन्ते पञ्चमहाभूतानि भूतशब्देनोच्यन्ते etc. (Ibid III, 2), “पृथिवी च पृथिवीमात्रा आपश्चापोमात्राः etc (Pr up IV, 8) and so on.

In the Mbh, and the Purānas, we find Sāṃkhya philosophy fully reflected. At one place we find the mention of the five gross elements, the twenty-four categories in their manifested or unmanifested character and the three *gunas* (Mbh III, 209, 16-21; 211, 4). The distinction between *Prakṛti*, and *Puruṣa* has been extensively expounded in S'āntiparvan (235, 33-40). Here the word *sattva* stands for *Prakṛti* and not *Brahman*. But Keith, seeing that *sattva* was used as the subject of comparison of a spider, erroneously maintains that *sattva* is referring to *Brahman* (S S, p. 17). It will be clear from the two verses quoted below that his explanation is erroneous, since it is opposed to the context :—“सृजते हि गुणान् सत्त्वं क्षेत्रज्ञ. परिपश्यति । सम्प्रयोगस्तयोरेष सत्त्वक्षेत्रज्ञयोर्ध्रुवः ॥ ३७ ॥ स्वभावामिदमैव. तगदिमान् सृजते गुणान् । उर्णनाभिर्यथा सूर्वं विज्ञेयाम्तन्तुवद् गुणः ॥ ३८ ॥”. We find a reference in the Mbh. of Sāṃkhya knowledge being called *Vaiśeṣika* which was imparted to Janaka by Pāṇcāsikha of Parāśara *gotra*, e. g. “यस्मात्तर्चनमया प्राप्तं ज्ञानं वैशेषिकं पुरा ” (S'ānti. 330, 23a). There again, three paths of emancipation have been described. We find there from the

context that leaving aside the paths of mere knowledge or action, Sāṅkhya lays down a third kind of path, *viz.*, a combination of knowledge and action. S'ānti, 320, 38—40. In this connection, *vide* my article, P. O. C., Lahore, II, 1027 f ).

In the dialogue between Janaka and Sulabhā, the latter uses the word *Sāṅkhya* in the sense of a particular kind of a sentence, —“ मांश्चर्म्यं मांश्चर्म्यं चोभीं निर्णयः सप्रयोजनः । पञ्चतान्यर्थ-  
जानानि वाक्यमित्युच्यते नृप ॥ दीपानां च गुणानां च प्रमाणं प्रविभागत. ८  
कञ्चिदर्शमभिप्रेत्य मा संख्येत्युपधार्यताम् ॥ ” ( S'ānti. 320, 79 and 82 ).  
But at one place in the Mbh., thirty qualities of a body have been mentioned. This classification of qualities is not met with in the Sāṅkhya philosophy *e. g.*, (1) *S'abda*, (2) *Spars'a*, (3) *Rasa*, (4) *Rūpa*, (5) *Gandha*, (6-10) the five senses, (11) *Manas*, (12) *Buddhi*, (13) *Sattva*, (14) *Aham-kartā*, (15) *Sūmagrya*, (16) *Sanghāta*, (17) *Prakṛti*, (18) *Vyakti*, (19) *Dvandvayoga*, (20) *Kāla*, (21-25) the five gross elements, (26) *Sadbhāvayoga*, (27) *Asadbhāvayoga*, (28) *Vidhi*, (29) *S'akra* and (30) *Bala* ( S'ānti 320, 97-112 ). So it has been said —“ विंशति-  
दशैश्च द्वि गुणाः संख्यातन स्मृता । समया यत्र वर्तन्ते तच्छरीरमिति स्मृतम् ॥ ”  
( *ibid.*, 112 ) There, the eight-fold varieties of *Prakṛti* and sixteen varieties of modifications have been described in the 310th chapter of the same *parvan*. Again, the nine kinds of creation mentioned there are not found in Sāṅkhya books. They are as given below —

(1) The creation of *mahat* from *avyakta*, (2) from *mahat* there is the creation of *ahamkāra*, (3) from the latter of *manas*, (4) from it, that of the five gross elements, (5) from these, that of five attributes, (6) from these, that of five senses, (7) from these, that of “ connected with the senses ( *aindriyaka* ), ” (8) from this, that of the upper and oblique varieties and (9) from the oblique, there is the creation of the lower variety. Thus, there is mutual discrepancy in the doctrines expounded in the Mbh. The categories taught by Pañcaśikha in S'ānti. 219, are nowhere obtained in the

Sāṅkhya. A teaching of this very teacher, quite different from that mentioned above, is found in 321, 96-112 of the S'ānti. In the 274th chapter, the doctrines expounded by Devala are different from every other. But even in the midst of divergent expositions of Sāṅkhya doctrines, all agree with regard to the exposition of *Brahman* or *Īs'vara*. Even though the plurality of *puruṣas* has been accepted, *Brahman* has been described as the basis of all. (*vide*—“ब्रह्मं पुरुषाणां स यथैका योनिरुच्यते,” S'ānti 350. 26). Āsuri, having taught Sāṅkhya to Pañcas'ikha, got merged in *Brahman*—“यत्तदेकाशरं ब्रह्म नानारूपं प्रदृश्यते । भासुरिमण्डले तस्मिन् प्रतिपेदे तद्व्ययम् ॥” (S'ānti, 218, 13)

In the *Bhagavadgītā* also, we do not find atheism among the Sāṅkhyas. Rather we find the antiquity and dualism of Sāṅkhya propounded in it (Tilak's *Gītārahasya*, Hindi translation by Sapre, p. 514, 1917 edn.) Kapila, the pioneer of Sāṅkhya philosophy has been described by Lord Kṛṣṇa as an example of his own glory; e. g. “सिद्धानां कपिलो मुनिः” (Bh. G. X, 26). Here the Sāṅkhya path without *karman* is only a synonym of *Jñāna*. Therefore S'āṅkarācārya explains the word *kṛtūnta* as “कृतमिति कर्मोच्यते । तस्यान्तः परिसमाप्तिर्वचनं न कृतान्तः कर्मान्त इत्येतत् ॥” (Bh. G. XVIII, 13). S'āṅkarācārya explains the word *gunasāṅkhyāna* (Bh. G. XVIII, 19) as the system of Kapila the subject-matter of which is the exposition of the three *gunas*, viz. *Sattva*, *Rajas* and *Tamas*.

Again in the 3rd chapter of *Bhāgavata Purāna*, the Sāṅkhya doctrines in detail tend to propound devotion to Viṣṇu. Among the *Purānas* also, the various traditional schools interpret Sāṅkhya doctrines in their own way (see V. P. VI 5, 2-8, VI. 4, 35 Sk. P. *Prabhāsa-khaṇḍa*, 18, 13-15; *Brah P ch.* 213 ff)

In the *Manu-smṛti* also which is contemporary with the *Mbh.* (8 9, p 52) there is a detailed description of *Sattva*, *Rajas* and *Tamas* (XII. 24-52) and reference to the three *pramāṇas* (*ibid*, 105) But the word *Sāṅkhya* is not found

in it. Medhātithi, commenting on " आकाशतु त्रिकुर्वाणात् सर्वगन्ध-  
 चहः श्रुतिः । ( I. 76 ), says— त्रिकुर्वाणादहद्वारादाकाशस्तस्माद्वायुः—, and thus  
 indicates the presence of Sāṅkhya doctrine. In Viṣṇusmṛti,  
 the distinction of Puruṣa from the twenty-four categories,  
 preceded by discrimination, has been clearly described. One  
 of the stanzas ( XX, 25 ) of this Smṛti very closely corresponds  
 with the comment on the second Kārikā by Gauḍapāda ( S  
 S p. 52 ). In the S'āṅkha-saṁhitā we find twenty-five cate-  
 gories, but Puruṣa is identified with Viṣṇu ( VII 21-25 ).  
 Yājñavalkya Smṛti has also been influenced by Sāṅkhya, e. g.  
 सुद्रेष्टवतिरव्यक्तततोऽहद्वारसम्भवः । तन्मात्रदीन्यहद्वारादेकोत्पन्नादि च ॥ "  
 ( III, 179 ff. ). We have already said that the Sāṅkhya cate-  
 gories expounded in these books give prominence to Is'vara  
 ( See also Bh. Com. pp. 183-4, where Belvalkar points out  
 five stages of the evolution of Sāṅkhya doctrines )

#### IV. Sāṅkhya Teachers

Names of twenty-six Sāṅkhya teachers are met with in  
 the Smṛtis, the Mbh., the Kārikās, etc. They are as follows.—

(1) Kapila, (2) Āsuri, (3) Pañcas'ikha, (4) Vindhya-  
 vāsa, or Vindhyavāsaka or Vindhyavāsin, (5) Vārṣaganya,  
 (6) Jaigīṣavya, (7) Vodhu, (8) Asitadevala or Devala, (9)  
 Sanaka, (10) Sanandana, (11) Sanātana, (12) Sanatkumāra,  
 (13) Bhṛgu, (14) S'ukra, (15) Kās'yapa, (16) Parās'ara, (17)  
 Garga or Gārgya, (18) Gautama, (19) Nārada, (20) Āraṭiṣena  
 (21) Agastya, (22) Pulastya, (23) Hārīta, (24) Ulūka, (25)  
 Vālmiki and (26) S'uka.

##### 1. Kapila

Mentioned in the Ś'v. Up. ( 5, 2 ) for the first time,  
 Kapila is known everywhere as the founder of the Sāṅkhya  
 philosophy. Many people think that he was not a historical  
 personage. But Garbe, criticising the views of Max-Müller  
 and Colebrooke, believes that the traditionally handed down  
 name of Kapila cannot be regarded as fictitious; there is

another support in the name of the town Kapilavastu of the Buddhists ( S. Y., 2, § 3 ). Keith, on the other hand, opines that Kapila was not a historical person as he is found identified with *Agni* or *Visnu* or *S'iva*, and is, therefore, another name for *Hiranyagarbha* ( S. S. 9, In; Mbh. S'ānti. 339, 66-67; 342. 92-93 ). Kaviraja Gopinatha also agrees with this opinion as expressed by him in the introduction to *Jayamaṅgalā* published by me ( p. 3 ). Bālarāma Udāsīna, in his footnotes to *Yogabhāṣya* 1. 25; "आदिविद्वान् निर्माणचित्तमपिडाय कारुण्याद्रगवान् परमर्षिरासुरये जिज्ञासमानाय तन्त्रं प्रोवाच ।" says :—

"(1) आदिविद्वान्=सर्गाश्वाविर्भूतो हिरण्यगर्भः स्वयंभु, निर्माणचित्तं =योगवलेन स्वनिर्मितं चित्तमपिडाय=स्वासेन प्रविश्य कपिलाख्यपरमर्षिर्भूत्वा कारुण्याजिज्ञासवे आसुरये तन्त्रं प्रोवाचेत्यर्थः ॥ (2) 'ऋषि प्रसूतं कपिलं यस्तमग्रं ज्ञानिर्भिर्भति जायमानं च पश्येत् ' इति श्रुत्या कपिलस्य जायमानस्य ज्ञानप्राप्तिः श्रूयते ॥ (3) पद्भमे कपिलो नाम निदेशः कालविन्दुत्तम । प्रोवाचासुरये मांख्यं तत्त्वग्रामविनिर्णयम् । (Bhāgavata Purāṇa, 1. 3. 11). इति स्मृती पद्भमावतार-स्वोक्तेर्विणोरवतारः कपिल इति भावः । 'अग्निः स कपिलो नाम मांख्यशास्त्र-प्रवर्तकः ' इति महाभारतं तु कल्पभेदेन नेयम् । कल्पभेदेनैव च कपिलो ब्रह्मपुत्र इति स्मर्यते ॥ (4) भास्कराचार्यप्रभृतयस्तु 'ऋषिं प्रसूतं कपिलं ' इति कपिलपदे-नापि हिरण्यगर्भं एव गृह्यते ॥ 'यो ब्रह्माणं इत्यादिचतुर्विंशतिरन्वसंवादादित्याहु ॥' ( Ch. 8. 8. p. 62 ).

From a quotation in the *Baudhāyana* (2, 6, 30), we learn that an *asura* Kapila divided the four āśramas. There is another Kapila also who wrote a *Kapilasmiti* dealing with the *s'rāddha*, *vivāha*, *prāyas'citta* ceremonies (H. Dh. 1, pp 25, 525). S'ānkarācārya also thinks that the Kapila of Sāṅkhya is different from the Vedic Kapila ( Br. S. Bhāṣya II, 1, 1 ). Ānandagiri, commenting on this says that the Vedic Kapila is that one who reduced the sixty-thousand sons of Sagara to ashes. He is quite different from the Sāṅkhya teacher. But we find in the *Padmapurāna* that one Kapila *alias* Vāsudeva taught the Sāṅkhya doctrines to Brahman, Bhṛgu, etc., supported by the Vedas; another Kapila taught ( the Sāṅkhya ) as opposed to all the Vedic tenets ( quoted in N. B. S., II 1, 1.

p. 4) But according to the Bhāgavata Purāna (3. 25. 1) Vāsudeva himself was born as Kapila from the womb of Devahūtī कपिलस्तत्त्वमंश्याता भगवतात्ममापया । जातः स्वयमजः ताश्री-  
शतमप्रजातये नृणाम् ॥ ”

Thus, we find no strong proof for believing Kapila a historical person.

## 2. Āsuri

There is a difference of opinion also with regard to the reality of Āsuri, the first disciple of Kapila. Kaviraja Gopinatha thinks him to be a historical person (Jay., Int., p. 3). But Garbe and Keith are opposed to this view (S. S. pp. 47-48, S. Y. pp. 2-3 : Garbe adds that if Āsuri is really historical then he is different from his namesake mentioned in the Ś'atapatha-Brāhmana). The two interesting accounts as to how Kapila taught Āsuri are found in the Jayamaṅgalā and the Māḥaravṛtti. In the Mbh., Āsuri is made the teacher of Pāñcas'ikha “तत्र पञ्चशिक्षो नाम कापिलेयो महाशुनिः ।... आशुरः प्रथमं शिष्ये etc.” (S'ānti, 218. 6. 10). We find only one quotation ascribed to Āsuri, viz. “विविक्ते हृक्परिणता बुद्धौ भोगोऽस्य कल्पते । प्रनिविन्द्रोऽयः स्वच्छो यथा चन्द्रममोऽम्भसि ॥” in the commentary of Hanbhadra on the Śaddars'anasamuccaya (p. 36).

## 3. Pāñcas'ikha

Pāñcas'ikha, the disciple of Āsuri is found quoted in the following works :

A. Y. Bh.—

(अ) “एकमेव दर्शनं व्याभिरेव दर्शनम्” [ १. ४ ] । (आ) “आदि-  
विद्वान् निर्माणचित्तमधिष्ठाय कारुण्याद्भगवान् परमपिराशुरये जिज्ञासमानाय  
तन्त्रं प्रोवाच” । [ १. २५ ] । (इ) “तमणुमाश्रमात्मनमनुविद्याऽस्मिन्त्येवं  
तावत्संप्रजानीते” [ १. ३६ ] । (उ) “व्यक्तमव्यक्तं वा सत्त्वमात्मत्वेना-  
भिप्रतित्य तस्य सम्यदमनुनन्दत्यात्मसम्पदं मन्वानस्तस्य व्यापदमनुज्ञोक्त्यात्म-  
व्यापदं मन्वानः स सर्वोऽप्रतिबुद्धः” [ २. ५ ] । (ऊ) “बुद्धितः परं

पुरुषमाकारशीलविद्यादिभिर्विभक्तमपश्यन् कुर्यात्तत्रात्मशुद्धिं मोहेन ” [२. ६]’  
 (क) “म्यान् स्वल्पः सङ्करः सपरिहारः सप्रत्यवमर्षः। कुशलस्य नापकर्पायालम्  
 कस्मान्, कुशलं हि मे पश्यन्वदस्ति यत्रायमावापं गतः स्वर्गोऽप्यपकर्षमल्पं  
 करिष्यति ” [ २, १३ ] । (ख) “रूपातिशया वृष्यतिशयाश्च परस्परेण  
 विरुध्यन्ते, सामान्यानि त्वतिशयैः मह प्रवर्तन्ते ” [ ३. १३ ] । ( ल )  
 “ तुल्यदेशश्रवणानामेकदेशश्रुतित्वं भवति ” [ ३. ४१. ] ॥

Vyāsa does not give the name of Pañcas'ikha, but it is Vācaspati who says so.

B S. Sū.—

( ष ) “ आधेयशक्तियोगः पञ्चशिखः ” [ ५. ३२ ] । ( ऐ ) “ अविशेक-  
 निमित्तो वा पञ्चशिखः [ ६. ६८ ] ”

C. S. S. B.—

( ओ ) “ मखं नाम प्रसादलाघवाभिष्वङ्गप्रतीतितिश्वासन्तोषादिरूपान-  
 न्तभेदं समासतः सुखात्मकम्, एवं रजोऽपि शोकादिनानाभेदं समासतो  
 दुःखात्मकम्, एवं तमोऽपि निद्रादिनानाभेदं समासतो मोहात्मकम् ”  
 १. १२७ ] ।

D. Bhāmati.—

( आ ) “ तत्संयोगहेतुधिवर्जनात्स्यादयमात्यन्तिको दुःखप्रतीकारः ” [ ब्रह्म-  
 सूत्र, २. २. १० ] .

E. Gauḍa. ( Kār. 1 ) and Māth. ( Kār. 22 )—

( क ) “ पञ्चविंशतितरवशो यत्र कुत्राश्रमे रतः । जटी मुण्डी शिखी वापि  
 मुच्यते नात्र संशयः ॥ ”

This verse is ascribed to Pañcas'ikha by Bhāvāganes'a in his Tattvayāthārthyadīpana and by Haribhadrasūri in Śāstravārtasamuccaya ( see Int. to Mātharavṛtti ). Bhāvāganes'a was the disciple of Viññānabhikṣu and flourished in the 17th century A.D. The time of Haribhadrasūri is 'about 725 A.D.



F. Bāla.—

(ख) "उभयथा चास्य प्रवृत्तिः प्रवानव्यवहारं दमते ।" (p. 153).

We find no account of this Pañcas'ikha born in the family of Parās'ara (Mbh. S'anti. 320, 23). All the quotations ascribed to him are in prose except the "E". It is just possible that he wrote a prose treatise. According to Garbe Pañcas'ikha flourished in the first century A.D. (S. Y. p. 3). Vyāsa, the author of the Yogabhāṣya, flourished in the 4th century A.D. (I. P. II, 342). It is possible that the writings of Pañcas'ikha were very common in the 4th century A.D., and, therefore, Vyāsa did not give his name while quoting. As Vācaspati frequently mentions his name, we can safely infer that the writings of Pañcas'ikha were known to him. Was it the Commentary on the Samāsasūtras which fell into the hands of Vācaspati? Vyāsanabhikṣu refers to Pañcas'ikha as the author of a commentary on the Samāsasūtras or the Tattvasamāsa; Bhāvāganeśa also says the same thing: "समासमुद्राण्यालम्ब्य व्याख्यां पञ्चशिलस्य च ।" (Int. to Māth. p. 2). According to Chinese tradition, Pañcas'ikha is the author of Śaṣṭitantra (S. S. 48). But this account is not to be believed, as is proved by many writers. Vācaspati, on the other hand, thinks that Śaṣṭitantra is a book on Yogaśāstra and its author was Vārsaganya (see Tattv. V. on Y. S. IV. 13; and Bhāmati on Brahmasūtra II. 1, 3). Kaviraja Gopinātha is of opinion that Vācaspati never saw the Śaṣṭitantra (Jay. Int. pp. 4-7). But, according to the late M. M. P. Rāmāvatāra S'armā, Vācaspati knew Śaṣṭitantra (Bāla. p. 226). That this Pañcas'ikha is different from his namesake in the Mahābhārata is evident from their views; he is different from Gandhabha Pañcas'ikha also (S. S., pp. 48, 51).

#### 4. Vindhyavāsa

The view that Vindhyavāsa is to be identified with Īśvara-kṛṣṇa is not sound (Jay. Int. pp. 6-7). We find one quotation

from him in the Rājamārtanḍa of Bhoja "सत्त्वतप्यत्वमेव पुरुषतप्यत्वम्. (Y. S. IV 23) Medhātithi also quotes his opinion in his Bhāṣya on Manu I 55: "सांख्या द्वि केचिन्नान्तराभवमिच्छन्ति विन्ध्यवास-प्रभृतयः।". This seems to be derived from the S'lokavārtika: "अन्तरामवेदहस्तु निषिद्धो विन्ध्यवासिना।" (p. 704) Also in the Saddarśanasamuccaya we find a quotation from him: "पुरुषो-ऽत्रिकृतात्मैव स्वनिर्भासमचेतनम्। मनः करोति सांनिध्याद्वाचेः स्फटिको यथा॥" (p 36). Vallālasena, king of Bengal (12th century A.D.), has given a list of works which he consulted while compiling his Adbhutasāgara. There we find a work of a certain Sāṅkhya teacher named Vindhyavāsini (H. Dh I, 341, 793n). This proves that the work of Vindhyavāsini was available as late as the 12th century A.D. Tanusukharāma, in his introduction to the Mātharavṛtti (Ch. S S.), has established an identity between Vindhyavāsini and Vyāḍi on the basis of quotations from the Trikāndaśeṣa, the Haimakośa and the Saṁyamināmamālā. He says. स च भगवतो वर्षस्य शिष्यो वन्दम-कार्त्वीन. (Kathāsaritsāgara, I. 2) पाणिनिमूत्राणां संग्रहाख्यटीकायाः कस्यचिन् कोशस्य कर्ता, दाशपाणेः पत्न्यभेदेऽपि पुरोगामी सांख्ययोगाचार्यश्च ॥" (p. 3). This leads us to suppose that Vindhyavāsini *alias* Vyāḍi, flourished in the 4th century B.C. According to a Chinese tradition Vindhyavāsini wrote a Sāṅkhya work called Hiranyasaptati (Bh. Com. p 175). According to Dr Belvalkar, Hiranyasaptati is a commentary on the Sāṅkhya-kāṅkā (ibid 177) But Kaviraja Gopinatha says: "The Anuyogadvārasūtra of the Jainas preserves a list of Brahmanical works, which contains the name of Kanagasattari (Kanasaptati), which I take to be equivalent to the Suvarnasaptati or Hiranyasaptati, the name of Sāṅkhya-saptati familiar in China." (Jay. Int. p. 7, 12n). But it must be noted here that along with the Kanagasattari, we find Mād̥hara also in the list of the Anuyogadvārasūtra. If Mād̥hara stands for the Mātharavṛtti then it is impossible to conclude that Anuyogadvārasūtra was written in the 1st

century A.D. ( F. O. Schrader in a letter to me from Kiel, March 1, 1927 ). In the Mātharavṛtti we find : “ यथा दर्पणमात्रं आभामहर्षिणा ” a quotation from the Hastāmālākastotra which is of the age of Śāṅkarācārya ( i. e. 780-812 A.D., See Int., Māth., p. 5 ). Therefore, it is wrong to decide the age of Vindhyavāsa or Īśvarakṛṣṇa on the basis of the Kanaga-sattari. And, if Vyāḍi *alias* Vindhyavāsin, is the author of the Hiranyasaptati, then the latter is certainly different from the Sām̐khyakāṅkā, and Vindhyavāsin is different from Īśvarakṛṣṇa. Otherwise the date of Īśvarakṛṣṇa will have to be pushed back to the 4th century B. C. Therefore, it is safe to conclude, as Keith also says, that there are more than one Vindhyavāsins and that their dates are uncertain ( S. S., 79 in; also, Karma., p. 59 ).

### 5. Vārṣaganya

We are as uncertain about Vārṣaganya as about the former teachers of Sām̐khyā. We find two quotations from him in the Vyāsabhāṣya. (1) “ मूर्तिव्यवधिज्ञानिभेदाभावात्तास्ति मूल-पृथक्त्वं इति वार्षगण्यः । ” ( III 53, (2) “ गुणानां परमं रूपं न दृष्टिपथमृच्छति । यत्तु दृष्टिपर्यं प्राप्तं तन्मायेव सुतुच्छम् ॥ ” ( Ibid. IV, 13 ) Vācaspati thinks that the latter quotation is taken from the Śaṣṭitantra. This very verse is quoted by Vācaspati in his Bhāmātī with the remarks : “ अत एव योगशास्त्रं व्युत्पादयिता आह स्म भगवान् वार्ष-गण्यः । ” ( on the Brahmasūtrabhāṣya, II 1, 3 ). Another quotation from Vārṣaganya, “ पञ्चपदी अविद्या इत्याह स्म भगवान् वार्षगण्यः । ” is found in the Tatt. K. ( on Kāṅkā 47 ) The quotation—“ पुरुषाधिष्ठितं प्रथमं प्रवर्तते । ” found in the Gaud, and the Māth. ( Kāṅkā 17 ), is ascribed to Vārṣaganya by Keith ( S. S. 73, 3n ). All these lead us to the conclusion that the Chinese tradition ascribing the authorship of the Śaṣṭitantra to Pañcaśikha is not trustworthy. There is also considerable doubt as to Vārṣaganya being the author of the Śaṣṭitantra ( Jay. Int. pp 4-6, Huiyanna: “ Śaṣṭitantra and Vārṣaganya ”.

*Journal of Oriental Research*, Madras, April-June, 1929, pp. 107-112). This has been discussed in detail below.

### 6. Jaigīṣavya

According to the Kūrmapurāna, Jaigīṣavya was a class-fellow of Pañcas'ikha ( S. S. 51 ). This Jaigīṣavya is quoted as an authority on Yoga ( Y. Bh., II. 55 and III. 18 ). Vācaspati also refers to him in his Nyāyavārtikatātparyaṭikā as the author of Dhāraṇās'āstra ( on Nyāyasūtra III. 2. 43 ). But, according to the Buddhacarita ( 12 67 ), Arāṇkalāma refers to Jaigīṣavya, Janaka and Parāś'ara as persons who obtained salvation through Sāṃkhya ( Jay., Int. p. 2, 2n. ) In the present state of our knowledge, we can say nothing more about Jaigīṣavya.

### 7. Voḍhu

Voḍhu is also familiar by name alone. We have not come across any of his writings or quotations. In the list of the names of the sages pronounced in the Ṛṣitarpana, we find the name of Voḍhu after that of Āsuri, and before that of Pañcas'ikha. The opinion of Weber that it is the Brahmanised form of Buddha's name, is quite untenable ( see S. Y. p 6 ) Keith has, however, discovered Voḍhu's name before that of Āsuri in one of the *paris'istas* of the Atharvaveda ( S. S. 51 ).

### 8. Devala

We find a dialogue between Aṣṭadevala and Nārada in the Mahābhārata ( S'ānti, Ch. 274 ). There we find eight kinds of *bhūtas* ( *bhūta*, *abhūta*, *kāla*, *pṛthvi*, *āpas*, *vāyu*, *ākāśa* and *tejas* ); and *kāla* impelled by *bhūta* creating all the five elements, viz., earth, air, water, wind and glow. The senses themselves are not the knowers but produce knowledge for the *kṣetrajña*. Higher than the senses is *citta*, higher than the latter is *manas*, higher than it is *buddhi* and the highest of all is *parva*. The ear, the skin, the eye

the nose, the tongue, the *citta*, the *manas* and the *buddhi* are the eight instruments of knowledge, etc. It is said there - पुण्यपापद्वयार्थं हि मांश्वज्जनं विधीयते । तद्यथे ह्यस्य पश्यन्ति ब्रह्म-भावे परं गतिम् ॥ ” ( Verse 39 ) Thus we see that this dialogue deals with theistic Sāṅkhya. The quotations from Devala as found in the Aparārka, a commentary on the Yājñavalkya-smṛti, resemble the Tattvasamāsa very much ( See Yājñavalkya-smṛti, Ānandāśrama, Edn. II, pp. 986-7 ). Kane, in his H Dh. Vol. I, p. 121, says that Devala was a contemporary of the Smṛtikāras, viz., Bṛhaspati and Kātyāyana. And the age of Kātyāyana according to him is between the 4th and 6th centuries A. D. ( see p. 218 ). But Udayavīrasāstri says that as Devala is frequently alluded to in the Mahābhārata, his age must be determined by the age of the epic in its present form. The Mahābhārata according to western scholars ( says Mr Śāstri ), assumed its present form by the 2nd century B. C. ( P. O. C. Lahore, II p. 865 ) But according to Prof Winternitz, the epic assumed its present form by the 4th century A. D. ( See H. I. L. I. pp. 465-475 ) Devala does not seem to be much older than Śvarakṛṣṇa. The theory to the contrary does not seem to be convincing. It is based on the following quotation from the Mātharvṛtti “ कपिलादासुरिणः प्राप्तमिदं ज्ञानं ततः पञ्चशिखेन तस्माद् भार्गव-इन्द्रक-वाल्मीकि-हारीत-देवद प्रभृतीनागतम् ”, ( p. 84 ), where the word *prabhṛti* is taken to indicate a wide gap between Devala and Śvarakṛṣṇa. But the traditional list found in the Mātharvṛtti does not tally with any other such list. Therefore, Māthara's quotation can only establish Devala's priority to Śvarakṛṣṇa and nothing else.

#### 9-26 Sanaka, etc.

Gauḍapāda ( on Kār. I ), quotes a verse and a half in which he enumerates the names of the seven sons of Brahman. They are : Sanaka, Sananda, Sanātana, Āsuri, Kapila, Voḍhu and Pañcaśikha. But in the Mahābhārata, the list is different ( Śānti. 340, 67-69 ), viz., Sana, Sanatsujāta, Sanaka,

Sanandana, Sanatkumāra, Kapila and Sanātana Unfortunately we find no information about Sanaka, Sanandana, Sanātana, Sana, Sanatsujāta and Sanatkumāra, except a reference to Sanandanācārya in *द्विऋषीरनिमित्तक इति सनन्दनाचार्यं*. (S. Sū VI, 69). There is a reference to a Sanatkumāra, author of some Smṛti, in the *Nirnayasindhu* and the *Tristhalisetu* (H., Dh., 1, 656). Similarly we find Bhṛgu, Ś'ukra, Kāśyapa, Parās'ara, Garga, Gautama, Nārada, Ārṣṭiṣena, Agastya, Pulastya and Hārīta mentioned as writers of Smṛtis (Ibid, index). The dialogue between Parās'ara and Janaka named the Parās'ara gītā, and found in the *Mahābhārata* (S'ānti, Chs., 290-299), deals with the duties of the *varnas* and *āśramas* and has no vestige of Sām̐khya teaching in it. It is just possible that Parās'ara came to be regarded as a teacher of Sām̐khya because he happened to be born in the same family as Pañcas'ikha (Mbh., S'ānti., 320-23). Ulūka is a synonym for Kaus'ika. In the Chinese translation of the Sām̐khya Kārikā, Īs'varakṛṣṇa is referred to as born in the Kaus'ika family (Jay. Int p. 2, 2n). We know absolutely nothing of Vālmiki and Ś'uka as teachers of Sām̐khya.

#### V. Standard Works on Sām̐khya

##### A Available :—

Of the standard works on Sām̐khya, only three are available. They are "Sām̐khya-Sūtras", "Tattva-samāsa" and "Sām̐khya-Kārikā".

Some scholars are of opinion that S. Sū. are not written by Kapila. The reason is that we find many passages from other works in them. For example, "आवृत्तिरसद्बुद्धदेशात्" (Br. S., IV, 1, 1) = S. Sū., IV 3, "वृत्तपः पञ्चतपः द्विष्टाद्विष्टाः" (Y. S., II, 46) = S. Sū., III 34 and VI. 24. Again, in the *sūtras* establishing the authority of the Vedas (S. Sū., V, 40-51), the influence of the Vedānta is clearly visible. Again, we find many passages from Sām̐khya-Kārikā, quoted in the

Sūtras. Mādhavācārya of the 14th century A.D., quotes from the Kārikās and not Sūtras in his S. D. S. The oldest commentator on the Sūtras is Anuruddha who flourished in about 1500 A.D. Therefore, the Sūtras must have come into existence between 1380 and 1450 A.D. (See S. Y., pp. 8-9).

..... a commen-  
 ..... the author of  
 ..... the author of  
 Samāsa-Sūtra (Ch., S. S., No. 246, pp. 93-94). But as the author of the S. D. S. does not quote from the Tattva-samāsa even, so the antiquity of the latter also is doubtful. And if the author of the S. Sū., is Kapila, then how did he quote Pañcas'ika, etc., who were his grand disciples and who, therefore, must have flourished much later (See S. Sū., VI 68-69)?

But Udayavīra S'āstri has tried to prove that Kapila himself is the author of the S. Sū., in his article "Antiquity of the Sāṅkhya Sūtras" (P. C. C., Lahore, II, pp. 855-882). He is of opinion that several sūtras have been interpolated in the original of Kapila. For example, in the I chapter, the sūtras 20-54 are interpolated, because the 19th sūtra is literally the same as the 55th sūtra, and because the 53rd and 54th sūtras are identical with the 15th and 16th sūtras. And as we find the names of Srughna and Pātaliputra in these interpolated sūtras, the interpolation must have been made when these towns were famous (from 4th century B.C., to the 5th century A.D.). The sūtras 79, 80 and 84-115 of the V chapter are also interpolations; the interpolation of these (84-115) is obvious as they discuss the principles opposed to Sāṅkhya Philosophy.

Thus Mr. S'āstri thinks that 68 sūtras are interpolated. I, on the other hand, think that the entire book was written by some later writer and therein some interpolations might have been made. Mr. S'āstri does not give any weighty or conclusive argument in support of his thesis. On the other

hand, when Śāṅkarācārya and others quote from Sāṅkhya-Kārikā only, there is no doubt that the Sūtras did not exist in their time. Had the S. Sū., been existent, then Śāṅkarācārya and others would not have deliberately left aside the composition of a ṛsi and quoted from the work of an ordinary mortal like Is'varkṛṣṇa.

Mr. Śāstri further tries to prove that V. Bh., and others have borrowed from the S. Sū. His contention is :—

(1) “ प्राग्निष्पत्तौर्निष्पत्तिवर्मकं नाऽसन् उपादाननियमात् = कस्यचिदुत्पत्तये ईक्षिचिदुपादेयम् ” ( V. Bh., on N. 8, IV. 1, 48 )—here उपादाननियमात् is borrowed from “ उपादाननियमात् ” ( २. Sū., 1, 115 ). This very sūtra has been quoted again by Vātsyāyana in his gloss on the next N. 8, viz., “ यत्पुनरुक्तं—प्रागुत्पत्तेः कार्यं नाऽसन् उपादाननियमान् इति ”. Here the insertion of the word इति shows that it is a quotation from some other work. That other work is S. Sū.

To this we reply—If the word इति is a sure sign of quotation from another work then why did not Vātsyāyana put it after “ उपादाननियमात् ” in the first passage ( V. Bh., on N. 8., IV. 1, 48 ) quoted above ? And as regards the presence of इति in the second passage, it should be noted that this word is not connected with only “ उपादाननियमात् ” but the whole passage, viz.,—“ प्रागुत्पत्ते कार्यं नासन् उपादाननियमात्. ” Here Vātsyāyana merely repeats his own words with slight change. Therefore, it does not show that V. Bh. has borrowed from the S. Sū. rather, it may be just the reverse.

(2) In the Aparārka, a commentary on the Yājñavalkya-Smṛiti ( Prāyaścittādhyāya, v. 109 ), we find quotations from Devala which resemble the sūtras in S. Sū. very much. Therefore, Devala must have borrowed them from the S. Sū.

Mr. Śāstri starts here on the presumption of the priority of the S. Sū., to Devala, a fact which he has to prove.

(3) Patañjali, in his Mahābhāṣya, lays down the six causes of non perception thus—“ पद्भिः प्रचारैः सतां भावात्सामु-



पलब्धिर्भवति — अतिसात्रिकपांडतिविप्रकारान्मूर्त्यन्तगव्यवयानात्तमसावृत्तत्वादि-  
न्द्रियशैर्बल्यादतिप्रमाणादिति ॥” On this, Kaiyyāṭa says in his gloss  
Pradīpa—इतरे विद्यमानस्यापि लिङ्गस्य सोऽभ्यमनुपलब्धिकारणं दर्शयितुमाह-  
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(a) “ . . . . .  
Kār., . . . . .  
18 = Kār., 25) (c) “सामान्यरूपवृत्तिः प्राणाय वायवः पञ्च” (S. Sū.,  
II. 31 = Kār. 29). In (a) and (b) we find different readings.

*Avyāpi* in (a) has not been commented upon by Aniruddha. The word *pravartate* in (b) is not found in the Ms. in Mr. Sāstri's possession.

The arguments of Mr. Sāstri do not stand a close examination. If Aniruddha did not comment upon the word *avyāpi*, then it alone does not mean that the word did not exist formerly. Moreover, Vijñānabhikṣu has commented upon this word. Again, what is there to prove that the Ms. in Mr. Sāstri's possession is the oldest and the only correct Ms., whose one reading should decide so important a question as the authorship of Kapila. In his zeal to disprove the theory that "the Sūtras were composed on the basis of the Kārikās," Mr. Sāstri says that if we change the order of words in "सामान्यकरणवृत्तिः प्राणाय वायवः पञ्च" and read it as "सामान्यकरणवृत्तिः प्राणायः पञ्च वायव" we attain *anuṣṭubh* metre in place of *āryā*. But this flight of imagination, *viz.*, changing the reading itself, is too much to be swallowed even by ordinary people. Therefore, Mr. Sāstri has failed to disprove that the 8. sū. are based upon the Kārikās.

There is a tradition that Paramārtha translated the Kārikās into Chinese in 557-569 A.D. (Bh., Com., pp. 175-178). According to Paramārtha, Buddhāmītra the teacher of Vasubandhu, was vanquished in debate by Vindhyavāsa, the Sāṅkhya-teacher; Vindhyavāsa died before Vasubandhu. Thus, Vindhyavāsa and Vasubandhu were contemporaries. There is another tradition, according to which Vindhyavāsa was a contemporary of king Bālāditya and pupil of Vārṣaganya. A third tradition tells us that the pupil of Vārṣaganya composed Hiraṇyasaptati. But all these traditions  
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(4) The following sūtras agree verbatim with the Kārikās  
 (a) “हेतुमदित्यस्यापि साक्ष्यमनेकमाश्रितं लिङ्गम्” (S. Sū., I, 124 =  
 Kār., 10) (b) “सात्विकमेकादशकं प्रवर्तते विहृतादृष्टात्” (S. Sū., II,  
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the conclusion that Vārṣaganya is the author of Śaṣṭitantra. But the reading in the Y. Bh. is मायेव सुतुच्छकम्, while as the reading in the Bhāmātī is मायेव सुतुच्छकम्. The reading cannot have been deliberately altered by Vācaspati, for a scholar of his reputation would not commit such a crime. On the other hand, from the opinions of Vārṣaganya as found quoted in Buddhistic works, it seems that he altered the reading. Moreover, from Bhāskara's remark, viz., "कपिलमहर्षिप्रणीतपठितन्त्राख्यस्मृतेः" (on Br. S., II, 1, 1), we can infer that Kapila was the author of a Śaṣṭitantra. (See also P. O. C., Lahore, II, p. 882, where Mr. S'āstri states Śaṣṭitantra is the real *Sāmākhya-dars'ana* written by Kapila. Mr. Bhattacharya also holds this view. See I. H. Q., Sept., 1932, p. 518). This old Śaṣṭitantra of Kapila has been enlarged by Pañcas'ikha in his Śaṣṭitantra.

To this we reply—One should not put implicit faith in commentators when they refer to the names of writers. For example, we see that Bhaṭṭa-Utpala, in his commentary on Bṛhat-Saṁhitā, quotes the verses (22-30) from Sāmākhya-Kārikā, preceded by the remark "तथाह कपिलाचार्यः". As regards the alteration of मायेव into मायेव, if it is considered impossible in the case of Vācaspati, it should be still more impossible in the case of Vārṣaganya whom Vācaspati refers to with great reverence as भगवान् वार्येण्य.. The opinion of Vārṣaganya, as quoted in the Buddhist work Abhidharmakośa (viz., nothing new comes into existence, nor anything born is ever destroyed; that what is existent, is ever existent; that what is non-existent can never become existent) is simply a statement of the *sat-kārya* theory. It is futile to read from it the difference between the theories of modification, as Mr. Hiriyanna does, when it is admitted that

But that requires proof.

A SYNOPSIS OF THE CARDINAL DOCTRINES OF  
THE SĀṆKHYA PHILOSOPHY

BY

Gaṅgānātha Jhā

The lucid writing of Vācaspati Miśra does not stand in need of much in the shape of an Introduction. But under the cover of this title, I propose to give a brief synopsis of the cardinal doctrines of the Sāṅkhya Philosophy, in the hope that a reading of this *resumé* would prepare the mind of the student for the reception of the abstruse truths, in which the *Tattvaksurnudī* abounds. Any corrections or suggestions for alteration, &c., will be most gratefully received.

To begin with, the Sāṅkhya lays down a fourfold division of categories based on their respective causal and productive

purely productive, since the Sāṅkhyas allow of no other purely productive agency. The *Productive—and—produced* are the other Principles—*Buddhi*, &c. These partake of the nature of both;—thus *Buddhi* is *productive* in as much as out of it evolves *Ahaṅkāra*, and it is *produced* in as much as it itself evolves out of *Prakṛti*. The purely non productive Principles are the eleven sense-organs and the five material substances. These are purely *non-productive* because none of these can give birth to a substance essentially different from themselves. The *Puruṣa* (Spirit) is *neither productive nor produced*. In fact it is without attributes. All accessories are the effects of the *Guṇas*, and the Spirit is by its very nature free from these and as such without any accessories.

Having thus classified the various principles, we now turn to the consideration of the various principles separately

First of all then we must examine the nature of the all-powerful productive agent of the Sāṅkhyas or, more properly, the productive force of the Universe. How is this force constituted? It is made up of the three Gunas—Sattva, Rajas and Tamas; and when Nature is in its quiescent state, lying dormant, these three attributes are in equilibrium. When occasion presents itself, *i. e.* when the Adiṣṭa of the Spirits waiting to be born acts upon Nature, the equilibrium is disturbed, and it is this disturbance that gives rise to the various kinds of Products. The diversity of Products is thus rendered explicable. As already mentioned, all accessories are due to the predominance of one or other of the three Gunas—the predominance of Sattva giving rise to the kind of Product in which that attribute predominates, and so forth.

The three attributes—Sattva, Rajas and Tamas,—have respectively the character of Happiness, Unhappiness and Delusion; and have their operations characterised respectively by enlightenment, activity and inertia; and are so constituted that the one always operates through the suppression of the other, and at the same time depending upon this latter. To explain this contrariety of properties—The universe would be in an unceasing round of activity, if the only operating force were Rajas; in order to provide against this, Nature provides herself with a restraining agency in the shape of Tamas which by its nature is inert. The character of the objects of the universe is thus determined in accordance with the excess of one or the other of these attributes. Again, if there were no enlightening agency in the shape of Sattva, Nature would be nothing better than a mass of blind force acting in a haphazard manner.

Here an objector comes forward and says—“How can the Attributes, endowed as they are with mutually

properties, cooperate and bring about such a grand and stupendous structure as our Universe?"

The answer is that it is a very common fact that two or more substances, though mutually contradictory, do cooperate towards a single end;—e. g. the wick and the oil—both taken separately are as much against the action of one another as towards fire, but when they are together they help to enliven the fire. In the same manner, though the Attributes are mutually counteractive, yet when combined, they act towards a single end, supplying each other's deficiencies.

The necessity of postulating three different forces is further supported by another reason. We see that in Nature there are three distinct properties—of 'happiness', 'unhappiness' and 'delusion'. All other properties are reducible under these three heads. Again we find that these are properties so much opposed to one another that all could never be the product of a single cause. Thus it is necessary to postulate three different forces or constituent elements of Nature, to which severally we could trace the three distinct properties. To these three constituents of Nature we give the names—Sattva, Rajas and Tamas. We find in the universe the above three properties, and as all the properties of the Product must be a direct resultant of a like property in its cause, we arrive at the conclusion that the cause of the Universe—Nature—must be imbued with the three Attributes.

So much for the action of the Gunas. We now turn our attention towards the all-important Prakṛti, Nature—the Key-stone of the Sāṃkhya Philosophy.

What, then, is this Prakṛti, Nature? Does it stand for the Theistic God? Or for the Bauddha "Sensations"? Or does it correspond to the Vedāntic "Māyā"? To all this we reply—It is all these, and it is none of these. It resembles the Vedāntic Māyā in as much as it is the one root of the Uni-



verse. It is not the God; since it is said to be without intelligence, mere dead Matter equipped with certain potentialities; the Prakṛti. In short, Prakṛti is the unmanifested

The next point that we have to consider is—How do the Sāṅkhyas prove the existence, the rootlessness, and eternity of this Prakṛti? Is it necessary to postulate such a rootless root, itself unmanifested, and yet manifesting all objective and subjective entities? Proofs of this are given at length in all works on the Sāṅkhya Philosophy, and it will not be altogether out of place here briefly to sum them up. But before we take up this, it is necessary to explain the Sāṅkhya doctrine of causality, the point on which rests the whole fabric of the system. What then is the cause and how is it related to the effect? Cause is defined as a substance in which the effect subsists in a latent form. Thus the effect must be said to be eternally existent—primarily in a latent condition, in the cause, and latterly manifesting itself and then commonly recognized as the effect. How to prove that the effect has been lying latent in the cause and has not been newly produced by the cause?

Firstly.—What is a nonentity can never be made an entity. —That is to say—that which has never existed can never be brought into existence. What remains to be done by the operation of the cause is the manifestation of the effect—that is to say, its manifestation as the effect of the particular cause. And this kind of manifestation we find in the production of oil from the different oil-seeds wherein it has been hitherto lying latent.

Secondly.—We find that the effect is always in one way or the other related to the cause. Now, this relation would not be possible if the effect were a

for a nonentity can have no relations. If the relation of the effect with the cause were not necessary then every effect would be possible from every cause. Since in that case there would be no restrictive qualification which would confine the operation of particular causes to particular effects. This would lead to an absurdity.

*Thirdly*—We cannot deny causal efficiency. Now what does this efficiency consist in? It cannot be anything other than the 'existence' in the cause of the effect in a latent

take an example, the cloth is non-different from the threads composing it; because it is neither heavier than the latter, nor is any other relation than that of inherence possible between the two; and it is only between two different things that any other relation as that of conjunction, etc., is possible. Nor can the cloth ever exist apart from the threads. The difference of properties and actions cannot establish any difference. For though a single thread cannot do what is done by the cloth, yet this latter is nothing more than a collection of threads; and we see that what a single man cannot do, can be done very well by a number of them together; e. g., a single man cannot carry a palanquin, which work can be performed by a number of men together. Thus then we see that the effect is nothing more than the developed cause; and the latter again is merely an undeveloped effect. This identity of cause and effect has been thus explained by Sir William Hamilton also, who says—"When we are aware of something which begins to be, we are by the necessity of our intelligence, constrained to believe that it has a cause. But what does the expression, *that it has a cause*, signify?

If we analyse our thought, we shall find that it simply means, that as we cannot conceive any new existence to commence, therefore,  $\epsilon^1$  that existence had pre- . . . . .  
existence had pre- . . . . .  
 are utterly

complement of existence either increased or diminished. We are unable, on the one hand, to conceive nothing becoming something—or on the other something becoming nothing... There is thus conceived an absolute tautology between the effect and its causes. We think the cause to contain all that is contained in the effect; the effect to contain nothing which was not contained in the cause."

—*Lectures on Metaphysics*—XXXIX.

Having thus proved the existence of the effect in the cause, the Sāṃkhya employ this fact in proving the existence of their Prakṛti, Nature. The effect being only a developed cause, in which it has been lying latent, all entities must have their unmanifested condition in their cause. That is to say, the elements lie in Ahankāra which lies in Buddhi. Now if we go on expanding this series we would be landed in a *regressus ad infinitum*. In order to avoid this we must postulate the existence of a principle which must be uncaused and which must be the final substratum of the undeveloped state of all other entities. Thus we have a causeless cause which must be by its very nature unmanifested, the final cause of all;—and to this the Sāṃkhya give the names "Pradhāna," "Prakṛti", "Avyakta." (Nature).

Secondly, we find that all entities—from Buddhi downwards—are limited and are the development of some further ultimate Principle—and this latter is Prakṛti.

Having thus proved the Existence of Nature the Sāṃkhya proceeds to define its properties as well as those of its Products, and to explain wherein lies their difference.

In order to do this they first of all consider the properties of the Manifested Entities—the effects of Prakṛti. These are caused, and as a necessary consequence of this—transitory, limited, mobile, many, dependent (on the activity of the Prakṛti), made up of parts; these are the characteristics where the Prakṛti differs from the Manifested Entities, Buddhi and the rest. For, as already explained, the Prakṛti is the uncaused root of the Universe, and as such, must be eternal. And as all Universe is the result of Its evolution, It must be all-prevading; as a necessary consequence of this it is immoveable *i. e.*, it cannot move, in the sense of going from one place to another. And further, since it is all-prevading it must be one. It is independent—depending only on the activity of its own constituent Gunas.

These are the points of difference. Those of agreement are, that Prakṛti as well as the manifested entities are the resultants of the various actions and interactions of the three Gunas. Secondly, being without intelligence, both must be without discrimination, since discrimination proceeds from intelligence. Thirdly, both these present objects for the enjoyment of the Spirit. Fourthly, since they are without intelligence, they can never be the observers, they must always remain the observed, and as such common. That is to say, every object that is observed is so observed, not differently by different individuals, but is a common object of observation by all, and it is common in that sense. Fifthly, they are without intelligence—the only Principle endowed with intelligence being the Spirit. Sixthly, they are prolific, *i. e.* endowed with evolutionary potency. The Spirits are without this.

These in brief, are the points of agreement and difference between Prakṛti on one hand and its Products on the other.

Now we must consider the nature of the Spirits and see what the Śūtrikhyas have to say as to their existence, number and properties. But before we proceed with this, we must

first see if it is necessary to have a distinct principle in the shape of innumerable Spirits. And on this score, the first reason that presents itself is the fact that we have not yet got any principle that will supply the factor of intelligence.

cause cannot manifest itself in the product. So we must have a distinct *Principle of Sentience*.

*Secondly.*—We see in our everyday life that all that is composite is for the use of another, as a bed, a chair, &c. And we have seen before that all the entities from Prakṛti downwards are *composites*. Though this sounds a little absurd as regards Prakṛti, Buddhi and Ahaṁkāra yet we must

existence of an incorporeal entity. And this is Puruṣa, the Spirit, and as we have not yet had an intelligent principle, we attribute intelligence to this incorporeal Spirit. This Spirit cannot be *composite* because it is devoid of the three Attributes, as it is only what is made up of the Gunas that is found to be *composite*.

*Thirdly.*—We have in daily life found that whatever is naturally connected with either pleasure, pain or delusion, is supervised by something else; and we have also seen that all the entities from Prakṛti downwards are made up of the pleasure by per-visor. this supervisor must be himself unattached in his essence by pleasure, etc; and as such must be something over and above Prakṛti. And this is Puruṣa, the Spirit.

*Fourthly.*—Prakṛti and the rest are objects of enjoyment and as such they necessitate the existence of an *enjoyer* who again must not be an *object* himself. And the enjoyer must be an intelligent entity. For a non-intelligent principle being devoid of consciousness can never be the *enjoyer*. This again must be something not made up of pleasure, etc. This can never be the case with Buddhi and the rest.—These latter being made up as they are of the three Gunas which are of the nature of pleasure, pain and delusion, cannot be the *enjoyer* of these; for that will involve the absurdity of self-contradictory action—one made up of pleasure, pain and delusion, cannot be pleased or pained; for each of these is contradictory to the one or other phase of the constitution of Buddhi. So we must have an enjoyer over and above Prakṛti and the rest. And this is Spirit.

*Fifthly and lastly.*—All systems of Philosophy, and all the great men of the past we find striving after final Release. Now this is not possible for Prakṛti or Buddhi. For these latter are, by their constitution, made up of pain and as such can never be released from this. So the object of final Release must be one who has neither pleasure nor pain nor delusion for its constituent element; and such an entity is the Spirit alone.

We have thus shown the necessity of postulating a distinct entity in the shape of Puruṣa, over and above Prakṛti.

The next thing, we have to consider is—What is this Puruṣa?—How is it constituted?—What are its properties?—What its aim?—and finally, how and when does it attain final Release? We must take each of these questions one by one.

(1) What is Puruṣa? It is not the thinking principle, since thinking belongs to the *mind*. Nor is it the determining principle, since that is allotted to Buddhi. The character of the Spirit is unique. It is none of these, and yet

...factor in all these. It is the principal  
 well as material. It is the  
 Without it no functions  
 would be possible, specially *consciousness*. In short, Spirit  
 is the source of intelligence, and as such, the necessary factor  
 in every function of the mind—feeling, intellecting and willing.

(2) How is this Spirit constituted? As a matter of fact the Spirit is constituted of intelligence or sentience pure and simple, and is free from every other qualification and encumbrance.

(3) What are its properties? These are thus enun-  
 scri-  
 non-  
 the  
action of the Attributes, no liberation from metempsychosis  
 would be possible. Since pain constitutes the very nature of  
 the Attributes and as such cannot possibly be separated  
 from it. And thus no liberation being possible, there would  
 be no necessity for enquiries to which the various systems of  
 philosophy are devoted. And lastly, if the Spirit were not  
 equipped with discriminative faculties, it could never attain  
 the discriminative wisdom arrived at by the philosophical  
 systems, which would thus become purposeless.

Next as to the aims of the Spirit. It has been laid down  
 5  
 2  
 t  
 f  
 delusions—the modifications of Buddha. Now the one all-  
 absorbing aim of every Spirit is the attainment of that wisdom  
 which would help him to discriminate between Himself and  
 the fluctuations of the Attributes, and thus see the pleasure  
 and pain caused by these in their true light and be no longer  
 affected by them.

The next question that presents itself to us is—how does Puruṣa attain to this wisdom and thence to final emancipation? This wisdom arises from a constant study of the Sāṃkhya Philosophy, when the Attribute of Sattva is paramount in one's constitution and the others have almost ceased to exist. The Puruṣa then sees Nature and its constituents in their true light and finds out His mistake and so shakes off all mistaken preconceptions about self, and thus becomes free from the self-imposed bonds of Buddhi, and finally retires from metempsychosis and attains final Beatitude.

Having thus said all that we had to say about Prakṛti and Puruṣa we must look a little into the details of the process of creation.

We have already said that Prakṛti is the rootless Root of the Universe. From this Prakṛti emanates Buddhi, to which the technical name of *Mahat* or the Great Principle is given, it is the Cosmic Mind. From this Buddhi proceed *Ahaṃkāra* or the I-principle. From this again emanate the eleven senses and the five subtle elements of sound, odour, taste, colour and touch. And from these latter five, proceed the five gross substances—Earth, Water, Fire, Air and Ākāśa.

First in this scale comes *Buddhi*. This is defined as the principle of *adhyavasāya*. This term literally means "ascertainment" and in explaining this term, the writers exemplify it as the determination that "this is to be done by me." It is that process that the function of this principle are the will, and y of the Kantian School—"Intellect contemplates the circumstances calling for action and provides the rule of conduct: Will controls the disposition in harmony with the dictates of intelligence." The Sāṃkhyas attribute both these functions



to their *Buddhi*. That *Buddhi* resembles *will*, is further made clearer by the properties assigned to it, by the Sāṃkhya. These properties are Virtue, Wisdom, Dispassion and

the course of  
of actions  
to find that  
ive and so

to attribute the property of wisdom to *Buddhi* is to give it the dual character of Intellect and Will. Dispassion and Power again must belong to the principle that decides on a certain course of action and in this too we find *Buddhi* cognate with *Intellect* and *Will* combined. We have, therefore, called it the *Cosmic Mind*.

The principle that we have to consider next is that of *Egoism*, the *I-principle*. It is the principle to which all notions of the 'I' are due. It corresponds with Kant's "*apperception*" and Hamilton's "*self-consciousness*", that is to say, the notion of self in every form of consciousness: The idea that "*I have the consciousness*," "*I feel*, etc." As immediate effects of this *I-principle* we have the eleven sense-organs and the five subtle elements. The eleven sense-organs consist of the five intellectual (subjective) senses—the eye, the ear, the nose, the tongue, the skin,—and the five of action (objective), *viz.*—the hands, the feet, speech, the excretory organ and the organ of generation. The eleventh sense is *Mānas*, (individual mind). The five subtle rudimentary elements are those of odour, touch, taste, colour and sound. From these latter again proceed the five gross substances—Earth, Air, Water, Fire and *Ākāśa*, and these have the subtle rudimentary elements for their essential properties.

Before proceeding any further we must consider the nature of the eleventh sense-organ, the *mind* or the reflective principle. Here first of all we must consider why we should call *mind* a 'sense' at all? The answer is not far

that cycle. If this were not so, the actions of one incarnation could not react upon the Spirit in the next, for the Spirit itself cannot be affected by either good or evil, and as such could not be affected by the actions of one incarnation in another. For the actions were done by the body and the organs of the former incarnation and these dying with the Body, wherein would the traces of the former actions be left? So we must postulate the existence of a substratum in the form of the "Linga-S'arira", the subtle Body, which is equipped with subtle counterparts of all the sensory and motor organs. This Linga-S'arira is imprinted with all the effects of the actions of the Spirit. And since this subtle body follows the Spirit in all its subsequent incarnations, it is but natural that the fruits of past actions should affect the Spirit;—though the Spirit cannot be affected, yet so long as he has not attained to discriminative wisdom, he thinks all the affections of Buddhi to be his own. This subtle body thus must have traces of virtue and vice on itself so as to bring out their effects in a future incarnation. It acts also as the substratum of the different organs which are subtle in their nature, and as such could not subsist without a subtle substratum.

Let us now see how the Sāṅkhyas treat of the idea of means and consequences of actions. By means of virtue the Spirit ascends to higher regions. Vice leads the other way; Emancipation results from discriminative wisdom. This wisdom consists of deep insight into the character of Spirit and Nature, and consequent intelligent perception of the difference between the two—from which results the Spirit's perception of His own true nature, which is above the operation of the three Attributes, though so long He has been labouring under the self-imposed imaginary thralldom of the Attributes. No sooner has this perception been gained than the Spirit casts off His self-imposed chains and becomes free

under the influence of attachments proceeding from the attribute of Rajas it falls into the stinky darkness of metempsychosis from which it can be freed only by the divine ray of wisdom. We are all labouring under this category

The Sāmkhyas have further entered into a very elaborate enunciation of the various manifestations of Buddhi dividing them into no less than fifty forms. These are made up of five kinds of impediments, twenty-eight of incapacity (resulting from the disability of the organs), nine of contentment and eight of perfection. Of these, again there are 62 forms of impediment alone.

So much for 'mental' creation. The 'material' creation <sup>ings, the five</sup> The various or otherwise of one of the Attributes. Thus the Attribute of Sattva predominates among divine beings, that of Rajas among human beings, and that of Tamas in all lower creation.

All this elaborate process of creation is begun by Nature solely for the sake of the Spirit's emancipation from the miseries of metempsychosis—miseries inevitable to Him when born in a body. Nature is described as a benevolent benefactress, not caring for any return of services from the Spirit, and working for His emancipation out of her own sweet will, till He comes to perceive her true character; when She retires from the scene like an actress who has

played her part and never again returns to the same Spirit, the spectator. Thus then in reality all bonds and pains are only supposed by the Spirit to be His own. By His very nature He is free from all fluctuations, in as much as He is above the Attributes, whose effect these fluctuations are. After the attainment of discriminative wisdom, the Spirit steers clear of all notions of egoism, and attains to His own natural spiritual condition. But the body continues for a time on account of the impulse previously imparted to it. And the attainment of wisdom having put a stop to the operation of all such agents as virtue, etc.,—the operation of which is a necessary cause of rebirth—the body falls, and the Spirit regains His true character, and attains to absolute and eternal beatitude, never to return to the cycles of metempsychosis.

## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

- Bāla. = Bālarāma's Comm. on Sāṅkhya Tattva-  
kaumudī, Bombay, 1929.
- Bh. Com. = Bhandarkar Commemoration Volume.
- Bh. G. = Bhagavadgītā.
- Br. up. = Bṛhadāranyaka Upaniṣad.
- Br. S. = Brahma-Sūtras.
- Brah. P. = Brahma Purāṇa.
- Ch. S. S. = Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series (Benares).
- Ch. Up. = Chāndogya Upaniṣad.
- Davies. = Hindu Philosophy : The Sāṅkhya Kārikā of  
Īśwara Kṛishna, by John Davies, Trübner's  
Oriental Series, London, 1881.
- Ent. Gott. = Die Entwicklung der Gottesidee bei den  
Indern and deren Beweise, von H. Jacobi,  
Bonn, 1923.
- Gauḍa. = Gaudapādabhāṣya.
- H. I. L. = History of Indian Literature, Vol. I., by M  
Winternitz.
- H. I. P. = History of Indian Philosophy by Das Gupta.
- H. Dh. = History of Dharmaśāstra, Vol I.,  
by P. V. Kane, Poona, 1930.
- H. S. L. = History of Sanskrit Literature, by Macdonell.
- I. A. = Indian Antiquary.
- I. H. Q. = Indian Historical Quarterly, edited by  
N. Law, Calcutta.
- I. P. = Indian Philosophy by S. Radhakrishnan.

- Īśādi. = ईशास्यधोतत्ततोपनिषद्., निर्णयमागर edn.  
 Jay. = Jayamaṅgalā, a Comm. on Sāṅkhya-Kāṅkā, edited by H. Sarmā, Calcutta Oriental Series, No. 19.  
 J. O. R. = Journal of Oriental Research, Madras.  
 Karma. = Karmamīmāṃsā by Keith (Heritage of India Series.)  
 Māth. = Mātharavṛtti (Ch. S. S., No. 296).  
 Mbh. = Mahābhārata, P. C. Roy's edn. Calcutta, 1810 Saka era.  
 N. B. S. = Notes on Brahma-Sūtras, II, 1 and 2 by S. K. Belvalkar, Oriental Book Agency Poona, 1923.  
 N. S. = Nyāya-Sūtras.  
 Pr. Up. = Praśna Upaniṣad.  
 P. O. C. = Proceedings of the Oriental Conference.  
 S. N. S. = The Sāṅkhya Kāṅkā of Īśvarakṛṣṇa by S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri, University of Madras, 1930.  
 'Sovani. = A critical study of Sāṅkhya System on the line of Sāṅkhya Kāṅkā, Sāṅkhya-Sūtra and their Commentaries, by V. V. Sovani, M. A., (The Allahabad University Studies, Vol. VII, Art Section, Allahabad, 1931).  
 S. S. = Sāṅkhya System by Keith (Heritage of India Series).  
 S. P. = Sāṅkhya Philosophie von R. Garbe, 2nd edn., Leipzig, 1917.  
 S. Sū. = Sāṅkhya Sūtras of Kapila.  
 S. S. B. = Sāṅkhya-Sūtra-Bhāṣya of Viṅṇānabhikṣu.  
 S. B. E. = Sacred Books of the East.  
 Sk. P. = Skanda Purāna.

- S. Y. = Sāṃkhya und Yoga, von R. Garbe, Grundriss der Indo-Arischen Philologie and Altertumskunde, 1896.
- S. D. S. = Sarvadarśana Saṃgraha, B. O. R. I., Poona.
- Śv. Up. = Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad.
- Tatt. K. = Vācaspati's Tattva-Kaumudi on Sāṃkhya-Kārikā.
- Tatt. V. = Vācaspati's Tattva-Vaiśāradi on Yoga-Bhāṣya.
- Tatt. Sk. = The Sāṃkhya-Kārikā, Studied in the light of its Chinese version, by M. Takakusu; rendered from the French into English, by S. S. Suryanarayana Sastrī, Madras, 1933.
- Y. Bh. = Vyāsa's Bhāṣya on the Yoga-Sūtras of Patañjali.
- Y. S. = Yoga-Sūtras of Patañjali.
- V. Bh. = Vātsyāyana's Bhāṣya on the Nyāya-Sūtras.
- V. P. = Viṣṇu Purāna.
- Wilson = The Sāṃkhya Kārikā with Colebrooke's translation and Comments by H. H. Wilson, published by Tookaram Tattya, Bombay, 1887.

# तत्त्वकौमुदी.

( सांख्य. )

( १ ) महत्त्वचरणम् ॥

अजामेकां लोहितशुक्लकृष्णां बह्वीः प्रजाः सृजमानां नमामः ।

अजा ये तां लुपमाणां भजन्ते जहरयेनां भुक्तभोगां लुमस्तान् ॥ १ ॥

कपिलाय महामुनये मुनये शिष्याय तस्य चासुरये ।

पद्मशिष्याय तथेश्वरकृष्णार्यताक्षमस्यामः ॥ २ ॥

इह खलु प्रतिपिस्तितमर्थं प्रतिपादयन् प्रतिपादयिता ऽवधेयवचनो  
, भवति प्रेक्षावताम् । अप्रतिपिस्तितमर्थं तु प्रतिपाद-

( २ ) शास्त्रविषयक-  
जिज्ञासाक्तरणम् ॥

यन् ' नायं लौकिको नापि परीक्षक ' इति प्रेक्षाव-  
द्भिस्त्वन्मत्तवदुपेक्ष्येन । स चैषां प्रतिपिस्तितो ऽर्थो यो  
ज्ञातः मन् परमपुरुषार्थाय कल्पने । इति प्रारिप्सित-  
शास्त्रविषयज्ञानस्य परमपुरुषार्थसाधनहेतुत्वात् तद्विषयजिज्ञासामवतारयति-

२४.१२ दुःखत्रयाभिघाताज्जिज्ञासा तदपघातके हेतौ ।

दृष्टे सा ऽपार्था चैर्नैकान्तात्यन्ततो ऽभावात् ॥ १ ॥

“दु.ख-” इति । एवं हि शास्त्रविषयो न जिज्ञास्येत, यदि दुःखं नाम

जगति न स्यात्, सद्वा न जिहंसितम्, जिहंसितं

( ३ ) शास्त्रविषयक-  
जिज्ञासाया आवश्य-  
कत्वसद्भा ॥

वा अशक्यममुच्छेदम् । ( अशक्यममुच्छेदता च द्वेषा,

दुःखस्य निव्यत्वात्, तदुच्छेदोपायापरिज्ञानात् ) ।

शक्यममुच्छेदत्वेऽपि च शास्त्रविषयस्य ज्ञानस्यानु-

पायभूतत्वाद्वा, मुररस्योपायान्तरस्य सन्नायाद्वा ॥



संन्ति चोपायाः शतशः शारोरदुःखप्रतीकारायेपक्त्रा विपत्रां वररूपदिष्टाः । मानसस्यापि मन्तापस्य प्रतीकाराय मनोज्ञस्त्रीपानभोजनविलेपनवस्त्रालङ्कारादि-विषयमग्राप्तिरुपायः सुकरः । एदमाधिर्मातिक्रस्यापि दुःखस्य नीतिशास्त्राभ्यासकुशलतानिरत्ययस्थानाध्यासनादिः प्रतीकारहेतुरापक्करः । तथा ऽऽधि-द्वैविकस्यापि मणिमन्त्रौपधाद्युरयोगः सुकरः प्रतीकारोपाय इति ॥

निराकरोति—“ न ” इति । कुतः ? “ एकान्तात्यन्ततो ऽभावान् ” ।

“ एकान्तो ” दुःखनिवृत्तेरवश्यम्भावः; “ अत्यन्तो ”

( ६ ) वैयर्थ्यापत्तिनिरा- निवृत्तस्य दुःखस्य पुनरनुत्पादः, तयोः एकान्तात्यन्त-  
करणम्-परिरागितो- योरभावः “ एकान्तात्यन्ततो ऽभावः ” । पट्टीस्थाने  
पायेभ्य आत्यन्तिक- स्वारंविभक्तिकम्मसिः। एतदुक्तं भवति, यथाविधि रसा-  
कान्तिकदुःखनिवृत्ते- यनादिका मिनीनीतिशास्त्राभ्यासमन्त्राद्युपाययोगे ऽपि  
रदर्शनम् ॥ तस्य तस्याध्यात्मिकादिदुःखस्य निवृत्तेरदर्शनान्  
अनत्यन्तिकत्वम्, इति सुकरोऽपि पेशान्तिकत्यन्तिकदुःखनिवृत्तेर्न ह्य उपाय  
इति ना उपार्था जिज्ञासैर्यथः ॥

( ७ ) दुःखापघातवर्धा- यद्यपि दुःखममङ्गलम्, तथाऽपि तत्परिहारार्थत्वेन  
नम् मङ्गलमेव ॥ तदपघातो मङ्गलमेवेति युक्तं शास्त्रादौ तत्कीर्तन-  
मिति ॥ १ ॥

स्यादेतन् । मा भूदृष्ट उपायः, वैदिकस्तु ज्योति-  
ष्टोमादिः संवत्सरपर्यन्तः कर्मकलापस्तापत्रयमे-  
कान्तमत्यन्तस्त्रापनेष्यति । ध्रुतिश्च, “ स्वर्गकामो  
यजेत ” इति । स्वर्गश्च—

( ८ ) वैदिकस्य दुःखाप-  
घातकस्य सुकरस्य सत्वे  
शास्त्रविषयजिज्ञासायाः  
पुनर्वैयर्थ्यापत्तिः ॥

“ यत्त दुःखेन सम्भिन्नं न च प्रस्तमनन्तरम् ।  
अभिलाषोपनीतं च तन् सुखं स्वःपदास्पदम् ” इति ।

१. एतत् ( वक्ष्यमाणम्, आशाङ्कितम् ) स्यात्-इति ग्रन्थकारोक्तिः । अथवा-  
एतत् ( भवतोक्तम् ) स्यात् ( भवतु ), स्वीकृतमस्माभिरिति शङ्काकृदुक्तिः । उभयथा-  
ऽपि युज्यते ।

दुःखविरोधी सुखविशेषश्च स्वराः । स च स्वशक्त्या समूलपातमपहन्ति दुःखम् ।  
न चैव क्षयी । तथा हि ध्रुयते—“ अपाम सोमममृता अभूम ” इति [ अथर्व-  
शिरस् ३ ] । तक्षये कुनोऽस्यामृतत्वसम्भवः ? तत्सार्द्धदिकत्योपायस्य तावद्य-  
प्रतीकारहेतोर्मुहूर्तयामाहोरात्रिसाम्यवत्सरनिर्वर्तनायम्यानेकजन्मपरम्परायामप-  
ग्यादर्नाधान् विवेकज्ञानात् ईषत्करत्वात् पुनरपि व्यर्था जिज्ञासा इत्याशङ्क्याह—

दृष्टवदानुश्रविकः, स ह्यविशुद्धिक्षयातिशययुक्तः ।

तद्धिंपरीतः श्रेयान् व्यकाच्यक्त्वविज्ञानात् ॥ २ ॥

“ दृष्ट—” इति । गुरुराशादनुश्रूयते इत्यनुश्रवो, वेदः । पुनदुक्तं भवति—

‘ ध्रुयत एव परं न केनापि क्रियत ’ इति । तत्र भव आहु

(९) वैदिकानामप्युपा-

यानां दृष्टोपायैस्मह

तुल्यत्वम् ॥

श्रविकः, तत्र प्राप्ते ज्ञात इति यावत् । आनुश्रविको

ऽपि कर्मकलापो दृष्टेन तुल्यो वर्तते, ऐकान्तिकत्व

निकदुःखत्रयप्रतीकारानुपायत्वस्योभयत्रापि तुल्य

त्वात् । यद्यपि च “ आनुश्रविक ” इति सामान्या

भिधानं, तथापि कर्मकलापमिप्रायं दृष्टव्यम्, विवेकज्ञानस्याप्यानुश्रविक

त्वात् । तथा च श्रूयते—“ आत्मा वा ऽरे ज्ञातव्यः प्रकृतितो विवेकव्यः ’

[ बृहदारण्यक, २।१।५ ], “ न स पुनरावर्तते न स पुनरावर्तते ” [ छन्दोग

८।१५ ] इति ॥

अस्यां प्रतिज्ञायां हेतुमाह—“ स ह्यविशुद्धिक्षयातिशययुक्तः ” इति

“ अविशुद्धिः ” सोमाद्रियागस्य पशुर्वाजादिवधसाध

(१०) दृष्टवैदिकोपाया-

ययोःअविशुद्धिक्षयाति-

शक्त्युक्तत्वम् तुल्यम् ॥

नता । यथाऽऽह स्व भगवान् पद्मसिंहाचार्यः—“ स्व

ल्पमद्भरोः सपरिहारः सप्रत्ययमपैः ” इति । ‘ स

ल्पमद्भरो ’ ऽर्थातिशयोक्त्यादिजन्मनः प्रधानापूर्व

स्वल्पेन पशुहिंसादिजन्मना ऽनर्थहेतुना ऽपूर्व

मद्भरोः । ‘ सपरिहारः, ’ क्रियता ऽपि प्रायश्चित्तं परिहर्तुं शक्यः । अथ

प्रमादनः प्रायश्चित्तमपि नाचरितं, प्रधानकर्मविपाकसमये स पश्यते । तथा ऽ

यावदगापनर्थं मृते तावत् प्रत्ययमपैंग ( महिष्युतया ) मह घतंत इ

“सप्रत्यमवर्षः” । मृष्यन्ते हि पुण्यसम्भारोपनीतस्वर्गसुधामहाद्भवावगाहिनः  
कुशलाः पापमात्रोपसादितां दुःखवह्निकणिकाम् ॥

न च—“मा हिंस्यात् सर्वा भूतानि” इति मामान्यशास्त्रं विशेषशास्त्रेण  
“अग्नीषोमीयं पशुमालभेत” इत्यनेन बाध्यते—  
( ११ ) याज्ञिकहिंसाया इति युक्तम्, विरोधाभावात् । विरोधे हि बलीयसा  
अप्यनर्थहेतुत्वसाधनम् ॥ दुर्बलं बाध्यते । न चेहास्ति कश्चिद्विरोधः, मित्रविषय-  
त्वान् । तथा हि—“मा हिंस्यात्” इति निषेधेन  
हिंसाया अनर्थहेतुभावो शाप्यते, न स्वकृत्यर्थत्वमपि, ‘अग्नीषोमीयं पशुमाल-  
भेत’ इत्यनेन वाक्येन च पशुहिंसायाः कृत्यर्थत्वमुच्यते, नानर्थहेतुत्वाभावः,  
तथा सति वाक्यभेदप्रसङ्गात् । न चानर्थहेतुत्वकृतूपकारकत्वयोः कश्चिद्विरोधो-  
ऽस्ति । हिंसा हि पुरुषस्य दोषमावक्ष्यति, क्रतोश्चोपकरिष्यतीति ॥

क्षयातिशयो च फलगतावप्युपाय उपचरितौ । क्षयित्वं च स्वर्गादेः सत्त्वे  
( १२ ) वैदिकोपायस्य सानि कार्यत्वादानुमितम् । ज्योतिष्टोमाद्यः स्वर्गमात्रस्य  
सातिशयत्वप्रदर्शनम् ॥ साधनम्, वराजपेयादयस्तु स्वाराज्यस्येत्यतिशययुक्त-  
त्वम् । परसम्पदुत्कर्षो हि हीनसम्पदं पुरयं दुःखा-  
कराति ॥

“अपाम सोमममृता अभूम” इति चामृतत्वाभिधानम् चिरस्थेमानमुप-  
लक्षयति । यद्वाहुः—“आभूतसम्भवं स्थानममृतत्वं हि  
( १३ ) अमृतत्वश्रुति-भाष्यते” इति (विष्णुपुराणे) ॥ अत एव च श्रुतिः—  
विरोधपरिहारः—अमृतत्वस्य “न कर्मणा न प्रजया धनेन स्यागेनैकेनामृतत्वमा-  
चिरस्थेन उपलक्षकत्वात् ॥ ननुः । परेण नाकं निहितं गुहायां विश्राजते यद्यतयो  
विशन्ति” इति [ महानारायण १०।५ ] । तथा  
“कर्मणा मृत्युमृत्ययो निषेदुः प्रजावन्तो द्रविणमीहमाणाः । तथा परे  
ऋषयो ये मनीषिणः परं कर्मभ्योऽमृतत्वमाननुः” इति च ॥

१. विधेयद्वयापत्तेः । हिंसा यागसाधिका अनर्थशून्या चेति वाक्यभेदः ।

तदेतन् सर्वमभिप्रेत्याह—“ तद्विपरीतः श्रेयान्, व्यक्ताव्यक्तज्ञविज्ञानात् ” इति । तस्मात् ( आनुश्रविकात् दुःखापघातकंपाषाद् ( १४ ) लौकिकवैदिको- सोमपानादेरविशुद्धात् अनित्यसातिशयफलात् ) पायेभ्यः शास्त्रविषयज्ञा- विपरीतः विशुद्धः हिंसादिसङ्गराभावात्, नित्यनित्य- नस्य श्रेयस्त्वप्रदर्शनम् ॥ तिशयफलः, असकृत् पुनरावृत्तिश्रुतेः । न च कार्यत्वेनानित्यता फलस्य युक्ता, भावरूपस्य कार्यस्य तथाभावात्, दुःखप्रध्वंसनस्य तु कार्यस्यापि तद्विपरीत्यात् । न च दुःखान्तरो- त्पादः, कारणाप्रवृत्तौ कार्यस्यानुत्पादात्, विवेकज्ञानोपजननपर्यन्तत्वाच्च कारणप्रवृत्तेः । एतच्चोपैरिष्टादुत्पादयित्यते ॥

अक्षरार्थस्तु—तस्मात् ( आनुश्रविकात् दुःखापघातकात् हंतोः ) विपरीतः ( सखिपुरुषान्यताप्रत्ययः साक्षात्कारो ) दुःखापघा- ( १५ ) “ तद्विपरीतः तको हेतुः, अत एव श्रेयान् । आनुश्रविको हि वेद- श्रेयान् ” इत्यस्याक्षरार्थः ॥ विहितत्वात् मात्रया दुःखापघातकत्वाच्च प्रशंस्यः । सखिपुरुषान्यताप्रत्ययोऽपि प्रशंस्यः । तदनयोः प्रशं- स्ययोर्मध्ये सखिपुरुषान्यताप्रत्ययः श्रेयान् ॥

कुतः पुनरन्वोत्पत्तिरित्यत आह—“ व्यक्ताव्यक्तज्ञविज्ञानात् ” इति । व्यक्तं च अव्यक्तं च ज्ञञ्च व्यक्तान्यक्तज्ञाः, तेषां ( १६ ) शास्त्रविषयस्य विज्ञानम् विवेकेन ज्ञानम्, व्यक्ताव्यक्तज्ञविज्ञानम् । दुःखापघातकस्य तत्त्वज्ञा- व्यक्तज्ञानपूर्वकमव्यक्तस्य तत्कारणस्य ज्ञानम् । तैयोश्च नस्योत्पत्तिप्रदर्शनम् ॥ पाराध्वेनात्मा परो ज्ञायते, इति ज्ञानक्रमेणाभिधानम् । एतदुक्तं भवति—श्रुतिस्मृतीतिहासपुराणेभ्यो व्यक्ता- दीन् विवेकेन श्रुत्वा, शास्त्रयुक्त्या च व्यवस्थाप्य दीर्घकालादरन्तरेत्तयैस्तत्कार- सेवितान् भावनामप्यात् विज्ञानादिनि । तथा च वक्ष्यति—

१ अनित्यत्वात् । २ अभावरूपत्वात् । ३ ( ६६ ) कारिकायाम् । ४ व्यक्ताव्यक्तयोः परार्थत्वेन । व्यक्ताव्यक्तं अचेतने कस्यचिद्येननस्यार्याय वनेते स च चेतन आत्मेत्यादिक्रमेण ।

भ्यस्तत्त्वान्तरम् । तत्त्वान्तरोपादानम् च प्रकृतित्वमिहाभिप्रेतम्, इति न दोषः । सर्वेषां गोघटादीनां स्थूलतेन्द्रियप्राप्तता च ममेति न तत्त्वान्तरम् ॥

अनुभयरूपमाह—“ न प्रकृतिर्न विकृतिः पुरुषः ” इति । एतत् सर्वमुपरिष्ठा-  
( २१ ) अनुभयरूपकथनम् ॥ दुपपादयिष्यते ॥ ३ ॥

तमिममर्थं प्रामाणिकं कर्तुमभिमताः प्रमाणभेदा लक्षणीयाः । न च  
( २२ ) प्रमाणसामा- सामान्यलक्षणमन्तरेण शक्यते विशेषलक्षणम् कर्तुम् ।  
न्यलक्षणम् ॥ इति प्रमाणसामान्यं तावदलक्षयति—

२१-१२ दृष्टमनुमानमाप्तवचनं च, सर्वप्रमाणसिद्धत्वात् ।

त्रिविधप्रमाणमिष्टं, प्रमेयसिद्धिः प्रमाणादि ॥ ४ ॥

“ प्रमाणमिष्टम् ” इति । अत्र—च ‘ प्रमाणम् ’ इति समाख्या लक्ष्यपदम् ।  
तद्विचरं च लक्षणम् । प्रमेयते ऽनेनेति निर्वचनम्  
( २३ ) प्रमाणपदस्य— प्रमां प्रति करणत्वमवगम्यते । तच्चासन्दिग्धाविपरीता-  
निर्वचनम् ॥ नधिगतविषया चित्तवृत्तिः । बोधेश्च पौरुषेयः फलम्  
प्रमा, तन्माधनम् प्रमाणमिति । एतेन संशयविषय-  
यत्कृतिमाधनेव्यप्रमाणेष्वप्रसङ्गः ॥

संख्याविप्रतिपत्तिं निराकरोति—“ त्रिविधम् ” इति । तिस्रो विधा  
यस्य प्रमाणसामान्यस्य तत् त्रिविधम्, न न्यूनम्,  
( २४ ) प्रमाणसंख्या ॥ नाप्यधिकमित्यर्थः । विशेषलक्षणानन्तरैकतदुपपाद-  
यिष्यामः ॥

कतमाः पुनस्तास्तिषो विधा इत्यत्र आह—“ दृष्टमनुमानमाप्तवचनम् ”  
इति । एतच्च लौकिकप्रमाणानिप्रायम्, लोकच्युत्पादाना-  
( २५ ) प्रमाणत्रय- र्थत्वाच्छास्त्रस्य, तस्यैवाप्राधिकारात् । आपं तु विज्ञानं  
परिगणनम् ॥ योगिनामूर्ध्वोत्पत्तौ न लोकच्युत्पादनायालमिति सद्य-  
नामिहितम्, अत्रधिकारात् ॥

१ नैर्यायकानामनुव्यवसायः—घटप्राने “ घटमहं जानमीति ”—पुरुषगतः ।

स्यादेतन्—ना भून्मूयन्म्, अधिकं तु कस्माच्च भवति ? मद्गिरन्ते हि प्रति-  
वादिन उपमानादीन्यपि प्रमाणानि, इत्यत आह—

( २६ ) प्रमाण-  
सम्बन्धाऽऽधिक्यशङ्का,  
तत्परिहारश्च ॥

“ सर्वप्रमाणसिद्धत्वात् ” इति । पृथ्वेव दृष्टानुमानास-  
वचनेषु सर्वेषां प्रमाणानां सिद्धत्वात्, अन्तर्भावा  
दित्यर्थः । एतत्त्वोपपादयिष्यत इत्युक्तम् ॥

अथ प्रमेयव्युत्पादनाय प्रवृत्तं शास्त्रं कस्मान् प्रमाणं सामान्यतो विशेषतश्च-

( २७ ) प्रमेयवर्ण-  
नात् प्रागेव प्रमाण-  
निर्वचनस्यावश्यकत्वम् ॥

लक्षयति? इत्यत आह—“ प्रमेयसिद्धिः प्रमाणाद्धि ”  
इति । सिद्धिः प्रतीतिः ॥

( २८ ) कारिका-  
पाठक्रमपरिवर्तनहेतुः ॥

सेयमार्यां ऽर्थक्रमानुरोधेन पाठक्रममनादृत्यैव व्या-  
ख्याता ॥ ४ ॥

सम्प्रति प्रमाणविशेषलक्षणावसरे प्रत्यक्षस्य सर्वप्रमाणेषु ज्येष्ठत्वात् तदधी-  
( २९ ) प्रमाणाना नत्वाच्चानुमानादीनाम्, सर्ववादिनामविप्रतिपत्तेश्च,  
विशेषलक्षणम् ॥ तदेव तावलक्षयति—

प्रतिविषयाध्यवसायो दृष्टं, त्रिविधमनुमानमाख्यातम् ।  
तद्विद्वल्लिङ्गिपूर्वकम्, आस्तश्रुतिरासवचनं तु ॥ ५ ॥

“ प्रतिविषयाध्यवसायो दृष्टम् ” इति । अत्र “ दृष्टम् ” इति लक्ष्यनि-  
र्देशः, परिशिष्टं तु लक्षणम् । समानात्ममानजातीयव्यवच्छेदो लक्षणार्थः ॥

अवयवार्थस्तु—विपिष्वन्ति, विपयिणमनुबध्नन्ति, स्वप्नेन रूपेण निरूपणीयं  
कुर्वन्तीति यावत् = “ विषयाः, ” पृथिव्यादयः सुखा-  
( ३० ) प्रत्यक्ष-  
लक्षणावयवार्थः ॥ दयश्चात्मद्रादीनाम् अविषयाः तस्मात्प्रलक्षणाः योगिना-  
मूर्ध्वस्रोतसां च विषयाः । विषयं विषयं प्रति वर्तते  
इति प्रतिविषयम् = इन्द्रियम् । वृत्तिश्च सन्निकर्यः ।  
अर्धसन्निकृष्टमिन्द्रियमित्यर्थः । तस्मिन् अध्यवसायः, तदाश्रित इत्यर्थः ।  
अध्यवसायश्च बुद्धिव्यापारो ज्ञानम् । उपात्तविषयाणामिन्द्रियाणां वृत्ती

सत्याम्, बुद्धेस्तमोऽभिभवे सति यः सत्त्वसमुद्भेकः सोऽध्यवसाय<sup>१</sup> इति ।  
वृत्तिरिति ज्ञानमिति चाख्यायते । इदं तावत् प्रमाणम्, "अनेन यश्चेतनाशक्त-  
रनुग्रहस्तत्फलं प्रमाबोधः ॥

✓ (बुद्धितत्त्वं हि प्राकृतत्वादचेतनम्, इति तदीयोऽध्यवसायोऽप्यचेतनी;  
घटादिवत् । एवं बुद्धितत्त्वस्य सुखादयोऽपि परिणाम-  
\* (३१) जानानाम- भेदा अचेतनाः) पुरुषस्तु सुखाद्यननुपपत्नी चेतनः ।  
चेतनत्वम् ॥ सोऽयं बुद्धितत्त्ववर्तिना ज्ञानसुखादिना तत्प्रति-  
बिम्बितस्तच्छायापरया ज्ञानसुखादिमानिव भवतीति-  
चेतनोऽनुगृह्यते । चित्तिच्छायापरयाऽचेतनाऽपि बुद्धिस्तदध्यवसायोऽप्यचेत-  
नश्चेतनवद्भवतीति । तथा च वक्ष्यति—

“ तस्मात्तत्त्वयोगादचेतनं चेतनावदिव लिङ्गम् ।

गुणकर्तृत्वेऽपि तथा कर्तव्यं भवत्युदासीनः ॥ ” इति [ कारिका. २० ] .

अप्राध्यवसायग्रहणेन संशयं व्यवच्छिन्नन्ति, संशयस्यानवस्थितग्रहणेना-  
निश्चितरूपत्वान् । निश्चयोऽध्यवसाय इति चानर्थान्तरम् । विषय-

(३२) प्रत्यक्षलक्षणा- ग्रहणेन चासद्विषयं विषय्यमपाकरोति । प्रतिग्रहणेन  
न्तर्गतानां शब्दानां चन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षसूचनादनुमानस्मृत्यादयश्च पराकृता  
व्यावृत्तिः ॥ भवन्ति ॥

तद्वैपं मनानाममानजातीयव्यवच्छेदकत्वान् “ प्रतिविषयाध्यवसाय ” इति

(३३) प्रत्यक्षस्य दृष्टस्य सम्पूर्णं लक्षणम् । तन्त्रान्तरेषु लक्षणान्तराणि  
पर्यवर्तिता लक्षणम् ॥ तैर्धिकानां न भूषितानि न दूषितानि, विस्तरभयादिति ॥

नानुमानप्रमाणमिति यद्वा लोकायतिकेनाप्रतिपन्नः समिद्धो विषयस्तौ

(३४) अनुमानस्य अज्ञानस्यैहविषय्याः शक्त्या अर्वाग्रहणा प्रत्यक्षेण प्रति-  
प्रमाणत्वसाधनम् ॥ पत्तुम् । नापि प्रमाणान्तरेण, अनभ्युपगमान् । अनव-

ष्टानाज्ञानसंज्ञविषय्यस्तु यं कंचन पुराणं प्रति वर्तमानोऽनवधेयवचनतया

प्रेक्षावद्विरुद्धत्वदुरेक्ष्येत । तदनेनाज्ञानादयः परपुरवतिनो ऽभिप्रायभेदा-  
द्वचनभेदाद्वा लिङ्गादनुमातव्याः, इत्यकामेनाप्यनुमानप्रमाणमभ्युपेयम् ॥

तत्र प्रत्यक्षकार्यत्वात् अनुमानं प्रत्यक्षानन्तरं लक्षणीयम् । तत्रापि,  
(३५) अनुमानस्य सामान्यलक्षणम् ॥ सामान्यलक्षणपूर्वकत्वाद्विशेषलक्षणस्यानुमानसामान्यं  
तावलक्षयति—“ तत् लिङ्गलिङ्गिपूर्वकम् ” इति ।  
लिङ्गम् व्याप्यम् । लिङ्गि व्यापकम् । शङ्कितसमारोपि-

तोपाधिनिराकरणेन च स्वभावप्रतिबद्धं व्याप्यम्, येन प्रतिबद्धं तद्व्यापकम् ।  
लिङ्गलिङ्गिग्रहणेन विषयवाचिना विषयिणं प्रत्ययमुपलक्षयति । धूमादिव्याप्यो  
बह्वरादिव्यापक इति यः प्रत्ययस्तत्पूर्वकम् । लिङ्गग्रहणं चावतनीयम् । तेन  
च लिङ्गमस्यास्तीति पक्षधर्मताज्ञानमपि दर्शितम्भवति । तद्व्याप्यव्यापकभाव-  
पक्षधर्मताज्ञानपूर्वकमनुमानमित्यनुमानसामान्यं लक्षितम् ॥

अनुमानविशेषान् तन्त्रान्तरलक्षितान् अभिमतान् स्मारयति— “ त्रिवि-

(३६) अनुमानस्य विशेषलक्षणम्—त्रैविध्यम्  
पूर्ववच्छेषवत्सामान्यतो  
दृष्टभेदान् ॥ धननुमानमगत्यातम् ” इति । तत् सामान्यतां  
लक्षितमनुमानं विशेषित्विधिं, पूर्ववत्-शेषवत्-  
सामान्यतां दृष्टञ्चेति ॥

तत्र प्रथमं तावत् द्विविधम्—वोतमवीतं च । अन्यमुखेन प्रवर्तमानं  
(३७) वीतवीतरूपेणा- विधापकं वोतम्, व्यतिरेकमुखेन प्रवर्तमानं निषेध-  
नुमानस्य द्वैविध्यम् ॥ कनवीतम् ॥

तत्रावीतं शेषवत् । शिष्यते परिशिष्यते इति शेषः, स एव विषयतया यस्या-  
स्यनुमानज्ञानस्य तच्छेषवत् । यदाहुः—“ प्रत्यक्त-  
( ३८ ) अवीतनि- प्रतिषेधे, अन्यत्राप्रमत्तात् शिष्यमाणे सम्प्रत्ययः  
रूपणम् ॥ परिशेष ” इति [ वात्स्यायन-न्यायभाष्य १. १. ५. ] -

अस्य चावीतस्य व्यतिरेकिण उदाहरणमग्रे ऽभिधास्यते ॥

१. एकेन विभागप्रकारेण अनुमानम् द्विविधमिति भावः । २. अत्राहु राघवा-  
नन्दीतीर्थीः—“ एतां सम्प्रतिमाह यथाहुरिति—गुणत्वात् पृथिव्याश्रयः शब्दः स्यादिति  
प्रसक्तस्य शब्दस्य न पृथिवीगुणत्वम्, अपाकजविशेषगुणत्वान्, तद्विशेषपटुणेन गन्धेन  
च सहाश्रुतित्वान् । एवं निषेधे कृते आकाशादन्यत्र भूम्याद्यष्टरूपप्रमत्तात्, शिष्य-  
माणे आकाशे एव शब्दस्य गुणत्वेन सम्यक्प्रत्ययः ”— इति ॥



धीतं द्वेषा-पूर्ववत् सामान्यतो दृष्टं च । तत्रैकम् दृष्टस्वलक्षणसामान्यविषयं  
 यत्पूर्ववत्, पूर्वं प्रसिद्धं, दृष्टस्वलक्षणसामान्यमिति  
 (३९) धीतनिरूपणम् यावत्, तदस्य विषयत्वेनास्यनुमानज्ञानस्येति पूर्व-  
 -तद्द्विविध्यम् ॥ यत् । यथा धूमाद्बह्विष्यत्सामान्यविशेषः पर्वते ऽनुमी-  
 यते, तस्य बह्विष्यत्सामान्यविशेषस्य स्वलक्षणं  
 बह्विष्यत्सामान्यविशेषो दृष्टो रसवत्याम् । अपरं च धीतं सामान्यतो दृष्टमदृष्टस्वल-  
 क्षणसामान्यविषयम् । यथेन्द्रियविषयमनुमानम् । अत्र हि रूपादिविज्ञानानां  
 क्रियात्वेन करणवाचमनुमीयते । यद्यपि करणत्वसामान्यस्य छिदादीं वाग्यादि  
 स्वलक्षणमुपलब्धम्, तथा ऽपि यज्ञातीयं रूपादिज्ञाने करणत्वमनुमीयते  
 तज्जातीयस्य करणस्य न दृष्टं स्वलक्षणं प्रत्यक्षेण । इन्द्रियजातीयं हि तत्करणम्,  
 नचेन्द्रियत्वसामान्यस्य स्वलक्षणमिन्द्रियविशेषः प्रायश्क्षणेचरो ऽर्वाग्दशाम्,  
 यथा बह्विष्यत्सामान्यस्य स्वलक्षणं बह्विः । सो ऽयं पूर्ववत्तः सामान्यतो दृष्टान्  
 सत्यपि धीतत्वेन तुल्यत्वे विशेषः । अत्र च दृष्टं दर्शनम्, सामान्यत इति  
 सामान्यस्य, सार्वविभक्तिकस्तसिल् । अदृष्टस्वलक्षणस्य सामान्यविशेषस्य  
 दर्शनम् सामान्यतो दृष्टमनुमानमित्यर्थः । सर्वं चैतदस्माभिर्न्यायवार्तिकतात्पर्य-  
 टांक्रामां द्युत्पादितमिति मेद्मोक्तं विस्तरभयात् ॥

प्रयोजकवृद्धशब्दध्रुवणसमनन्तरं प्रयोज्यवृद्धप्रवृत्तिहेतुज्ञानानुमानपूर्वकत्वा-  
 (४०) शब्दप्रमाण- च्छब्दार्थसम्बन्धग्रहणस्य, स्वार्थमन्वन्धज्ञानसहकारि-  
 लक्षणम् ॥ णश्च शब्दस्यार्थप्रत्यायकत्वादनुमानपूर्वकत्वमित्यनुमा-  
 नानन्तरं शब्दं लक्षयति-“ आस्रश्रुतिरास्रवचनं तु ”  
 इति । आस्रवचनमिति लक्षयनिर्देशः, परिशिष्टं लक्षणम् । आसा प्रासा युक्तेति  
 यावत् । आसा चास्री श्रुतिश्चेति ‘आस्रश्रुतिः’ । श्रुतिः वाक्यजनितं  
 वाक्यार्थज्ञानम् ॥

तत्र स्वतः प्रमाणम् । अपौरुषेयवेदवाक्यजनितत्वेन सकलदोषान्नाङ्गवि-  
 (४१) तस्य स्वतः- निर्मुक्तैर्युक्तं भवति । एवं वेदमूलस्मृतिवृत्तहामपुराण-  
 प्रामाण्यम् ॥ वाक्यजनितमपि ज्ञानं युक्तं भवति ॥

आदिविदुषश्च कपिलस्य कल्पादी कल्पान्तराधीतश्रुतिस्मरणसम्भवः, सुप्त-  
(४२) कपिलस्य पूर्व-  
जन्माधीतश्रुतिस्मरणम्॥  
प्रबुद्धस्यैव पूर्वचरुवगतानामर्थानामपरेद्युः । तथा  
चावद्यजगीपव्यसंवादे भगवान् जैगीपव्यो दशमहा-  
कल्पवर्तिजन्मस्मरणमात्मन उवाच “ दशसु महाकल्पेषु  
विपरिवर्तमानेन मया ” इत्यादिना ग्रन्थसन्दर्भेण ॥

आप्तग्रहणेनायुक्ताः शाक्यभिभूनिर्ग्रन्थकर्मसारमोचकादीनामागमाभावाः  
(४३) आगमाभास-  
निरूपणम् ॥ परिहृता भवन्ति । अयुक्तत्वं चैतेषां विगानान्  
विच्छिन्नमूलत्वात्प्रमाणाविरुद्धार्थाभिधानाच्च कैश्चिदेव  
म्लेच्छादिभिः पुरुषापमदैः पशुप्रायैः परिग्रहाद्बो-  
द्धव्यम् ।

‘तु’ शब्देनानुमानाद्यवच्छिन्नन्ति । वाक्यार्थो हि प्रमेयो, न तु तद्धर्मो  
(४४) आप्तश्रुत-  
मानाद्यवच्छेदः ॥ वाक्यम्, येन तत्र लिङ्गं भवेत् । न च वाक्यं वाक्यार्थं  
बोधयत् सम्बन्धग्रहणमपेक्षते, अभिनवकविरचितस्य  
वाक्यस्यादृष्टपूर्वस्याननुभूतचरवाक्यार्थबोधकत्वादिति॥

१. अत्राहुर्भारतीयलाइयः—“ कथं ‘तु’ शब्देनानुमानाद्यवच्छेद आप्तवचनस्ये-  
त्पत आह—‘वाक्यार्थोहि’ इति । नन्वस्तु तावद्वाक्यार्थस्य प्रमेयत्वम्, एतावता  
कथमनुमानाद् व्यवच्छेदः स्यात्, शब्दस्य तत्कारणत्वात्, यथा धूमेन लिङ्गेन लिङ्गी  
वर्द्धीयते तथा वाक्येन लिङ्गेन शब्दार्थलिङ्गयनुमानं भवेदित्याशङ्क्याह—‘न तु तद्धर्म’  
इति । धूमस्य कलिधर्मत्वान् तल्लिङ्गत्वम्, न तु वाक्यस्य अर्थधर्मत्वम्, येन तल्लिङ्गं  
वाक्यं स्यादिति यावत् । ननु यद्यपि धूमाग्निवत् वाक्यवाक्यार्थयोर्धर्मधर्मिभावो नास्ति,  
तथा ऽपि यथा धूमो ऽग्निना सम्बन्धिना सम्बन्धग्रहणापेक्ष एव तद्गमकः, तथा  
वाक्यमपि अर्थेन सम्बन्धग्रहणापेक्षमेव तद्बोधकमिति घट्टुह्यामेव प्रभात इति  
चेत्तत्राह—“न च” इति । आत्पात्तिकमूत्रे जैमिनिना शब्दार्थयोर्नित्यसम्बन्धे साधिते ऽपि  
शब्दस्यैव श्रद्धव्यवहारतः सम्बन्धग्रहणापेक्षस्यैवावबोधकत्वान्, पदार्थपूर्वकत्वात्  
वाक्यार्थस्य स्वार्थबोधकत्वे सम्बन्धग्रहणापेक्षा नास्ति । विशिष्टार्थसंप्रत्ययो हि  
वाक्यार्थः ” इति । यदि वाक्यार्थजज्ञेऽनुमानं स्यात् तर्हि वाक्यवाक्यार्थयोर्व्याप्यव्या-

(४५) शाब्दान्तरो- एवं प्रमाणमामान्यलक्षणेषु तद्विरोधलक्षणेषु च सन्तु  
 कप्रमाणान्तराणामुक्तेष्व- यानि प्रमाणान्तराण्युपमानादीनि प्रसिवादिभिरभ्युपेयन्ते  
 न्तर्भावः ॥ तान्युक्तलक्षणेष्वेव प्रमाणेष्वन्तर्भवन्ति ॥

तथा हि—उपमानं तावदथा गौस्तथा गवय इति वाक्यम् । तज्जनिता धीरागम  
 ( ४६ ) उपमानस्य एवं । यो ऽप्यथ गवयशब्दो गोसदस्य वाचक इति  
 शब्दे ऽनुमाने चान्त- प्रत्ययः, सो ऽप्यनुमानमेव । यो हि शब्दो यत्र वृद्धैः  
 भावः ॥ प्रयुज्यते, सो ऽस्ति वृथ्यन्तरे, तस्य वाचकः, यथा  
 गोशब्दो गोत्वस्य । प्रयुज्यते चैवं गवयशब्दो गोसदस्ये,  
 इति तस्यैव वाचकः, इति तन् ज्ञानमनुमानमेव । यत्तु गवयस्य चक्षुःसन्निकृष्टस्य  
 गोसादस्यज्ञानं तन् प्रत्यक्षमेव । अत एव स्मर्यमाणायां गवि, गवयसादस्यज्ञानं  
 प्रत्यक्षम् । न स्वयन्तु वि सादस्यमन्यत्र गवये । भूयोऽन्यवसामान्ययोगी हि  
 जात्यन्तरवर्ती जात्यन्तरे सादस्यमुच्यते । सामान्ययोगश्रवकः । स चैतद्वप्रे  
 प्रत्यक्षो, गव्यपि तथेति नोपमानस्य प्रमेयान्तरमस्ति, यत्र प्रमाणान्तरमुपमाने  
 भवेत्, इति न प्रमाणान्तरमुपमानम् ॥

एकमन्वयोऽपेक्षितः स्यात् । न च तथा । तथाहि वाक्यं प्रमाणं वाक्यार्थः प्रमेय ।  
 एवं च वाक्यं वाक्यार्थस्य धर्मो न भवति—यथा भवति धूमो वह्नेर्धर्मः । अतो वाक्यं  
 वाक्यार्थस्य लिंगं न भवतीत्याशयः ।

शाब्दज्ञानं ये ऽनुमाने ऽन्तर्भावयति तेषां मते—यथा ध्यासेज्ञानपूर्वकमनुमान तर्पेव  
 शब्दार्थसम्बन्धज्ञानपूर्वकं शाब्द ज्ञानम् । तत्र चेत्यमनुमानस्वरूपम्—यत्र यत्र घटमान-  
 यति शब्दः प्रयुज्यते तत्र तत्र घटानयनं बोध्यते—यथा मम बाल्याबस्वायामुच्चरितौक्त-  
 शब्दः—अधुनाऽपि स एव शब्दः प्रयुज्यते—तस्मादधुनापि घटानयनमेव बोध्यत  
 इति ॥ अस्सैव मतस्य परिहारो ऽत्र ग्रन्थे प्रदर्श्यत न च वाक्यमित्यादिना ।  
 स्याप्यव्यापकसम्बन्धज्ञानं विना ऽनुमानं नैव प्रसरति । शाब्दज्ञाने त्वेवंविधशब्दार्थ-  
 सम्बन्धज्ञानपूर्वकत्वं न सार्वत्रिकम्—अभिनवकपिरचितवाक्यस्याश्रुतपूर्वत्वात्तत्र  
 तादृशसम्बन्धज्ञानत्यागमभवः । तथा च सति पूर्वशक्तिमतेन तत्र शाब्दज्ञानं नैव-  
 स्यादिति तात्पर्यम् ॥

एवमर्धापत्तिरपि न प्रमाणान्तरम् । तथा हि-जीवतश्चैत्रस्य गृहाभावदर्शनेन बहिर्भावस्यादृष्टस्य कल्पनमर्धापत्तिरभिमतता वृद्धानाम् ।  
 ( ४७ ) अर्धापत्ते- साऽप्यनुमानमेव । यदा स्थलव्यापकः संज्ञकत्र नास्ति  
 रनुमानेऽन्तर्भावः ॥ तदाऽन्यत्रास्ति । यदाऽध्यापक एकत्रास्ति तदाऽन्यत्र  
 नास्तीति सुकरः स्वशरीरे व्याप्तिग्रहः । तथा च मती गृहाभावदर्शनेन  
 लङ्घनेन बहिर्भावदर्शनमनुमानमेव । न च चैत्रस्य क्वचित्सत्त्वेन गृहाभावः  
 शक्योऽपह्नोतुम्, येनाग्निद्रो गृहाभावो बहिर्भावे न हेतुः स्यात् । न च  
 गृहाभावेन वा सत्त्वमपह्न्यते, येन मत्त्वमेवानुपपद्यमानमात्मानं न  
 बहिरवस्थापयेत् । तथा हि-चैत्रस्य गृहासत्त्वेन सत्त्वमात्रं विरध्यते, गृहमत्त्वं  
 वा ? न तत्रयत्र क्वचन सत्त्वस्यास्ति विरोधो गृहामत्त्वेन, भिन्नविषयत्वात् ।  
 “देशसामान्येन” गृहविशेषक्षेपोऽपि पाक्षिक इति समानविषयतया विरोधः ”  
 इति चेत्, न, प्रमाणनिश्चितस्य गृहेऽमत्त्वस्य पाक्षिकतया सांशयिकेन गृह-  
 मत्त्वेन प्रतिक्षेपायोगात् । नापि प्रमाणनिश्चितो गृहाभावः पाक्षिकमत्त्व गृह-  
 मत्त्वं प्रतिक्षिपन् मत्त्वमपि प्रतिक्षेप्तुं सांशयिकत्वं च व्यपनेनुमहतीति युक्तम् ।

१. “देशसामान्यप्रविष्टगृहविशेषमादात्र समानविषयतया विरोध इति शङ्कते”  
 इति राघवानन्दाः । सत्त्वं हि गृहबहिर्भावाधारणतया सामान्यप्रवृत्तिं विशेषगृहामत्त्वेन  
 विरुद्धमिति शङ्काकृद्भावः । क्वचिदस्तीति कल्पनेन म्भलविशेषाविनिगमनाविरहात्  
 गृहाभावोऽपि याप्यते, गृहस्यापि क्वचित्पदेऽन्तर्भावान्, अतएव गृहसत्त्वेन विरोध  
 इति हृदयम् ।

“देशसामान्येनेति” सामान्यस्य साधारणधर्मतया तज्ज्ञानस्य संशयहेतुतया  
 उर्ध्वस्तरत्वज्ञानेन स्थाणुत्वपुरुषत्वयोरिव गृहबहिर्देशयोराधेयतासम्बन्धेन क्षेत्रे संशये  
 गृहत्वावच्छिन्नप्रकारकज्ञानस्य गृहाभावज्ञानविरोधितया गृहाभावरूपहेतोर्ज्ञानं न  
 सम्भवतीत्यभिप्रायः । शब्दार्थस्तु “देशसामान्येन” देशसामान्यज्ञानेन, “गृह-  
 विरोधाक्षेपः” गृहात्मकविशेषसम्बन्धः, “पाक्षिकः” संशयविषयः, “समानविषय-  
 तया” गृहाभावप्रतियोगितावच्छेदकावच्छिन्नतया, “विरोधः” एकमत्त्वेऽपरा-  
 कृत्वान्तरमः ।

“प्रमाणेति” प्रतियोगितावच्छेदकावच्छिन्नप्रकारकनिश्चयस्यैवाभावधीहेतुतया  
 भेदवत्त्वं न विरोधेनेत्यभिप्रायः, अत्रार्थस्तु स्पष्टः ।

गृहायच्छिन्नेन चैत्राभावेन गृहसात्वं विरद्धत्वात् प्रतिक्षिप्यते, न तु सात्त्वमात्रम्, तस्य तत्रादार्शान्द्यात् । तस्माद्गृहाभावेन लिङ्गेन सिद्धेन सतो बहिर्भावाः नुर्मायत इति युक्तम् । एतेन ' विरुद्धयोः प्रमाणयोर्विषयव्यवस्थयाऽविरोधापादनमर्थापत्तिर्विषय ' इति निरस्तम्, अवच्छिन्नज्ञानवच्छिन्नयोर्विरोधाभावात् । उदाहरणान्तराणि चार्थापत्तेरेवमेवानुमानेऽन्तर्भावनीयानि । तस्माच्चानुमानात्प्रमाणान्तरमर्थापत्तिरिति सिद्धम् ॥

एवमभावोऽपि प्रत्यक्षमेव । न हि भूतलस्य परिणामविशेषात् केवल्यलक्षणादन्यो घटाभावो नाम । प्रतिक्षणपरिणामिनो हि  
( ४८ ) अभावस्य सर्वं एव भावाः, कृते चिन्तिज्ञानेः । स च परिणामभेदप्रत्यक्षेऽन्तर्भावः ॥ ऐन्द्रियक इति नास्ति प्रत्यक्षज्ञानवल्द्वो विषयो यथा भावाद्द्वयं प्रमाणान्तरमभ्युपेयेतेति ॥

सम्भवस्तु, यथा-स्वार्या द्रोणाटकप्रस्थाद्यवगमः । स चानुमानमेव । स्वार्थं हि द्रोणाद्यविनाभूतं प्रतीतेम् स्वार्थां द्रोणादिमात्रमानेऽन्तर्भावः ॥ मवगमयति ॥

यत्त्वानिर्दिष्टप्रवक्तृकं प्रवादपरम्यमात्रम्- ' इति होचुर्द्विः, ' -इत्येतिस्यम्, यथा ' इह वटे यक्षः प्रतिवसति ' इति, न तन् प्रमाणान्तरम्, अनिर्दिष्टप्रवक्तृकत्वेन सांशयिकत्वात् । आतवक्तृकत्वनिश्चये स्वार्थम एव । इत्युपपन्नम् " त्रिविधप्रमाणम् " इति ॥ ५ ॥

एवं तावत्प्रकाश्यात्प्रत्यक्षप्रमेयमिदं प्रमाणानि लक्षितानि । तत्र स्पष्टं पृथिव्यादि स्वरूपतः पामुल्पादको हान्तिकोऽपि प्रायः क्षतः प्रतिपद्यते, पूर्ववता चानुमानेन धूमादिदशनात् बहिरादीनि चेति, तद्गुल्पादनाय मन्दप्रयोजनं शास्त्रम् इति दुरधिगममनेन व्युत्पाद्यम् । तत्र यत्प्रमाणं यत्र शास्त्रम् तदुक्तलक्षणैः प्रमाणैः निवृत्त्य दशयति—

‘सामान्यतस्तु दृष्टात् अतीन्द्रियाणाम्प्रतीतिरनुमानात् ।

तस्मादपि चासिद्धं परोक्षमाप्तागमात् सिद्धम् ॥ ६ ॥

२९-१२

—“ सामान्यत ” इति । ‘ तु ’ शब्दः प्रत्यक्षपूर्ववद्गणं विशिनष्टि । सामा-

(५२) अतीन्द्रियाणा न्यतो दृष्टादनुमानादतीन्द्रियाणां प्रधानपुरुषादीनां

सामान्यतो दृष्टादनुमानात् प्रतीतिः—चित्च्छायापत्तिबुद्धेरध्यवसाय इत्यर्थः ।

प्रतीतिः ॥ -

उपलक्षणं चैतत्, शेषवदित्यपि द्रष्टव्यम् ॥

तर्किक सर्वेष्वतीन्द्रियेषु सामान्यतोदृष्टमेव प्रवर्तते ? । तथा च यत्र तत्रास्ति,

महदाधारम्भक्रमे स्वर्गापूर्वदेवतादीं च, तत्र तेषा-

(५३) सामान्यतो दृष्टा-

दनुमानादसिद्धानामाप्ता-

गमान् सिद्धिः ॥

मभावः प्राप्त इत्यत आह— “ तस्मादपि ” इति ।

तस्मादित्येतावतैव सिद्धे ‘ च ’ कारणे शेषवदित्यपि

समुद्धितम् ॥ ६ ॥

स्वादितन्, यथा गगनकुसुमकूमरोमशशशिषाणादिषु प्रत्यक्षमप्रवर्तमानम्

(५४) प्रत्यक्षाभावात्, तदभावमवगमयति, एवं प्रधानादिवपि । तत्कथं

प्रधानादीनामभावज्ञा ॥ तेषां सामान्यतो दृष्टादिभ्यः सिद्धिरित्यत आह—

३१-१२ अतिदूरात् सामीप्यात् इन्द्रियघातान्मनोऽनवस्थानात् ।

सौभ्याश्रयधानान् अभिभवात् समानाभिहाराच्च ॥ ७ ॥

१: यथा कौमुद्यां तर्कवेधं कारिका व्याख्याता गांडवदेनाथ जयमङ्गलायाम् ॥

इदमपरमपि व्याख्यानमुपलभ्यते चन्द्रिकायाम्—‘ सामान्यतः ’ साधारणस्य वस्तु-

जातस्य प्रतीतिः ‘ दृष्टात् ’ प्रत्यक्षान् भवति ‘ अतीन्द्रियाणा ’ तु प्रतीतिः ‘ अनुमानान् ’

भवति—‘ तरमात् ’ अनुमानान् अपि केचित् पदार्था प्रत्येत्तु न शक्याः—तेषां प्रती-

तिस्तु ‘ आप्तागमात् ’ निष्पत्ति—इति ॥

त. कौ. २ .

“अतिदूरात्” इति । अनुपलब्धिरिति वक्ष्यमाणं सिंहावलोकनत्वात्  
 (५५) तान्त्रिकः, नानुपजनीयम् । यथा उत्पन्नं विद्यति पतन्त्री अतिदू-  
 अतिदूरातिमामीन्द्रि- तया, मन्त्रपि, प्रत्यक्षेण नोपलभ्यते । सामोप्यादित्यत्र  
 यथातमनाऽनवस्थानसौ- प्यतिरनुवर्तनीयः, यथा लोचनस्थमजनमतिमामीप्यात्र  
 क्ष्यथ्यधानाभिभवसमा- दृश्यते । इन्द्रियघातोऽन्धत्ववधिरत्वादिः । “मनोऽन  
 नाभिहारेभ्यः प्रत्यक्षा- वस्थानान्,” यथा कामाद्युपहतमनाः स्फीतालोकमप्य  
 भावः ॥ वर्तितमिन्द्रियमन्निकृष्टमर्थं न पश्यति । “मोक्ष्यात्,”  
 राजद्वारादि न पश्यति । “अभिभवात्,” यथा ऽहनि सौरीभिर्भाभिरभिभूतं प्रह  
 नक्षत्रमण्डलं न पश्यति । “समानाभिहारान्,” यथा तोयदविमुक्तानुद्विन्दू  
 जलाशये न पश्यति ॥

‘च’ कारोऽनुक्तसमुच्चयार्थः । तेनानुद्धवोऽपि मंगृहीतः । तद्यत्र  
 (५६) अनुद्धवादि क्षीराद्यवस्थायां द्रव्याद्यनुद्धवात् पश्यति ॥  
 प्रत्यक्षनिवृत्तिः ॥

पृथक् भवति । न प्रत्यक्षनिवृत्तिमात्रात्स्वभावो भवति, अतिप्रसङ्गात् ।  
 (५७) प्रत्यक्षनिवृत्ति- तथा हि गृहाद्विनिर्गतो गृहजनमपश्यंस्तदभावं  
 रेव नाभावस्य कारणम् । विनिश्चिनुयान्, न त्वेवम् । अपि तु योग्यप्रत्यक्ष-  
 अपि तु योग्यप्रत्यक्ष- निवृत्तेरयमभावं विनिश्चिनोति । न च प्रधानपुरा-  
 निवृत्तिः ॥ दीनामस्ति प्रत्यक्षयोग्यता, इति न तन्निवृत्तिमात्रा-  
 त्तदभावनिश्चयो युक्तः प्रामाणिकानाम् इति ॥ ७ ॥

कतमत्पुनरेतेषु कारणं प्रधानादीनामनुलपधावित्यत आह—

सौक्ष्म्यात्तदनुपलब्धिर्नाभावात्, कार्यतस्तदुपलब्धेः ।

महदादि तच्च कार्यं प्रकृतिसरूपं विरूपं च ॥ ८ ॥

१. यथा निहः पुरतो गत्वा पश्चात् पश्यति तथा ऽग्निमपदस्य यत्र प्राग्गतशब्दः  
 सम्बन्धस्तत्रास्य न्यायस्म प्रकृतिरित्यादिकमस्मदीयन्यायलिकाया द्रष्टव्यम् ॥

“साक्ष्यान्” इति । अथाभावादेव सप्तमरमवदेतेषामनुपलब्धिः कस्मान्न भवतीत्यत आह— “नाभावात्” इति । कुतः ? ( ५८ ) प्रधानानुप- “कार्यतस्तदुपलब्धेः” इति । ‘तत्’ इति प्रधानं परा- लब्ध्या साक्ष्यम् कार- मृशति । पुरयोपलब्ध्या तु प्रमाणं वक्ष्यति, “सद्भा- णम् ॥ तपरार्थत्वात्” (कारिका १७) इति । दृढतरप्रमाणा- यधारिते हि प्रत्यक्षमप्रवर्तमानमयोग्यत्वात् प्रवर्तने इति कल्पते । सप्तमन्तु रमो न प्रमाणेनावधारित इति न तत्र प्रत्यक्षस्या- योग्यता शक्या ऽध्ययमिनुमित्यभिप्रायः ॥

किं पुनस्तत्कार्यं यतः प्रधानानुमानमित्यत आह— “महदादि तच्च कार्यम्” इति । एतच्च यथा गमकम् तथोपरिष्ठादुपपादयिष्यते । ( ५९ ) प्रधानास्ति- तस्य च कार्यस्य विवेकज्ञानोपयोगिनी सारूप्यवैरूप्ये त्वसाधनकारणभूतम- आह— “प्रकृतिसरूपं विरूपं च” इति । एते हृदादिकार्यम् ॥ नृपरिष्ठादिभजनीये इति ॥ ८ ॥

कार्यान् कारगमार्थं गम्यते । मन्ति चात्र घाटिनां विप्रतिपत्तयः । तथा हि केचिद्वाहुः, ‘अमतः सन् जायते’ इति, ‘एकस्य ( ६० ) कार्यकारणग-मतो विवर्तः कार्यजातं न घन्तु सन्’ इत्यपरे, अन्ये स्वन्वे वादिविप्रतिपत्तयः ॥ तु ‘मतः असन् जायते’ इति, ‘मतः सन् जायते’ इति वृद्धाः ॥

तत्र पूर्वमिन्द्र कंठत्रये प्रधान न विष्यति । सुषुप्तदुःखमोहभेदस्वरूप- परिणामशब्दाद्यात्मकं हि जगत् कारणस्य प्रधानस्य ( ६१ ) सत्कार्यपक्ष- प्रधानत्वं स्वप्नरजस्तमस्वभावत्वमवगमयति । यदि एव प्रधानास्ति स्वप्नाश्रयः ॥ पुनरसनः सज्जायेत अमस्तिरपाल्यं कारणं सुखादिरूप- शब्दाद्यात्मकं कथं स्यात्, सद्मतोस्नादाग्न्यानुपपत्तेः? अथैकस्य मतो विवर्तः शब्दादिप्रपञ्चः, तथा ऽपि सतः सज्जायत इति न स्यात् । न चास्याह्वयस्य प्रपञ्चात्मनस्त्वम्, अपि त्वप्रपञ्चस्य प्रपञ्चात्मकतया प्रतीतिर्धेम एव । येषामपि कगभशाक्षरणादीनां मत एव कारणाद्मतो जन्म तेषामपि सद्मतोरेकानुपपत्तेर्न कार्यात्मकं कारणमिति न तन्मते प्रधानमिद्विः



(१२) सत्कार्यप्रति- अंतः प्रधानसिद्धयर्थं प्रथमं तावत्सत्कार्यं प्रति-  
पादनम् ॥ जन्ति—

असदकरणादुपादानग्रहणात् सर्वसंभवाभावात् । ३।१३

शक्तस्य शक्यकरणात्, कारणभावाच्च सत् कार्यम् ॥ ९ ॥

“ असदकरणात् ” इति । “ सत् कार्यम् ”—कारणव्यापारात् प्रागपीति

(६३) बौद्धसिद्धान्त-  
निरासः ॥

शेषः । तथा च न सिद्धसाधनं नैयायिकतनयैस्तद्वा-  
वनीयम् । यद्यपि बीजमृत्पिण्डादिप्रध्वंसानन्तरमदुर्-  
घटाद्युत्पत्तिरुपलभ्यते, तथा ऽपि न प्रध्वंसस्य कारण-  
त्वम्, अपि तु भावस्यैव बीजाश्रयवयवस्य । अभावाद्

भावोत्पत्तौ, तस्य सर्वत्र सुलभत्वात्, सर्वदा सर्वकार्योत्पादप्रसङ्ग इत्यादि  
न्यायवार्तिकनात्पर्यटीकायामस्माभिः प्रतिपादितम् ॥

( ६४ ) वेदान्तमत-  
निरासः ॥

प्रपञ्चप्रत्ययश्चासति बाधके न शक्यो मिथ्येति वदितुम्  
इति ॥

कणभ्रशाक्षचरणमतमवशिष्यते । तत्रेदं प्रतिज्ञातम्, “ सत् कार्यम् ”

इति । अत्र हेतुमाह “ असदकरणात् ” इति । असत्

(६५) न्यायमतनिरासः ।  
असतः करणायाम्यत्वात्  
सत् कार्यमिति प्रथमो  
हेतुः ( १ ) ॥

चेत् कारणव्यापारात् पूर्वं कार्यम्, नास्य सर्वं कर्तुं  
केनापि दाक्यम्, नहि नीलं शिल्पिमहस्त्रेणापि पीतं कर्तुं  
शक्यते । ‘ सदसत्त्वे घटस्य धर्मो ’ इति चेत्, तर्था  
ऽप्यसति धर्मिणि न तस्य धर्म इति सर्वं तदवस्थमेव ।

तथा च नासत्त्वम्, असम्बद्धेनातदात्मना चासत्त्वेन

कथमसन् घटः ? तस्मात् कारणव्यापारादूर्ध्वमिव ततः प्रागपि सदेव कार्यमिति ।

कारणाच्चास्य सतोऽभिव्यक्तिरेषावशिष्यते । सतश्चाभिव्यक्तिरुपपन्ना, यथा

पीठनेन तिलेषु तैलस्यावघातेन घान्येषु तण्डुलानां दोहनेन सौरभेयीषु पथमः ।

१. धर्मिणि ( घटे ) नासत्त्वम् ( घटस्य धर्मः ) ॥ “ असत्त्वं घटे संबद्धं

तदात्मकं भवति न वा ? आद्ये असदात्मकस्य घटस्य असत्त्वं धर्मो न स्यात् ।

सम्बन्धस्य तदात्मकस्य घटसापेक्षत्वात् सत्त्वं स्यात् घटस्येति सर्वं तदवस्थमेव ।

द्वितीयं प्रत्याह—“ असम्बद्धेन ” इति, तस्यासत्त्वे ऽभ्युपगम्यमाने ऽतिप्रसङ्गः

स्यादित्युभयथा ऽपि सत्त्वं घटस्येति ” भारतीयत्यादयः ॥

अग्नतः करणे तु न निदर्शनं किञ्चिदस्ति । न खल्वभिव्यज्यमानं चोत्पद्यमानं वा क्वचिदमदृष्टम् ॥

इतश्च कारणव्यापरात् प्राक् सदेव - कार्यम्—“ उपादानग्रहणात् ” ।

( ६६ ) कार्यकारण-  
सम्बन्धाच्च सत्कार्यमिति  
द्विर्नायो ह्युः ( २ ) ॥

उपादानानि कारणानि, तेषां ग्रहणं, कार्येण सम्बन्धः ।  
उपादानैः कार्यस्य सम्बन्धादिति यावत् । एतदुक्तं  
भवति—कार्येण सम्बन्धं कारणम् कार्यस्य जनकम्,  
सम्बन्धश्च कार्यस्यासतो न सम्भवति, तस्मादिति ॥

स्यादेतन्—असम्बन्धमेव कार्यं कारणैः कस्मात् जन्वते ? तथा घामदेवो-

( ६७ ) कार्यकारण-  
योर्नियतसम्बन्धाभावे  
गर्वकार्यकारणभाव-  
विनाशकतिः ॥

त्पस्यत इत्यत आह—“ सर्वसम्भवाभावात् ” इति ।  
असम्बन्धस्य जन्वत्वे, असम्बन्धत्वाविशेषेण सर्वं  
कार्यजातं सर्वस्मान्नवेत् । न चैतदस्ति, तस्मात्ता-  
सम्बन्धमसम्बन्धेन जन्वते अपि तु सम्बन्धं सम्बन्धेन  
जन्वत इति । यथाहुः सान्ध्यावृदाः—

“ अमत्वे नान्नि सम्बन्धः कारणैः सत्त्वमङ्गिभिः ।

असम्बन्धस्य चोत्पत्तिमिच्छतो न व्ययस्थितिः ” इति ॥

स्यादेतन्—असम्बन्धमपि सत् तदेव करोति यत्र यत् कारणं शक्तम् । शक्तिश्च  
कार्यदर्शनाद्वगम्यते । तेन नाप्ययस्थेत्यत आह

( ६८ ) कारणशक्तेः  
कार्यपरत्वाच्च तत्कार्यम्  
( ३ ) ॥

“ शक्तस्य शक्त्यकरणात् ” इति । सा शक्तिः शक्त-  
कारणाश्रया सर्वत्र वा स्यात्, शक्त्ये एव वा ? सर्वत्र  
चेत्तद्व्यर्थ्याप्यवस्था, शक्त्ये चेत्, कथममति शक्त्ये तत्र,  
इति घकप्यम् । शक्तिभेद एव एतादृशो यतः

किञ्चिदेव कार्यं जनयेत् न सर्वमिति चेत्, इन्न भोः शक्तिविशेषः कार्यसम्बन्धो  
वा असम्बन्धो वा ? सम्बन्धत्वे नामता सम्बन्धः इति सत् कार्यम् । असम्बन्धत्वे  
संवाप्यवस्था, इति सुष्टुक्तं “ शक्तस्य शक्त्यकरणात् ” इति ॥

इतश्च सत् कार्यमित्याह—“ कारणभाराद्य ” । कार्यस्य कारणारम-

( ६९ ) कारणारमत्त्वान् कथ्यात् । नहि कारणाद्विभक्तं कार्यम्, कारणं च सत्,  
कार्यस्य सत् कार्यम् ( ४ ) ॥ इति कथं तद्विभक्तं कार्यमस्य भवेत् ॥

कार्यस्य कारणाभेदसाधनानि च प्रमाणानि—( १ ) न पटस्तन्तुभ्यो भिद्यते, तन्तुधर्मत्वान् । इह यत् यतो भिद्यते तत् तस्य धर्मो न भवति, यथा गौरश्वस्य । धर्मश्च पटस्तन्तूनां, तस्माच्चार्थान्तरम् । ( २ ) उपादानोपादेयभावाच्च नार्थान्तरत्वं तन्तुपटयोः । ययोरर्थान्तरत्वम् न तयोरुपादानोपादेयभावः, यथा घटपटयोः । उपादानोपादेयभावश्च तन्तुपटयोः । तस्माच्चार्थान्तरत्वम् । ( ३ ) इतश्च नार्थान्तरत्वं तन्तुपटयोः, संयोगप्राप्त्यभावात् । अर्थान्तरत्वे हि संयोगो दृष्टो यथा कुण्डवद्वरयोः, अप्राप्तिर्वा यथा हिमवद्विन्ध्ययोः । न चेह संयोगप्राप्ति, तस्माच्चार्थान्तरत्वमिति । ( ४ ) इतश्च पटस्तन्तुभ्यो न भिद्यते, गुरुत्वान्तरकार्याग्रहणात् । इह यत् यस्मान्निष्पद्यते, तत् तस्मात् तस्य गुरुत्वान्तरं कार्यं गृह्यते, यथैकपलिकस्य स्वस्तिकस्य गुरुत्वकार्यो ऽवननिविशोपमत्स्माद्द्विपलिकस्य स्वस्तिकस्य गुरुत्वकार्यो ऽवनतिभेदो ऽधिकः । न च तथा तन्तुगुरुत्वकार्यात् पटगुरुत्वकार्यान्तरं दृश्यते । तस्माद्भिन्नस्तन्तुभ्यः पट इति । तान्येनान्यभेदसाधनान्येकीतानि ॥

एवमभेदे सिद्धे, तन्तये एव तेन तेन संस्थानभेदेन परिणताः पटो, न तन्तुभ्यो ऽर्थान्तरं पटः । स्वात्मनि क्रियाविरोधसंबन्धवुद्धिव्यपदेशार्थक्रियाभेदाच्च नैकान्तिकं भेदं साधयितुमर्हन्ति, एकस्मिन्नपि तत्तद्विशेषाविभाषतिरोभावान्भ्यामेतेषामविरोधात्, यथा हि कूर्मस्याङ्गानि कूर्मशरीरे निविशमानानि तिरोभवन्ति, निःसरन्ति चाविर्भवन्ति । न तु कूर्मस्तदङ्गान्युत्पद्यन्ते प्रध्वंसन्ते वा । एवमेकस्या मृदः सुवर्षन्त्य वा घटमुकुटादवयो विशेषाः निःसरन्त आविर्भवन्त उत्पद्यन्त ह्युच्यन्ते, निविशमानान्तिरोभवन्ति विनश्यन्तीत्युच्यन्ते । न पुनरसतामुत्पादः सतां वा निरोधः । यथाह भगवाद् कृष्णद्वैपायनः—

१. व्यतिरेकानुमानानि । २. स्वात्मनि उत्पत्तिविनाशलक्षणविशुद्धक्रिया, उह तन्तुपु पट इति । अत्र तन्तुपटयोः सम्बन्धस्य ज्ञान भासने तादृशी चोक्तिर्भवति । ३. व्यपदेशः, प्रावरणार्थक्रियाभेदश्च ।

“ नासतो विद्यते भावो नाभावो विद्यते सतः ” इति । ( भगवद्गीता, २।१६ )

यथा कर्मः स्वावयवेभ्यः सङ्कोचविक्रामिभ्यो न भिद्यः, एवं घटमुकुटादयो ऽपि सूरमुवर्गादिभ्यो न भिन्नाः । एवं ज्ञेह तन्तुषु पट इति व्यपदेशो, यथेह वने तिलका<sup>१</sup> इत्युपपन्नः । न चार्थक्रियाभेदो ऽपि भेदमापादयति, एकस्यापि नानार्थ-क्रियादर्शनात् । यथैक एव वह्निर्द्राहकः पाचकः प्रकाशकश्चेति । नाप्यर्थक्रियाव्यवस्था वन्मुभेदे हेतुः, तेषामेव समस्तव्यम्नानामर्थक्रियाव्यवस्थादर्शनात् । यथा अन्येकं विद्यते वन्नेदर्शनलक्षणामर्थक्रियं कुर्वन्ति, न तु शिविकावहनम् । मिलिताम्नु शिविकामुद्रहन्ति, एवं तन्तवः प्रत्येकं प्रावरणमकुर्वाणा अपि मिलिता आविर्भूतपटभावाः प्रावरिष्यन्ति ॥

स्यादेतन्—आविर्भावः पटस्य कारणव्यापारान् प्राक् सन् अमन् वा ? अमंश्चेन् प्राप्तं तद्वत्सदुत्पादनम् । अथ सन्, कृतं तर्हि कारणव्यापारेण । नहि (७२) कर्मस्य कारणपरिणामविशेषत्वे कारणव्यापारस्याप्रयोजकत्व-मनवस्थापत्तिश्च ॥ भावे चाविर्भावान्तरकल्पने ऽनवस्थाप्रसङ्गः । तस्मादाविर्भूतपटभावामन्तवः त्रियन्त इति रिक्तं वचः ॥

मैवम् । अधामदुत्पद्यत इति मते केयममदुत्पत्तिः ? मती, असती (७३) तत्परिहारः । उक्त- या ? मती चेत्, कृतं तर्हि कारणैः । असती चेत्, दोषस्योभयमते तुल्यत्वम् ॥ तस्या अप्युत्पत्त्यन्तरमित्यनवस्था<sup>२</sup> ॥

अथ<sup>३</sup>—‘ उत्पत्तिः पटात्प्रायान्तरम्, अपि तु पट एवार्था ’, तथा ऽपि यावद्दुक्तं भवति ‘ पट ’ इति तावद्दुक्तं भवति (७४) पटतदुत्पत्त्योरैक्य-‘ उत्पद्यते ’ इति । ततश्च ‘ पट ’ इत्युक्ते, ‘ उत्पद्यते ’ शब्दा—तत्परिहारश्च ॥ इति न वाच्यम्, पौनरुक्त्यात् । ‘ वितस्यति ’ इत्यपि न वाच्यम्, उत्पत्तिविनाशयोर्युगपदेकत्र विरोधान् ॥

१. तिलकवृक्षमवयवविषये यथा “ इह वने तिलका ” इति सङ्कल्पेन तथा तन्तुमयपटे ऽर्थाति । २. एवं च शब्दाद्दुद्भाविनो दोषः समान एव पक्षद्वये । ततश्च दैकेनापरमत्र्युद्भावनाय इति । यथाहुर्द्रुमूत्रकाराः—स्वपक्षदोषाचेति— । ३. उक्तानवस्थालक्षणद्वेषपरिजिहीर्षया पटोत्पत्त्योरैक्यं शब्देन ‘ पट एवार्था ’ ततश्च नानवस्थानं दोषः ॥ तर्हि पदार्थशब्दावेनाविग्नमिदमेव परिहरति च ।

- तस्मादियं पटोत्पत्तिः स्वकारणसमवायो वा, स्वसत्तासमवायो वा, उभययोः  
 अपि नोत्पद्यते, अथ च तदर्थानि कारणानि व्यापार्यन्ते ।  
 (७५) पटोत्पत्ता सत्या- एवं सत एव पटादेराविर्भावाय कारणपरिक्षेप्युपपन्नम् ॥  
 मपि कारणव्यापारो- न च पटरूपेण कारणानां सम्बन्धः, तद्रूपस्याक्रिया-  
 पेशा ॥ त्वात्, क्रियासम्बन्धित्वाच्च कारणानाम्, अन्यथा  
 कारणत्वाभावात् ॥  
 (७६) कारिकोप- तस्मात् सत् कार्यमिति पुष्कलम् ॥ १ ॥  
 संहारः ॥

१. पटोत्पत्ता सत्यामपि कारणव्यापारस्य प्रयोजनामित्यभिप्रेत्याह—‘तस्मात्’  
 इति । न्यायमते अपि पटोत्पत्तिः स्वकारणभूततन्तुभिर्युतसिद्धा, स्वसत्तामात्रेण-  
 युतसिद्धा वा भवितुमर्हति । उभययोः अपि तु कारणव्यापारमन्तरेण न पटोत्पत्तिरु-  
 पद्यते । न चाभिव्यक्तैरपि अन्यत्वे सत्कार्यबाधोऽनवस्था चेत्यादि वाच्यम् । व्यव-  
 हारोपयोगितत्तत्कार्योभिव्यक्तेस्तत्तत्कार्यनिष्ठमत्वगुणरूपातया निरव्यक्तेऽपि तमस  
 प्रतिबद्धत्वाच्च व्यवहारोपयोगित्वम् । अभिव्यक्तसामग्र्या तु तमसः प्रतिबन्धः ।  
 उत्तेजकस्याप्युत्तेजनमात्रात्काराच्च सत्कार्यबाधः । कार्यकारणयोर्भेदेऽपि व्यवहारक्षमता  
 कार्योत्तमानाभिव्यक्तस्यैव नान्यथा इत्यादि चन्द्रिकायां स्पष्टम् ॥ “उपसंहरति  
 ‘तस्मादिति’ उत्पत्त्युत्पत्तेरङ्गीकारेऽनवस्थाप्रसङ्गेनानुत्पत्त्याः अप्युत्पत्तेः कारण-  
 व्यापारोपेक्षितवदस्मन्मतेऽपि सत एव घटस्याविर्भावाय कारणव्यापारोपेशा ।  
 पटोत्पत्तिमङ्गीकुर्वाणेन घटे कारणव्यापारोपेक्षित्वस्य प्रयोज्यत्वरूपस्यैवादर्शनीयतया-  
 ऽऽविर्भावे एव तदङ्गीकारमात्रेण निर्वाहे कृतमुत्पत्त्यङ्गीकारेण, युक्तं चैतत्, अन्ययो-  
 त्पत्तिवादे च कार्यस्यैव कारणभोपेक्षतया तस्य च क्रियात्वाभावे क्रियासम्बन्धि-  
 त्वप्रयुक्तकारकत्वकारणत्वव्यवहारानुपपत्तेः सत्कार्यबाध एव साधीयानित्याशयः”  
 इति केचित् । २. न्यायमते कारणस्य सत्तायाः सकलस्य समवायस्य नित्यत्वादि-  
 त्याशयः । ‘नोत्पद्यते’, अपि तु आविर्भावत्येवेति शेषः । ३. भवन्मतेऽपीति शेषः ॥  
 ४. ननु ‘अस्मत्पक्षे—पटरूपाणि कारणानि कुर्वन्ति इति सदुक्तिस्त्वत्पक्षबाधिका’  
 इति चेत्, तत्राह “न च” इति । तद्रूपं चाभिव्यक्तेति भवति तस्योत्पत्तिरिति  
 दृश्यम् ।

तदेवं प्रधानसाधनानुगुणं सत् कार्यमुपपाद्य यादृशं तत् प्रधानं साधनीयं  
(७७) व्यक्ताव्यक्तसारूप्यं रूप्यैरूप्ये तावदाह—  
तादृशमादर्शयितुं विवेकज्ञानोपयोगिनी व्यक्ताव्यक्तसारूप्यैरूप्ये तावदाह—

3.1 हेतुमदनित्यमव्यापि सक्रियमनेकमाश्रितं लिङ्गम् ।

सावययं परतन्त्रं व्यक्तं, विपरीतमव्यक्तम् ॥ १० ॥

(७८) व्यक्तानां सारूप्यम् । तत्र हेतुम-  
स्वम् ॥ (१) “हेतुमत्” इति । व्यक्तं हेतुमत्, हेतुः कारणम्,  
तद्वत्, यस्य च यो हेतुः तमुपरिष्ठाद्दृश्यति ॥

(७९) अनित्य-  
त्वम् ॥ (२) “अनित्यम्,” विनाशि, तिरोभावीति यावत् ॥

“अव्यापि”, सर्वं परिणामिनं न व्याप्नोति । कारणेन हि कार्यमाविष्टम्,  
(८०) अव्यापि-  
त्वम् ॥ (३) न कार्येण कारणम् । न च बुद्धयादयः प्रधानं वेवि-  
पन्तीत्यव्यापकाः ॥

“सक्रियम्”, परिस्पन्दवत् । यथा हि बुद्धयादयः उपात्तमुपात्तं देहं  
(८१) सक्रियत्वम् ॥ (४) त्यजन्ति देहान्तरं चोपाद्दत्त, इति तेषां परिस्पन्दः ।  
शरीरपृथिव्यादीनां च परिस्पन्दः प्रसिद्ध एव ।

“अनेकम्”, प्रतिपुरुषं बुद्धयादीनां भेदात् पृथिव्याद्यपि शरीरघटा-  
(८२) अनेकत्वम् ॥ (५) दिभेदेनानेकमेव ॥

“आश्रितम्”, स्वकारणमाश्रितम् । बुद्धयादिकार्याणामभेदे ऽपि कथं-  
(८३) आश्रित-  
त्वम् ॥ (६) चिन्नेदविवक्षया ऽऽश्रयाश्रयिभावः, यथेह चने तिलका  
इत्युक्तम् ॥

“लिङ्गम्” प्रधानस्य । यथा चैते बुद्धयादयः प्रधानस्य लिङ्गम् तयो-  
(८४) लिङ्गत्वम् ॥ (७) परिष्ठाद्दृश्यति । प्रधानं तु न प्रधानस्य लिङ्गम् पुरपस्य  
लिङ्गमभवदपीति भावः ॥

१. ‘सक्रियम्’ अण्ववरायाद्वरूपनिवृत्तक्रियाकारिरकामिति भाव्ये । २. अथवा  
रुग्भेदेन भिन्नम् । ३. ‘लिङ्गयति’ अनुमानेन भोक्तारं ज्ञापयतीति लिङ्गम् ।

“सावयम्” अवयवावयविसंयोगसंयोगि । अथवा अवयवत्वम्<sup>१</sup> अवयव-  
 अवयवानामवयवविनां मिथः संश्लेषो मिश्रणम् संश्लेष-  
 इति यावत् । अप्राप्तिपूर्विका प्राप्तिः संयोगः । तेन  
 (८५) सावयव- सह वर्तत इति सावयवम् । तथाहि पृथिव्याद्य-  
 त्वम् ॥ (८) परस्परं संयुज्यन्ते, एवमन्ये ऽपि । न तु प्रधानस्य  
 बुद्ध्यादिभिः संयोगः, तादात्म्यात् । नापि सावरजभ्रमसां परस्परं संयोग-  
 अप्राप्तेरभावात् ॥

“परतन्त्रम्” बुद्ध्यादि । बुद्ध्या स्वकार्ये ऽहङ्कारे जनयितव्ये प्रकृत्या  
 (८६) परतन्त्र- पूरो ऽपेक्ष्यते, अन्यथा क्षीणा सती नालमहङ्कारं  
 त्वम् ॥ (९) जनयितुमिति स्थितिः । एवमहङ्कारादिभिरपि स्वकार्यं  
 जनने । इति सर्वैः स्वकार्येषु प्रकृत्या पूरमपेक्षते । तेन  
 परां प्रकृतिमपेक्षमाणं कारणमपि स्वकार्यजनने परतन्त्रं  
 व्यक्तम् ॥

“विपरीतमन्त्रकम्”—व्यक्तात् । अहेतुमज्ञित्वं न्यापि निष्क्रियम्, [ यद्यप्य-  
 (८७) अव्यक्तस्य ध्यक्तस्यास्ति परिणामलक्षणा क्रिया तथा ऽपि परि-  
 विपरीतम् ॥ स्पन्दो नास्ति ॥ ] एकमनाधितमलिङ्गमनवयवत्वं  
 स्वतन्त्रमव्यक्तम् ॥ १० ॥

(८८) व्यक्ताव्यक्तयो- तदनेन प्रबन्धेन व्यक्ताव्यक्तयोर्विधर्म्यमुक्तम्  
 स्माधर्म्याणि पुरुषाद्य सप्रति तयोः साधर्म्यम्, पुरुषाद्य विधर्म्यम्, आर्ह-  
 तयोर्विधर्म्यम् ॥

त्रिगुणमविवेकि द्विपयः सामान्यमचेतनमप्रसवधर्मि ।

व्यक्तं, तथा प्रधानम्, तद्विपरीतस्तथा च पुमान् ॥ ११ ॥

(८९) त्रिगुणत्वम् “त्रिगुणम्” इति । त्रयो गुणाः सुखदुःखमोहा  
 प्रथमम् साधर्म्यम् ॥ अस्पृतेति त्रिगुणम् । तदनेन सुप्तादीनामात्मगुणत्वम्  
 (९) विपरीतमन्त्रकम् ।

“अविचेकि” । यथा प्रधानं न स्वतो विविच्यते, एवमहदादयो ऽपि न प्रधानान् विविच्यन्ते, तदात्मकत्वात् । अथ वा (१०) अविबोद्धित्वम् सम्भूयकारिता ऽत्राविचेकिता । न हि किञ्चिदेकं पर्याप्तन् स्वकार्ये, अपि तु सम्भूय । तत्र नैकस्मात् यस्य कस्यचिन् केनचित्तरम्भव इति ॥

ये<sup>१</sup> स्वाहुः—‘विज्ञानमेव हर्षविषादमोहशब्दाद्यात्मकम्, न पुनरितो ऽन्यस्तद्वर्मा’ इति—तान् प्रत्याह—“विषय” इति । (११) विषयत्वम् सा- ‘विषयो’ ग्राह्यः, विज्ञानाद्बहिरिति यावन् । अत एव “सामान्यम्” साधारणम्, अनेकैः पुरुषैर्गृहीतमित्यर्थः । विज्ञानाकारत्वे तु, असाधारण्याद्विज्ञानानां वृत्तिरूपाणां, ते ऽप्यसाधारणाः स्युः । विज्ञानं परेण न गृह्यते परबुद्धेरप्रत्यक्षत्वादित्यभिप्रायः । तथा च नतंकी-भूलतामज्ञे एकस्मिन् बहूनां प्रतिसन्धानं युक्तम् । अन्यथा<sup>२</sup> तन्न स्यात् इति भावः ॥

(१२) अचेतनत्वम् “अचेतनम्” । सर्व एव प्रधानबुद्ध्यादयो ऽचेतनाः, न तु वैनाशिकवत् चैतन्यबुद्धेरित्यर्थः ॥

“प्रसवधर्मि” । प्रसवरूपो धर्मो यः सो ऽस्यास्तीति प्रसवधर्मि । [ प्रसवधर्मेति वक्तव्ये मन्वर्थायः प्रसवधर्मस्य नित्य-योगनाम्यानुम् ] । स्वरूपविरूपपरिणामाभ्यां न कदाचिदपि विद्युज्यत इत्यर्थः ॥

(१४) उक्तव्यक्तधर्मा- व्यक्तवृत्तमव्यक्ते ऽतिदिशति, “तथा प्रधानम्” णामव्यक्ते ऽतिदेशः ॥ इति । यथा व्यक्तं तथा ऽव्यक्तमित्यर्थः<sup>३</sup> ॥

(१५) व्यक्तव्यक्तयोः ताभ्यां वैधर्म्यं पुरस्तात् ऽऽह—“तद्विपरितः पुर्यात् वैधर्म्यम् ॥ पुमान्” इति ॥

\* १. विज्ञानवादिनो बांदाः । २. तेषां विज्ञानाकारत्वे । ३. त्रिगुणत्वादि-साधर्म्यं व्यक्तव्यक्तयोरिति यावन् ।



स्यादितत्-अहेतुमत्त्वनित्यत्वादि प्रधानसाधर्म्यमस्ति गुरुपत्न्य, एवमेव  
 कर्तव्यं व्यक्तसाधर्म्यम्, तत्कथमुच्यते 'तद्विपरीतं  
 (१६) साधर्म्यं च ॥ पुमान्' इति? अत आह-"तथा च" इति।  
 चकारो ऽप्यर्थः' । यत्तस्यहेतुमत्त्वादि साधर्म्यं  
 तत्राप्यत्रैगुण्यादि वैपरीत्यमरूपेवेत्यर्थः ॥ ११ ॥

द्विगुणमित्युक्तम्, तत्र के ते त्रयो गुणाः, किं च तदुपलक्षणमित्य  
 (१७) गुणनिरूपणम् ॥ अह—

प्रीत्यप्रीतिविपादात्मकाः प्रकाशप्रवृत्तिनियमार्थाः । ३-1

अन्योन्याभिभवाश्रयजननमित्यनवृत्तयश्च गुणाः ॥ १२ ॥

"गुणाः" [ परार्थाः ] "सावं लघु प्रकाशकम्" [ कारिका ११ ]

(१८) गुणानां स्वरूपं इत्यत्र निर्देह्यन्ते । तदनागतविषयेण तन्त्रयुक्त्या च  
 पाणि, सुखदुःखायोः पर- प्रीत्यादीनां यथासंख्यं वेदितव्यम् ॥

स्वरूपमावृत्तयुक्त्या च

एतदुक्तं भवति-प्रीतिः सुखम्, प्रीत्यात्मकः सखगुणः; अप्रीतिर्दुःखम्, अप्री-

(१९) उपलक्षणस- इत्यत्र निर्देह्यन्ते । ये तु मन्यन्ते "न प्रीतिर्दुःखमा  
 मन्वयः ॥ स्तमोगुणः इत्यर्थः । ये तु मन्यन्ते "न प्रीतिर्दुःखमा  
 चादतिरिच्यते, एवं दुःखमपि न प्रीत्यभावादन्यदिति,"  
 तान् प्रति "आराम"-प्रहणम् । नैतरेतराभावा

सुखादयः, अपि तु भावाः, आरामशब्दस्य भाववचनत्वात् । प्रीतिः आराम  
 भावो येषां ते प्रीत्यात्मानः । एवमन्यदपि व्याख्येयम् । भावरूपता येषामनु-  
 भवमिदा । परस्परभावात्मकत्वे तु परस्परश्रयापत्तेरेकस्याप्यसिद्धेरानया-  
 सिद्धिरिति भावः ॥

१, च=अपि । २, आर्जवशब्दादीनां प्रीत्यात्मानतां, द्वेषमोहविषयत्वमनयादीनां  
 याप्रीत्या ।

स्वरूपमेवामुक्त्वा प्रयोजनमाह- “ प्रकाशप्रवृत्तिनियमायांः ” इति ।  
 १००) गुणानां प्रयो- अत्रापि यथासंख्यमेव । रजः प्रवर्तकत्वात् सर्वत्र लघु  
 तम-यथासख्यं प्रकाश- सखं प्रवर्तयेत्, यदि तमसा गुण्णा न नियम्येत ।  
 तृत्तिनियमरूपम् ॥ तमोनियतन्तु क्वचिदेव प्रवर्तयतीति भवति तमो  
 नियमार्थम् ॥

प्रयोजनमुक्त्वा क्रियामाह- “ अन्योन्याभिभवश्चयजननमिधुनवृत्तयश्च ”  
 इति । वृत्तिः क्रिया, सा च प्रत्येकमभिमन्वध्यते ।  
 (१०१) गुणानां क्रियाः, ‘ अन्योन्याभिभववृत्तयः ’ । एषामन्यतमेनार्थवशाद्दु-  
 अन्योन्याभिभव-अन्यो- द्भूतेनान्यदभिभूयते । तथा हि सखं रजस्तमसी  
 न्यापेश-अन्योन्यापेश- अभिभूय शान्तामामनो वृत्तिं प्रतिलभते, एवं रजः  
 जनन-अन्योन्यमिधुन- सखतमसी अभिभूय घोराम्, एवं तमः सखरजसी  
 वृत्तिरूपाः ॥ अभिभूय मूढामिति । ‘ अन्योन्याश्रयवृत्तयः ’ ।

यद्यप्याधाराधेयभावेन नायमर्थो घटते, तथा ऽपि  
 यदपेक्षया यस्य क्रिया स तस्याश्रयः । तथा हि, सखं प्रवृत्तिनियमावाश्रित्य  
 रजस्तमसोः प्रकाशेनोपकरोति, रजः प्रकाशनियमावाश्रित्य प्रवृत्त्येतरयोः, तमः  
 प्रकाशप्रवृत्ती आश्रित्य नियमेनेतरयोरिति । ‘ अन्योन्यजननवृत्तयः ’ ।  
 अन्यतमो ऽन्यतममपेक्ष्य जनयति । जननं च परिणामः, स च गुणानां  
 सदृशरूपः । अत एव न हेतुमावम्, तत्त्वान्तरम्य, हेतोरसम्भवात्, नाप्य-  
 निरत्यरवम्, तत्त्वान्तरे लयाभावात् । ‘ अन्योन्यमिधुनवृत्तयः ’ । अन्योन्य-  
 सहचराः, अविनाभाववृत्तय इति यावत् । ‘ चः ’ समुच्चये । भवति चात्रागमः-

“ अन्योन्यमिधुनाः सर्वे सर्वे सर्वत्रगाग्निनः ।

रजसो मिधुने सखं सखस्य मिधुने रजः ॥

तमसश्चापि मिधुने ते सखरजसी उभे ।

उभयोः सखरजसीमिधुने तम उच्यते ॥

नैपामादिः सम्प्रयोगो विद्योगो वीपलभ्यते ” ॥ इति देवी-

भागवत-३।८. ॥ १२ ॥

“ प्रकाशप्रवृत्तिनियमार्थाः ” इत्युक्तम्, तत्र के ते इत्थम्भूताः कुतश्चेत्यत्र  
(१०२) - गुणत्रयनिरूपणम्, तेषां पृथक्स्वभावश्च ॥ आह—

४०१ सत्त्वं लघु प्रकाशकमिष्टमुपष्टम्भकं चलं च रजः ।

गुरु वरणकमेव तमः, प्रदीपवच्चार्थतो वृत्तिः ॥ १३ ॥

“ सत्त्वम् ” इति । सत्त्वमेव लघु प्रकाशकमिष्टम्-सांख्याचार्यैः । तत्र

(१०३) सत्त्वगुणस्वभावः-लाघवम्, प्रकाशकत्वम् ॥ कार्योत्क्रमेण हेतुर्धर्मो लाघवम् गौरवप्रतिबन्धि यत्  
ऽप्रेरुर्ध्वगदलनं भवति, तदेव लाघवम् कस्यचित्तो गमने हेतुर्भवति, यथा वायोः । एवं करणाना वृत्ति पटुत्वहेतुर्लाघवम्, गुरुत्वे हि मन्दानि स्युरिति सत्त्वस्य प्रकाशात्मकत्वमुक्तम् ॥

सत्त्वतमसी स्वयमक्रियतया स्वकार्यप्रवृत्तिं प्रत्यवसीदन्ती रजसोपष्टम्भे

(१०४) रजोगुणस्वभावः-उपष्टम्भकत्वम्, चलत्वम् ॥ अवमादात् प्रच्याव्य स्वकार्यं उरमाहं प्रयत्नं कार्थेन।  
तद्विदमुक्तम्-“ उपष्टम्भकं रजः ” इति । कल्पादित्यत उक्तम्-“ चलम् ” इति । तद्वनेन रजन प्रवृत्त्यर्थत्वं दर्शितम् ॥

रजसु चलतया परितर्खेगुण्यं चालयेत्, गुरुणा ऽऽवृण्वता च तमया तत्र

(१०५) तमोगुणस्वभावः-गुरुत्वम् आवरणकत्वम् ॥ तत्र प्रवृत्तिप्रतिबन्धकेन क्वचिदेव प्रवर्त्यते इति तन्-  
स्ततो व्यावृत्त्या तमो नियामकमुक्तम्-“ गुणवर्णकमेव तमः ” इति । एवकारः प्रत्येकं भिन्नप्रकृतं सम्यध्यते, सत्त्वमेव, रज एव, तम एवेति ॥

ननु ‘ एने परस्परविरोधशीला गुणाः सुन्दोऽसुन्दवत् परस्परं ध्वंसन्

(१०६) परस्परविरोधदानामपि गुणानामर्थवशात् सहर्शितान्यम् ॥ इत्येव युक्तम्, ‘ प्रागेव स्वनेपामेकक्रियाकर्तृता’-इत्यत्र आह-“ प्रदीपवच्चार्थतो वृत्तिः ” इति । दृष्टेनैतन्, यथा यत्सिर्नेले अनलविरोधिनी, अथ मित्रिणे सदानलेन रूपप्रकाशलक्षणं कार्यं कुरतः; तथा च यत् वित्तश्रेष्माणः परस्परविरोधिनाः शरीरधारणलक्षणकार्य-

१. अर्थावभासकमिति यावत् ॥ २. प्रकाशकत्वमिति यावत् । ३. इत्येव । वा कथा परस्परसंज्ञानामेकक्रियाकारिताया इति भावः ।

कारिणः; एवं सत्त्वरजस्तमांसि मिथोविरुद्धान्यप्यनुवत्स्यन्ति स्वकार्यं करि-  
ष्यन्ति च । “ अर्थत ” इति पुरुषार्थत इति यावत्, यथा च वक्ष्यति—

“ पुरुषार्थं एव हेतुर्न केनचित् कार्यते करणम् ” इति ॥ [ कारिका ३१ ]

अत्र च सुखदुःखमोहाः परस्परविरोधिनः स्वस्वानुरूपाणि सुखदुःखमोहा-  
त्मकान्येष निमित्तानि<sup>१</sup> कल्पयन्ति । तेषां च परस्पर-

( १०७ ) सुखदुःख- मभिभाष्याभिभावकभावात्तानात्वम् । तद्यथा एकैव  
मोहानापरस्परविरुद्धत्वा- स्त्री रूपयौवनकुलशोलसम्पन्ना स्वामिनं सुखाकरोति;  
तेषां निमित्तरूपेण शुण- तत्कस्य हेतोः? स्वामिनं प्रति तस्या. सुखरूपसमु-  
द्रयस्या ऽऽवश्यकत्वम् ॥ ज्ञवात् । सैव स्त्री सपत्नीर्दुःखाकरोति; तत् कस्य  
हेतोः? ताः प्रति तस्याः दुःखरूपसमुद्भवात् । एवं  
पुरुषान्तरं तामविन्द्रमानं सैव मोहयति; तत् कस्य हेतोः? तत्र प्रति तस्याः  
मोहरूपसमुद्भवात् । अनया च स्त्रिया मर्षं भावा व्याख्याताः । तत्र यत्  
सुखहेतुः तत् सुखात्मकम् सत्यम्, यत् दुःखहेतुः तत् दुःखात्मकं रजः,  
यन्मोहहेतुस्तन्मोहात्मकं नमः । सुखप्रकाशलाघवानां त्वेकस्मिन् युगपद्दुःभूता-  
वविरोधः, सहदर्शनात् । तस्मात्<sup>३</sup> सुखदुःखमोहैरिव विरोधिभिः अविरोधि-  
भिरैकैकगुणवृत्तिभिः सुखप्रकाशलाघवर्षनं निमित्तभेदा उच्यते । एवं दुःखो-  
पष्टम्भकवप्रवर्तकत्वैः, एवं मोहगुरुत्वावरणैः—इति मिदं त्रैगुण्यमिति ॥ १३ ॥

सादेतत्—अनुभूयमानेषु पृथिव्यादिष्वनुभवमिद्धाः भवन्त्वविवेकित्वाद्यः ।

( १०८ ) अननुभवमि- ये पुनः सत्त्वादयो नानुभवपथमधिरोहन्ति तेषां  
देषु सत्त्वादिष्वविवेकि- कृतस्यमविवेकित्वम्, विषयत्वमचेतनत्वम् प्रसवध-  
त्वादिगुणसम्भवशङ्का ॥ मिथं च? इत्यत आह—

१. सत्त्वरजस्तमोरूपाणि । २. सत्त्वरजस्तमांसीव सुखदुःखमोहानाम्,

सुखप्रकाशलाघवानामपि भिन्नानि निमित्तानि कस्मान्नोक्तान्याशङ्क्या ऽह—

“ मुजेति ” । ३. यथा सुखदुःखमोहाः परस्परविरुद्धाः भिन्नानि निमित्तानि

सत्त्वरजस्तमोरूपाणि कल्पयन्ति—न तथा सुखप्रकाशलाघवादीनामेकैकगुणवृत्तिष्वे

कथिद्द्विरोधोऽस्ति, येन भिन्नानि निमित्तानि कल्पेरन् इति भावः । अविरोधिनामपि

भिन्ननिमित्तकल्पने ऽनवग्याऽपि ॥

अविवेक्यादेः सिद्धिस्त्रैगुण्यात्तद्विपर्ययाभावात् ।

कारणगुणात्मकत्वात्कार्यस्याव्यक्तमपि सिद्धम् ॥ १४ ॥

“ अविवेक्यादेः ” इति । अविवेकित्वमविवेकि-यथा ‘ व्येकयोर्द्विवचने कवचने ’ [ पाणिनिस्मृत. १।४।२२ ] इत्यत्र द्वित्वं

( १०९ ) तन्निरासः- कत्वयोरिति अन्यथा व्येकैत्विति स्यात् । कुतः पुनरपि गुणत्रयाविवेकित्वसाध- वेकित्वादेः सिद्धिरित्यत आह-“ त्रैगुण्यात् ” २. १. नान्वयव्यातिरेकां ॥ सुखदुःखमोहात्मकं तत्तदविवेकित्वादिद्योगि यथेदमनुभूयमानं व्यक्तम् -इति स्फुटत्वाद्भवयो

व्यतिरेकमाह-“ तद्विपर्ययाभावान् ” इति । अविवेक्यादिविपर्यये पुनः त्रैगुण्याभावान् । अथ वा व्यक्ताव्यक्तं पक्षीकृत्यान्वयाभावेनावीतः । हेतुस्त्रैगुण्यादिति वक्तव्यः ॥

स्यादेतन्-अव्यक्तसिद्धौ सत्यां तस्याविवेकित्वादयो धर्माः ।  
अव्यक्तमेव त्वत्त्वादि न सिध्यति,

( ११० ) अव्यक्तसा- दिसिद्धिरत आह-“ कारणगुणात्मकत्वात् ” इति ।  
धनम् ॥ अयमभिसन्धिः-कार्यं हि कारणगुणात्मकं दृष्टम्,

तत्त्वादिगुणात्मकं पटादि । तथा मत्त

कार्येण सुखदुःखमोहरूपेण स्वकारणगतसुखदुःखमोहारमना भवितव्यम् । तत्र च ताकारणं सुखदुःखमोहारमकं प्रधानमव्यक्तं सिद्धम् भवति ॥ १४ ॥

स्यादेतन्-‘ व्यक्तात् व्यक्तमुत्पद्यते ’ इति कणभक्षाक्षिचरणतनयाः ॥ ११

( १११ ) व्यक्तादेव माणवो हि व्यक्तः, तस्मैणुकादिप्रमेण पृथिव्यादि सर्वकार्यसारणभावोपर- लक्षणं कार्यंव्यक्तमारभ्यते । पृथिव्यादिषु च कारणगुण क्रमेण रूपाद्युत्पत्तिः ।  
सैरव्यक्तकारणकृत्तना- चोत्पत्तेः कृतमदृष्टशरेणाप्यक्षेनेत्यत आह-

१. मत्तादयोऽ विवेकित्वादिद्योगिनः त्रैगुण्यात् सुखदुःखमोहारमकत्वादिति स्वरूपमनुमानस्य । २. पृथिव्यादि । ३. ‘ यत्राविवेकित्वाभावस्तत्र त्रैगुण्याभाव इत्येवंरूपम् ।

स्यादेतन्-शक्ति प्रवृत्ति कारणकार्यविभागाविभागौ च महत् एव परमा  
व्यक्तत्वसाधयिष्यत, कृततत परेणाव्यक्तेनेत्यत आह-  
(११४) महदादिपर्ये “परिमाणात्” इति । परिमितत्वान्, अव्यापित्वा  
न्तम्य कार्यनातस्य द्विति यावत् । विवादाध्यासिता महदादिभेदा अव्य  
परिमितत्वाच्चेति नृती नकारणवन्त, परिमितत्वान्, घटादिवत् । घटादयो  
यम् ( ३ ) ॥ हि परिमिता मृदाद्यव्यक्तकारणका दृष्टा । उक्तमेतद्यथा  
कार्यस्याव्यक्तावस्था कारणमेवेति, यन्महत् कारण  
तत् परमाव्यक्तम्, तत परतराव्यक्तकल्पनाया प्रमाणाभावात्<sup>१</sup> ॥

इतश्च विवादाध्यासिता भेदा अव्यक्तकारणवन्त —“समन्वयान्<sup>२</sup>” ।  
भिन्नाना समानरूपता समन्वय । मुखदु खमोहस  
(११४) समन्वयाच्चेति मन्विता हि बुद्ध्यादयो ऽध्यवसायादिलक्षणा प्रती  
चतुर्थम् ( ४ ) ॥ यन्ते । यानि च यद्रूपसमनुगतानि तानि तत्स्वभावा  
व्यक्तकारणानि, यथा मृद्धेमपिण्डसमनुगता घ  
मुक्तादयो मृद्धेमपिण्डाव्यक्तकारणका इति—कारणमस्त्यव्यक्त भेदानामिति  
मिदम् ॥ १५ ॥

अव्यक्त साधयिवा अस्य प्रवृत्तिप्रकारमाह—

5.1 कारणमस्त्यव्यक्तम्, प्रवर्तते त्रिगुणत समुदयाच्च ।

परिणामत सलिलवत् प्रतिप्रतिगुणाश्रयविशेषात् ॥ १६ ॥

“प्रवर्तते त्रिगुणत” इति । प्रतिसर्गावस्थाया सत्त्वं रजस्तमश्च सत्त्वं

(११६) प्रकृतौश्च  
गुणत प्रवृत्ति प्रथमा  
( १ ) ॥

परिणामानि भवन्ति । परिणामस्वभावा हि गुणा नाप  
रिणमद्य क्षणमप्यवतिष्ठन्ते । तस्मान् सत्त्वं सत्त्वरूप  
तया रजो रजारूपतया तमन्ममोरूपतया प्रतिसर्गा  
वस्थायामपि प्रवर्तते । तदिदमुक्तम् “त्रिगुणत”  
इति ॥

प्रवृत्त्यन्तरमाह—“समुद्रयाश्च” इति । समेत्य उदयः ‘समुद्रयः’ सम-  
 वायः । समुद्रयश्च गुणानाम् न गुणप्रधानभावमन्तरेण  
 (११७) प्रवृत्तेस्समु- सम्भवति, न च गुणप्रधानभावो वैषम्यं विना, न च  
 द्यान् प्रवृत्तिर्द्वितीया वैषम्यमुत्पन्नमदोषमदोषभावाद्गते । इति महदादिभावेन  
 (२) ॥ प्रवृत्तिर्द्वितीया ॥

स्यादेतन्—कथमेकरूपाणां गुणानामनेकरूपा प्रवृत्तिरित्यत आह—“परिणा-  
 मनः सलिलवत्” इति । यथा हि चारिद्विमुक्तमुद-  
 (११८) प्रवृत्तेः प्रवृत्तिः कमेकरूपमपि तत्तद्भूतिकारानासाद्य नारिकेलतालता-  
 परिणामतो नानाप्रकाराः॥ लीबिल्वचिरदिल्वतिन्दुकामलकप्राचीनामलककपित्थ-  
 कटरमतया परिणमन्नपुरामल्लवणतिककपायकटुतया  
 विकल्प्यते, एवमेकैकगुणममुद्रयात् प्रधानगुणाः परिणामभेदान् प्रवर्तयन्ति ।  
 तद्विद्वमुक्तम्—“प्रतिप्रतिगुणाश्रयविशेषात्” । एकैकगुणाश्रयेण गो विशेष-  
 मन्मादित्यर्थः ॥ १६ ॥

ये तु तौष्टिका अव्यक्तं वा महान्तं वा ऽहङ्कारं वा इन्द्रियाणि वा भूतानि  
 (११९) पुरुषास्त्वि- वा ऽऽत्मानमभिमन्यमानास्तान्धेवौपासते तान्  
 साधनम् ॥ प्रत्याह—

संघातपरार्थत्वात् त्रिगुणादिविपर्ययादधिष्ठानात् ।  
 पुरुषो ऽस्ति भोक्तृभावात्कैवल्यार्थं प्रवृत्तेश्च ॥ १७ ॥

“संघातपरार्थत्वात्” इति । पुरुषो ऽस्ति, अव्यक्तादेर्व्यतिरिक्तः । कुतः ?  
 “संघातपरार्थत्वात्” । अव्यक्तमहदहङ्कारादयः  
 (१२०) संघातानां परार्थाः, संघातत्वात्, शयनासनाभ्यङ्गादिवत्,  
 परार्थत्वादिति प्रथम- सुखदुःखमोहात्मकतया ऽव्यक्तादयः सर्वे  
 साधनम् (१) ॥ संघाताः॥

१ यदर्थः सहाताः सोऽत्रिगुणविवेकित्वादियोग्यवश्यं स्यात् । स च पुरुष एव ।

स्वादेतन्-क्षयनांमनादयः संघाताः संहतररीरायां दृष्टाः, न त्वात्मानम-  
 व्यक्ताद्यतिरिक्तं प्रति परार्थाः । तस्मात् संघातान्तरमेव  
 (१२१) संघातानां परं गमयेयुः, त एवसंहतात्मानम् इत्यत आह—  
 संघातान्तरार्थत्वे ऽनव- “त्रिगुणादिविपर्ययात्” इति । अयमभिप्रायः—  
 स्या त्रिगुणादिविपर्य- संघातान्तरार्थत्वे हि तस्यापि संघातत्वात् तेनापि  
 यथ ॥ संघातान्तरार्थेन भवितव्यम्; एवं सैन तेनेत्यनवस्था

स्यात् । न च व्यवस्थायां सत्यामनवस्था युक्ता,  
 कल्पनार्गोत्त्वप्रसङ्गान् । न च ‘प्रमाणबलेन कल्पनार्गौरवमपि मृष्यत’ इति  
 युक्तम्, संहतत्वस्य पारार्थ्यमात्रेणान्वयात् । दृष्टान्तदृष्टसर्वधर्मानुरोधेन त्वनु-  
 मानमिच्छतः मर्चानुमानोच्छेदप्रसङ्ग इत्युपपादितं न्यायवार्तिकतात्पर्यटीका-  
 यामस्माभिः । तस्माद्नवस्थाभिः ऽभ्यासंघातत्वमिच्छता ऽत्रिगुणत्वं द्विवेकि-  
 त्वमविपर्ययत्वमसामान्यत्वं चेन्नत्वमप्रसवधर्मित्वञ्चाभ्युपेयम् । त्रिगुणत्वादयो हि  
 धर्माः संहतत्वेन व्याप्ताः । तत्संहतत्वमस्मिन् परे व्यावर्तमानं त्रैगुण्यदि  
 व्यावर्तयति, ब्राह्मणत्वमिव व्यावर्तमानं कटत्वादिकम् । तस्मादाद्यर्थेण  
 ‘त्रिगुणादिविपर्ययात्’ इति वदता ऽसंहतः परं विवक्षितः, स चास्मेति  
 सिद्धम् ॥

इतश्च परः पुरुषो ऽस्ति—“अधिष्ठानात्”, त्रिगुणात्मकानामधिष्ठीयमान-  
 (१२२) त्रिगुणात्मका- र्वात् । यद्यत्सुखदुःखमोहात्मकं तत्सर्वं परेणाधिष्ठीय-  
 नामधिष्ठीयमानत्वादिनि त्तित्वात् । सुखदुःख-  
 द्वितीयं साधनम् (२) ॥ मोहात्मकं चेदं बुद्ध्यादि, तस्मादेतदपि परेणाधिष्ठा-  
 तव्यम् । न च परस्त्रैगुण्यादन्य आत्मेति ॥

इतश्चामि पुरुषो—“भोक्त्रुभावात्” । भोक्त्रुभावेन भोग्ये सुखदुःखे उप-  
 (१२३) भोक्त्रुभावा- लक्षयति । भोग्ये हि सुखदुःखे अनुकूलप्रतिकूलवेदनीये  
 दिनि तृतीयम् (३) ॥ प्रत्यात्ममनुभूयेते । तेनानयोरनुकूलनीयेन प्रतिकूलनीयेन  
 च केनचिदप्यन्येन भवितव्यम् । न चानुकूलनीयाः  
 प्रतिकूलनीया वा बुद्ध्यादयः, तेषां सुखदुःखाद्यात्मक-

१. सुखदुःखादयो भोगाः । अतो भोक्त्रे पुरे सुखदुःखाद्यात्मकत्वज्ञ  
 गम्भवति । तस्मान् पुरे त्रैगुण्यविपर्ययः ॥



स्वेन स्वात्मनि घृत्तिविहोधात् । तस्मात् यो ऽमुखाद्यात्मा सो ऽनुकूलनीयः  
प्रतिकूलनीयो वा, स चा ऽऽत्मेति ॥

अन्ये त्वाहुः—भोग्या दृश्या बुद्ध्यादयः । न च द्रष्टारमन्तरेण दृश्यता युक्ता  
(१२४) भोक्तृभावा-  
दित्यस्य द्रष्टृभावादि-  
त्यर्थो ऽपि सम्भवति ॥  
तेषाम् । तस्मादस्ति द्रष्टा दृश्यबुद्ध्याद्यतिरिक्तः, स  
चा ऽऽत्मेति । भोक्तृभावात् द्रष्टृभावात्, दृश्येन  
द्रष्टुरनुमानादित्यर्थः । दृश्यत्वं च बुद्ध्यादीनां सुखा-  
द्यात्मकतया पृथिव्यादिवद्रनुमितम् ॥

इतश्चास्ति पुरुष इत्याह—“कैवल्यार्थं प्रवृत्तेश्च” इति । शास्त्राणां महर्षीणां  
दिव्यलोचनानां च कैवल्यमात्यन्तिकदुःखत्रयप्रशमलक्षणं  
(१२५) शास्त्राणां कैव-  
ल्यार्थं प्रवृत्तेरिति चतुर्थं  
साधनम्—(४) ॥  
न बुद्ध्यादीनां सम्भवति । ते हि दुःखाद्यात्मकाः कथं  
स्वभावाद्द्वियोजयितुं शक्यन्ते । तदतिरिक्तस्य स्वतदा-  
त्मनस्ततो वियोगः शक्यसम्भवादः, तस्मात् कैवल्यार्थं  
प्रवृत्तेरागमानां महाधियां चास्ति बुद्ध्यादिष्व्यतिरिक्त-  
आत्मेति सिद्धम् ॥ १७ ॥

तदेवं पुरुषास्तिष्ठं प्रतिपाद्य, स किं सर्वशरीरेष्वेकः किमनेकः प्रतिक्षेत्रमिति  
(१२६) पुरुषबहुत्व-  
साधनानि ॥ संशये, तस्य प्रतिक्षेत्रमनेकत्वमुपपादयति—

जननमरणकरणानां प्रतिनियमादयुगपत्प्रवृत्तेश्च ।

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पुरुषबहुत्वं सिद्धं त्रैगुण्यविपर्ययाच्चैव ॥ १८ ॥

जननेत्यादिना । “पुरुषबहुत्वं सिद्धम्” । कस्मात्? “जननमरण-  
(१२७) जन्ममरण-  
प्रतिनियमादिति प्रथ-  
मम् (१) ॥  
करणानां प्रतिनियमात्” । निष्कायविशिष्टाभिरपूर्वा-  
भिर्देहेन्द्रियमनो ऽहकारबुद्धिवेदनाभिः पुरुषस्याभि-  
सम्यन्धो जन्म, न तु पुरुषस्य परिणमः, तस्यापरि-  
णामिन्वान् । तेषामेव च देहादीनामुपात्तानां परित्यागो  
भरणम्, नत्वात्मनो विनाशः, तस्य कूटस्थनित्यत्वान् ।  
करणानि बुद्ध्यादीनि त्रयोदश । तेषां जन्ममरणकरणानां प्रतिनियमो व्यवस्था ।

सा ग्त्वियं सर्वशरीरेष्वेकस्मिन् पुरुषे नोपपद्यते । तदा खट्वेकस्मिन् पुरुषे जायमाने सर्वं जायेत्, द्वियमाणे च द्वियेत्, अन्धादौ चैकस्मिन् सर्वं एव अन्धादयो, विचित्ते चैकस्मिन् सर्वं एव विचित्ताः स्युरित्यव्यवस्था स्यात् । प्रतिक्षेत्रं तु पुरुषभेदे भवति व्यवस्था । न च ' एकस्यापि पुरुषस्य देहोपादान-भेदाद्यवस्था ' इति युक्तम्, पाणिम्नानाद्युपाधिभेदेनापि जन्ममरणादिव्यवस्था-प्रसङ्गात् । न हि पाणौ वृक्षे, जाते वा मनादौ महत्यवयवे युवतिर्मृता जाता वा भवतीति ॥

इतश्च प्रतिक्षेत्रं पुरुषभेद इत्याह—“ अयुगपत्प्रवृत्तेश्च ” इति । प्रवृत्तिः प्रयत्नलक्षणा यद्यप्यन्तःकरणवर्तिनी, तथा ऽपि ( १२८ ) पुरुषाणाम-पुरुषे उपचर्यते । तथा च तस्मिन्नेकत्र शरीरे प्रयत्न-युगपत्प्रवृत्तेरिति द्वितीय-माने, स एव सर्वशरीरेष्वेक इति सर्वत्र प्रयतेत, ततश्च सर्वाण्येव शरीराणि युगपच्छालयेत् । नानात्वे तु नायं दोष इति ॥

इतश्च पुरुषभेद इत्याह—“ त्रैगुण्यविपर्ययाच्चैव ” इति । एवकारो भिन्नकर्मः ' सिद्धम् ' इत्यस्यानन्तरं द्रष्टव्यः; सिद्धमेव नासिद्धम् । ( १२९ ) त्रैगुण्यविपर्य-त्रयो गुणार्थगुण्यम्, तस्य विपर्ययो ऽन्यथात्वम् । यादिनि तृतीयम् ( ३ ) ॥ केचित्खलु सत्त्विकायाः सत्त्वबहुलाः; यथोर्ध्वस्तो-तसः; केचिद्भ्रजोबहुलाः, यथा मनुष्याः; केचित्तमो-बहुलाः, यथा तिर्यग्योनयः । सो ऽयमाहशस्त्रैर्गुण्यविपर्ययो ऽन्यथाभावस्तेषु सत्त्वनिकायेषु न भवेन् यद्येकः पुरुषः स्यात्, पुरुषभेदे त्वयमदोष इति ॥ १८ ॥

( १३० ) पुरुषधर्मोः ॥ एवं पुरुषबहुत्वं प्रसाध्य विवेकज्ञानोपयोगितया तस्य धर्मानाह—

तस्माच्च विपर्यासारिसिद्धं साक्षित्वमस्य पुरुषस्य ।

किञ्चल्यग्माध्यस्थं द्रष्टृबमकर्तृभावश्च ॥ १९ ॥

“तस्माच्च” इति । ‘च’ शब्दः पुरुषस्य बहुत्वेन सह धर्मान्तराणि समुच्चिनोति । ‘विपर्यासादस्मान्’ इत्युक्ते त्रैगुण्य-  
( १३१ ) तस्मात्पदस्य विपर्ययादित्यनन्तरोक्तं सम्बध्येत; अतस्तन्निरासाय सम्बन्धप्रदर्शनम् ॥  
‘तस्मात्’ इत्युक्तम् । अनन्तरोक्तं हिं सन्निधानादि-  
दमो विषयो, विप्रकृष्टं च तद्ः, इति विप्रकृष्टं त्रिगुण-  
मविवेकीत्यादि सम्बध्यते ॥

तस्मात्त्रिगुणादेर्यो विपर्यासः स पुरुषस्यात्रिगुणत्वं विवेकित्वमविषयत्वम-  
साधारणत्वं चेतनत्वमप्रसवधर्मित्वञ्च । तत्र चेतनत्वेना-  
( १३२ ) अत्रैगुण्यादेः विषयत्वेन च साक्षित्वद्रष्टृत्वे दर्शिते । चेतनो हि पुरुषस्य साक्षित्वम्  
द्रष्टृत्वं च ॥  
यस्मिं प्रदर्शयते विषयः स साक्षी, तथा हि लोकै-  
र्धिप्रत्यर्धिनी विवादविषयं साक्षिणे दर्शयतः, एवं प्रकृतिरपि स्वचरितं विषयं पुरुषाय दर्शयतीति पुरुषः साक्षी, न चाचेतनो विषयो वा शक्यो विषयं दर्शयितुम्, इति चतन्यादविषयत्वाच्च भवति साक्षी । अत एव द्रष्टा ऽपि भवति ॥

अत्रैगुण्याच्चास्य कैवल्यम् । आत्यन्तिको दुःखत्रयाभावः कैवल्यम् । तच्च  
( १३३ ) कैवल्यम् ॥ तस्य स्वाभाविकादेवात्रैगुण्यात् सुखदुःखमोहरहितत्वात्सिद्धम् ॥

अत एवात्रैगुण्यान्माध्यस्थ्यम् । सुखी हि सुखेन तृप्यन् दुःखी हि दुःखं  
( १३४ ) माध्यस्थ्यम्, द्विपन् मध्यस्थो न भवति । तदुभयरहितस्तु  
अकर्तृत्वं च ॥ मध्यस्थ इत्युदासीन इति चाख्यायते । विवेकित्वा-  
दप्रसवधर्मित्वाच्चाकर्तृत्वं सिद्धम् ॥ १९ ॥

स्वादेतन्-प्रमाणेन कर्तव्यमर्थमवगम्य ‘चेतनोऽहं चिकीर्षन् करोमि’ इति  
( १३५ ) चेतन्यकर्तृ- कृतिर्चेतन्ययोः सामानाधिकरण्यामनुभवसिद्धम्; तदे-  
त्वयोर्यैवाधिकरण्यापत्ति- तस्मिन्मते नावकल्पते, चेतनस्याकर्तृत्वात् कर्तुंश्चाचेत-  
नाद्वा ॥ न्यान् इत्यत आह—

सा खल्वियं सर्वशरीरेष्वेकस्मिन् पुरुषे नोपपद्यते । तदा खल्वेकस्मिन् पुरुषे जायमाने सर्वे जायेरन्, म्रियमाणे च म्रियेरन्, अन्धादौ चैकस्मिन् सर्वे एव अन्धादयो, विचिन्ने चैकस्मिन् सर्वे एव विचिन्ताः स्युरित्यव्यवस्था स्यात् । प्रतिक्षेत्रं तु पुरुषभेदे भवति व्यवस्था । न च ' एकस्यापि पुरुषस्य देहोपादान-भेदाद्व्यवस्था ' इति युक्तम्, पाणिननालुपाधिभेदेनापि जन्ममरणादिव्यवस्था-प्रमद्धान् । न हि पाणां वृक्णे, जाते वा मनादौ महत्यवयवे युवतिर्मुता जाता वा भवतीति ॥

इतश्च प्रतिक्षेत्रं पुरुषभेद इत्याह—“ अयुगपत्प्रवृत्तेश्च ” इति । प्रवृत्तिः प्रयत्नलक्षणा यद्यप्यन्तःकरणवर्तिनी, तथा ऽपि ( १२८ ) पुरुषाणाम-युगपत्प्रवृत्तिरिति द्वितीयम् ( २ ) ॥

इतश्च पुरुषभेद इत्याह—“ त्रैगुण्यविपर्ययाच्चैव ” इति । एवकारो भिन्नकर्मः ' सिद्धम् ' इत्यस्यानन्तरं द्रष्टव्यं; सिद्धमेव नामिद्धम् । ( १२९ ) त्रैगुण्यविपर्ययाच्चैव गुणाद्यैर्गुण्यम्, तस्य विपर्ययो ऽन्यथात्वम् । यादिति तृतीयम् ( ३ ) ॥ केचित्खलु सत्त्वनिकायाः सत्त्वबहुलाः, यथोर्ध्वसो-तमः; केचिद्ज्ञोबहुलाः, यथा मनुष्याः; केचित्तमो-बहुलाः, यथा तिर्यग्योनयः । मां ऽयमौटशस्त्रैर्गुण्यविपर्ययो ऽन्यथाभावस्तेषु सत्त्वनिकायेषु न भवेत् यद्येकः पुरुषः स्यात्, पुरुषभेदे त्वयमदोष इति ॥ १८ ॥

( १३० ) पुरुषार्थाः ॥ एवं पुरुषबहुत्वं प्रगाप्य त्रिवेकज्ञानोपयोगिताया तस्य धर्मानाह—

नस्माच्च विपर्यासान्सिद्धं साक्षिण्यमस्य पुरुषस्य ।  
 त्रैवस्यस्माध्यस्यं द्रष्टव्यमकर्तृभायथ ॥ १९ ॥

“ तस्माच्च ” इति । ‘ च ’ शब्दः पुरुषस्य बहुत्वेन सह धर्मान्तराणि समुच्चिनोति । ‘ विपर्यामादस्मात् ’ इत्युक्ते त्रैगुण्य-  
( १३१ ) तस्मात्पदस्य विपर्ययादित्यनन्तरोक्तं सम्बध्यते; अतस्नाघिरासाय सम्बन्धप्रदर्शनम् ॥ ‘ तस्मात् ’ इत्युक्तम् । अनन्तरोक्तं हिं सन्निधानादि-  
दमो विपर्ययो, विप्रकृष्टं च तदः, इति विप्रकृष्टं त्रिगुण-  
मविवेकीत्यादि सम्बध्यते ॥

नस्मात्त्रिगुणादेर्यो विपर्यासः स पुरुषस्यात्रिगुणत्वं विवेकित्वमविपर्यन्वम-  
साधारणत्वं चेतनत्वमप्रसवधर्मित्वञ्च । तत्र चेतनत्वेना-  
( १३२ ) अत्रैगुण्यादेः विपर्यत्वेन च साक्षित्वद्रष्टृत्वे दर्शिते । चेतनो हि पुरुषस्य साक्षित्वम्  
द्रष्टा भवति, नाचंतनः; साक्षी च दर्शितविपर्ययो भवति, यस्मै प्रदर्श्यते विपर्ययः स साक्षी, तथा हि लोके-  
ऽधिप्रत्यर्थिनौ विवादविपर्ययं साक्षिणे दर्शयतः, एवं प्रकृतिरपि स्वचरितं विपर्ययं पुरुषाय दर्शयतीति पुरुषः साक्षी, न चाचेतनो विपर्ययो वा शक्यो विपर्ययं दर्शयितुम्, इति चतन्यादविपर्ययत्वाच्च भवति साक्षी । अत एव द्रष्टा ऽपि भवति ॥

अत्रैगुण्याद्यास्य केवल्यम् । आत्यन्तिको दुःखत्रयाभावः केवल्यम् । तच्च  
( १३३ ) केवल्यम् ॥ तस्य स्वाभाविकादेवात्रैगुण्यात् सुखदुःखमोहरहि-  
तत्वात्सिद्धम् ॥

अत एवात्रैगुण्यान्माध्यस्थ्यम् । सुखी हि सुखेन नृच्यन् दुःखी हि दुःखं  
( १३४ ) माध्यस्थ्यम्, द्विपन् मध्यस्थो न भवति । तदुभयरहितस्तु  
अकर्तृत्वं च ॥ मध्यस्थ इत्युदासीन इति चाख्यायते । विवेकित्वा-  
दप्रसवधर्मित्वाच्चाकर्तेति सिद्धम् ॥ १९ ॥

स्यादेतन्-प्रमाणेन कर्तव्यमर्थमवगम्य ‘ चेतनोऽहं धिर्कीर्षन् करोमि ’ इति  
( १३५ ) चेतन्यकर्तृ- कृतिचेतन्ययोः सामानाधिकरण्यमनुभवसिद्धम्; तदे-  
त्ययोर्वैयाधिकरण्यापत्ति- तस्मिन्मते नावकल्पते, चेतनस्याकर्तृत्वात् कर्तुंश्चाचत-  
साद्वा ॥ न्यात् इत्यत आह—

तस्मात्तत्संयोगादचेतनं चेतनाद्यदिषु लिङ्गम् ।

शुणकर्तृत्वे च तथा कर्तव्यं भवत्युदासीनः ॥ २० ॥

“ तस्मान् ” इति । यतश्चेतन्यकर्तृत्वे भिन्नाधिकरणे युक्तितः सिद्धे, तस्मात्  
( १३६ ) इष्टापत्तिः । भ्रान्तिरियमित्यर्थः । ‘ लिङ्गम् ’ महदादिसूक्ष्मपर्यन्तं  
सामानाधिकरण्यज्ञानं चक्ष्यति । भ्रान्तिधीजम् तत्संयोगः तत्संज्ञिधानम् ।  
भ्रान्तिवितर्कसतम् ॥ अतिरोहितार्थमन्यन् ॥ २० ॥

‘ तत्संयोगान् ’ इत्युक्तम्, न च भिन्नयोः संयोगो उपेक्षां विना, न चेय-  
( १३७ ) पुरुषप्रधानयोः सुप्रकार्योपकारकभावं विनेत्युपेक्षाहेतुमुपकारमाह—  
संयोगे मद्वा ॥

पुरुषस्य दर्शनार्थं कैवल्यार्थं तथा प्रधानस्य ।

पेश्यन्धवदुभयोरपि संयोगस्तत्कृतः सर्गः ॥ २१ ॥ ७-१

“ पुरुषस्य ” इति । प्रधानस्येति कर्मणि षष्ठी । प्रधानस्य सर्वकारणस्य  
( १३८ ) प्रधानस्य यद्दर्शनं पुरुषेण तदर्थम् । तदनेन भोग्यता प्रधानस्य  
पुरुषापेक्षा-भोक्तृपेक्षा ॥ दर्शिता । ततश्च भोग्यं प्रधानं भोक्तारमन्त्रेण न  
सम्भवतीति युक्ता अस्य भोक्तृपेक्षा ॥

“ पुरुषस्यापेक्षां दर्शयति—“ पुरुषस्य कैवल्यार्थम् ” इति । तथाहि भोग्येन  
( १३९ ) कैवल्यार्थं प्रधानेन मग्निभक्षः पुरुषस्तद्व्रतं दुःखत्रयं स्वात्मन्यभि-  
पुरुषस्य प्रधानपेक्षा ॥ मन्यमानः कैवल्यम् प्रार्थयते । तच्च सत्त्वपुरुषान्यता-  
न्यातिनिबन्धनम् । न च सत्त्वपुरुषान्यताख्यातिः  
प्रधानमन्तरेणेति कैवल्यार्थं पुरुषः प्रधानमपेक्षते  
अनादिवाद्यसंयोगपरम्पराया भोगाय संयुक्तोऽपि कैवल्याय पुनः संयुज्यते  
इति युक्तम् ॥

१. शुणानां कर्तृत्वे दृशानोऽपि पुरुषः कर्तव्यं भवति । न च न तत्कृतः  
कर्तृत्वेवधारणभिन्नायः । २. कारिकास्थाः पदार्थाः दृष्टा एवाऽप्येवः । ३. पुरुषो  
निर्तिक्रमत्वात् ‘ पुरुः, ’ प्रधानमपेक्षनत्वात् ‘ अन्धम् ’ ।

ननु भवत्त्वन्तयोः संयोगो, महदादिसर्गस्तु कुत इत्यत आह—“ तत्कृतः  
(१४१) भोगापवर्गार्थ- सर्गः” इति । संयोगो हि न महदादिसर्गमन्तरेण  
मेव महदादिसर्गस्या- भोगाय केवल्याय च पर्याप्त इति संयोग एव भोगाप-  
वदयकत्वम् ॥ चर्गार्थं सर्गं करोतीत्यर्थः ॥ २१ ॥

सर्गक्रममाह—

१०-१ प्रकृतेर्महांस्ततो ऽहङ्कारस्तस्माद्गणश्च षोडशकः ।

तस्माद्रपि षोडशकात्पञ्चभ्यः पञ्च भूतानि ॥ २२ ॥ ✓

“ प्रकृतेः ” इति । प्रकृतिरव्यक्तम् । महदहङ्कारौ वक्ष्यमाणलक्षणौ । एका-  
दशेन्द्रियाणि वक्ष्यमाणानि, तन्मात्राणि च पञ्च, सो  
(१४१) प्रकृतेर्महानि- ऽयं षोडशमंख्यापरिमितो गणः षोडशकः । तस्मा-  
त्यादि-सर्गक्रमः ॥ दपि षोडशकात्पञ्चभ्यः पञ्चभ्यन्तन्मात्रेभ्यः पञ्च  
भूतान्याकाशादीनि ॥

तत्र शब्दतन्मात्रादाकाशं शब्दगुणम्, शब्दतन्मात्रसहितान् स्पर्शतन्मात्रा-

(१४२) तन्मात्रेभ्यो न्मात्रात्तेजः शब्दस्पर्शरूपगुणम्, शब्दस्पर्शरूपतन्मा-  
गुणकेमेण भूतसर्गः ॥ असहितात्सतन्मात्रादापः शब्दस्पर्शरूपरसगुणाः,  
शब्दस्पर्शरूपरसतन्मात्रसहितान्मन्धतन्मात्राच्छब्दस्पर्श-  
रूपरसगन्धगुणा पृथिवी, जायत इत्यर्थः ॥ २२ ॥

अव्यक्तं सामान्यतो लक्षितम् “ तद्विपरीतमव्यक्तम् ” ( कारिका १० )

इत्यनेन, विशेषतश्च “ सत्त्वं लघु प्रकाशकम् ”

(१४३) बुद्धिलक्षणप्र- ( कारिका १३ ) इत्यनेन । व्यक्तमपि सामान्यतो  
लावः ॥ लक्षितम् “ हेतुमन् ” ( कारिका १० ) इत्यादिना ।

सम्प्रति विवेकज्ञानोपयोगितया व्यक्तविशेषं बुद्धि-

लक्षयति—

अध्यवसायो बुद्धिर्धर्मो ज्ञानं विराग प्रेभ्यर्यम् ।

सारिख्यमतद्रूपं तामसमस्माद्विपर्यस्तम् ॥ २३ ॥

“अध्यवसाय” इति । ‘अध्यवसायो बुद्धिः’ क्रियाक्रियावतोरभेदविवक्षया । सर्वो व्यवहृतो ऽऽलोच्य मत्वा ऽहमप्राधि-  
(१४४) बुद्धेर्लक्षणम् कृत्वा इत्यभिमत्य कर्तव्यमेतन्मयेत्यध्यवस्यति, तत्र प्रवर्तत इति लोकसिद्धम् । तत्र यो ऽयं कर्तव्यमिति विनिश्चयश्चित्तिसक्तिधानादापन्नचैतन्याया बुद्धेः सो ऽध्यवसायः, बुद्धेरसाधारणो व्यापारः; तदभेदा बुद्धिः । स च बुद्धेर्लक्षणम् समानासमानज्ञातीयव्यवच्छेदकत्वात् ॥

तदेवं बुद्धिं लक्षयित्वा विवेकज्ञानोपयोगिनस्तस्या धर्मान्सात्त्विकतामसानाह-  
“धर्मो ज्ञानं विरागं वेधयन् सात्त्विकमेतद्रूपं,  
(१४५) बुद्धेः सात्त्विका तामममस्माद्विपर्यस्तम्” इति । धर्मो ऽभ्युद-  
धर्मोः धर्मज्ञानविरागधर्मा- यनि-श्रेयसहेतुः, तत्र यागदानाद्यनुष्ठानजनितं धर्मो  
भिधानाः । तत्र धर्मज्ञान- ऽभ्युदयहेतुः, अष्टाङ्गयोगानुष्ठानजनितश्च निःश्रेयस-  
वैराग्याणा निरूपणम् ॥ हेतुः । गुणपुरोपान्यनाध्यातिज्ञानम् । विरागो वैरा-  
ग्यम् रागाभावः ॥

तस्य-यतमानसंज्ञा व्यतिरेकसंज्ञा एकैन्द्रियसंज्ञा वशीकारसंज्ञा-इति  
चतस्रः संज्ञाः । रागादयः कृपायाश्चित्तवर्तिनः,  
(१४६) विरागस्य यत- तैस्त्रिन्द्रियाणि यथाश्वं विषयेषु प्रवर्त्यन्ते । तन्मा ऽत्र  
मानव्यतिरेकैकेन्द्रिय- प्रवर्तिष्यन् विषयेष्विन्द्रियाणीति तत्परिपाचनाधारम्भः  
शीकाररूपाश्चतस्रः प्रयत्नो यतमानसंज्ञा । परिपाचने चानुष्ठीयमाने केचि-  
संज्ञाः ॥ रूपायाः पक्षाः, पश्यन्ते च केचिन्, सश्रेयं\* पूर्वापरी-

भावे सति पश्यमाणेभ्यः कृपायेभ्यः पक्षानां व्यतिरे-  
केणवधारणं इत्यतिरेकसंज्ञा । इन्द्रियमवृत्तवममर्थतया पक्षानामासुव्यवसाय-  
मनसि व्यवस्थापनमेकेन्द्रियसंज्ञा । आसुव्यवसायस्यापि निवृत्तिरस्यस्थितेऽपि  
दृष्टानुभविकविषयेषु, या संज्ञाप्रयात् परार्थिना सा वशीकारसंज्ञा । यामत्र-  
भगवाद् वतन्नन्विर्गंयाश्चकार-“दृष्टानुभविकविषयविवृत्त्यस्य वशीकारसंज्ञा  
वैराग्यम्” इति [ योगसूत्र-१।१५ ] । यो ऽयं बुद्धिधर्मो, विराग इति ॥



ऐश्वर्यमपि बुद्धिधर्मो, यतो ऽग्निमादिप्रादुर्भावः । ( १ ) अत्राग्निमा-  
 ऽणुभावो, यतः शिलामपि प्रविशति । ( २ ) लघिमा  
 ( १४७ ) ऐश्वर्यरुनिपणे लघुभावः, यतः सूर्यमरीचीनालम्य सूर्यलोकं यति ।  
 अष्टसिद्धिनिर्हणम् ॥ ( ३ ) गरिमा गुरुभावः, यतो गुरुर्भवति । ( ४ )  
 महिमा महतो भावः, यतो महान् भवति । ( ५ )  
 प्राप्तिः, यतो ऽद्भुत्यग्रेण सृशति चन्द्रमसम् । ( ६ ) प्राकाम्यमिच्छानभिधानो  
 यतो, भूमाबुन्मज्जति निमज्जति च यथोदके । ( ७ ) वशित्वम्, यतो भूतर्भा-  
 तिकं वशीभक्त्यवश्यम् । इंशित्वम् यतो भूतर्भातिकानां प्रभवस्थितिमीष्टे ।  
 ( ८ ) यच्च कामावसाधित्वम् सा सत्यसङ्कल्पता, येन यथाऽस्य सद्बल्यो  
 भवति भूतेषु तथैव भूतानि भवन्ति । अन्येषां मनुष्याणां निश्चयाः निश्चेतव्य-  
 मनुविधीयन्ते, योगिनस्तु निश्चेतव्याः पदार्थाः निश्चयम् । इति चत्वारः  
 सार्विका बुद्धिधर्माः ॥

( १४८ ) बुद्धेस्तामसा तामसास्तु तद्विपरीता बुद्धिधर्माः । अधर्माज्ञानाधैरा-  
 धर्मा अधर्मादयः ॥ ग्यानैश्वर्याभिधानाश्चत्वार इत्यर्थः ॥ २३ ॥

अहङ्कारस्य लक्षणमाह—

अभिमानो ऽहङ्कारः, तस्माद् द्विविधः प्रवर्तते सर्गः । 10.1

एकादशकश्च गणस्तन्मात्रपञ्चकश्चैव ॥ २४ ॥ ✓

“ अभिमान ” इति । ‘ अभिमानो ऽहङ्कारः ’ । यत् खल्वालोचितम्मतं  
 च तत्र ‘ अहमधिकृतः’, ‘ शक्तः सस्वहमत्र’, ‘ मदर्था  
 ( १४९ ) अहङ्कारस्य प्वामी विषयाः’, ‘ मत्तो नान्यो ऽत्राकृषितः  
 लक्षणम् ॥ कश्चिदस्ति’, ‘ अतो ऽहमस्मि ’ इति यो ऽभिमानः  
 सो ऽसाधारणव्यापारत्वाद्दहङ्कारः । तमुपजात्य हि  
 बुद्धिरध्यवस्यति—‘ कर्तव्यमेतन्मया ’ इति निश्चयं करोति ॥

तस्य कार्यभेदमाह—“ तस्माद् द्विविधः प्रवर्तते सर्गः ” इति । प्रकारद्वयमाह  
 ( १५० ) अहङ्कारस्य “ एकादशकश्च गणः ” इन्द्रियाहः, तन्मात्रपञ्चकश्चैव ।  
 कार्यभेदाः ॥ द्विविध एव सर्गो ऽहङ्कारात् न स्वयं इति ‘ एव’—  
 कारेणावधारयति ॥ २४ ॥

स्यादेतन्—अहङ्कारदिकरूपाकारणात्कथं जडप्रकाशकी गणौ विलक्षणौ भवत इत्यत आह—

सांख्यिक एकादशकः प्रवर्तते वैकुण्ठादहङ्कारात् ।

भूतादेस्तन्मात्रः स तामसः, तैजसादुभयम् ॥ २५ ॥ ✓

“सांख्यिक” इति । प्रकाशलाघवाभ्यामेकादशक इन्द्रियगणः सांख्यिको ( १५१ ) एकरूपस्याध्य- द्वैक्यतादहङ्कारात्प्रवर्तते । भूतादेस्त्वहङ्कारात्तामसात् अहङ्कारस्य गुणभेदादिकार- न्मात्रो गणः प्रवर्तते । कस्मान् ? यतः ‘स तामसः’ । भेदाः—सत्त्वादिन्द्रियगणः, एतदुक्तम्भवति ‘यद्यप्येको ऽहङ्कारस्तथा ऽपि गुण- तामसात्तन्मात्रगणः ॥ भेदोऽज्ञवाभिभवाभ्यां भिन्नं कार्यं करोतीति ’ ॥

ननु यदि सत्त्वतमोभ्यामेव सर्वं कार्यं जन्यते तदा कृतमङ्घ्रिकरेण रजसे- ह्यत आह— “तैजसाद्राज- ( १५२ ) सत्त्वतमसोः- सादुभयं गुणद्वयं भवति, यद्यपि रजसो न कार्यान्तर- प्रवर्तकतया रजसःसा- मस्ति तथा ऽपि सत्त्वतमसो स्वयमक्रिये समर्थे ऽपि न स्वस्वकार्यं कुरुतः; रजस्तु चलतया ते यदा चाल- यति तदा स्वकार्यं कुरुत इति । तदुभयस्मिन्नपि कार्ये सत्त्वतमसोः क्रियोगादनद्वारेणास्ति रजसः कारणत्वमिति न प्यर्थं रज इति ॥ २५ ॥

१. भाष्यमतेन मनस्य अहङ्कारस्य सांख्यिकत्वम् इतरेषां दर्शानां राजसत्वमेवेति । २।१८ सूत्रे दृश्यम् । अहङ्कारत्वं प्रिधा विभक्तम्—‘वैश्रुत’—‘भूतादि’—‘तैजसे- रजसभेदात्’ । तदुक्तं गोटादादेन—“सत्त्वेताभिभूते रजसतमसो यदा अहङ्कारे भरतः तदा गो ऽहङ्कारः सांख्यिकः—तस्य भेदा कृता ‘वैश्रुत’ इति ॥ एवं च तमसाऽभिभूते सत्त्वरजसो यदा अहङ्कारे भवतस्तदा गोहङ्कारात्तामसः—तस्य भेदा कृता ‘भूतादिः’ इति ॥ एवमेव यदा अहङ्कारे सत्त्वतमसो रजसाऽभिभूते तदा गोऽहङ्कारो राजसः ‘वैश्रुत’ इति गोपां लभते—इति

सात्त्विकमेकादशमाख्यातुं बाह्येन्द्रियदशकं तावदाह--

बुद्धीन्द्रियाणि चक्षुःश्रोत्रघ्राणरसनत्वगाख्यानि ।

वाक्पाणिपादपायूपस्थानि कर्मेन्द्रियाण्याहुः ॥ २६ ॥

“ बुद्धीन्द्रियाणि ” इति । सात्त्विकाहङ्कारोपादानत्वमिन्द्रियाणाम् । तच्च द्विविधम् बुद्धीन्द्रियं कर्मेन्द्रियं च । उभयमप्येतदिन्द्रस्यात्मनश्चिह्नत्वादिन्द्रियमुच्यते । तानि च स्वसकम् इन्द्रियलक्षणम् पद-  
 (१५३) बाह्येन्द्रियदश- शक्तिश्चक्षुरादिभिरक्तानि । तत्र रूपग्रहणलिङ्गं चक्षुः, शब्दग्रहणलिङ्गं श्रोत्रम्, गन्धग्रहणलिङ्गं घ्राणम्, रसग्रहणलिङ्गं रसनम्, स्पर्शग्रहणलिङ्गं त्वक्, इति ज्ञानेन्द्रियाणां संज्ञा । एवं वागादीनां कार्यं वक्ष्यति ( कारिका २८ ) ॥ २६ ॥

२६-२७

एकादशमिन्द्रियमाह—

उभयात्मकमत्र मनः, सङ्कल्पकमिन्द्रियं च साधर्म्यात् ।

गुणपरिणामविशेषान्नान्यं चात्मावेदाश्च ॥ २७ ॥

“ उभयात्मकम् ” इति । एकादशस्विन्द्रियेषु मध्ये मन उभयात्मकम्, (१५४) मनसो बुद्धिक- बुद्धीन्द्रियं कर्मेन्द्रियं च, चक्षुरादीनां वागादीनां च र्मात्मकत्वग्राहकम् ॥ मनोऽधिष्ठितानामत्र स्वस्वविषयेषु प्रवृत्तेः ॥

तदवधारणेन रूपेण लक्षयति—“ सङ्कल्पकमत्र मनः ” इति । सङ्कल्पेन रूपेण (१५५) मनसो लक्ष- मनो लक्ष्यते । ‘ आलोचितमिन्द्रियेण बस्त्रिदम् ’ इति णम्-सङ्कल्पकम्, लक्ष- सम्मुखम् ‘ इदमेवम्, मैवम् ’ इति सम्यक्त्ववयति णसमन्वयश्च ॥ विशेषणविशेष्यभावेन विवेचयतीति यावत् । यद्वाहुः-

सम्मुखं वस्तुमात्रं तु प्राग्गृह्यन्वविकल्पितम् ।

सत् सामान्यविशेषाभ्यां कल्पयन्ति मनीषिणः ’ ॥ इति ॥ तथाहि,

१. ‘ इ ’ विषयाः, तान् प्रति इवन्तीति ‘ इन्द्रिय ’ शब्दव्युत्पत्तिः कैश्चिन् कियते ।

वसति ह्यालोचितज्ञानं प्रथमत्रिविकल्पकम् ।  
 बालमूकादिविज्ञानसदृशम् सुग्धवस्तुजमिति ॥  
 ततः परं पुनर्वस्तु धर्मैर्जात्यादिभिर्धया ।  
 बुद्ध्या ऽवसीयते सा ऽपि प्रत्यक्षत्वेन सम्मता ॥

मो ऽयं मङ्गललक्षणो व्यापारो मनसः समानाममानजातीयाभ्यां व्यवच्छि-  
 न्दन् मनो लक्षयति ॥

स्यादेतन्—अमाधारणव्यापारयोगिनी यथा महदहङ्कारी नेन्द्रियम्, एव  
 मनो ऽप्यमाधारणव्यापारयोगि नेन्द्रियं भवितुमर्ह-  
 (१५६) मनस इन्द्रिय- तीत्यत आह—“ इन्द्रियं च ” इति । कुतः ?  
 त्वसाधनम्—इन्द्रियैः “ साधर्म्यान् ” । इन्द्रियान्तरः सात्त्विकाहङ्कारी-  
 -सह सात्त्विकाहङ्कारोपा- पादानत्वं च साधर्म्यम् नत्विन्द्रलिङ्गत्वम्, महदह-  
 दानत्वरूपसाधर्म्यात् ॥ ङ्कारयोरप्यात्मलिङ्गत्वेनेन्द्रियत्वप्रसङ्गात्, तस्माद्बुद्ध्युत्प-  
 त्तिमात्रमिन्द्रलिङ्गत्वम् न तु प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तम् ॥

अथ कथं सात्त्विकाहङ्कारादेकस्मादेकादशेन्द्रियाणीत्यत आह—“ गुणपरि-  
 (१५७) एकस्याहङ्कारस्य गुणपरिणामवि- णामविशेषान् नानात्वं बाह्यभेदाश्च ” इति शब्दाद्युप-  
 शेषात्कार्यभेदः ॥ भोगसम्प्रवर्तकादृष्टसहकारिभेदात्कार्यभेदः । अदृष्टभेदो  
 ऽपि गुणपरिणाम एव ।

(१५८) बाह्यभेदाधेनि ‘ बाह्यभेदाश्च ’ इति दृष्टान्तार्थम्—यथा बाह्य-  
 दृष्टान्तार्थम् ॥ भेदान्तर्गतदर्पात्यर्थः ॥ २७ ॥

(१५९) दशेन्द्रियवृ- त्तदेवमेकादशेन्द्रियाणि स्वरूपत उक्त्वा दशानामप्य-  
 त्तिवचनम् ॥ साधारणीवृत्तीराह—

७-१ शब्दादिषु पञ्चानामालोचनमाद्यमिष्यते वृत्तिः ।  
 वचनादानविहरणोत्सर्गान्मन्दाश्च पञ्चानाम् ॥ २८ ॥

बुद्धीन्द्रियाणां मसुग्धवस्तुदर्शनमालोचनमुक्तम् । “ वचनादानविहरणोत्स-  
 र्गान्मन्दाश्च पञ्चानाम् ” कर्मेन्द्रियाणाम् । कण्ठताप्त्वादिम्यानमिन्द्रियं यारु,  
 तस्या वृत्तिवचनम् । ज्ञानेन्द्रियाणां वृत्तयः स्पष्टाः ॥ २८ ॥

अन्तःकरणत्रयस्य वृत्तिर्माह—

स्वालक्षण्यं वृत्तिस्त्रयस्य सैषा भवत्यसामान्या ।

सामान्यकरणवृत्तिः प्राणाद्या वायवः पञ्च ॥ २९ ॥

“ स्वालक्षण्यम् ” इति । स्वालक्षण्यं वृत्तिस्त्रयस्य । स्वममाधारणं लक्षणं  
 येषां तानि स्वलक्षणानि महदहङ्कारमनांसि, तेषां  
 (१६०) अन्तःकरणत्र- भावः स्वालक्षण्यम्, तत्र स्वानि स्वानि लक्षणान्येव ।  
 यस्य स्वस्वलक्षणरूपमे तत्रया—महतो ऽध्यवसायो ऽहङ्कारन्याभिमानः  
 चासाधारणं वृत्तित्रयम् ॥ सङ्ख्या मनसो वृत्तिर्व्यापारः ॥

वृत्तिद्वैविध्यं साधारणमाधारणत्वाभ्यामाह—“ सैषा भवत्यसामान्या ”  
 असाधारणी । “ सामान्यकरणवृत्तिः प्राणाद्या वायवः  
 (१६१) पञ्चवायुरा पञ्च ” । सामान्या चासौ करणवृत्तिश्चेति । त्रयाणा-  
 माधारणी वृत्तिः ॥ मपि करणानां पञ्च वायवो जीवनं वृत्तिः, तद्भावे  
 भावात् तदभावे चाभावात् । तत्र प्राणो नासाग्रहृद्वा-  
 भिरादाहुष्टवृत्तिः, अपानः कृकाटिकाष्टपरादपायूरस्थपार्श्ववृत्तिः, समानो  
 हृद्वाभिसर्वमन्धि वृत्तिः, उदानो हृत्कण्ठतालुमूर्धभ्रमध्यवृत्तिः, ध्यानस्त्ववृत्ति-  
 रिति पञ्च वायवः ॥ २९ ॥

चतुर्विधकरणस्यास्यामाधारणेषु वृत्तिषु क्रमाकर्मा मप्रकारावाह—

युगपच्चतुष्टयस्य तु वृत्तिः क्रमशश्च तस्य निदिष्टा ।

दृष्टे तथा ऽप्यदृष्टे त्रयस्य तरपुर्विका वृत्तिः ॥ ३० ॥ १३१

“ युगपत् ” इति, दृष्टे यथा—यश्च सन्तममान्धकारे विद्युन्मभ्यतिमात्रा-  
 द्वाघ्नमभिमुखमतिस्निहितं पश्यति तदा खल्वस्या-  
 (१६२) चतुर्विधकरण- लोचनसङ्ख्याभिमानाध्यवसायाः युगपदेव प्रादुर्भ-  
 स्य प्रत्यक्षे युगपद्वृत्तिः ॥ वन्ति, यतस्तत्र उत्प्लुन्य तरस्थानादेकपदै-  
 ऽपर्यति ॥

“ क्रमशश्च ” यदा मन्दालोके प्रथमन्तावद्वस्तुमात्रं सम्मुखमालोचयति,  
 अथ प्रणिहितमनाः कर्णान्ताकृष्टसशरसिञ्जिनीमण्डली-  
 (१६३) क्रमशश्च ॥  
 कृतकोदण्डः प्रचण्डतरः पाटश्चरोऽयमिति निश्चिनोति,  
 अथ च माम्प्रत्येतित्यभिमन्यते, अथाध्यवस्यत्यपसरा-  
 मीतः स्थानादिति ॥

परोक्षे त्वन्तःकरणत्रयस्य बाह्येन्द्रियवर्जं वृत्तिरित्यह—“ अदृष्टे त्रयस्य  
 तत्पूर्विका वृत्तिः ” इति । अन्तःकरणत्रयस्य युगप-  
 (१६४) अन्तःकर-  
 णत्रयस्य परोक्षे वृत्ति-  
 द्वयम् दृष्टपूर्वकमेव ॥  
 परोक्षे ऽर्थं दर्शनपूर्वाः प्रवर्तन्ते नान्यथा । यथा दृष्टे  
 तथा ऽदृष्टे ऽपीति योजना ॥ ३० ॥

स्याद्वेतन्-चतुर्णां त्रयाणां वा वृत्तयो न तावन्मात्राधीनाः, तेषां सदातन-  
 (१६५) करणाना स्व-  
 तन्त्रत्वे दोषाः ॥  
 त्वेन वृत्तीनां सदेत्पादप्रसङ्गात्, आकस्मिकत्वे तु  
 वृत्तिगङ्गप्रपङ्गो नियमहेतोरभावादित्यत आह—

स्वां स्वां प्रतिपद्यन्ते परस्पराकृतहेतुकां वृत्तिम् ।  
 पुरुषार्थं पद्य हेतुर्न केनचित्कार्यते कारणम् ॥ ३१ ॥

“ स्वाम् ” इति । करणानीति शेषः । यथा हि बहवः पुरुषाः शाक्ती-  
 अतस्कोदण  
 (१६६) तद्विराकर-  
 णम्-परस्परमापेक्षाप्ये-  
 य करणानि स्वस्वरू-  
 पितुः ॥  
 कयाष्टीकधानुष्ककार्पाणिकाः कृतमङ्गैताः पराचस्कन्द-  
 नाय प्रवृत्ताः, तत्रान्यतमस्याकृतमवगम्यान्व्यतमः  
 प्रवर्तन्ते, प्रवर्तमानस्तु शाक्तीकः शक्तिमेवादत्ते न तु  
 यद्यथादिकम्, एयं याष्टीको ऽपि यष्टिमेव, न शक्त्या-  
 दिकम् । तथा ऽन्यतमस्य कारणस्याकृतानु स्वकार्य-  
 करणाभिमुल्यात्वन्यतमं कारणं प्रवर्तते । तत्प्रवृत्तेर्ध  
 हेतुवाच्यं वृत्तिगङ्गप्रसङ्ग इत्युक्तम्—“ स्वां स्वां प्रतिपद्यन्ते ” इति ॥

स्यादेतत्—यादृच्छिद्यश्चेतनत्वान् परस्परकृतमवगम्य प्रवर्तन्ते इति युक्तम्

( १६७ ) करणानाम-  
चेतनत्वे ऽपि पुरुषार्थ-  
स्यैव प्रवर्तकत्वम् ॥

करणानि त्वचेतनानि, तस्मान्नैवं प्रवर्तितुमुत्सहन्ते ।  
तेनैवामधिष्ठात्रा करणानां स्वरूपसामर्थ्योपयोगाभिज्ञेन  
भवितव्यमित्यत आह—“ पुरुषार्थ एव हेतुः, न केन-  
चित्कार्यते करणम् ” इति । भोगोपधंगलक्षणः पुरु-  
षार्थ एवानागतावस्थः प्रवर्तयति करणानि, कृतमत्र  
तस्वरूपाभिज्ञेन कर्ता । एतच्च “ वत्सविवृद्धिनिमित्तम् ” ( कारिका ५७ )  
इत्यत्रोपपादयिष्यते ॥ ३१ ॥

( १६८ ) करणवि-  
भागः ॥

“ न केनचित् कार्यते करणम् ” इत्युक्तम् । तत्र करणं  
विभजते—

करणं त्रयोदशविधम्, तद्दाहरणधारणप्रकाशकरम् ।

कार्यं च तस्य दशधा, हायं धायं प्रकाश्यं च ॥ ३२ ॥

“ करणं त्रयोदशविधम् ” इति । इन्द्रियाण्येकादश बुद्धिरहङ्कारश्चेति त्रयो-

( १६९ ) त्रयोदश- दशप्रकार करणम् । कारकविशेषः करणम् । न च  
विधकरणपरिगणनम् । व्यापारादेशं विना कारकत्वमिति व्यापारादेशमाह—  
“ तद्दाहरणधारणप्रकाशकरम् ” इति यथायथम् । तत्र कर्मेन्द्रियाणि वागादीन्वा-  
हरन्ति, यथास्वमुपादृष्टे, स्वव्यापारेण व्याप्नुवन्तीनि यावन् । बुद्धयहङ्कार-  
मनांसि तु स्ववृत्त्या प्राणादिलक्षणया धारयन्ति । बुद्धीन्द्रियाणि प्रकाशयन्ति ॥

आहरणधारणादिक्रियाणां सकर्मकतया किं कर्म कतिविधं चेत्यत आह—

( १७० ) करणव्या- “ कार्यं च तस्य ” इति । कार्यं तस्य त्रयोदशविधस्य  
पारपरिगणनम् ॥ करणस्य दशधा, आहार्यं धायं प्रकाश्यं च । आहार्यं

व्याप्यम् । कर्मेन्द्रियाणां वचनादानविहरणोत्सर्गानन्दाः यथायथं व्याप्याः ;  
ते च यथायथं दिव्यादिव्यतया दश—इत्याहार्यं दशधा । एवं धार्यमयन्तः-  
करणत्रयस्य प्राणादिलक्षणया वृत्त्या शरीरम्, तस्य पायिवादिपाञ्चभौतिकम् ।  
दत्तदादीनां पञ्जानां समूहः पृथिवी, ते च पञ्च दिव्यादिव्यतया दशेति धार्य-  
मपि दशधा । एवं बुद्धीन्द्रियाणां शब्दस्पर्शरूपरसगन्धा यथायथं व्याप्याः ; ते  
च यथायथं दिव्यादिव्यतया दशेति प्रकाश्यमपि दशधेति ॥ ३२ ॥

( १७१ ) त्रयोद-  
शविधकरणेऽवान्तर-  
विभागः—वाह्यान्तर-  
भेदात् ॥

त्रयोदशविधकरणेऽवान्तरविभागं करोति-

अन्तःकरणं त्रिविधं दशधा वाह्यं त्रयस्य विषयाख्यम् ।  
साम्प्रतकालं वाह्यं त्रिकालमाभ्यन्तरं करणम् ॥ ३३ ॥

“अन्तःकरणम्” इति । अन्तःकरणं त्रिविधम्-

( १७२ ) अन्तः- ‘बुद्धिरहङ्कारो मन’ इति; शरीराभ्यन्तरवर्तित्वा-  
करणस्य त्रिविध्यम् ॥ अन्तःकरणम् ॥

“दशधा” वाह्यकरणम् “त्रयस्य” अन्तःकरणस्य “विषयाख्यम्” ।

( १७३ ) वाह्य- विषयमाख्याति विषयसङ्ख्याभिमानाध्यवसायेषु  
करणानां दशधात्वम् ॥ कर्तव्येषु द्वारीभवति । तत्र बुद्धीन्द्रियाण्यालोचनेन,  
कर्मन्द्रियाणि तु यथास्वं व्यापारेण ॥

वाह्यान्तरयोः करणयोर्विशेषान्तरमाह—“साम्प्रतकालम्” इति । वर्तमान-

( १७४ ) वाह्या-  
न्तरकरणयोर्भेदः—वाह्य-  
करणानां वर्तमानकाल-  
लीनत्वं, अन्तःकरणा-  
नां त्रिकालीनत्वम् ॥  
वर्तमान-  
कालं वाह्यमिन्द्रियम् । वर्तमानसमीपमनागतमतीत-  
मपि वर्तमानम्; अतो वागपि वर्तमानकालविषया  
भवति । “त्रिकालमाभ्यन्तरं करणम्” इति ।  
तद्यथा—नदीपूरभेदाद्भृद्बृष्टिः; अस्ति धूमादग्निरिह  
नगनिकुञ्जे, असत्युपघातके पिपीलिकाष्टसञ्चरणाद्ब-  
विष्यति वृष्टिरिति, तदनुरूपाश्च सङ्ख्याभिमानाध्य-  
वसाया भवन्ति ॥

कालश्च वैशेषिकाभिमत एको न अनागतादिव्यवहारभेदं प्रवर्तयितुमर्हति ।

( १७५ ) सांख्य-  
मते कालस्य न तत्त्वा-  
न्तरत्वम् ॥ तस्मादयं वैख्याधिभेदैरनागतादिभेदं प्रतिपद्यते सन्तु  
... .. प्रा-  
... .. काल-



(१७६) वाद्येन्द्रि- साम्प्रतकालानां वाद्येन्द्रियाणां विषयं विवे-  
यविषयविवेचनम् ॥ चयति—

बुद्धीन्द्रियाणि तेषां पञ्च विशेषाविशेषविषयाणि ।

वाग्भवति शब्दविषया शेषाणि तु पञ्चविषयाणि ॥ ३४ ॥ १२०

“बुद्धीन्द्रियाणि” इति । “बुद्धीन्द्रियाणि” तेषां दशानामिन्द्रियाणा-  
म्मध्ये “पञ्च,” “विशेषाविशेषविषयाणि” विशेषा

(१७७) बुद्धीन्द्रि- स्थूलाः शब्दादयः शान्तघोरमृडरूपाः पृथिव्यादि-  
याणां विषयाः स्थूल- रूपाः, अविशेषास्तन्मात्राणि सूक्ष्माः शब्दादयः,  
सूक्ष्मरूपाः ॥ मात्रग्रहणेन स्थूलभूतमात्राकरोति । विशेषाश्च अत्रि-  
शेषाश्च विशेषाविशेषाः, त एव विषया तेषां बुद्धी-

न्द्रियाणा तानि तथोक्तानि । तत्रोर्ध्वोत्तरां योगिनाञ्च श्रोत्रं शब्दतन्मात्र-  
विषयं स्थूलशब्दविषयं च, अस्मदादीनां तु स्थूलशब्दविषयमेव । एवन्तेषु  
स्वर् स्थूलसूक्ष्मस्पर्शविषया, अस्मदादीनां तु स्थूलस्पर्शविषयैव । एवञ्चक्षु-  
रादयो ऽपि तेषामस्मदादीनां च रूपादिषु सूक्ष्मस्थूलेषु द्रष्टव्याः ॥

एवं कर्मेन्द्रियेषु मध्ये “वाग्भवति शब्दविषया” स्थूलशब्दविषया, तद्धे  
मुन्वात् । नतु शब्दतन्मात्रस्य हेतुस्तस्याहङ्कारिकत्वेन  
(१७८) कर्मेन्द्रियाणां वागिन्द्रियेण सहैककारणकत्वात् । “शेषाणि तु”  
विषयाः ॥ चत्वारि पायूपस्थपाणिशाल्यानि “पञ्चविषयाणि”  
पाण्याद्याहार्याणां घटादीनां पञ्चशब्दाद्यात्मकरवा-  
दिति ॥ ३५ ॥

१२०

साम्प्रतं त्रयोदशसु करणेषु केषाञ्चित्प्रधानभावं सहेतुकमाह—

सान्तःकरणं बुद्धिः सर्वं विषयमवगाहते यस्मात् ।

तस्माच्चिद्विधं करणं द्वारि, द्वाराणि शेषाणि ॥ ३५ ॥

१. तन्मात्रपदे । २. ‘भूतभावनावगाहकरोति’ इति पाठान्तरम् ।

“ सान्तःकरणा ” इति । “ द्वारि ” प्रधानम् । “ द्वाराणि ” करणानि वाह्येन्द्रियाणि द्वाराणि । तैरुपनीतं सर्वं विषयं समनो ऽहङ्कारा बुद्धिः यस्मादवगाहते ऽध्यवस्यति तस्माद्वाह्येन्द्रियाणि द्वाराणि, द्वारवती च सान्तः-करणा बुद्धिरिति ॥ ३५ ॥

न केवलं बाह्यानीन्द्रियाण्यप्यपेक्ष्य प्रधानं बुद्धिः, अपि तु ये ऽप्यहङ्कारमनसी द्वारिणो ते अप्यपेक्ष्य बुद्धिः प्रधानमित्याह—

एते प्रदीपकल्पाः परस्परविलक्षणा गुणविशेषाः ।

एतल्लं पुरुषस्यार्थं प्रकाश्यं बुद्धौ प्रयच्छन्ति ॥ ३६ ॥

“ एते ” इति । यथा हि प्रामाण्यक्षः कौटुम्बिकेभ्यः करमादाय विषया-

( १८० ) अन्तः-ध्यक्षाय प्रयच्छति, विषयाध्यक्षश्च सर्वाध्यक्षाय, म करणेऽपि बुद्धेः प्राधा-च भूपतये; तथा बाह्येन्द्रियाण्यालोच्य मनसे समर्प-न्यम् ॥ यन्ति, मनश्च सङ्ख्याहङ्काराय, अहङ्कारश्चाभिमन्य बुद्धौ सर्वाध्यक्षभूतायां,—तद्विदमुक्तम्—“ पुरुषस्यार्थं

प्रकाश्यं बुद्धौ प्रयच्छन्ति ” इति ॥

बाह्येन्द्रियमनोऽहङ्काराश्च “ गुणविशेषाः ” गुणानां साध्वरजसमसो विकाराः,

( १८१ ) परस्पर-ते तु परस्परविरोधशीला अपि पुरुषार्थेन भोगापदग-विरोधगोलानामपि रूपेणैकयावयतास्तीताः, यथा चतितैरुच्यन्तेः सन्तम-गुणानां पुरुषार्थरूप-साधनयेन रूपप्रकाशाय मिलिताः प्रदीपः, एवमेते एवकार्ये प्रगतिः प्रदी-पवन् ॥ गुणविशेषाः इति योजना ॥ ३६ ॥

कस्मान्पुनर्बुद्धौ प्रयच्छन्ति, न तु बुद्धिहङ्काराय द्वारिणे मनसे चेतन-थाह—

सर्वं प्रत्युपभोगं यस्मान्पुरुषस्य साधयति बुद्धिः ।

नय च त्रिदिगष्टि पुनः प्रधानपुरुषान्तरं नृशमम् ॥ ३७ ॥

“ सर्वम् ” इति । पुरुषार्थस्य सर्वोत्कर्षणम् तस्य यस्मात्साधयति तत्

( १८२ ) बुद्धेः

प्राधान्यमाधनम्-माशा-  
स्पुर्यार्थसाधनत्वान् ॥

प्रधानम् । बुद्धिश्चास्य साक्षात्साधनम्, तस्मात्सर्व  
प्रधानम् । यथा सर्वाध्यक्षः साक्षाद्गार्थसाधनतया  
प्रधानमितरे तु प्रामाध्यक्षादयस्मत्प्रति गुणभूताः ।  
बुद्धिर्हि पुरुषमधिधातान् तच्छायापाया तद्रूपेषु  
सर्वविषयोपभोगं पुरुषस्य साधयति । सुग्रहः ग्या-  
नुभवो हि भोगः, स च बुद्धी, बुद्धिश्च पुरुषरूपवेति, सा च पुरुषमुपभोजयति ।  
यथा ऽर्धांलौचनसङ्ख्याभिमानाश्च तत्तद्रूपपरिणामेन बुद्ध्यापुपसंक्रांताः तथेन्द्रिय-  
व्यापारा अपि बुद्धेरेव स्वव्यापारेणाध्यवभायेन सहकल्याणार्गीभवन्ति, यथा  
स्वसंन्येन सह प्रामाध्यक्षादिर्मन्यं सर्वाध्यक्षस्य भवति । “सर्वं” शब्दादिकं  
“प्रति” य “उपभोग.” “पुरुषस्य” तं साधयति ॥

ननु पुरुषस्य सर्वविषयोपभोगमन्मादिका यदि बुद्धिः तर्ह्यनिर्मोक्ष इत्यत

आह—पश्चात् “प्रधानपुरुषयोरन्तरं” विशेषं “विशि

( १८३ ) पुरुषार्थस्याप-  
वर्गस्य कृतकत्वादपि  
नानित्यत्वम्-करणस्या-  
त्र बाधनार्थत्वान् ॥

दष्टि” करोति-सर्पादनपाकं पचतीति,—करणं च  
प्रतिपादनम् । ननु प्रधानपुरुषयोरन्तरस्य कृतकत्वाद्-  
नित्यत्वम्, तत्कृतस्य मोक्षस्यानित्यत्वं स्यादित्यत  
आह—“विशिनष्टि”—“प्रधानं सविकारमन्यद्रह-  
मन्य” इति विद्यमानमेवान्तरमविवेकेनाविद्यमानमिव  
बुद्धिविधायति, न तु करोति, येनानित्यत्वमित्यर्थः । अनेनापवर्गः पुरुषार्थो  
दर्शितः, “सूक्ष्मम्” दुर्लक्ष्यम् तदन्तरमित्यर्थः ॥ ३७ ॥

तदेवं करणानि विमथ्य विशेषाविशेषान् विभजते—

तन्मात्राण्यविशेषाः तेभ्यो भूतानि पञ्च पञ्चभ्यः ।

पते स्मृतं विशेषाः, शान्ता घोरश्च मूढश्च ॥ ३८ ॥ १६०

“तन्मात्राणि” इति । शब्दादितन्मात्राणि सूक्ष्माणि । न चैव  
( १८४ ) आविशाप- शान्तत्वादिरस्ति उपभोगयोग्यो विशेष इति  
(सूक्ष्म) कथनम् ॥ मात्रशब्दार्थः ॥

अविशेषानुक्त्वा विशेषान्वक्तुमुत्पत्तिमेवामाह—“ तेभ्यो भूतानि ” इति ।  
 (१८५) विशेष(स्थूल) तेभ्यस्तन्मात्रेभ्यो यथासंख्यमेकद्वित्रिचतुःपञ्चभ्यो  
 कथनम्—तदुत्पत्तिप्रद- भूतान्याकाशानिलानलमलिलावनिरूपाणि “ पञ्च ”  
 र्शनपूर्वकम् ॥ “ पञ्चभ्यः ” तन्मात्रेभ्यः ॥

अस्वेतेषामुत्पत्तिः, विशेषत्वे किमायातमित्यत आह—“ एते स्मृता विशेषाः ”  
 इति । कुतः—“ शान्ता घोराश्च सूडाश्च ” । चकार  
 (१८६) भूताना स्थू- एको हर्ता द्वितीयः समुच्चये । यस्मादाकाशादिषु  
 लक्षे हेतुकथनम् ॥ स्थूलेषु सत्त्वप्रधानतया केचिच्छान्ताः सुखाः, प्रकाशा  
 लघवः, केचिद्रजःप्रधानतया घोराः दुःखाः अनवस्थिताः, केचित्तमःप्रधान-  
 तया मूढा विषण्णा गुरवः । ते ऽग्नी परस्परव्यावृत्त्या ऽनुभूयमाना ‘विशेषाः’ ।  
 इति च ‘स्थूलाः’ इति चोच्यन्ते । तन्मात्राणि त्वस्मदादिभिः परस्परव्यावृ-  
 त्तानि नानुभूयन्ते, इत्यविशेषाः सूक्ष्मा इति चोच्यन्ते ॥ ३८ ॥

विशेषाणामवान्तरविशेषमाह—

१९१ सूक्ष्मा मातापितृजाः सहप्रभूतैस्त्रिधा विशेषाः स्युः ।

सूक्ष्मास्तेषां नियता, मातापितृजा नियतन्ते ॥ ३९ ॥

“ सूक्ष्मा ” इति । “ त्रिधा विशेषाः स्युः ” इति, तान् विशेषप्रकारा-

नाह—“ सूक्ष्माः ” सूक्ष्मदेशाः परिकल्पिताः, “ माता-

पितृजाः ” पाट्कौशिकाः । तत्र मातृनो लोमलोहित-

मांसानि, पितृतस्म स्यात्त्वन्धिमज्जान इति पट् कौशाः ॥

प्रकृतानि महान्ति भूतानि “ प्रभूतानि ”—तैस्मह ।

सूक्ष्मं शरीरमेको विशेषः, मातापितृजो द्वितीयः, महाभूतानि तृतीयः, महा-

भूतवर्गे च घटादीनां नियेन इति ॥

सूक्ष्ममातापितृजयोर्द्वेष्टयोर्विशेषमाह— “ सूक्ष्मा-

स्तेषाम् ” इति । विशेषाणां मध्ये ये ते “ नियताः ” ।

“ मातापितृजा नियतन्ते ” इति, स्वान्ता वा

अस्मान्ता वा विदन्ता येति ॥ ३९ ॥

(१८८) सूक्ष्ममा-  
 तापितृजयोर्भेदः नियत-  
 त्वादिभ्योऽनियतः ॥

सूक्ष्मशरीरं विभजते—

पूर्वोत्पन्नमसक्तं नियतम्महदादिसूक्ष्मपर्यन्तम् ।

संसरति निरुपभोगं भावैरधिवासितं लिङ्गम् ॥ ४० ॥

'पूर्वोत्पन्नम्' इति । "पूर्वोत्पन्नम्" प्रधानेनादिसर्गे प्रतिपुरुषमेकै-  
कमुत्पादितम् । "असक्तम्" अव्याहृतम् शिलास-

( १८९ ) सूक्ष्म-

शरीरोपपादनम्—तस्य

लक्षणानि—(१) असक्त-

त्वम्—(२) नित्यत्वम् ॥

न्वितत्वाद्भिषेपः ॥

नन्वस्त्वेतदेव शरीरं

(१९०) ( १ ) संसर-

णम् निरुपभोगत्वं च

ततश्च पादकौशिक-

शरीरस्यावश्यकत्वम् ॥

भोगायतनं पुरुषस्य, कृतं दृश्यमानेन पादकौशिकेन

शरीरेणेत्यत आह—“संसरति” इति । उपात्त-

मुपात्तं पादकौशिकं शरीरं जहानि हायं हायं धोपादत्ते-

कस्मात् इति “निरुपभोगम्” यतः, पादकौशिकं

शरीरं भोगायतनं विना सूक्ष्मं शरीरं निरुपभोगं

यस्मात्तस्मात्सूक्ष्मं शरीरं संसरति ॥

ननु धर्माधर्मनिमित्तः संसारः, न च सूक्ष्मशरीरस्यास्ति तद्योगः, तत्कथं

(१९१) धर्माधर्मादि-

भावैरधिवासितत्वमूलकं

तत्संसारणम् ॥

संसरतीत्यत आह—“भावैरधिवासितम्” इति ।

धर्माधर्मज्ञानानवैराग्यावैराग्यैश्वर्यानिश्वर्याणि भावाः-

तदम्बिना बुद्धिः, तदम्बितश्च सूक्ष्मं शरीरमिति तदपि

भावैरधिवासितम्, यथा सुरभिचम्पककुसुमसम्पर्का-

द्वस्त्रं तदामोदवामितम्भवति । तस्मान्नाभावैरेवाधिवासितत्वात्संसरति ॥

कस्मात् पुनः प्रधानमिव महाप्रलये ऽपि तच्छरीरञ्च तिष्ठतीत्यत आह—

( १९२ ) महाप्रलये

तस्य लयं गमितत्वा-

लिङ्गत्वम् ॥

“लिङ्गम्” इति । लयं गच्छतीति लिङ्गम्—हेतुमत्त्वेन

चास्य लिङ्गत्वमिति भावः ॥ ४० ॥

स्यादेतन्-बुद्धिरेव साहकारेन्द्रिया कस्माच्च संसरति ? कृतं सूक्ष्मशरीरेणा-  
प्रमाणिकेनेत्यत आह—

‘चित्रं यथाश्रयमृते स्थाण्वादिभ्यो विना यथा च्छाया । १७.१  
तद्वद्विना विशेषेण तिष्ठति निराश्रयं लिङ्गम् ॥ ४१ ॥

“ चित्रम् ” इति । लिङ्गान् ज्ञापनान् बुद्ध्यादयो ‘ लिङ्गम् ’, तत् अना-  
श्रयञ्च तिष्ठति । जन्ममरणान्तराले बुद्ध्यादयः प्रत्यु-  
( १९३ ) सूक्ष्मशरीर-  
स्यावश्यकत्वप्रदर्शनम् ॥ बुद्ध्यादित्वान् — दृश्यमानशरीरवृत्तिकुद्ध्यादिवत् ।

“ विना विशेषैः ” इति, सूक्ष्मः शरीरैरित्यर्थः ।  
आगमश्चात्र भवति—

“ ततः सत्यवतः कायात् पाशवद्धं वशकृतम् ।

अङ्गुष्ठमात्रं पुरुषं निश्चरुषं बलाद्यमः ” ( महाभारत वनपर्व-अध्याय  
२९६. ) इत्यङ्गुष्ठमात्रवेन सूक्ष्मशरीरत्वमुपलक्षयति । आत्मनो निष्कर्षासम्भ-  
वान् सूक्ष्ममेव शरीरम् ‘ पुरुषः ’, तदपि पुरि स्थूलशरीरे शेते इति ॥ ४१ ॥

एवं सूक्ष्मशरीरास्तित्वमुपपाद्य यथा संसरति, येन हेतुना च-तदुभयमाह—

‘ तद्वद्विना विशेषेण तिष्ठति निराश्रयं लिङ्गम् ॥ ४१ ॥

१७.१

॥

“ १ ”

“ निमित्तम् ”

(-१९४) सूक्ष्मशरीर-  
संकरणप्रकारः ॥ यथायथं पादकौशिकशरीरप्रहः, स हि धर्मादिनिमित्त-  
प्रभवः । निमित्तञ्च नैमित्तिकञ्च-तत्र यः प्रसङ्गः  
प्रसक्तिस्तथा “ नटवद्व्यतिष्ठते लिङ्गम् ” सूक्ष्म-  
शरीरम् । यथा हि नटस्तां तां भूमिद्यां विधाय परशुरामो वा उजातशयुर्वा

१. केचिदिमां कारिका स्थूलशरीरपरतया व्याख्याय ‘ लिङ्गम् ’ लिङ्गशरीरे  
‘ विशेषैः ’ स्थूलशरीरैरित्याहुः ॥ अन्ये तु ‘ लिङ्गम् ’ लिङ्गशरीरं ‘ विशेषैः ’ लिङ्ग-  
शरीरार्थापत्तनभूतः सूक्ष्मशरीरैरिति । एतन्मते शरीरप्रथम-लिङ्गशरीरम्, तद-  
धिष्ठनभूतं सूक्ष्मशरीरम्, तदधिष्ठनभूतं च स्थूलशरीरमिति ।

वाग्मराजो वा भवति, एवमन्तत्तस्थूलशरीरपरिमहणादिवो वा मनुष्यो वा पशुर्वा  
वनस्पतिर्वा भवति सूक्ष्मं शरीरमित्यर्थः ॥

वृत्तस्थः पुनरस्येदशो महिमेत्यत आह—“ प्रकृतेर्विभुत्वयोगान् ” इति ।

( १९५ ) सूक्ष्मशरीर-  
संशरणे हेतुः—प्रकृतेर्वि-  
भुत्वम् ॥

तथा च पुराणम्—

“ वैश्वरूप्यान् प्रधानस्य परिणामो ऽयमकुत ”  
इति ॥ ४२ ॥

“ निमित्तनैमित्तिकप्रसङ्गेन ” इत्युक्तम्—तत्र निमित्तनैमित्तिके विभजते—  
21. सांसिद्धिकाश्च भावाः प्राकृतिका वैकृतिकाश्च धर्माद्याः ।

दृष्टाः ' करणाश्रयिणः कार्याश्रयिणश्च कललाद्याः ॥ ४३ ॥

“ सांसिद्धिकाश्च ” इति । “ वैकृतिकाः ” नैमित्तिकाः, पुरुषस्य जातस्यो-

( १९६ ) निमित्तनै-  
मित्तिकविभागः—धर्मादि-  
रूपनिमित्तस्य प्राकृतिक-  
वैकृतिकभावकथनम्,  
तस्य च करणाश्रयित्व-  
वर्णनम् ॥

त्तरकालदेवताराधनादिनोत्पन्नाः । “ प्राकृतिकाः ”  
स्वाभाविका भावाः सांसिद्धिकाः<sup>१</sup> । तथा हि—सर्गा-  
दावादिविद्वानप्रभगवान् कपिलो महामुनिर्धर्मज्ञान-  
धैराग्यैश्वर्यसम्पन्नः प्रादुर्बभूवेति स्मरन्ति । वैकृताश्च  
भावा असांसिद्धिकाः, ये उपायानुष्ठानेनोत्पन्नाः,  
यथा प्राचेतसप्रभृतीनाम्महर्षाणाम् । एवमधर्माज्ञाना-  
वैराग्यानीश्वर्याण्यपि ॥

कार्यं शरीरं तद्दश्रयिणः, तस्यावस्थाः, कललबुद्बुदमांसपेशांकरणदाह-  
प्रत्यङ्गच्छुहा<sup>२</sup> गर्भस्थस्य, ततो निर्गतस्य बालस्य

( १९७ ) शरीरग्रह-  
रूपनैमित्तिकस्य कार्या-  
श्रयित्वकथनम् ॥

वाल्यक्रीमार्यौवनवार्धकानीति ॥ ४३ ॥

अद्यगतानि निमित्तनैमित्तिकानि । कतमस्य तु निमित्तस्य कतमशैमि-  
त्तिकमित्यत आह—

( १९८ ) निमित्त-  
विशेषाणां कार्यविशेष-  
निरूपणम् ॥

१. करणमत्र बुद्धिः । २. ' स्वाभाविकाः ' यावद्वस्तुभाविनः, ' वैकृतिकाः '  
कादचित्कृतयः ॥ ३. उपादाभाष्ये तु—' भावादिधा चिन्त्यन्ते—नांसिद्धिकाः, प्राकृताः,  
' वैकृताधेस्युक्तम् ।

धर्मेण गमनमूर्ध्वं, गमनमधस्ताद्भवत्यधर्मेण ।

ज्ञानेन चापवर्गो, विपर्ययादिष्यते बन्धः ॥ ४४ ॥

“ धर्मेण गमनमूर्ध्वम् ” सुप्रभृतिषु लोकेषु । “ गमनमधस्ताद्भवत्यधर्मेण ”  
 (१९९) धर्मस्य ऊर्ध्व- सुकलादिषु<sup>१</sup> लोकेषु । “ ज्ञानेन चापवर्गः । ” तावदेव  
 गमने प्रति अधर्मस्या- प्रकृतिभंगिमारभते न चापद्विवेकख्याति करोति; अप  
 धोगमनम्प्रति, ज्ञानस्या- विवेकख्यातौ सत्यां वृत्तकृत्यतया विवेकख्यातिमन्त-  
 पवर्गम्प्रति, अज्ञानस्य म्पुरुषम्प्रति निवर्तते । यथाहुः—  
 च बन्धनम्प्रति—कारण-  
 त्वम् ॥

“ विवेकख्यातिपर्यन्तं ज्ञेयम् प्रकृतिषेडितम् ” इति ॥

“ विपर्येयान् ” अतएवज्ञानान् “ इष्यते बन्धः ” ॥

स च त्रिविधः—प्राकृतिको वैकृतिको दाक्षिणकश्चेति । तत्र प्रकृतावबन्ध-  
 (२००) बन्धत्रैविध्य- ज्ञानाद्ये प्रकृतिमुपासते तेषां प्राकृतिको बन्धः, यः  
 निरूपणम् प्राकृतिक-वै- पुराणे प्रकृतिहयान् प्रत्युच्यते ।  
 कृतिक-दाक्षिणकरूपम् ॥

“ पूर्णं ज्ञानमहस्यं हि तिष्ठन्त्यव्यक्तचिन्तकाः ” इति ॥

वैकारिको बन्धन्तेषां ये विकारानेव भूतेन्द्रियाहङ्कारसुद्धीः पुरुषधियोपासते,  
 तान् प्रगीदमुच्यते—

“ द्वा मन्वन्तराणीह तिष्ठन्तीन्द्रियचिन्तकाः ।

भौतिकाम्बु<sup>२</sup> ज्ञानपूर्णं, महसन्त्याभिमानिकाः ॥

बाँदा द्वा सहस्राणि तिष्ठन्ति विरातावरः ।

ते मन्वमी विदेहा<sup>३</sup> तेषां वैकृतिको बन्धः ” इति ॥

१. भूतेति वाञ्छन्तरम् । २. ‘ भौतिकाः ’—ये भूतान्येव पुरुषधियोपासते ।  
 ‘ आभिमानिकाः ’—ये अहङ्कारमेव पुरुषधियोपासते । ‘ बाँदाः ’—ये सुद्धिमेव  
 पुरुषधियोपासते । ३. विदेहाः—वैशाख्येणैकवर्षवतां संज्ञान्तरमिदम् पारिभाषिकम् ।



इष्टापूर्तेन' दाक्षिण्यः । पुरुषतत्त्वानभिज्ञो हीष्टापूर्तकारी कामोपहतमना  
बध्यते इति ॥ ४४ ॥

वैराग्यात् प्रकृतिलयः, संसारो भवति राजसाद्रागात् ।

ऐश्वर्यादविघातो विपर्ययात्तद्विपर्यासः ॥ ४५ ॥

“वैराग्यात् प्रकृतिलयः” इति—पुरुषतत्त्वानभिज्ञस्य वैराग्यमात्रान्

( २०१ ) वैराग्यात्  
प्रकृतिलयः ॥

प्रकृतिलयः, प्रकृतिग्रहणेन प्रकृतिमहदहङ्कारभूते-  
न्द्रियाणि गृह्यन्ते, तेष्व्वात्मबुद्धयोपास्यमानेषु लयः ।  
कालान्तरेण च पुनराविर्भवति ॥

“संसारो भवति राजसाद्रागात्” इति । ‘राजसान्’ इत्यनेन रजसो

( २०२ ) राज-

दुःखहेतुत्वात् संसारस्य दुःखहेतुता सूचिता ॥

साद्रागात् संसारः ।

“ऐश्वर्यादविघात” इति—इच्छायाः । ईश्वरो हि यदेवेच्छति तदेव करोति ।

( २०३ ) ऐश्व-

“विपर्ययात्” अनैश्वर्यात् “तद्विपर्यासः” सर्वत्रे-  
च्छाविघात इत्यर्थः ॥ ४५ ॥

र्यादिन्द्रियानभिघातः,

अनैश्वर्याच्चेच्छाविघातः ॥

बुद्धिधर्मान् धर्मादीनिर्धा भावान् समासच्यामाभ्यां मुमुक्षुणां हेयोपादेयान्  
दर्शयितुं प्रथमन्तःपत्न समासमाह—

४५' एष प्रत्ययसर्गो विपर्ययादाक्तितुष्टिसिद्ध्याख्यः ।

गुणवैषम्यविमर्दात्, तस्य च भेदास्तु पञ्चादात् ॥ ४६ ॥

२१-१

१. वापीकूपतडागादि देवतायतनानि च । अन्नप्रदानमारामाः पृतमर्थ्याः  
प्रचक्षते ॥ एकाग्रिर्कर्मह्वने प्रेतायां यन्न हूयते । अन्तर्वेद्या च यद्दानमिष्टन्तर्दमि-  
र्धयते । २. यः प्रकृतिलये गच्छति ।

“ एषः ” इति । प्रतीयते ऽनेनेति प्रत्ययो बुद्धिः, तस्य सर्गः । नत्र  
 “ विपर्ययः ” अज्ञानमविद्या, सा ऽपि बुद्धिधर्मः,  
 ( २०४ ) विपर्ययादि- “ अशक्तिः ” अपि करणवैकल्यहेतुका बुद्धिधर्म एव ।  
 बुद्धिसर्गस्य समासेन “ तुष्टिमिद्धी ” अपि वक्ष्यमाणलक्षणे बुद्धिधर्मावेव ।  
 कथनम् ॥ तत्र विपर्ययाशक्तितुष्टिषु यथायोगं सप्तानाञ्च धर्मा-  
 दीनां ज्ञानवर्जमन्तर्भावः; सिद्धौ च ज्ञानस्येति ॥

व्याख्यमाह—“ तस्य च भेदास्तु पञ्चाशत् ” इति । कस्मात्? “ गुण,  
 वैपम्यविमर्शात् ” इति । गुणानां वैपम्यमेकैकस्या-  
 ( २०५ ) तस्यैव व्यासेन धिकबलता द्वयोर्द्वयोर्वा, एकैकस्य न्यूनबलता द्वयो-  
 कथनम्-पञ्चाशद्भेदाः ॥ द्वयोर्वा, ते च न्यूनाधिक्ये मन्दमध्याधिक्यमात्रतया  
 यथाकार्यमुच्येते । तदिदं गुणानां वैपम्यम् तेनोपमर्दः  
 एकैकस्य न्यूनस्य द्वयोर्वा ऽभिभवः । तस्मात्तस्य भेदाः पञ्चाशदिति ॥ ४६ ॥

तानेव पञ्चाशद्भेदान् गणयति—

पञ्च विपर्ययभेदा भवन्त्यशक्तिश्च करणवैकल्यात् ।  
 अष्टाविंशतिभेदा तुष्टिर्नवधा ऽष्टधा सिद्धिः ॥ ४७ ॥

“ पञ्च ” इति । अविद्याऽस्मितारागद्वेषाभिनिवेशा यथासंख्यं तमो-  
 मोहमहामोहतामिष्टान्धतामिस्त्रमंज्ञकाः पञ्च विपर्यय-  
 ( २०६ ) विपर्ययादीना विदोषाः, विपर्ययप्रभवानामप्यस्मितार्दीनां विपर्यय-  
 पञ्चाशद्भेदपरिगणनम् ॥ स्वभावत्वात् । सद्वा-यद्विद्यया विपर्ययेणावधार्यते  
 वस्तु, अस्मिताद्यस्तस्वभावाः सन्तस्तदभिनिवि-  
 शन्ते । अत एव पञ्चरवाविद्येत्याह भगवान् चार्पण्यः ॥ ४७ ॥

( २०७ ) विपर्ययादीना भगवति पञ्चानां विपर्ययभेदानामवान्तरभेदमाह—  
 प्रत्येकमवान्तरभेदकथ-  
 नम्-तत्र प्रथमं विपर्यय-  
 यस्य द्वार्षाटः ॥

भेदस्तमसो ऽष्टविधो मोहस्य च, दशविधो महामोहः ।

तामिस्रोऽष्टादशधा, तथा भवत्यन्धतामिस्रः ॥ ४८ ॥

“ भेदः ” इति । भेदस्तमसो ऽष्टविधाया अष्टविधः । अष्टस्वव्यक्तमह-

( २०८ ) अविद्यारूप-  
विपर्ययस्याष्टविधत्वम् ॥

दहद्वारपञ्चतन्मात्रेष्वनात्मस्वामबुद्धिरविद्या तमः,  
अष्टविधविपर्ययत्तस्याष्टविधत्वम् ॥

“ मोहस्य च ” इति, अत्राष्टविधो भेदश्चकारेणानुपपद्यते । देवा

( २०९ ) अस्मितारूप  
विपर्ययस्याष्टविधत्वम् ॥

ष्टविधमैश्वर्यमासाद्यामृतत्वाभिमानिनो ऽणिमादिक-  
मात्मीयं शाश्वतिकमभिमन्यन्ते, सैशमस्मिता मोहो  
ऽष्टविधैश्वर्यविपर्ययत्वाद्दष्टविधः

“ दशविधो महामोहः ” इति । शब्दादिषु पञ्चसु दिव्यादिव्यतया

( २१० ) रागरूपविप-  
र्ययस्य दशविधत्वम् ॥

दशविधविपर्ययेषु रजनीयेषु राग आसक्तिर्महामोहः,  
स च दशविधविपर्ययत्वाद्दशविधः ॥

“ तामिस्रो ” द्वेषो “ ऽष्टादशधा ” । शब्दादयो दशविपर्यया रजनीयाः-

( २११ ) द्वेषरूपविपर्य-  
यस्याष्टादशविधत्वम् ॥

स्वरूपतः, पेश्वर्यम्वणिमादिकञ्च स्वरूपतां रजनी-  
यम् । किं तु रजनीयशब्दाद्युपायाः । ते च शब्दादय  
उपस्थिताः परम्परणोऽहम्यमानास्तदुपायाश्चाणिमादयः  
स्वरूपेणैव कोपनीया भवन्तीति शब्दादिभिर्दशभिः  
सहाणिमाद्यष्टकमष्टादशधेति, तद्विपर्ययो द्वेषस्तामिस्रो ऽष्टादशविपर्ययत्वाद्दष्टा-  
दशधेति ।

“ तथा भवत्यन्धतामिस्रः ” । अभिनिवेशो ऽन्धतामिस्रः । तथेत्यनेनाष्टा-

( २१२ ) अभिनिवेश-  
रूपविपर्ययस्य ष्टादश-  
विधत्वम् ॥

दशधेत्यनुपपद्यते । देवाः स्वत्वणिमादिकमष्टविधमै-  
श्वर्यमासाद्य दश शब्दादीन् विपर्यान् भुञ्जानाः-  
‘ शब्दादयो भोग्यास्तदुपायाश्चाणिमादयो ऽस्माकम-  
सुरादिभिर्भोग्यानिपत ’ इति-विभ्यति । तदिदं  
भवमभिनिवेशो ऽन्धतामिस्रो ऽष्टादशविपर्ययत्वाद्दष्टा-

दशधेति ॥

( २१३ ) विपर्ययावा- सो ऽयं पञ्चविधो विकल्पो विपर्ययो ऽवान्तरभेदा-  
न्तरभेदसमष्टिसंख्या द्व द्वापष्टिरिति ॥ ४८ ॥  
द्वांपष्टिः ॥

( २१४ ) अष्टाविंशति- तदेवं पञ्चविपर्ययभेदानुक्त्वा ऽष्टाविंशतिभेदाम-  
प्रकारकाशक्तिकथनम् ॥ शक्तिमाह--

एकादशेन्द्रियवधाः सह बुद्धिवधैरशक्तिरुद्दिष्टा ।  
सप्तदश वधा बुद्धेर्विपर्ययात्तुष्टिसिद्धीनाम् ॥ ४९ ॥

“ एकादश ”—इति । इन्द्रियवधस्य ग्रहो बुद्धिवधहेतुत्वेन, न त्वशक्ति-  
( २१५ ) एकादशेन्द्रि- भेदपूर्णत्वेन “ एकादशेन्द्रियवधाः ”—  
यवधजन्यैकादशविधा- ऽशक्तिः ॥

वाधियं कुष्टिता ऽन्धत्वं जडता ऽभिघ्नता तथा ।  
सूकनाकौण्ड्यपद्भुत्वक्लृण्ड्योदावर्तमन्दताः ॥

यथाम्बुत्वं श्रोत्रादीनामिन्द्रियाणां वधाः । एतावाप्येव तु तद्हेतुका बुद्धेर-  
शक्तिः स्वव्यापारे भवति । तथा चैकादशहेतुक्त्वादेकादशधा बुद्धेरशक्तिरुच्यते ।  
हेतुहेतुमतोरभेदविवक्षया च सामानाधिकरण्यम् ॥

तदेवमिन्द्रियवधद्वारेण बुद्धेरशक्तिमुक्त्वा स्वरूपतो ऽशक्तीराह—“ सह-  
( २१६ ) बुद्धेः साक्षा- बुद्धिवधैः” इति । कति बुद्धेः स्वरूपतो वधा इत्यत  
दशक्तिः सप्तदशविधा ॥ आह—“ सप्तदश वधा बुद्धेः” । कुतः ? “ विपर्य-  
यात्तुष्टिसिद्धीनाम् । ” तुष्टयो नवधेति तद्विपर्ययान्त-  
रिह्यरूपणाश्रवधा भवन्ति, एवं सिद्धयो ऽष्टाविति तद्विपर्ययास्तस्मिन्निरूपणादष्टौ  
भवन्तीति ॥ ४९ ॥

( २१७ ) नवविधतु- तुष्टिर्नवधेयुक्तम्, ताः परिगणयति—  
ष्टिकथनम् ॥

आध्यात्मिकाश्चतस्रः प्रकृत्युपादानकालभाग्याख्याः । 25।  
वाह्या विषयोपरमात् पञ्च,—नव तुष्टयो ऽभिमतः ॥ ५० ॥

“आध्यात्मिकाः” इति । आध्यात्मिकाः—‘प्रकृतिव्यतिरिक्त आत्मा ऽस्ति’ इति प्रतिरस, ततो ऽस्य श्रवणमननादिना विवेकमाश्लाकाराय त्वसदुपदेशतुष्टो यो न प्रयतते तस्याध्यात्मिकाश्चतस्रस्तुष्टयो भवन्ति, प्रकृतिव्यतिरिक्तमात्मानमधिकृत्य यस्मात्तास्तुष्टयस्तस्मादाध्यात्मिकाः । कास्ता इत्यत आह—“प्रकृत्युपादानकालभाग्याख्याः”, प्रकृत्यादिराख्या यामां तान्नयोक्ताः ॥

‘तत्र प्रकृत्याख्या तुष्टिर्यथा कस्यचिदुपदेशे,—‘विवेकमाश्लाकारो हि प्रकृतिपरिणामभेदस्तत्र प्रकृतिरेव करोर्नानि कृतन्त-  
( २१९ ) आध्यात्मि-  
कतुष्टियु प्रथमा प्रकृ-  
त्याख्या अम्भः ॥  
द्वयानाभ्यासेन, तस्मादेवमेवास्तु वच्य’,—इति सेय-  
मुपदेशेऽस्य तुष्टिः प्रकृती, सा तुष्टिः प्रकृत्याख्या  
अम्भ उच्यते ॥

या तु,—‘प्राकृत्यपि<sup>१</sup> विवेकख्यातिर्न, सा प्रकृतिमात्राद्भवति,<sup>२</sup> माभूत्सर्वस्य  
( २२० ) द्वितीया उपा-  
दानाख्या गलिलम् ॥  
सर्वदा, तन्मात्रस्य सर्वान् प्रत्यक्षिरोपान्; प्रव्रज्या-  
यान्तु सा भवति, तस्मात् प्रव्रज्यामुपाददीयाः,  
कृतन्ते ध्यानाभ्यासेनायुष्मन्’—इति उपदेशे या तुष्टिः  
सोपादानाख्या ‘सलिलम्’ उच्यते ॥

या तु,—‘प्रव्रज्या ऽपि न सद्योनिर्वाणदेति भव कालपरिवाकमपेक्ष्य मिश्रित्ते  
( २२१ ) तृतीया काला-  
ख्या येषः ॥  
विधास्यति, अलमुत्ततया तव’—इति उपदेशे या  
तुष्टिः सा कालाख्या ‘मेघ’ उच्यते ॥

१. अप्रायं सहप्रदृशोक्तः—अम्भः गलिलं मेघो वृष्टिः पारं तथा सुपारं च ।  
अन्येष पारपारमनुत्तमाम्भ वतामाम्भ’ इति । २. प्रकृत्या निरुता । ३. प्रकृति-  
मात्राद्विवेकख्यातां सत्यां प्रकृतेः सर्वं प्रति तुल्यमवबन्धवात् सकलजनस्य विवे-  
कख्यातिः स्यादिति हृदयम् । ४. ‘ओष’ इति पाठान्तरम् ।

या तु,—‘ न प्रकृतेर्न कालान्नाप्युपादानाद्विवेकख्यातिः, अपि तु भाग्यादेव ।  
 ( २२२ ) चतुर्थी भा- अत एव मदालसापत्यान्यतिवालानि भातुरुपदेशादेव  
 ग्याख्या वृष्टिः ॥ विवेकख्यातिमन्ति मुक्तानि यमूवुः, तस्मान्नाग्यमेव  
 हेतुर्नान्यन्’—इति उपदेशे या तुष्टिः सा भाग्याख्या  
 ‘ वृष्टिः ’ उच्यते ॥

वाद्या दर्शयति—“ वाद्याः ” तुष्टयः “ विषयोपरमात्, पञ्च ” । या.  
 खल्वनात्मनः प्रकृतिमद्दहद्वारादीनात्मेत्यभिमन्य-  
 ( २२३ ) पञ्चविधवाद्य- मानस्य वैराग्ये सति तुष्टयस्ता वाद्याः, आत्मज्ञाना-  
 तुष्टिकथनम् ॥ भावे सत्यनात्मानमधिकृत्य प्रवृत्तेरिति । ताश्च वैराग्ये  
 सति तुष्टय इति वैराग्यहेतुपञ्चत्वाद्वैराग्याण्यपि पञ्च,  
 तत्पञ्चत्वात् तुष्टयः पञ्चेति । उपरम्यते अनेनेत्युपरमो वैराग्यम्, विषयादुपरमो  
 विषयोपरमः । विषया भोग्याः शब्दादयः पञ्च, उपरमा अपि पञ्च ॥

तथा हि—अर्जनरक्षणक्षयभोगहिंसादोषदर्शनहेतुजन्मानः पञ्चोपरमा भवन्ति ।  
 ( २२४ ) षष्ठतुष्टिषु तथा हि—सेवाद्वयो धनार्जनोपायाः, ते च सेवाकार्यं  
 प्रथमा, पारम् ॥ दुःखाजुर्वन्ति,

“ ह्यदुरीधरद्वाःस्थटण्डिचण्डार्धचन्द्रजाम् ।

वेदानां भावयन् प्राज्ञः कः संवाम्यनुपज्जते ” ॥

एवमन्ये ऽप्यर्जनोपायाः दुःखा इति विषयोपरमे या तुष्टिः सेवा ‘ पारम् ’  
 उच्यते ॥

तथा ऽर्जिनन्धनम् ‘राजैःशारिजामिजलौघादिभ्यो विनङ्ङयतीति तद्रक्षणे  
 ( २२५ ) द्वितीया महदुःगमिति भावयतो विषयोपरमे या तुष्टिः सा  
 सुगारम् ॥ द्वितीया ‘ सुपारम् ’ उच्यते ॥

तथा मद्यता ऽऽवासेनार्जितन्धनं भुज्यमानं क्षीयते इति तत्रप्रथमभाषयतो  
 ( २२६ ) तृतीया पारा- विषयोपरमे या तुष्टिः सा तृतीया ‘ पारापारम् ’  
 पारम् ॥ उच्यते ॥

एवं शब्दादिभोगाभ्यासान् प्रवर्धन्ते कामाः, ते च विषयाप्राप्तौ कामिनं  
(२२७) चतुर्थी, अनुत्- दुःस्त्राकुर्यन्तीति भोगदोषम् भावयतो विषयोपरमे  
मान्मः ॥ या तुष्टिः सा चतुर्थी 'अनुत्तमान्म' उच्यते ॥

एवञ्चात्रुपहस्य भूतानि त्रिषोपभोगः सम्भवतीति हिंसादोषदर्शनाद्विषयो-  
(२२८) पञ्चमी .उत्त- परमे या तुष्टिः सा पञ्चमी 'उत्तमान्म' उच्यते ॥  
मान्मः ॥

एवमाध्यात्मिकीभिश्चतसृभिः याद्याभिश्च पञ्चभिः 'नव तुष्टयो ऽभि-  
मताः' ॥ ५० ॥

(२२९) सिद्धिभेदक- गौणमुख्यभेदः सिद्धीराह—  
यनम् ॥

२०<sup>१</sup> ऊहः शब्दो ऽध्ययनं दुःस्त्रविघातास्त्रयः सुहृत्प्राप्तिः ।

दानं च सिद्धयो ऽष्टौ, सिद्धेः पूर्वो ऽङ्कुशस्त्रिविधः ॥ ५१ ॥

“ऊह” इति । विहन्यमानस्य दुःस्त्रस्य त्रिधात्तन्निघातास्त्रयः, इतीमा

(२३०) सिद्धिभेदक- मुख्यान्निघः सिद्धयः, तदुपायनया त्रितरा गौण्यः  
यनम् ॥ पञ्च सिद्धयः, ता अपि हेतुहेतुमनया व्यवस्थिताः ।

तत्राद्या ऽध्ययनलक्षणा सिद्धिहेतुरेव । मुख्यास्तु  
सिद्धयो हेतुमन्य एव । मध्यमान्तु हेतुहेतुमत्यः ॥

विधिवद्गुत्सुग्यादध्यात्मविघानामशरस्वरूपप्रहणमध्ययनम् प्रथमा सिद्धि-

(२३१) अध्ययनरूपा स्नारमुच्यते ॥  
प्रथमा सिद्धिः, तारम् ॥

तत्कार्यम् शब्दः; 'शब्दः' इति पदम् शब्दजनितमर्थज्ञानमुपलक्षयति,

(२३२) शब्दरूपा कार्ये कारणोपचारात् । सा द्वितीया सिद्धिः सुतार-  
द्वितीया, सुतारम् ॥ मुच्यते । पात्रार्थाभ्यान्तद्विद्विधा ध्रुवणम् ॥

(२५१) सृष्टिसारणवि-  
प्रतिपत्तिनिराकरणम् ॥

उक्तस्य सर्गस्य कारणविप्रतिपत्तीनिराकरोति—

इत्येष प्रकृतिकृतो महदादिविशेषभूतपर्यन्तः ।

प्रतिपुरुषविमोक्षार्थं स्वार्थं इव परार्थं आरम्भः ॥ ५६ ॥

(२५२) चार्वाकवेदान्त-  
न्यायमतदूषणम् ॥

“ इत्येष ” इति । आरभ्यते इति “ आरम्भः ” सर्गः महदादिभूतः प्रकृ-  
र्येव कृतो नेत्रेण, न ब्रह्मोपादानो, नाप्यकारण ।  
अकारणत्वे ह्यत्यन्ताभावो ऽन्यन्तभावो वा स्यात् ।

न ब्रह्मोपादानः, चित्तिशक्तेरपरिणामात् । नेत्रराधि-  
ष्ठितप्रकृतिकृतो, निर्व्यापारस्याधिष्ठानृत्वासम्भवात् । न हि निर्व्यापारस्त्वा  
वास्याद्यधितिष्ठति ॥

ननु प्रकृतिकृतश्चेत्, तस्या निर्यायाः प्रवृत्तिशैलाया अनुपरमात् सर्व  
(२५३) नित्यप्रवृत्ति-  
शीलप्रकृतिकृतसृष्टिपक्षे  
सम्युत्पत्तित्वस्यानिर्मो-  
क्षस्य च प्रमदशब्दा-  
तन्निरासश्च ॥

सर्गः स्यादिति न कश्चिन्मुच्येतेत्यत आह—“ प्रति-  
पुरुषविमोक्षार्थं स्वार्थं इव परार्थं आरम्भः ” इति ।  
यथादनयान ओदनाय पाके प्रवृत्तः ओदनसिद्धौ  
निवर्तते,—एवं प्रत्येकगुरूपान् मोचयितुमप्रवृत्ता प्रकृ-  
तियं पुरुषमोचयति तम्प्रति पुनर्न प्रवर्तते—नदिद-  
माह—‘ स्वार्थं इव, ’ स्वार्थं यथा तथा परार्थं आरम्भ

इत्यर्थः ॥ ५६ ॥

स्यादेतन्—‘ स्वार्थं परार्थं वा चेन्नः प्रवर्तते । न च प्रकृतिरचेन्नैयं भवितु-  
(२५४) अचेन्नप्रधान-  
प्रवृत्तिशब्दः । महति तन्मादग्नि प्रवृत्तेरधिष्ठाना घेतनः । न च  
क्षेत्रज्ञाश्रयतना अपि प्रवृत्तिमधिष्ठानुमहन्ति, तेषां प्रवृत्ति-  
स्वरूपानभिज्ञायात् । तन्मादग्नि सर्गार्थं दर्शा प्रवृत्ते-  
रधिष्ठाना, न घेतन ’—इत्यत आह—

यन्सर्विष्टिनिमित्तं क्षीम्य यथा प्रवृत्तिरस्य ।

पुरुषविमोक्षनिमित्तं तथा प्रवृत्तिः प्रधानस्य ॥ ५७ ॥



“ वत्सविवृद्धिनिमित्तम् ” इति । दृष्टमचेतनमपि प्रयोजनमप्रवर्तमानम्, यथा वत्सविवृद्धयर्थं क्षीरमचेतनम् प्रवर्तते । एव-  
( २५५ ) तत्परिहारः— म्प्रकृतिरचेतना ऽपि पुरुषविमोक्षणाय प्रवर्तित्व्यते ॥  
क्षीरप्रवृत्तिवत्तस्याः प्र-  
वृत्तिः ॥

न च—“ क्षीरप्रवृत्तेरपीश्वराधिष्ठाननिबन्धनत्वेन साध्यत्वाच्च साध्यव्यभि-  
चार ’ इति, साग्रतमप्रेक्षावतः प्रवृत्तेः स्वार्थकारु-  
( २५६ ) ईश्वराधिष्ठित- ण्याभ्यां व्यासत्वात् । ते च जगत्सर्गाद्यावर्तमाने प्रेक्षा-  
प्रधानसृष्टौ दोषाः ॥ वत्प्रवृत्तिपूर्वकत्वमपि व्याचर्तयतः । न श्वात्सकले-

प्सितस्य भगवतो जगन् सृजतः किमप्यभिलषित-  
म्भवति । नापि कारण्यादस्य सर्गे प्रवृत्तिः, प्राक् सर्गाज्जीवानामिन्द्रियशरी-  
रविषयानुत्पत्तौ दुःस्वाभावेन कस्य प्रहाणेच्छा कारण्यम् ? सर्गोत्तरकालं  
दुःखिनो ऽवलोक्य कारण्याभ्युपगमे दुरुत्तरमितरेतराश्रयत्वन्दूपणम्,—कारण्येन  
सृष्टिः सृष्ट्या च कारण्यमिति । अपि च करणया प्रेरित ईश्वरः सुखिन  
एव जन्तून् सृजेन्न विचित्रान् । ‘ कर्मवैचित्र्याद्वैचित्र्यम् ’ इति चेत्—कृतमस्य  
प्रेक्षावतः कर्माधिष्ठानेन, तद्वनधिष्ठानमात्रादेवाचेतनस्यापि कर्मणः प्रवृत्त्यनुप-  
पत्तेस्तन्कार्यशरीरेन्द्रियविषयानुत्पत्तौ दुःखानुत्पत्तेरपि मुक्तरत्वात् ॥

प्रकृतेरवचेतनायाः प्रवृत्तेर्न स्वार्थानुग्रहो न वा कारण्यप्रयोजकमिति  
( २५७ ) प्रकृतिगुणै- नोक्तदोषप्रसङ्गावतारः । पारार्थ्यमाग्रन्तु प्रयोजकमुप-  
तद्दोषो भावः ॥ पद्यते । तस्मात् सुशूक्तम्—“ वत्सविवृद्धिनिमित्तम् ”  
इति ॥ ५७ ॥

“ स्वार्थं इव ” इति दृष्टान्तितम् [ कारिका. ५६ ] तद्विभजते—  
( २५८ ) पुरुषविमोक्षा-  
र्थम् प्रधानस्य प्रवृत्तिः ॥

थात्सुक्यनिवृत्त्यर्थं यथा क्रियासु प्रवर्तते लोकः । 281  
पुरुषस्य विमोक्षार्थं प्रवर्तते तद्वद्व्यक्तम् ॥ ५८ ॥

“ आत्मुक्त्य-” इति । आत्मुक्त्यमिच्छा, सा खल्विष्यमाणप्राप्तौ निवर्तते । इष्यमाणश्च स्वार्थः, इष्टलक्षणत्वान् फलस्य । दाष्टान्तिके योजयति-  
“ पुरुषस्य विमोक्षार्थमप्रवर्तते तद्वदव्यक्तम् ” इति ॥ ५८ ॥

ननु भवतु पुरुषार्थः प्रकृतेः प्रवर्तकः, निवृत्तिस्तु कुतस्त्या प्रकृतेः  
(२५९) विवेकख्यात्य- इत्यत आह—  
नन्तरम् प्रधाननिवृत्तिः ॥

रङ्गस्य दर्शयित्वा निवर्तते नर्तकी यथा नृत्यात् ।

पुरुषस्य तथा ऽऽत्मानं प्रकाश्य विनिवर्तते प्रकृतिः ॥ ५९ ॥

“ रङ्गस्य ” इति, स्थानेन स्थानिन पारिपदानुपलक्षयति । ‘आत्मानम्’ शब्दाद्यात्मना पुरुषाद्भेदेन च प्रकाशयेत्यर्थः ॥ ५९ ॥

स्यादेतन्-‘ प्रवर्ततामप्रकृतिः पुरुषार्थम् । पुरुषादुपकृतामप्रकृतिर्लप्स्यते कश्चि-  
(२६०) गुणवत्याः प्रकृतेः दुषकारम्, आज्ञाम्पादनाराधितादिवाज्ञापयितुर्भु-  
प्रत्युपकारं विनैव जिन्या । तथा च न परार्थोऽस्या आरम्भः ’-इत्यत  
पुरुषोपकारः ॥ आह—

नानाविधैरुपायैरुपकारिष्यनुपाकरिणः पुंसः ।

गुणवत्यगुणस्य मतस्तन्म्यार्थमपार्थकञ्चरति ॥ ६० ॥

“ नाना-” इति । यथा गुणवानुपकार्येण भृश्या निर्गुणे ऽत एवानुपकारिणि  
स्यामिनि निष्कलागधनः, एवमियमप्रकृतिमपरिचिनी गुणवानुपकारिष्यनुपका-  
रिणि पुरुषे ध्यर्थपरिभ्रमेति पुरुषार्थमेव यतने न स्वार्थमिति सिद्धम् ॥ ६० ॥

स्यादेतन्—‘नर्तकी नृत्यमरिपद्मयो दर्शयित्वा निवृत्ताऽपि पुनस्तद्दृष्टिकौतू-  
 हलान् प्रवर्तते यथा, तथा प्रकृतिरपि पुरपाठ्यात्मानं  
 (२६१) विवेकरूपात्यन्त-  
 न्तरं प्रधानस्यात्य-  
 न्तिकां निवृत्तिः ॥  
 दर्शयित्वा निवृत्ता ऽपि पुनः प्रवत्स्यति’—इत्यत  
 आह—

प्रकृतेः सुकुमारतरङ्ग किञ्चिदस्तीति मे मतिर्भवति ।

या दृष्टा ऽस्मीति पुनर्न दर्शनमुपैति पुरुषस्य ॥ ६१ ॥<sup>१</sup>

“ प्रकृतेः ” इति । सुकुमारतरता ऽतिपेशलता, परपुररवशं नामद्विष्युनेति  
 माघन् । अमूर्धभइया हि कुलवधूरतिमन्दाक्षमन्धरा प्रमादाद्विगलितसिचया-  
 ब्रह्मा वेदालोक्यते परपुरपेण, तदा ऽस्मी यथा प्रयतने, अप्रमत्ता यथेनां पर-

१.—अस्याः कारिकाया अनन्तरमेवान्यथैक्या कारिकया भवितव्यमिति स्वर्ग-  
 सस्य तिलकान्वयजस्य बालगङ्गाधरपण्डितस्य सिद्धान्तः । तत्संक्षेपस्तु—

“ सप्तलां किल येऽर्थाः ’ इतीश्वरकृष्णवचनानुरोधेनार्याणां सप्तला भाव्यम् ।  
 किन्तु गौटपादभाष्ये स्वैकोनसप्ततिरेवोपलभ्यते । भाष्यं चैकपठितमाथा उपरि  
 नैकस्या अपि तु कारिकयोः । अत एकपठितमाथा अनन्तरमेवानया तुभया कारिकया  
 भाव्यम् । भाष्यगतप्रतीकानुरोधेन यथा कारिकैवं निर्मातुं शक्यते—

कारणमीश्वरमेके ब्रुवते कालं परे स्वभावे वा ।

प्रजाः कथं निर्गुणतो व्यक्तः कालः स्वभावश्च ॥

अस्ति चास्याः कारिकायाः पूर्वापरसन्दर्भसङ्गतिः । निरीश्वरत्वप्रतिपादकत्वाच्च  
 केनचिदसद्विष्णुना व्यावितेयम् । किन्तु भाष्यध्यावनमर्गा विस्मृतवान् । पूर्वेपा मते  
 स्वभावस्य, कालस्य, ईश्वरस्य वा जगन्मूलरमिति धेताश्वतरमन्त्रेण द्योत्यते—

स्वभावमेके कवयो वदन्ति कालं तथान्ये परिमुद्यमानाः ।

देवस्यैव महिमा तु लोके येनेदं भ्राम्यते बाह्यचक्रम् ॥ ” इति

अस्या नष्टायाः कारिकायाः पूर्वादिमन्मन्मतानुसारेण स्वैवं पठनीयम् ।—

‘ कारणमीश्वरमेके पुरपं कालं परे स्वभावे वा । ’

सूर्यनारायणनास्त्रिणा च कृतमेतत्कारिकातण्डनं न मयुक्तिकम् । तन्मतानुरोधे-  
 नैकपठितमकारिकाया भाष्यस्यान्तिमे कृतः, इत्नां च माठरेण कृतः सुकुमारतरमिति-  
 शब्दस्य परानर्शः, प्रकृतकारिका विश्वायानन्दस्याः कारिकाया भाष्यद्वयोः सम्भावनां  
 निराकरोति । एतदत्र विचारणीयम्—

पुरुषान्तराणि न पुनः पश्यन्ति, -गुणप्रकृतिरपि कुलबधूतोऽप्यधिका इष्ट  
वित्रेकेन न पुनर्द्रश्यत इत्यर्थः ॥ ६१ ॥

भाष्यस्यादिमे भाग एवं पठ्यते—'अहमनेन पुरषेण दृष्टाऽस्मीत्यस्य पुंस् पुन-  
दर्शनं नोपैति, पुरुषस्यादर्शनमुपयार्तात्पर्यः । तत्र सुकुमारतरं वर्णयति—'एतदनन्तरं  
भाष्यचरमभागः—'न पुनर्दर्शनमुपयाति पुरषस्य' इति पठनीयः । 'सुकुमारतरं वर्ण-  
यति' इत्यनन्तरं 'केचिदीश्वरं कारणं ब्रुवते' इत्यादिपाठस्तु नितरामसङ्गत एव । नदी-  
श्वरादीनां कारणत्वं प्रकृतेःसुकुमारतरत्ववर्णनम् । अतो ध्रुवं केनचिदीश्वरनिरासामहि-  
ष्णुना कारिकेयं स्तेपिता । अन्येन च केनचिद्द्वाराकेण भाष्यमेतन्मूलकारिकाविहीनमिति  
मत्वा तद्वृत्तमकारिकाभाष्यान्तर्निवेशितं यथा स्थूलदर्शनरपि विभाव्यते । अत  
एव 'न पुनर्दर्शनमुपयाति पुरषस्य' इत्येतदनन्तरं तेन 'अत प्रकृतेःसुकुमारतरं  
सुभोग्यतरं न किञ्चिदीश्वरादिकारणमस्तीति मे मतिर्भवति' इति महत्त्वार्थं प्रशितम् ।  
यथा च नैतन्मद्वन्दते तथा स्फुटमेव । परं च, ईश्वरादीनां सुभोग्यत्वादिकथनमपि  
भृशमनर्थकम् । एवं माठरवृत्तावपि यथाकथञ्चिन् मंग्रन्धनमेव । अतो वाक्यस्यान्त-  
रीनां पुरत एव लुपेयं कारिका ।

यस्तु 'ननु ईश्वरनिरासामहिष्णुत्वं कारिकाविलोपे प्रयोजकं चेन्, कथं नन  
तद्भाष्याविलोपे प्रयोजकं न स्यात्' इति मूर्यनारायणशास्त्र्याभिप्रायस्तत्र ब्रूमः—यस्य  
शत्रु कुटिलमते स्वानभिमतैयं कारिका दृष्टिपर्यं याता, न तस्य भाष्यं हरगोवर्दी-  
भूतामिति गम्भाष्यते । न शत्रु भाष्यकारिकयोरप्यभिचारि महावस्थानं, येन कारिका  
निसंग्रहयन् भाष्यमात्रं बहिः कुर्यात् । भाष्य चास्मद्भाष्यवशात् तद्वस्ते पतितम् ।  
अतस्तादृशकुटिलमयनन्तरभाष्यविलोपकृत्येनैव वा मूलकारिकाविहीनं भाष्यमेत-  
द्विलोक्य यथाकथञ्चिद्वृत्तमकारिकाभाष्यं नियोजितमिति रादान्तः ॥

अनुनासि . प्राचीनहस्तलिखितपुस्तकेषु मूलग्रंथः टीकाग्रंथस्य पृथक् पृथक्  
लेखनावस्थितित्वेन दृश्यते । तेन मूलग्रंथस्य कारिका स्वविशेषः । भाष्यग्रंथस्य  
तत्त्वमये भ्रमस्तद्वन् भाष्यस्य अपि तिर्जनमस्ति । [ हरदत्तसर्गा ]

स्यादेतत्—“ पुरुषश्चेदगुणोऽपरिणामी, कथमस्य मोक्षः ? मुचेर्वन्धनविच्छे-  
 पार्थत्वात्, सवासनकेशकर्माशयानाञ्च बन्धनसमा-  
 (२६२) निर्गुणपुरुषमो- ख्यानां पुरुषेऽपरिणामिन्यसम्भवात् । अत एवाम्य च  
 क्षसंसारान्धसम्भवशङ्का ॥ पुरुषस्य न संसारः प्रेत्यभावापरनामाऽस्ति, निष्क्रि-  
 यत्वात् । तस्मात् ‘पुरुषविमोक्षार्थम्’ इति रिक्तं  
 धचः ”—इतीमां शङ्कामुपसंहारव्याजेनाभ्युपगच्छन्नप्राकरोति ॥

तस्मान्न बध्यते ऽद्धा न मुच्यते नापि संसरति कश्चित् ।

संसरति बध्यते मुच्यते च नानाश्रया प्रकृतिः ॥ ६२ ॥

“ तस्मान् ” इति । अद्धा न कश्चित् पुरुषो बध्यते, न कश्चित् संसरति;  
 न कश्चिन्मुच्यते । प्रकृतिरेव तु नानाश्रया सती

(२६३) तत्परिहारः—  
 प्रकृतिगतानां संसारा-  
 दीनां पुरुषे उपचारः ॥ न्युपचर्येते, तदाश्रयेण भृत्यानाग्नज्ञागित्वात्, तत्फ-  
 लस्य च शोकलाभादेः स्वामिनि सम्भवात् । भोगा-  
 पवर्गयोः प्रकृतिगतयोरपि विवेकाग्रहात् पुरुषरुःध्वन्ध उपपादित इति सर्व-  
 म्मुक्त्वम् ॥ ६२ ॥

नन्ववगतम् ‘ प्रकृतिगता बन्धसंसारापवर्गाः पुरुषे उपचर्यन्ते ’ इति ।  
 (२६४) प्रकृत्या धर्मादि- किंसाधनाः पुनरेते प्रकृतेः ? इत्यत आह—  
 सत्त्वरूपेर्वन्धनभेकरूपेण  
 तत्त्वज्ञानरूपेण च मोक्ष-  
 णम् ॥

रूपैः समभिरेव तु यद्भ्रात्यान्मानमात्मना प्रकृतिः ।

सैव च पुरुषार्थप्रति विमोचयत्येकरूपेण ॥ ६३ ॥

“ रूपैः ” इति । तत्त्वज्ञानवर्जं बध्नाति धर्माद्विभिस्समभी रूपैर्भावंसिति।  
 “ पुरुषार्थप्रति ” भोगापवर्गप्रति “ आत्मनाऽऽत्मानम् ” एकरूपेण तत्त्व-  
 ज्ञानेन विवेकव्याप्त्या विमोचयति, पुनर्भोगापवर्गां न करोतीत्यर्थः ॥ ६३ ॥

१. ‘ आत्मना ’ बुद्धिरूपेण, ‘ आत्मानम् ’ पुरुषमिति चन्द्रिका ।

अवगतर्मिदं तत्रम्, ततः किमित्यत आह—

एवन्तस्वाभ्यासात्तस्मि न मे नाहमित्यपरिशेषम् ।

अविपर्ययाद्विशुद्धं केवलमुत्पद्यते ज्ञानम् ॥ ६४ ॥

“ एवम् ” इति । तत्त्वेन विषयेण तत्त्वज्ञानमुपलक्षयति । उक्तस्यैव  
(२६५) अभ्यासात्तत्त्वज्ञान- तत्त्वविषयज्ञानाभ्यासाद्वादनन्तर्यदीर्घकालसेवित-  
नोत्पत्तिः ॥ तत्रैवपुरुषान्वयतासाक्षात्कारिज्ञानमुत्पद्यते । यद्विपर्य-  
भ्यासत्नद्विषयकमेव साक्षात्कारमुपजनयति, -तत्रैव  
पदधातव्याम् इति तत्रैवसाक्षात्कारं जनयति । अत उक्तम्—“ विशुद्धम् ”  
इति ॥

कृतं विशुद्धमित्यत आह—“ अविपर्ययात् ” इति । संशयविपर्ययोः हि  
(२६६) तत्त्वज्ञानस्य ज्ञानस्याविशुद्धी, तद्द्रष्टितम् विशुद्धत्वादिदुष्कृत-  
विशुद्धिहेतुः अविपर्यय- “ अविपर्ययात् ” इति । नियतमनियततया गृह्य-  
त्वम् ॥ संशयोऽपि विपर्ययः, तेन ‘ अविपर्ययात् ’ इति  
संशयविपर्ययाभावो दक्षितः । तत्रविपर्ययाद्यं संश-  
यविपर्ययाभावः ॥

स्यादेतन्—‘ उपपत्तात्मात्तस्मात्स्वाम्यान् तत्त्वज्ञानम्, तथा उप्यनादिना  
(२६७) अनादेर्मिथ्या- मिथ्याज्ञानसंस्कारेण मिथ्याज्ञानं जनयितव्यम्, तथा  
ज्ञानसंस्काररहादिमता- च तन्निवन्धनस्य संसारस्यानुच्छेदप्रयत्न इत्यत उक्तम्—  
तत्त्वज्ञानसंस्कारेण “ केवलम् ” इति—विपर्ययेणामभिप्रेतम् । यद्यपि  
मनुरुच्छेदः ॥ नात्रविपर्ययेवचायना तथा अपि तत्रैवज्ञानवापनः

तत्रविपर्ययात्साक्षात्कारमादृशया ऽऽदिगत्या ऽपि शक्या समुच्छेत्तुम् । तत्रैव  
पानो दि विषो म्भारः, यदाहुर्वासा अपि—

“ त्रिगुणभूतार्थम्विषयस्य विपर्ययः ।

न वाचोऽप्यनवाये ऽपि मुच्छेत्साक्षात्कारततः ” इति ॥

ज्ञानस्वरूपमुक्तम्—“ नास्मि, न मे, नाहम् ” इति । ‘ नास्मि ’ इत्यात्मनि क्रियामात्रशिषेयति । यथाहुः ‘ कृत्रमयः (२६८) तत्त्वज्ञानस्वरूप- क्रियामामान्यवचनाः ’ इति [ सिद्धान्तकौमुदी. ] । प्रदर्शनम्—सर्वविवाहद्वारा तथा चाध्यवसायाभिमानमनुस्वालोचनानि चान्तराणि रनिवृत्तिः ॥ याह्याश्च सर्वे व्यापारा आत्मनि प्रतिबद्धानि बोद्धव्यानि । यतश्चात्मनि व्यापारावेशो नास्त्यतो ‘ नाहम् ’ ।

अहमिति कर्तृपदम्, ‘ अहं ज्ञानान्यदहं ज्ञातोम्यहन्दद्रे ’ इति सर्वत्र कर्तुः परामर्शात् । निष्क्रियत्वे च सर्वत्र कर्तृत्वाभावः । ततः सुष्ठुक्तम्—“ नाहम् ” इति । अत एव “ न मे ” । कर्ता हि स्वामितां लभते, तस्मात् कुतः स्वाभाविकी स्वामितेत्यर्थः । अथवा “ नास्मि ” इति “ पुरुषो ऽस्मि, न प्रमवधर्मा ” । अप्रसवधर्मित्वाच्चाकर्तृत्वमाह—“ नाहम् ” इति । अकर्तृत्वाच्च न स्वामितेत्यन आह—“ न मे ” इति ॥

ननु ‘ एतावत्सु ज्ञातेष्वपि कश्चिन् कदाचिदज्ञातो विषयो ऽस्ति, न तदज्ञान- (२६९) तत्त्वज्ञानस्या- जन्तून् बन्धयिष्यति ’ इत्यन आह—“ अपरिशेषम् ” परिशेषत्वम् ॥ इति । नास्मि किञ्चिदस्मिन् परिशिष्टम् ज्ञातव्यम् यदज्ञानं बन्धयिष्यतीत्यर्थः ॥ ६४ ॥

(२७०) तत्त्वमाहात्कार- किं पुनरीदृशेन तत्त्वमाहात्कारेण सिध्यतीत्यन फलम् ॥ आह—

तेन निवृत्तप्रसवामर्थवशान् सतरूपविनिवृत्ताम् ।

प्रकृतिम् पश्यति पुरुषः प्रेक्षकवदवस्थितः स्वच्छः ॥ ६५ ॥

“ तेन ” इति । भोगविवेकमाहात्कारा द्वि प्रकृतेः प्रयोक्तव्या । तां च प्रमृताविति नाम्नाः प्रसोतव्यमवशिष्यत इति निवृत्तप्रसवा प्रकृतिः । विवेक-ज्ञानरूपो यो ऽर्थमस्य वशः ग्रामर्थ्यम् तस्मात् । अतएवज्ञानपूर्वकाणि खलु धर्माधर्माज्ञानवैराग्याद्यैरार्यैश्चर्यानि धर्माणि । वैराग्यमपि केवलनीष्टिकानाम- तत्त्वज्ञानपूर्वकमेव । तत्र तत्त्वज्ञानं विरोधिन्नेनातत्त्वज्ञानमुच्छिनत्ति । कारण-

१. ‘ नाहमिति ’ तादात्म्यनिषेध इति वैविन् २. “ सुस्थ ” इति पाठान्तरम् । ३. विशुद्धकेवलज्ञानेनेति यावत् ।

निवृत्त्या च सत्स्वरूपाणि निवर्तन्त इति “सत्स्वरूपविनिवृत्ता प्रकृतिः”  
 “अवस्थित” इति निष्क्रियः, “स्वच्छः” इति रजस्तमोवृत्तिकलुषय  
 बुद्ध्या ऽसम्भिन्नः। सात्त्विक्या तु बुद्ध्या तदा ऽप्यस्य मनाक् सम्भेदो ऽस्थेयः,  
 अन्यर्धैवम्भृतप्रकृतिदर्शनानुपपत्तेरिति ॥ ६५ ॥

स्यादेतन्— निवृत्तप्रसवामिति न मृष्यामहे। संयोगकृतो हि सर्ग इत्युक्तम्,  
 योग्यता च संयोगः, भोक्तृत्वयोग्यता च पुरुषस्य  
 ( २७१ ) एकविषयम- योच्यता च संयोगः, भोक्तृत्वयोग्यता च पुरुषस्य  
 पक्षे निवृत्ताया अपि चैतन्यम्, भोग्यत्वयोग्यता च प्रकृतेर्जडत्वम् विषय-  
 प्रकृतोर्धपयान्तरं प्रति त्वञ्च । न चैतयोरस्ति निवृत्तिः । न च करणीया-  
 प्रवृत्तिशब्दा प्रति त्वाञ्चिद्वृत्तिः, तज्जातीयस्यान्यस्य करणीयत्वान् पुनः  
 पुनः शब्दाद्युपभोगवत्—इत्यत आह—

दृष्टा मयेत्युपेक्षक एको, दृष्टा ऽहमित्युपरमत्वन्या ।

सति संयोगे ऽपि तयोः प्रयोजनघ्नास्ति सर्गस्य ॥ ६६ ॥

“दृष्टा” इति । करोतु नाम र्वाःपुन्येन शब्दाद्युपभोगप्रकृतिर्वया विवेक-  
 रत्यास्तिर्न कृता, कृतविवेकरत्यातिम्नु शब्दाद्युपभोगश्च  
 ( २७२ ) तज्जिह्वः ॥ जनयति । अविवेकरत्यातिनियन्धनो हि तदुपभोगो,  
 नियन्धनाभावे न तज्जित्तुमर्हति, अंकुर इव बीजा-  
 भावे । प्राकृतान् हि सुखदुःखमोहात्मनः शब्दादींस्तद्विवेकान् ‘समेतत्’  
 दृष्टमभिमन्यमान आत्मा भुञ्जीत । एवं विवेकरत्यातिमपि प्राकृतीमविवेका-  
 देवात्मा ‘मदर्थेयम्’ इति मन्यते । उत्पन्नविवेकरत्यातिम्नु तदसंसर्गाच्छब्दा-  
 दीन्नोपभोगमर्हति नापि विवेकरत्यातिप्राकृतीमपि कर्तुम् । ततो विविक्त-  
 आत्मा न स्वार्थमभिमन्तुमर्हति पुरुषार्थो च भोगविवेका प्रवृत्त्यात्मप्रयो-  
 ज्यवित्पुरुषार्थो मन्तो न प्रवृत्ति प्रयोजयतः । तद्विदुमुक्तम्—“प्रयोजन-  
 घ्नास्ति सर्गस्य” इति । अथ प्रयुज्यते समं प्रवृत्तिरनेनेति प्रयोजनम्, तद-  
 पुरुषार्थे नाम्नीत्यर्थः ॥ ६६ ॥



स्यादेतन्—“ उत्पन्नत्वसाक्षात्कारश्चेत्तदनन्तरमेव मुक्तस्य तस्य देह-

(२७३) विविक्तस्या-  
त्मनो देहपातात्प्रकृति-  
दर्शनामम्भवशाद् ॥

पातः स्यादिति कथमदेहः प्रकृतिगम्येत् । अथ  
तत्त्वज्ञाने ऽपि न मुच्यते कर्मणामप्रक्षीणत्वात् ? तेषां  
कुतः प्रक्षयः ? ‘ भोगात् ’ इति चेत्, हन्त भोस्त-  
त्त्वज्ञानञ्च भोक्षसाधनम्—इति ‘ स्वक्ताव्यक्तविज्ञान-  
जन्मना तत्त्वज्ञानेनापवर्ग ’ इति रिक्तं वचः । ‘ भोगेन

चापरिसंग्रहेयः कर्माशयप्रचयो ऽनियतविपाककालः क्षेतध्यः, ततश्चापवर्ग-  
प्राप्तिः ’ इत्यपि मनोरथमात्रम् ” इत्यत आह—

सम्यग्ज्ञानाधिगमात् धर्मादीनामकारणप्राप्ते ।

तिष्ठति संस्कारवशात्, चक्रभ्रमिवद्धतशरीरः ॥ ६७ ॥

“ मस्यह् ” इति । तत्त्वसाक्षात्कारोदयादेवानादिरप्यनियतेविपाक-  
कालो ऽपि कर्माशयप्रचयो दग्धवीजभावतया न

(२७४) तन्निराम.-  
विविक्तस्यापि संस्कार-  
वशाच्छरीरधारणम् ॥

जात्यायुर्भोगलक्षणाय फलाय कल्पते । क्लेशमल्लि-  
वसिक्तायां हि बुद्धिभूर्मा कर्मधीज्ञान्यङ्गुरं प्रसुवते ।  
तत्त्वज्ञाननिदाघनिरीतसकलक्लेशसल्लिलायाम्परायां  
कुतः कर्मवीजानामङ्गुरप्रसवः ? तदिदमुक्तम्—“ धर्मा-

दीनामकारणप्राप्ते ” इति, अकारणत्वप्राप्ताविग्यर्थः । उत्पन्नतत्त्वज्ञानो ऽपि च  
संस्कारवशात् तिष्ठति, यथोपरते ऽपि कुलालव्यापारे घटं बंगाल्यसंस्कारवशात्  
भ्रमन् तिष्ठति । कालपरिपाकवशात्पुपरते संस्कारे निष्क्रियमभवति । शरीर-  
स्थिती च प्रारब्धपरिपाकौ धर्माधर्मा संस्कारी । तथा चानुश्रूयते—“ भोगेन  
त्वितरे क्षयित्वा ऽथ मम्यते ” इति “ तस्य तावदेव चिरं यावन्न  
विमोक्ष्ये ऽथ सम्पस्ये ” इति च [ छान्दोग्य, ६।१।४।२ ] । प्रक्षीयमाणाविद्या-  
संस्कारावशेषश्च संस्कारस्तद्वशात् तत्सामर्थ्यात् एतदशीरतिस्तिष्ठति ॥ ६७ ॥

स्यादेतन्—“ यदि संस्कारशेषादपि घृतशरीरस्तथा ऽपि कदा ऽस्य मोक्षो  
मविष्यति ? इत्यत आह—

(२७५) शरीरनाशे ते-  
कान्तिकारयन्तिकमुक्तिः ॥

प्राप्ते शरीरभेदे चरितार्थत्वात् प्रधानविनिवृत्ता ।  
ऐकान्तिकमात्यन्तिकमुभयं कैवल्यमाप्नोति ॥ ६८ ॥

“ प्राप्ते ” इति । अनारब्धविपाकानान्तावत् कर्माशयानां तत्त्वज्ञाना-  
ग्निना धीजिभावो दग्धः । प्रारब्धविपाकानान्तूपभोगेन क्षये सति, “ प्राप्ते,  
शरीरभेदे ” इति=विनाशे-“ चरितार्थत्वात् ” इति=कृतप्रयोजनत्वात् ।  
प्रधानस्य तन्पुरुषप्रति विनिवृत्ता-“ ऐकान्तिकम् ”=अवश्यम्भावि “ आत्य-  
न्तिकम् ”=अविनाशि-इत्युभयं “ कैवल्यम् ” दुःखत्रयविगममप्राप्नोति  
पुरुषः ॥ ६८ ॥

( २७६ ) सांख्यशास्त्र- प्रमाणेनोपपादिते उपत्यन्तश्रद्धोत्पादनाय पर-  
स्य परमर्षिप्रणीतत्वम् मर्षिपूर्वकत्वमाह—

पुन्यार्थज्ञानमिदं गुह्यम्परमर्षिणा समाख्यातम् ।  
स्थित्युत्पत्तिप्रलयाश्चिन्त्यन्ते यत्र भूतानाम् ॥ ६९ ॥

“ पुरुष ” इति । “ गुह्यम् ” गुह्यानिवासि, स्थूलधियां दुर्बोधमिति  
यावत् । “ परमर्षिणा ” कपिलेन नामेव श्रद्धामागमिकत्वेन द्रवयति-  
“ स्थित्युत्पत्तिप्रलयाश्चिन्त्यन्ते यत्र भूतानाम् ” इति । ‘ यत्र ’ ज्ञाने=यदर्थम्,  
यथा ‘ चर्मणि द्वीपिनं हन्ति ’ इति । “ भूतानाम् ”= प्राणिनां “ स्थित्यु-  
त्पत्तिप्रलयाः ” आगमैः “ चिन्त्यन्ते ” ॥ ६९ ॥

( २७७ ) सांख्यशा- स्यादेतत्-“ यत् परमर्षिणा साक्षात्कथितम् तच्छृ-  
त्स्य गुह्यंश्रद्धापरम्परा र्थमाहि, यत्पुनरीश्वरकृष्णेन कथितम् तत्र पुनः  
कपिलाश्वरस्य परमर्षि- श्रद्धा ? ”—इत्यत आह—  
पर्यन्तम् ॥

एतन् पवित्रमन्त्रं मुनिरामुरयेऽनुरूपया प्रदर्श ।

व्यासुनिर्गपि पञ्चशिखाय, तेन च यदुधा कृतन्तन्धम् ॥ ७० ॥

“ एतन् ” इति । “ एतन् पवित्रम् ”=वाचनम्-दुःखत्रयहेतोः वाचनः  
पुनर्गतम्-“ भाष्यम् ”=मर्षेण्यः पवित्रेभ्यो मुन्यम्, “ मुनिः ” वदित्वा

आमुरये ऽनुकम्पया प्रददां, आमुरिरपि पञ्चशिखाय, तेन च बहुधा कृतं  
नन्त्रम् ॥ ७० ॥

शिष्यपरम्परया ऽऽगतमीश्वरकृष्णेन चैतदार्याभिः ।

संक्षिप्तमार्यमतिना सम्यग्विज्ञाय सिद्धान्तम् ॥ ७१ ॥

( २७८ ) ईश्वरकृष्णस्य  
गुरुशिष्यपरम्परा ॥

“ शिष्य ” इति । आरात् । याता तत्वेभ्य इत्यायां,  
आयां मतिर्यस्य सो ऽयम् “ आर्यमतिः ” इति ॥ ७१ ॥

( २७९ ) सप्ततिकारि-  
काणां शास्त्रत्वम् ॥

एतच्च शास्त्रम्, सकलशास्त्रार्थमूचकत्वात्, न तु  
प्रकरणमित्याह—

मतल्यां किल येष्यांस्तेऽर्थाः कृत्स्नस्य पट्टितन्त्रस्य ।

आख्यायिकाविरहिताः परत्राद्विवर्जिताश्चापि ॥ ७२ ॥

“ मत्स्याम् ” इति । तथा च राजवार्तिकम् ॥

“ प्रधानास्तित्वमेकत्वमर्थवत्त्वमथान्यता ।

पारार्थ्यं च तथाऽनैक्यं वियोगो योसि एव च ॥

शेषवृत्तिरकृतृत्वं मालिकायाः स्मृता दश ।

विपर्ययः पञ्चविधस्तथोक्ता नव तुष्टयः ॥

करणानाममामर्थ्यमष्टाविंशतिधा मतम् ।

इति पट्टिः पदार्थानामष्टभिः सह सिद्धिभिः ” ॥ इति ॥

सैयं पट्टिपदार्थां कथितेति सकलशास्त्रार्थकथनाद्वेदभ्रमकरणमपि तु शास्त्रमेवे-  
दमिति सिद्धम् । एकत्वमर्थवत्त्वम् पारार्थ्यञ्च प्रधानमधिकृत्योक्तम् । अन्यत्रम-  
कृतृत्वम् बहुत्वञ्चेति पुरुषमधिकृत्य । अन्तित्वम् वियोगो योगश्चेत्युभयमधि-  
कृत्य । वृत्तिः स्थितिरिति स्थूलसूक्ष्ममधिकृत्य ॥ ७२ ॥

मनांमि कुमुदानीव बोधयन्तो मतां मदा ।

श्रीवाचस्सतिमिश्रणां कृतिः स्तात् तथ्यकीमुदी ॥

इत्यखिलतन्त्रापरतन्त्रप्रतिभद्वादभदर्शनटीकाकृच्छ्री-

मद्वाचस्सतिमिश्रकृता सांगव्यतत्त्वकौमुदी ॥

S. N...

# THE TATTVA—KAUMUDĪ

[ SĀMĀKHYA ]

An English Translation.\*

(1) We bow to the One Unborn, Red, White and Black, producing many offsprings; we bow also to those Unborn Ones Who have recourse to Her while She is active, and renounce Her, on having undergone the experiences afforded by her.

—

To the Great Sage Kapīla, and to his disciple Āsuri, as also to Pañcaśikha and Is'varakṛṣṇa—to these we bow in reverence.

—

(2) In this world, that expounder is listened to by the audience, who offers expositions of facts whose knowledge is desired by them. On the other hand, one who expounds doctrines which no one cares for is regarded to be ignorant of worldly affairs as also devoid of the critical faculty; and such an expounder would be disregarded. The doctrine that people care to understand is just that which, on being understood, leads to the fulfilment of the highest aim of man. Consequently, as the science to be (hereafter) explained supplies the means to that final goal, the author introduces the inquiry into its subject-matter :—

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\* The translation of the Tattvakaumudī was done by me as a class-exercise when I was a student of the M. A. Class at the Queen's College, Benares. The revising of it, therefore, is a debt that I owe to the world of Scholarship. This revising I have done now. Though, having been done during the busiest part of my life, it may not be much of an improvement upon its predecessor, yet I am sending it out for what it is worth, and leave it to the mercy of competent critics. [Ganganath Jha.]

## Kārikā 1

There being ( in this world ) an impediment caused by the three kinds of pain ( there arises ) a desire for enquiry into the means of alleviating them. And if ( it be urged that ) the enquiry is superfluous on account of ( the existence of ) obvious means,—( we reply that it is ) not so; because these ( latter ) are neither absolute nor final.

(3) The subject-matter of a science would not be enquired into—(1) if there existed no pain in this scientific enquiry world; or (2) if, though extant, its removal were not desired; or (3) even if desired, its removal were impossible—such impossibility arising either from the fact of the pain being everlasting in its nature, or from the ignorance of the means of alleviating it, or (4) notwithstanding the possibility of removing it, if the subject-matter of the science did not afford the adequate means; or (5) lastly, if there were other and easier means elsewhere available.

(4) Now, that there is no pain and that its removal is not universally desired, are opposed to facts—*division of pain*. This is what is meant by the words: *There being an impediment caused by the three kinds of pain*. The three kinds of pain constitute ( what is ordinarily called ) the "triad of pain." These are: (1) the intrinsic (*Ādhyāt-mika*), (2) the extrinsic (*Ādhibhautika*) and (3) the divine or superhuman (*Ādhidaivika*). Of these the *intrinsic* is two-fold, *bodily* and *mental*. *Bodily* pain is caused by the disorder of the several humours, wind, bile and phlegm; and *mental* pain is due to desire, wrath, avarice, affection, fear, envy, grief, and the non-perception of particular objects. All these are called *intrinsic* on account of their being amenable to internal remedies. Pains amenable to external remedies are two fold: *extrinsic* and *superhuman*. The *extrinsic* are caused by men, beasts, birds, reptiles, and inanimate things; and the *superhuman* ones are due to the evil influence of

planets and the various elementals (Yakṣa etc.). Thus the fact that pain, which is a particular modification of the attribute of Rājas—is experienced by each soul, cannot be gainsaid. *Impediment* (*Abhigāta*) is the connection of the sentient faculty with the three kinds of pain subsisting in the internal organ, which are felt to be disagreeable. It is this idea of disagreeableness which has been mentioned as the incentive to the alleviation of pain. Though pain cannot be absolutely prevented, yet it is possible to alleviate it—as will be explained later on. This is what is meant by (enquiry to be made) *into the means of alleviating* the three kinds of pain. In the compound *śāpāghāta*, the pronoun *ta* refers to the three kinds of pain; and though this forms the subordinate factor in the preceding compound (*duḥkhatraya* etc.), yet in the mental conception it is the more proximate (and hence the following pronoun refers to it in preference to the other and primary factor of the compound)—What is meant by all this is that the means of alleviation, too, is only that which is set forth in the sciences,—none other.

(5) *An objection is raised: "On account of obvious remedies, such enquiry is superfluous."* That

*Objection Inquiry superfluous in presence of obvious means*

is to say: We grant that the triad of pain is there, and also that its removal is desirable; as also that the removal is possible, we go

further, and grant that the means set forth in the sciences are adequate to the removal. With all this, however, the present enquiry becomes superfluous, because we have easier and obvious means for the removal of pain; and further because of the difficult character of the means prescribed in the sciences,—which consists of a full knowledge of abstruse philosophical principles, attainable only by a long course of traditional study extending over many lives. Says a popular maxim: 'When a man can find honey in a much-frequented place, wherefore should he go to the mountains?' So, when

the object of desire has been attained, which wise man will make any further attempt? Hundreds of remedies for bodily pain are laid down by eminent physicians; for mental pains also we have easy remedies in the shape of the attainment of the objects of enjoyment—such as women, desirable food and drink, unguents, dress, ornaments and the like. Similarly, of extrinsic pains we have easy remedies—such as expert knowledge of moral and political science, residence in safe places, etc. In the same manner, of superhuman troubles we have remedies in the shape of charms, incantations and the rest.”

(6) This objection is answered as follows—Not so—why?—Because these are neither absolute

*Reply:* Obvious means are not absolute nor final. Absoluteness of the means consists in the certainty of its effect; and its finality consists in the non-recurrence of the pain once removed. The absence of these two properties is denoted by the expression, “*Ekāntāyantatobhāvah.*” The universal affix *tasī* has a genitive force here. The upshot of the whole is this: As a matter of fact, we find that even on the employment in the prescribed manner of the remedies mentioned above, such as medicines, women, moral and political science, incantations and the rest—the various kinds of pain are not actually alleviated; hence we predicate the want of certainty of the cure effected thereby; and similarly from the recurrence of pain once cured, we infer non-permanence of the cure. Thus though easily available, the obvious means do not effect absolute and final removal of pain. Consequently, the present enquiry is not superfluous.

(7) Though the mention of the word *pain* in the very beginning is inauspicious, yet that of the extirpatory means as leading to its removal is auspicious; and as such quite appropriate at the commencement of a treatise

Auspiciousness  
of the beginning  
word

(8) The following argument might be put forward:—

Objection: Vedic means adequate to removal of pain

“We grant the inadequacy of the obvious remedies; but we have others prescribed in the Vedas—in the shape of a host of such acts as the *Jyotistoma* etc., which extend

over the whole year; these will certainly remove the three kinds of pain absolutely and finally. Says the *S'ruti*: ‘Desiring heaven one must perform sacrifices,’ and Heaven is thus described: ‘Happiness, unmixed and uninterspersed with unhappiness and attainable by pure longing for it’ is what is denoted by the word Heaven.’ Heaven thus consists in such happiness as is diametrically opposed to unhappiness or pain and which by its inherent capacity extirpates pain from its very roots; nor is this happiness short-lived,—for, declares the *S'ruti*: “We drank the *Soma* and became immortal.” [Atharvasiras III]. And if the celestial happiness were short-lived how could there be ‘immortality’? Hence the Vedic remedies for the removal of pain, which can be gone through in a moment, a few hours, a day, a month, or a year,—are far easier than discriminative knowledge, which can be attained only by a continuous effort extending over many lives. Thus again, the proposed enquiry remains superfluous.”

The answer to this is suggested in the following *Kārikā*.

### Kārikā II

The revealed is like the obvious, since it is connected with impurity, decay and inequality. That which is contrary to that is better, proceeding from the right cognition of the Manifested, the Unmanifested and the Cogniser (Spirit).\*

\* This *Kārikā* embodies, as Davies rightly remarks, the leading principle of Kapila's philosophy according to which final emancipation is attainable not by religious rites, but by discriminative knowledge, as explained by Kapila.



(9) *Anus'raa* is Veda, that which is heard during the tutorial lectures of a qualified teacher—and

Reply : The Vedic is like the obvious

not done (written). *Anus'raavika* is that which is related to *Anus'raa* or *Veda*, i. e. which is derived or known therefrom. The

host of religious rites laid down in the Veda is equal to the obvious (remedies mentioned before);—both being equally inefficient in the absolute and final removal of the three kinds of pain. Though the text uses the generic term "*Vedic*" (*Anus'raavika*), yet it ought to be taken as implying only the ritualistic section of it: because discriminative knowledge also forms part of the Veda (which of course is not what the author means). Says the S'ruti: "The Spirit should be known and discriminated from Primordial Matter." (*Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, 2-4-5); (by so doing) "the agent does not return, yea, he does not return (into this world)". (*Chāndogya*, 8-15)

(10) Reasons for the above assertion are given: since it is connected with impurity, decay and

Because impure, decaying and excessive

excess. The impurity lies in the fact of the Soma and other sacrifices being accompanied by the killing of animals and the destruction

of grains and seeds. Says the revered Pañcasākhācārya: "It (the sin attendant upon slaughter) is slightly mixed, remediable and bearable." The 'slight mixture' meant here is that of the principle effect (*Apūra* i. e. merit) of the *Jyotistoma* and other sacrifices, with the minor *apūra* due to animal-slaughter which is the source of sin. The epithet 'remediable' implies that the sin is removable by certain experiments. . . . . the ele-

ments: and as long as these latter are being experienced, they are borne with patience; hence the qualification 'bearable'. Experts (in rituals) dangling in the nectar-tanks of heaven

attained by a mass of righteous deeds, have to bear the spark of the fire of pain brought about by the element of sin (involved in the rituals).

(11) It will not be right to argue that the generic law

—"Kill not any animal," is set aside by

The impurity of animal slaughter in a sacrifice established

the specific one, "Kill the animal dedicated

to *Agni-Soma*"—because they do not con-

tradict each other; and it is only when two

laws are mutually contradictory, that the

stronger sets aside the weaker. In the present instance, how-

ever, there is no contradiction, the two laws treating of two

entirely different subjects. For the negative law "Kill not

etc.," only declares that killing is productive of sin or evil

(and hence pain); but it does not deny the fact of its being

necessary for the performance of sacrifices; and in the same

manner, the injunction "Kill the animal etc.," declares that

the killing of animal helps in the performance of sacrifice, but

does not negative the fact of its being productive of sin. If

it did so, there would be a syntactical split [*i. e.* the sentence

"Kill the animal etc.," would bear two predicates—(1) ; The

killing is helpful in the performance of sacrifice; (2) and

that 'it is not conducive to sin']. Nor is there any con-

tradiction between the *productivity of sin* and the capability of

*helping the performance* of a sacrifice. Animal-slaughter can

produce sin in the man, and at the same time quite con-

sistently help the performance of the sacrifice.

(12) The properties—'decay' and 'inequality'—belong

essentially to the effects, but are here attributed

Decay and excess shown to apply to the results of Vedic action

to the cause, the sacrifice, which is the

entity and a product. Further, the *Jyotis'oma*

and other sacrifices are the means to the

attainment of *Heaven* only, whereas the *Vajareya* and others

lead to the attainment of the *kingdom of Heaven* (or, "

"

sovereignty'). This is what constitutes the *inequality* spoken of. The greatness of the magnificence of one man is a source of pain to another of lesser magnificence.

(13) In the passage "Drinking Soma, we became immortal"—*immortality* stands for *long-durability* as a result of Vedic action is only long-durability. —as is declared elsewhere: "Immortality is duration till the final dissolution of all finite existence." Hence the S'rutis: "Neither by deeds, nor by children nor by wealth, but by renunciation alone they got immortality." [Mahānārāyaṇa Upaniṣad X—5], and again "Heaven shines in a remote and secluded valley, which the ascetics alone enter; by actions did the ascetics with children, desiring wealth, come by death; while those other wise sages, who were above all action, got immortality."

(14) With all this in view it is declared: *That which is contrary to that is preferable—proceeding from discriminative knowledge of the Manifested, the Unmanifested, and the Cogniser.* The term that stands for the Vedic remedy of removing pain. A method—contrary to the impure Soma sacrifice etc. bringing about unequal and short-lived results. —is pure i. e. unmixed with the evils due to animal-slaughter and leading to results not unequal. This is clear from the S'rutis precluding all return to metempsychosis for people possessing discriminative knowledge. The argument based on the said result being a caused entity cannot be urged as a ground for its non-permanence, because this holds only in the case of the effect being a positive entity; in the present case, however, the effect—the removal of pain—though a product,

## Kārikā III

Root-matter is not a product; the group of seven consisting of the Great Principle and the rest are both product and productive; and the Spirit is neither a product nor productive.

Briefly, the objects treated of in the system are of four kinds: some of them are merely *productive*, some merely *products*, others *both productive and products*, and others, *neither the one nor the other*.

(18) To the question—What is the *productive*?—the answer is—Primordial Root-matter is not a **The Productive** product; 'Root-matter' (*Prakṛti*)\* is that which produces (*prakṛoti*): it is also called 'Pradhāna' (Primordial), which represents the three Attributes of *Sattvas*, *Rajas* and *Tamas* in the state of equilibrium:—that is purely *productice*. Why it is so is explained by the term 'Mūla', 'Root'; i e. it is that 'Matter' which is the 'Root'; it is the root of the Universe which is an aggregate product; of this Matter itself there can be no root; or else we would be landed in an unwarranted *regressus ad infinitum*.

(19) How many are the objects that are *both productive and products*, and which are these? **The Productive-Products** answer is—The group of seven consisting of the Great Principle and the rest are both; i e. they are *products* as well as *productive*. The Great Principle (*Buddhi*) is the root of *Egoism* (*Ahaṅkāra*), and the product of *Root-matter*; so is Principle of *Egoism* the root of the

\* What the term 'prakṛti' stands for has been made clear henceforth, the term shall be rendered either as 'Root matter' or simply as 'Nature.'

five subtle Primary Substances together with the eleven sense-organs, and it is also the product of the Great Principle; and so are the five subtle Primary Substances the root of the grosser elements, Ākāśa and the rest, and, at the same time, the product of Egoism.

(20) How many are the *products*; pure and simple, and what are they? Answer:—*The products*

The Products

are sixteen—i. e., sixteen in number, the

\* tu', which should be taken as coming after 'vikārah' (in the text). Though the cow, the jar, the trees and the rest are products of the earth, and so are curd and sprout, of milk and seed respectively, which latter are the products of the cow and the tree, yet these facts do not touch our position, since trees etc., do not differ from earth, in their essence, and it is the productiveness of something different in essence, for which the term Root, "Prakṛti" stands; and that the cow, the tree etc., do not differ from each other in their essence, is proved by the fact that they have, in common, the properties of grossness and perceptibility.

(21) That which is *neither productive nor product*, is now

The non-productive

described—*the Spirit is neither a product nor productive*. All this will be explained later on.

(22) In order to prove the above statement, the different

Three kinds of proofs

kinds of proof (Means of Right Cognition) have to be described. Nor can there be a particular definition without a general one. Hence the definition of Means of Right Cognition in general follows:—

## Kārikā IV

Perception, Inference, and Valid Assertion are accepted as the three kinds of Means of Right Cognition; because these include all forms of Means of Cognition. It is through the Means of Cognition that the objects of Cognition are properly cognised.

(23) *Means of Cognition are accepted*:—here the term 'Means of Cognition' only states the thing to be defined; and the explanation of the term would constitute the definition of 'Means of Cognition'; this explanation being that the *Means of Cognition is that through which things are cognised*. Thus the said Means comes to be recognised as the *Instrument of Right Cognition*. This represents a mental condition free from the contact of all that is either doubtful or wrong or unknown, what is brought about by this instrument is Right Cognition in the form of an apprehension by the human agent; and that which leads to such right notion is the 'Means of Cognition.' Thus the 'Means of Cognition' become differentiated from all that leads to wrong notion, viz. doubt, misconception, remembrance, and the like, which (on that account) are not the 'Means of Right Cognition.'

(24) The author now rejects the different views with regard to the number of Pramānas: "*Of three kinds*";—that is, of the Means of Right Cognition in general there are three kinds,—neither more nor less. This we shall explain in detail after the particular definitions of the various Means of Right Cognition.

(25) Now, there arises the question—*which are the three kinds of Means of Right Cognition?*  
 Only three kinds of proof The answer is—*Perception, Inference, and Valid Assertion*. The above is an exposition of what are popular forms of Cognition; as a philosophical

system is expounded for the benefit of the ordinary people, who alone are capable of benefitting by it. The intuition or supernatural forms of Cognitions which appear in the great sages and adepts,—though realities,—do not in any way help the ordinary people, and as such are not treated of here

(26) *Objection*:—"We grant that the number of *Prāmānas* is not less than three; but wherefore should the inclusion of it not be more than three? The different

is, all forms of Right Cognition are included—i. e. comprehended—under these three, Perception, Inference, and Valid Assertion. This is going to be explained later on, as said above.

(27) *Question*:—"Why should the philosophic system proceed with general and special definitions of the Means of Right Cognition, when it is launched forth with the express purpose of defining the *Prameyas*, i. e. the objects of Right Cognition?" *Answer*—It is by the Means of Right Cognition that objects of Cognition can be rightly cognised. Siddhi means apprehension—Cognition.

(28) The explanation of the *Kārikā* follows the sense, not the order of words.

(29) Now on the occasion of the definition of the special Means of Cognition, the author of the *Kārikā*, first of all, defines Perception, since it precedes and is superior to other Means of Cognition, and because these latter, Inference and the rest, are dependent upon it; and lastly, because with regard to it all parties are agreed.

## Karika V

'Perception' is definite Cognition of particular objects through the contact of the sense-organs. 'Inference' has its basis in the knowledge of the nature of things to be known by their effects. 'Reasoning' is the knowledge of things by their causes and effects. 'Revelation' is the knowledge of things by direct contact.

The term 'Perception' is used in the sentence to denote the differentiation (of the thing defined) from things of the same class, as well as from those of other classes.

(30). The literal meaning (of the definition of Perception) — '*prativisayaādhyavasāyah*' may be thus defined as the definite cognition of particular objects obtained through senses.

The Earth and other substances, as also Pleasure, Pain and the rest are 'objects' for us; but things in the form of the *Elemental Substances* are not 'objects' for us; though these also are 'objects' for the *Yogin* and the divine beings.—The term '*prativisaya*' denotes that which bears upon each particular object, i. e. the sense-organ;—'bearing upon' means contact so that what the term '*prativisaya*' stands for is the

stands for that exuberance of the attribute of *Sattva* which results from the suppression in the Will of the attribute of '*Tamas*' due to the contact of the sense-organs with their respective objects;—this is what is called *crtti* and also '*jñāna*,'—i. e. 'Cognition'.—This sense cognition is a means



of cognition and what is brought about by this means is the Right Cognition which is a form of assistance rendered to the Sentient Faculty.

(31) In its essence the *Buddhi* is insentient, being, as it is, a product of Root Matter; consequently the Cognitions are insentient Cognition which is a function of the *Buddhi* is also insentient, just like the Jar and such things. Similarly such other products of *Buddhi* also as pleasure and the rest are insentient. The Spirit, however, not being radically affected by pleasure and the rest, is sentient; this Spirit appears as if having the Cognition and the Pleasure and such other things by virtue of the image cast therein by the reflection of the Cognition and the Pleasure which really subsist in *Buddhi*; also it is in this manner that the Sentient Being (Spirit) comes to be favoured (by *Buddhi*), and *Buddhi* as also its Cognition, though in themselves insentient, appear as if sentient by virtue of being reflected in the Sentence (of the Spirit). This is what is going to be described under *Kārikā* 20, below.

(32) The use of the term '*adhyavasāya*,' 'Definite Cognition,' in the text excludes Doubt-  
Differentiation of terms in the definition of Perception

term '*viṣāya*,' 'object,' excludes Wrong Cognition, the object of which is non-existent.—The use of the particle '*prati*' indicates the contact of the sense-organ with the object and as such excludes Inference, Remembrance and other forms of Cognition.

(33) T

Final Definit  
of Perception

excluding, as it does, all other things, those of the same kind as well as others. Other definitions provided by philosophers have not been either defended, or criticised for fear of prolixity.

(34) The *Lokāyatika* (materialist) says that Inference is

Inference, a distinct Means of Cognition

not a Means of Cognition; if so, how could he know whether the person he was addressing was ignorant or in doubt or perverse? Certainly the ignorance, doubt and perverseness

of another person cannot be cognised through Sense-perception, by a person with ordinary powers of perception. Nor can they be said to be cognised by any other Means of Cognition; as the Materialist does not admit of any such means except Sense perception.—Under the circumstances, if, without knowing whether the person addressed is ignorant or in doubt or perverse, the Materialist were to go about addressing any and every person at random—he would be despised by all intelligent persons as mad and as one whose words should not

of Cognition.

(35) Inasmuch as Inference follows from Perception, it

Definition of Inference general

is only right that it should be defined after Perception; then again, inasmuch as a definition of Inference in general must precede that

of particular forms of it, the author provides the definition of

natural concomitance ( with the Major Term ) has been duly recognised after all suspected and assumed adventitious

accidents have been eliminated; and that with which the Middle Term is so concomitant is the 'more extensive' Major Term. The terms 'Middle Term' and 'Major Term' which recall the nature of the objects (of Cognition) stand for the

Inference is led up to by the Cognition of the fact that the Smoke is 'less extensive' than the Fire which is 'more extensive':—  
 "When there is Smoke there is Fire":—Smoke is in-  
 which has  
 as to be  
 repeated and taken in the sense of that in which the 'Linga' (Middle Term) is present; that is, the cognition that the Middle Term (Smoke) is present in the Minor Term (Hill).  
 —Thus then the definition of Inference in general comes to

(36) —The author recalls the particular forms of Inference described under another philosophical system (Nyāya)—Inference has been declared to be of three kinds; i. e. Inference that has been just defined in its general form has three special forms, called (1) 'Pūrvavat, A priori, (2) 'S'esavat, A posteriori, and (3) 'Sāmānyatodrsta, based on general observation.

(37) First of all, Inference is of two kinds—Vita and Acita;—that which functions through an affirmation is the Vita-affirmative, and that which functions through negation is the Acita, Negative.

First division of Inference into Vita and Acita

(38) Of these two, the *Avīta* is also called 'S'ṣavat.'

*Avīta*, the negative Inference defined

Inferential Cognition of that which is not its object (in the *Nyāyabhāṣya* on 1, 1, 5)—The S'ṣavat Inference is that in which, with regard to an object, some of the likely properties being denied and eliminated, and there being no likelihood of their belonging to some others, we have the Cognition of *that which remains* (undenied and uneliminated). An example of this negative *Avīta* will be cited later on (under *Kārikā* 9, Para 70).

(39) The *Vīta* Inference is of two kinds—(1) The

Two kinds of *Vīta*

*Pūrvavat*, *A Priori*, and (2) the *Sāmānyatodṛṣṭa*, 'Based on general observation.' Of these the first '*Pūrvavat*,' has for its object that 'universal' of which a specific 'individual' has been perceived: the term '*Pūrvavat*' (contained in the name '*Pūrvavat*') means *well-known*,—i. e. that 'universal' of which the 'specific individual' has been perceived;—and that Inferential Cognition of which such a 'universal' is the object is called '*Pūrvavat*'; e. g. when, from the presence of *Smoke*, we infer the presence of the particular '*Universal Fire in the Hill*'; and in this case this '*Universal Fire* is one of which a

must be an organ by the instrumentality whereof the Cognition of Colour, or of Touch, has been brought about'];—though of

the 'Universal', 'Instrument', we have seen the 'specific individuals' in the form of the Axe etc.; yet that particular form of 'instrument' which is referred in relation to the Cognition of Colour and such things has never been perceived: that particular form of 'instrument' is that which is regarded as belonging to the 'Universal' 'sense-organ,' and any 'specific individual' of that *Universal* sense-organ cannot be perceptible to us, persons of ordinary vision,—in the way in which the particular 'individual' of the *Universal* 'Fire' is seen.—This is what distinguishes the *Pārcavat* from the *Sāmānyatodrsta*, though both are equally 'Vita'.—In the term '*Sāmānyatodrsta*, 'drsta' stands for 'dars'ana,' Cognition.—'*Sāmānyatah*' stands for '*Sāmānyasya*', of the 'Universal',—the affix 'asī' being capable of signifying the sense of all case-endings;—thus the term '*Sāmānyatodrsta— anumāna*' stands for the '*Anumāna*, 'Inferential Cognition, of that particular 'universal' of which a 'specific individual' has not been perceived.—All this has been fully explained by us in the '*Nyāyavārtikāt- paryāyikā*, and we do not repeat it here for fear of being too prolix.

(40) When an experienced person, directing another

experienced person; utters a few words (such as 'Bring the Cow'),—and the latter, thus directed, acts in a certain manner (*i. e.* brings the cow),—the person watching all this infers that the action of the directed person would not be understood

and the action performed,—further, a word is found to express its meaning, whether the

fine, Valid Assertion—'Valid Assertion is right revelation'; 'Valid Assertion' 'āptavacana' is the term to be defined, and the rest of the sentence is its definition; the term 'āpta-s'ruti' means that 'S'ruti', revelation, which is 'āpta': 'right'; the term 'revelation' stands for that Cognition of the meaning of a sentence which is brought about by that sentence.

(41) This Valid Assertion is self-sufficient in its authority; i. e. it is always right, in as much as it is brought about by the words of the Veda which being independent of human authorship, is free from all defects (that make words unreliable) It is for this same reason that the knowledge derived from the *Itihāsa* and the *Smṛti*, which are based upon the Veda, is regarded as right.

(42) As regards the primeval sage *Kapila* (the founder of the Sāṃkhya Philosophy), it is possible that he remembered the revealed texts that he had studied during previous time-cycles; just as things known on the previous day are remembered on the next day, after waking from sleep. That such remembrance is possible is indicated by the conversation between *Avatyā*, and *Jaigisavya*, where the revered *Jaigisavya* speaks of his remembering things that occurred in past lives, extending over ten Time-cycles—in the text—"while I was evolving during ten Time-cycles etc., etc."

(43) The introduction of the epithet 'āpta' 'Right', in the term 'Right Revelation' ('āptavacanam') serves to exclude all pseudo-revelations, such as the scriptures of the 'S'ākya-Bhikṣu' (Buddhist) the 'Nirgranthaka' (Jaina), the 'Samsāramocaka' (Materialist who regards killing an animal virtuous because it frees it from the pains of existence) and others. That these scriptures are not right is to be inferred from (a) internal

'Valid Assertion' is self-sufficient in its authority

Reliability of the words of Kapila

Pseudo-Revelations

contradictions, (b) being devoid of any sound basis, (c) containing assertions unsupported by proofs and (d) being accepted by only a few low and beast-like persons *Mlecchas* and others.

(44) The particle 'tu' ('and') distinguishes 'Valid Assertion' from 'Inference'. *What the Sentence expresses* (the meaning) is an *object cognised* (by means of that Sentence), but the Sentence is not a 'property' (characteristic) of that *object*; and hence it could not serve as its *inferential indication* (as the *Smoke* is of the *Fire*). Further, when the Sentence expresses its meaning it does not stand in need

expresses a meaning that has never before been cognised as expressed by that sentence. [ So that there has been no previous cognition of the invariable concomitance between the Sentence and the Meaning, and without the cognition of such concomitance, there can be no Inference ].

(45) Thus then, the nature of 'Means of Cognition' in general and of that of the particular means of cognition being as described above,—it follows that all the other means of cognition,—such as 'Analogy' and the rest,—which have been posited in the other philosophical systems, are all included among those that have been described above.

(46) For instance, 'Analogy' has been illustrated by means of the assertion 'As the Cow so the *gavaya*'; and (in as much as this is a verbal 'Analogy' included under 'Valid Assertion', and 'Inference and Perception')

finer Valid Assertion—'Valid Assertion is right revelation': 'Valid Assertion' 'āptavacanā' is the term to be defined, and the rest of the sentence is its definition; the term 'āpta-s'ruti' means that 'S'ruti', revelation, which is 'āpta', 'right'; the term 'revelation' stands for that Cognition of the meaning of a sentence which is brought about by that sentence.

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(44) The particle 'ta' ('and') distinguishes 'Valid Assertion' from 'Inference'. *What the Sentence* expresses (the meaning) is an *object cognised* (by means of that Sentence), but the Sentence is not a 'property' (characteristic) of that *object*, and hence it could not serve as its *inferential indication* (as the *Smoke* is of the *Fire*). Further, when the Sentence expresses its meaning it does not stand in need of a previous cognition (concomitance) between itself and

expresses a meaning that has never before been cognised as expressed by that sentence [ So that there has been no previous cognition of the invariable concomitance between the Sentence and the Meaning, and without the cognition of such concomitance, there can be no Inference ].

(45) Thus then, the nature of 'Means of Cognition' in general and of that of the particular means of cognition being as described above,—it follows that all the other means of cognition,—such as 'Analogy' and the rest,—which have been posited in the other philosophical systems, are all included among those that have been described above.

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'Analogy' included under 'Valid Assertion', and 'Inference' and 'Perception'

denotative of the animal similar to the cow' [ which has been regarded as the cognition resulting from Analogy ],—this is purely *inferential*; the inference being in the following form—

'When experienced persons use a certain term in reference to a particular thing, it should be regarded as denoting it,—specially, when there is no function other than *Direct Denotation*, (through which the term could be applicable to that thing);—as is found in the well-known case of the term 'cow' applied to the animal genus 'cow'; (*Major Premiss*).

'The term *gavaya* is used ( by experienced persons ) in reference to the animal similar to the cow';—(*Minor Premiss*).

'Therefore, the term *gavaya* must be regarded as denotative of that animal.' (*Conclusion*)

This cognition is *purely inferential*

Lastly, the notion that 'the animal before our eyes is similar to the cow';—this is *purely perceptual*. Thus then, when the cow is remembered, and its remembrance is seen in the *gavaya*, this is perception pure and simple; certainly it is not something regarded to be a conglomeration of the component parts of the body of one animal is found to be almost the same as that in the body of another; and this same conglomeration can be one only; so that when it has been perceived in the *gavaya*, it must be the same in the cow also—Thus then, ( every notion involved in what has been regarded as *Analogical Cognition* being found to be either *verbal* or *inferential* or *perceptual* ), there is nothing left which could be regarded as the objective of a fourth means of cognition in the shape of 'Analogy'. We conclude therefore, that 'Analogy' is not a distinct means of Cognition

(47) Similarly 'Presumption' also is not a distinct Means of Cognition. For instance, the

'Presumption' included under 'Inference' example of 'Presumption' that has been cited by the Ancients is the case where on finding

that *Caitra*, who is alive, is not in the house, there is presumption of his being somewhere outside. As a matter of fact, however, this also is a case of Inference. In

the case of our own body we easily recognise the premiss that 'when a finite object is not present in one place, it is present

in another place,—and also that when a finite object is present in one place, it is not present in another place';—when, therefore, we find that 'the living *Caitra* is not in the house,'—

and from this Minor Premiss (taken along with the former Premiss) we deduce the conclusion that he must be somewhere outside the house,—this is a clear case of Inference.

The presence of *Caitra* somewhere in the world cannot set aside his *absence in the house*; and when it is not so set aside this *absence in the house* cannot fail to be a valid reason for

his *presence outside the house*. [So that the Inference would not be open to the Fallacy of the 'Unknown']. Nor again does *Caitra's absence in the house* set aside his *existence*

entirely; and only if it were so set aside would this *existence* be unable to establish itself *outside the house*. [So on this ground also the Inference is not fallacious]. To explain—

Is *Caitra's non existence in the house* inconsistent with his *existence itself*? Or only with his *existence in the house*?

—It cannot be the former, because there can be no inconsistency between *existence somewhere* and *non-existence in the house*; for the simple reason that the two things are entirely

different.—It might be argued that—"When it is asserted that *he must be somewhere*, his *existence in some place in general* being asserted (without any particular place being specified),—in as much as the *House* also would be included

under 'place in general', the assertion might imply *existence*

in the house also; and in this manner the subject-matter being the same, there would be an inconsistency between *existence somewhere* and *non-existence in the House*."—This, however, cannot be right. *Non-existence in the house* is known definitely and for certain, while (even in the manner shown) the notion of *existence in the house* (as implied by *existence somewhere*) would be only doubtful and implied, and as such this could never set aside the former definite cognition—And though the definitely ascertained *non-existence in the House* sets aside the implied and doubtful *existence in the House*, it cannot set aside the man's *existence*; nor can it remove the doubt (regarding the possibility of *existence in the house* implied in the general notion of *existence somewhere*). What is

when on the basis of *non-existence in the House*, as the only ascertained reason (Middle term), we deduce the man's *existence outside*,—it is a case of *Inference*.

This same reason disposes of also another definition of 'Presumption' as consisting in 'the removal of the inconsistency between two valid cognitions by relegating them to distinct spheres;' because, as a matter of fact, there is no inconsistency between what is restricted (*non-existence in the House*) and what is not restricted (*existence somewhere*).

Other examples of Presumption may be shown, as above, to be included under *Inference*.

From all this it follows that as a means of cognition, Presumption is not distinct from *Inference*.

(48) Similarly, *Abhāva*, 'Absence', is only a form of Perception. The absence of the Jar, at a

'Absence' included  
under 'Percep-  
tion'

certain place is not anything distinct from a particular modification of the place itself in the form of *vacancy*; all entities—with the

sole exception of the Sentient Faculty—~~are~~ consequently

be modifications

be no object,

which could form

the subject-matter of a distinct means of cognition in the form of 'Absence'.

(49) 'Probability' has been regarded as a distinct means of cognition, as leading to such cognitions as

that of the presence of the lesser weights—such as the '*Drona*' the '*Ādhaka*' the '*Prastha*'—in the heavier weight the '*Khāri*'

—This also is a case of Inference only. As a matter of fact, the heavier weight of the *Khāri* has been found to be invariably concomitant with the lesser weights of the *Drona* etc.; and it is this concomitance that leads to cognition of the presence of these lesser weights in the heavier weights.

(50) As for 'Rumour' it is a mere continuity of a vague assertion of which the original source cannot

'Rumour' is not  
a valid means of  
cognition

be traced; it generally appears in the form 'the old people have said so and so'; such assertions for instance as 'there is a ghost

living on this banyan tree'.—This is not a distinct means of cognition; because, its original source being undetermined, it must remain open to doubt; and if the original source is known and known to be trustworthy, then, it is a case of 'Verbal Cognition' pure and simple.

Thus it becomes established that *there are three Means of Cognition.*

(51) Thus have been defined the Means of Cognition or Proofs, necessary for the demonstration of the existence of the 'Manifest', the 'Unmanifest' and the 'Knowing' (Spirit). As for the 'Manifest', in the shape of Earth and the rest,—even the dusty-footed ploughman knows it directly through Perception; he knows also such (invisible) things as the Fire (in the mountain-cave) by means of *a priori* Inference based upon the perception of such indicative marks as the Smoke and the like. Under the circumstances, if a philosophical system were to deal with such things, it would not be of much use. It follows, therefore, that what should be dealt with by Philosophy is what is difficult to know by the ordinary means of Knowledge—Hence the author proceeds to show what Means of Cognition among those above described are capable of providing the knowledge of what things.—

### Kārik VI

The knowledge of supersensuous things is obtained through 'Inference, based on general observation' that imperceptible thing which cannot be known even through that is known through Trust-worthy Revelation.

(52) The particle 'ta' (in the text) distinguishes the 'Inference based on general observation' from 'Perception' and from the 'A priori Inference'. The Imperceptible...  
 Knowledge of supersensuous things  
 and the rest—  
 observation:  
 the operation of the *Buddhi* in the form of its reflection in the Cognitive Spirit.—The mention of this particular form of Inference is only illustrative; it should be taken to include the *A posteriori* Inference also.

(53) *Question*—“Is it only the *Inference based on general observation* that is effective in bringing about the cognition of all supersensuous things?—*If that were so, then it would mean that no such things exist as Heaven, Unseen Force, Divinities, or the order of evolution of the Mahat and the other Principles,—in regard to which the said Inference is not applicable*”—In answer to this it is added—“*That imperceptible thing etc* :” what was intended to be said would have been secured by the use of the term ‘*Tasmāt*’ only; hence the presence of the particle ‘*ca*’ is to be taken as meant to include the *A Posteriori* Inference also

(54) “Granted all this. But the non perception of such objects as ‘sky-flowers,’ ‘tortoises’ hair,’ ‘hare’s horns’ and the like leads to their being regarded as non-existent; in the same way we might infer the non existence of Nature and the rest ( which are, like sky-flowers, not amenable to perception ). This being the case, why should the existence of them be sought to be proved by a recourse to the various kinds of Inference?”

The answer to this is as follows—

### Kārikā VII

( Non-perception of things arises ) from excessive distance, proximity, destruction of the sense-organs, absence of mind, subtlety, intervention, suppression, ( of other objects ), and intermixture with other like objects.

(55) “From excessive distance”—The “non-perception” of the following Kārikā is to be construed along with this, in accordance with the maxim of the ‘Lion’s back-ward glance’—

The different causes of the non-perception of objects, explained

\* “The maxim of ‘the lion’s back-ward glance’ is generally used to mark the connection of a thing with what precedes and follows”

A bird soaring high, though existing, is yet not perceived by the eye, on account of its *extreme remoteness*. 'Excessive' (*ati*) must also be taken with 'proximity' (*sāmiṇya*)—e. g. the collyrium applied to the eye is not seen, because of extreme nearness.

"*Destruction of organs*"—e. g., blindness, deafness, etc.

"*From absence of mind*"—e. g., a person, under the influence of love or some other strong emotion does not perceive things, even in bright day-light, though quite within the range of his senses.

"*From subtlety*"—e. g., however much one may concentrate one's mind (i. e., however attentively one may look) one can never perceive atoms and such other things, though they may be under one's very eyes.

"*From Intercession*"—e. g., one cannot see the Queen and other persons hidden behind the walls.

"*From suppression*"—e. g., the planets and stars are not seen during the day, because they are suppressed by the brighter rays of the sun.

"*From intermixture*"—e. g., one does not perceive drops of rain-water, disappearing in a tank.

(56) The particle 'ca' in the Kārikā has a collective force, and it includes even those not here mentioned; such as 'non-manifestation' also becomes included (among the causes of non-perception)—as one cannot perceive, in the milk, the curd, because the latter has not become manifested.

(57) The upshot of the whole then is this:—The non-existence of a certain object cannot be inferred merely from the fact of its not being perceived; for there is danger of such a principle being unwarrantably stretched too far. For instance, a certain individual, getting out of his house, would in that case, conclude that the people in the house are non-existent, simply because he does not see them. As a matter of fact, however, it is not so. The fact is that it is only



with reference to objects capable of being perceived at the time, that their non-perception leads to the inference of their non-existence. And this *capability of being perceived* can never belong to such things as Nature, Spirit and the rest (which are by their nature imperceptible); and as such it cannot be right for intelligent men to infer their non-existence merely from their non-perception.

*Question*—Which of the above mentioned causes ( of non-perception ) applies in the case of Nature etc. ?

The answer is—

### Kārikā VIII

The non-perception of these ( Nature and the rest )

The non-apprehension of Nature due to subtlety and not to non-existence. Its existence verified by its effects

is due to its subtlety, not to its non-existence; since it is actually apprehended through its effects. These effects are the Great Principle, and the rest—effects (some of) which are similar, and ( some ) dissimilar to Nature.

(58) "Why should we not," continues the objector, "attribute the non-apprehension of Nature to its non-existence, as we do in the case of the seventh kind of Rasa ( in eatables ) ?"

The Author replies — "*Not due to its non-existence*". Why? "*Because it is apprehended through its effects.*" 'It' refers to Nature. The proofs of the apprehension of the Spirit will be adduced later on, in Kārikā XVII. If we find direct sense-perception inapplicable in the case of objects whose existence is ascertained by sound and valid means of knowledge, what this proves is the incapacity of sense-perception (and not the non-existence of the object itself).\* The seventh

Rasa, however, has not its existence ascertained by any valid means of knowledge, and hence the incapacity of sense-perception cannot be urged in its case. Such is the sense of the text.

(59) Question.—“What are the effects, from whose existence, you infer that of Nature?”

Answer.—“The Great Principle, and the rest are the effects.” This will be explained later on (Kārikā XXII).

Next are mentioned the similarity and dissimilarity in forms, of these effects, with Nature—the comprehension of both of which is helpful to discriminative wisdom:—“Similar and dissimilar to Nature.”

This will be further explained in Kārikā XXIII *et. seq.*

(60) All that (the existence of) the effect indicates is

Different views with regard to the nature of the effect. (1) The Buddha view of the effect being an entity arising from non-entity. (2) The Vedānta view of the whole series of effects being a mere evolution from a single reality. (3) The Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika view of the effect being a non-entity arising from entity. (4) The Sāṃkhya view of the effect being an entity arising from an entity.

that there is a Cause; in regard to this subject (of cause and effect) there is a difference of opinion among philosophers. (1) Some people assert that the ‘existent’ (effect) emanates from the ‘non-existent’ (cause); (2) others represent all effects as mere illusory evolutions from out of a single entity, and not real entities in themselves; (3) others again hold that the ‘non-existent’ (effect) emanates from the existent (cause); (4) lastly, the revered ones declare that the ‘existent’ (effect) emanates from the ‘existent’ (cause).

(61) Under the first three of these theories, the existence of Nature (Primordial Root-Matter) cannot be proved. As a matter of fact, the world is found to consist of Sound and other Elements which are only different forms and modifications of Pleasure, Pain, and Delusion; and it is this fact which goes to prove that the cause of the world is the Primordial Matter consist in its being *Satva, Rajas* and of Pleasure, Pain and Delusion. Since the effect is the existent effect

non-existent can never be of the nature of the existent.—If (as under the *second* view) the entire phenomenon of Sound and the rest were the illusory evolution out of a single 'existent' Being,—then also it cannot be proved that the 'existent effect' emanates from the 'existent cause' and the 'non-existent effect' from the 'non-existent cause'.

phenomenal as constituting the phenomenal must be wrong.—Even under the theory of Kanāda and Gautama,—that 'the non-existent effect is born out of the existent cause,'—as there could be no identity between the 'existent' and the 'non-existent,' the effect could not be regarded as constituted entirely by (being of the same nature as) the cause; and hence, under this theory also, there could be no proof for the existence of Primordial Matter (Nature).

(62) Hence, in order to establish the existence of Primordial Matter (Nature), the author at the outset declares that the effect is 'existent', (even before the causal operation)

## Kārikā IX

The effect is existent; (1) because what is 'non-existent' cannot be produced; (2) because there is a definite relation of the cause (with the effect); (3) because all is not possible; (4) because the efficient can do only that for which it is efficient; (5) (lastly), because the effect is of the same essence as the cause.

(63) Because what is non-existent cannot be produced, etc. 'The effect is existent,'—even before the operation of the cause,—this is what is meant. The followers of Nyāya cannot urge against this doctrine the objection that it involves the absurdity of 'doing what is already done' (i. e., if the Effect is already existent, the operation of the Cause must be superfluous);—such an objection cannot be raised [for reasons to be explained later on].

[As regards the theory that 'the Existent effect emanates from the Non-existent cause'] though it is true that products like the sprout and the jar are found to be produced after the destruction of the seed and clay-lump [so that it would appear as if the products were the outcome of this Destruction, which is non-existent],—yet the causal efficiency cannot be attributed to Destruction, which is a pure negation; it can belong only to the positive entities in the shape of the constituent particles of the seed and the clay-lump. If a

a.

c.

things being produced at all places and at all times. All this has been fully explained by us in the Nyāyaśrīkā-  
līlāparyāyikā.

(64) [ As regards the Vedānta theory ] the belief in the existence of the phenomenal world can not be said to be illusory unless we have some proof invalidating its existence.\* [ Hence the effect cannot be regarded as a mere 'illusory evolution' ].

(65) Now remains the theory of Gautama and Kaṇāda, with reference to which the author asserts—  
*The Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika view criticised; and the Sāṃkhya view established* "The effect is existent." In support of this assertion, the following proofs are adduced—(1) "What is non-existent cannot be produced." If the effect were 'non-existent' before the operation of the cause, it could never be brought into existence by anybody; by even a thousand artists blue can never be made yellow. If it be held that "'existence' and 'non-existence' are mere properties belonging to the jar," even so, if the object to which the property belongs is 'non-existent', there can be no property belonging to that object; so that the question of the 'existence' of the jar remains as it was (and is not affected by your assertion). Nor can 'non-existence' (be the property of the jar); because if the 'non-existence' is unconnected and non-coalescent with the jar (as it must be, the jar being now existent, *ex-hypothesis*), how could the jar be regarded as 'non-existent'?—Hence it follows that, as *after* the causal operation so also before it, the effect must be 'existent'.

Such being the case, all that remains to be done by the cause is the manifestation or unfolding of the pre-existing effect [i. e. its emanation from the cause wherein it has been lying latent]. The manifestation of something already existing is a fact quite compatible with experience, e. g. there

\* This is urged against the Vedānta theory of the effect being an evolution from a single real entity.

is the manifestation of oil from sesamum, by pressure,—of rice from paddy by thumping,—and of milk from cows, by milking. On the other hand, we have no instance of the manifestation of what is 'non-existent'; in fact what is 'non-existent' is never found to be either manifested or produced

(66) (2) For the following reason also should the effect be regarded as subsisting even before the operation of the cause—“*Because there is a definite relation of the cause with the effect.*” The term ‘*Upādāna*’ (in the text) stands for Cause,—and the ‘*Grahana*’ of the cause stands for its relation to the effect. so that the compound ‘*Upādānagrahanāt*’ means ‘because there is a definite relation of the cause with the effect.’ What is meant is that the cause produces the effect

(67) *Objection*: “Granted all this; but why should not the effect be produced by causes without being related to them? In that case it could be a ‘non-existent’ effect that would be produced.”

In answer to this we have the next clause—

(3) “*Because all is not possible.*”—If the effect could

‘Causes being always related to existent things, can have no connection with non-existent; for one who would have an unrelated effect produced, there would be no restriction at all’.

(68) *Objection*: “Be it so: But the Cause, even though unrelated, will always produce that effect only for which it is efficient; and this efficiency could always be inferred from

actually seeing the effect brought about; so that there would be no absence of restriction (such as has been argued above)".

*Answer*: (4) "Because the efficient Cause can do only that for which it is efficient."—Now then, asks our author,

if the latter, then it has to be explained how it can operate upon what is 'non-existent'. On this point if it be asserted

particular effect or not? In the former case, no relation being possible with what is 'non-existent', the effect will have to be regarded as 'existent'; in the latter, you have the same confusion remaining.—Thus it is rightly argued that 'because the

should

(70) The proofs establishing the non-difference of the effect from the cause are the following: (a)

*Proofs of the non-difference of cause and effect*—The cloth (an effect) is not different from the yarns (constituting it).—because it subsists in the yarns;—an object differing in

where any two things are entirely different, one is never found

to be the constituent cause of the other, e. g. in the case of the *Jar* and the *Cloth*; as between the *Cloth* and the *Yarns*, however, the *Yarns* are the constituent cause of the *Cloth*;—hence it follows that the two are not different—(c) For the following reason also, there is no difference between the *Cloth* and *Yarns*: because there is no conjunction between them and because there is no separation between them;—‘conjunction’ is found to take place in objects different from one another, as between the well and the bucket; the same with regard to ‘separation’, as between the *Himavān* and the *Vindhya*.—in the case of the *Cloth* and the *Yarns*, however, there is neither ‘conjunction’ nor ‘separation’;—hence it follows that they are not different.—(d) For the following reason too, the *Cloth* and the *Yarns* are not different things because the *Cloth* does not contain in itself any product which makes its weight different from the weight of the *Yarns* constituting it;—as a matter of fact, an object differing in essence from another always has a weight different from that of the latter—e. g., the lowering of the balance caused by a bracelet weighing two *palas* is more than that caused by the bracelet weighing a single *pala*;—but we find no such difference between the effect of the weight of the *Cloth* and that of the weight of the *Yarns* constituting it;—hence the *Cloth* is not different from the *Yarns*. These are the proofs afforded by a process of negative inference—[*Avitānumāna*—see, *Kāṅkā* V] establishing the non-difference (of the *Cloth* and the *Yarns* in particular, and of cause and effect in general).

(71) The non-difference between the cloth and the yarns having been thus established, it follows that the cloth is only the yarns arranged in a particular shape and that the two do not differ from each other in essence. Nor can the two be proved to be entirely different by such arguments as—(a) “If the cause and effect were not different, it would involve self-contradictory actions [that is, when the ‘cloth’ is



torn and reduced to 'threads', it involves the action of being *destroyed* on the part of the *cloth* and that of being

is notion and assertion of the cause and the effect being *related* [which means that the two members of the relation-

arguments, we say, cannot prove the difference between cause and effect; because all the said differences can be explained and reconciled by attributing the notions to the *appearance* and *disappearance* of certain factors (a) For instance, the limbs of the tortoise *disappear* on entering its body and *appear* again on emerging from it; but for this, we cannot say that the limbs are either *produced* from, or *destroyed* by, the tortoise; in the same manner, the jar, the crown, and other things, - which are only particular modifications of clay, gold and so forth, are said to be *produced* on emanating and appearing from these latter, and to be *destroyed* on entering

is *no being* for the non-existent, nor *non-being* for the *existent*.

—In the instance cited, the *Tortoise* is not different from its *appearing* and *disappearing* limbs; and similarly the jar, the crown and other products are not different from clay, gold and so forth—(b) The 'assertion' (of difference between the cloth and the yarns) implicit in such notions as 'This cloth is in (made up of) these yarns' is explicable, as being

analogous to the assertion 'There are *Tilaka* trees in the forest'.—(c) As for the *difference in the useful purpose served*, that also does not establish the difference between the cause and the effect; because one and the same thing is found to serve several useful purposes; for instance, the single thing, Fire, serves the purposes of *burning, cooking and lighting*. As a matter of fact, any variation of functions cannot be a ground of difference; because we find that the functions of the same things vary with their operating collectively or severally; for instance, each individual Bearer performs the function of indicating the path, but not that of carrying the palanquin, while collectively, they carry the palanquin; in the same manner, even though the yarns severally do not serve the purpose of *covering*, yet on combining and thereby appearing in the form of the *cloth*, they can serve the purpose of *covering*.

(72) *Opponent*.—“ [You say that the cloth is already existing in the cause, the yarns; and when

An objection based on the nature of the manifestation of the effect

the cause?

production of what was *non-existent* becomes admitted. If the former, then the causal operation is superfluous. When the effect (in the shape of the *manifestation of the cloth*) is already there, we see no use for the operation of the cause. If it be said that 'though the *manifestation* is 'existing', yet it is the manifestation of this manifestation (for which the operation of the cause is needed).—then this would involve an endless series of 'manifestations'. Thus we conclude that there is no sense in the assertion that when the cloth is produced what happens is that the yarns become manifested in the form of cloth.”

(73) This is not so, we reply. Even under your own theory that the non-existent effect is produced,

Reply—The objection set aside as common to both theories

what is this 'production'? Is it existent or non-existent? If it is existent, then there is

(74) It is not to regard the endless series of 'productions

tions  
than th

synonymous with 'production'; so that, when the term 'cloth' has been uttered, one should not utter the term 'is produced' (because it would be a useless repetition); nor could one say 'the cloth is destroyed': because *destruction and production* (denoted by *cloth*) can never co-exist.

(75) Thus, [Even under the Nyāya theory] the 'production of the cloth' must consist either in 'the inherence of the cloth in its cause', or in 'the inherence of the cloth in its Being'; in either case, the said 'Production' cannot be produced (as *Inherence is eternal*); and yet for the purposes of

to an operation that causes are directly related, as otherwise (without being related to operation) they would not be 'causes' (active) at all.

(76) Thus, it has been fully established that the Effect is ever existent.

(77) Having thus proved the effect to be 'existent', a fact favourable to the proof of the existence of Nature, the author next states the similarity and dissimilarity between the

Manifest and the Unmanifest, a right comprehension of which is conducive to discriminative wisdom; and this is done in order to show the character of Nature, whose existence is going to be proved.

### Kārikā X

The Manifest is 'with cause', 'not eternal', 'not pervasive', 'active', 'multiform', 'component', 'soluble', 'conjunct' and 'dependent'.—The Unmanifest is the reverse of this.

(78) 'With cause' (Product). The question as to what is the cause of what, will be dealt with later on (Kārikā XXII).  
Points of dissimilarity between the Manifest and the Unmanifest  
 All the qualifications explained

(79) 'Not eternal'—destructible, *i. e.*, evanescent [being absorbed in its material cause.\*]

(80) 'Not pervasive',—that is to say, the Manifest does not pervade or cover all space. It is the effect that is regarded

Nature and as such they are 'non-pervasive'.

(81) 'Active'—*i. e.*, mobile. The Sentient Faculty (Buddhi), and the other evolutes are regarded as 'mobile', inasmuch as they are found to renounce a body they have hitherto occupied, and to occupy another; as for the mobility of earth and such other substances, it is too well-known (to need an explanation).

(82) 'Multiform';—as the Sentient Faculty and other evolutes vary with each person; earth and other substances also are 'multiform' in the forms of the jars and other things.

(83) 'Component',—of its cause; though the Products like the Sentient Faculty and the rest are non-different from their cause, yet the assertion that they stand to their cause in

\* Since the Sāṃkhya do not admit of an utter annihilation of a substance.

... .. has been made  
 ... ..  
 ... ..  
 forest' (when the trees have no existence apart from the forest).

(84) 'Soluble',—into Nature. The Sentient Faculty  
 ... .. to be ex-  
 ... .. itself though

(85). 'Conjunct'.—Bearing within itself the relation of whole and parts. [Unsatisfied with this explanation on the ground of the relationship between the whole and its parts being eternal,—the author offers another explanation].—Or, the term '*avayaca*' (in the compound '*Sāvayavam*') may be explained as equivalent to '*avayana*', i. e., the mutual adhesion, contact,—i. e., *Conjunction*,—between wholes and parts. '*Conjunction*' consists in union following on disunion; and that which has such union or contact is what is expressed by the word '*Sāvayavam*'. For instance, there is such

stances;  
 the one  
 rest; be.

Nor can there be any conjunction between the three Attributes of *Satva*, *Rajas* and *Tamas*, because there is no disunion (absence of contact) among these

(86) 'Dependent'.—the Sentient Faculty and the rest are such. In the producing of its product, in the shape of the *I* principle, the Sentient Faculty requires the assistance of Nature, without such assistance it would be too weak to produce the *I*-principle. Similarly, the *I* principle and other things also require assistance in the producing of their representative products.—Thus, in the producing of its product, everything requires the assistance of Nature. Therefore, even though inefficient as a cause in the producing of its product, the *Manu-*

fest is dependent, requiring, as it does, the assistance of the Supreme Nature.

(87) *'The Unmanifest is the essence'—of the Manifest.*  
That is to say—  
pervasive, and in  
action of evolution,  
component, not soluble, unconjunct and independent.

(88) Having thus explained the dissimilarities between the Manifest and the Unmanifest, the author now mentions the similarities between these, and the dissimilarity of both of these again from the Spirit.

### Kārikā XI

**The Manifest is 'with the three Attributes' (Gunas).**

The points of similarity between the Manifest and the Unmanifest and those of dissimilarity of these from the soul

**'undistinguishable (or non-separative)', 'objective', 'common', 'insentient' and 'productive'. So also is Nature. The Spirit is the reverse, and yet also (in some respects) similar.**

(89) *'With the three Attributes.'*—That is to say, the Manifest has the three attributes of pleasure, pain and delusion. By this assertion are set aside all those theories that attribute pleasure and pain to the Spirit.

(90) *'Undistinguishable'*;—just as Nature cannot be distinguished from itself, so also the Great Principle (Buddhi), being separate, the Nature cannot be distinguished from

(91) Some people have held that it is *Idea* (Viśiṣṭa) alone that constitutes pleasure, pain and delusion, and that there exists nothing besides this *Idea* that could possess these (pleasure, etc.) as its attributes

An objection based on the Idealism of the Buddhās

In opposition to this view it is asserted that the Manifest is 'objective' ; 'objective' here stands for 'what can be apprehended'. That is, it is exterior to the Idea.—And because it is 'objective', therefore, 'common'—i. e., apprehended (simultaneously) by all eyes. If it were not so, more or less than the individuals, all that is 'manifest' would have to belong

In the case of [ Manifest substance such as the ] glance of a dancing girl, it is found that many persons continue to stare at it at the same time. This could not be the case if it were otherwise ( i. e. if the *glance* were a mere *Idea* )

(92) 'Insentient'—Nature (Prakṛti), Sentient Faculty (Buddhi) and the rest, are all insentient. That is, 'sentience' cannot belong to the Buddhi as held by the Vainās'ika (Buddhist)

(93) 'Productive'—i. e., possessed of the faculty of producing. The form of the word to be used would have been 'prasavadharmā', but the author has used the particular possessive affix (*ṛini*), in order to indicate the constant character of the property of productiveness as belonging to the Manifest, the sense being that the Manifest is never devoid of similar as well as dissimilar products.

(94) The author attributes the properties of the *Manifest* to the *Unmanifest*—'So also is Nature',—i. e., as the Manifest, so the Unmanifest (Nature). [That is, the properties of the Manifest, just enumerated, belong to Nature also.]

(95) The dissimilarity of these from the Spirit is next stated—'The spirit is the reverse.'

(96) 'Objection':—“How can you assert the Spirit to be the reverse of the Manifest and the Unmanifest;

Objection—There are points of similarity also between the soul and the Manifest as well as the Unmanifest when we see that there are points of similarity between the Spirit and the Unmanifest—such as being 'without cause', 'eternal' and so on—as also between the Spirit and the Manifest—such as being 'multiform'?”

Answer: 'Yet also similar';—that is to say, though there are points of similarity, such as being 'without cause' and the rest, yet there are points of dissimilarity also, in the form of being as of dissimilarity devoid of the three Attributes and the rest.

(97) The Manifest and the Unmanifest have been described as having 'three Attributes'.\* Now the question arises—What are these three Attributes, and what is their characteristic. The author answers this question in the following text—

\* This word 'Attribute' requires some explanation. It stands for the *Gunas* of the *Sāmānyas*—a term denoting the constituent elements of Nature or Primordial Matter—as says Colebrook—“These three qualities are not mere accidents of Nature, but are of its essence and enter into its composition.” On this Davies remarks—“Nature or Primordial Matter is described, in the system of Kapila as formed by the *Gunas*, which were primarily in equilibrium, and as long as this state existed there was no emanation into separate forms of matter.” And, as we shall see later on, this inert condition of Nature is disturbed by the subsequent preponderance of the Attribute of *Rajas*. Davies has rendered this important word—*Guna*—by 'Mode'. This is apt to mislead. For *Mode*, as understood by Western philosophers, is an affection of a substance, and not a constituent element of it.

sense imparted to it specially, by Spinoza, who thus distinguishes between Attribute and Mode. “By Attribute, I understand that which the mind perceives of substance as constituting its essence; by Mode, I understand the affections of substances, etc.”



## Kārikā XII

The Attributes are of the nature of pleasure, pain and delusion; they serve the purpose of illumination, action and restraint, and they are mutually subjugative, and supporting, and productive and co-operative.

The Character of the three Attributes (Gunas)

(98) These are called *Gunas* (literally, subsidiary or secondary) because they exist for the sake of others (the *Spirits*). The three Attributes will be named in order in the next *Kārikā*. And according to the maxim of presight, or in allowance with a convention among writers of treatises, the 'pleasure' ('pain' and 'delusion') of this *Kārikā* are to be taken in the same order (as '*Sattva*, etc.,' in the next)

(99) Thus then, the meaning is that '*Prīti*' being *Pleasure*, the *Sattva* attribute is of the nature of *pleasure*; '*Aprīti*' being *Pain*, the *Rajas* attribute is of the nature of *pain*; and, lastly, '*Viśāda*' being *Delusion*, the *Tamas* attribute is of the nature of *delusion*. The word '*Ātman*', 'nature' has been added with a view to discard the theory that "*pleasure is nothing more than mere negation of pain and vice versa*". As a matter of fact, *Pleasure* and *Pain* are not mere negations of one another, on the contrary, they are positive entities, and the term '*ātman*' 'nature' connotes positive reality, so that those things are '*prītyātman*', whose nature, *i. e.*, *Existence*, is in the form of *pleasure*, similarly with the other terms ('*apriyātman*' and '*viśādātman*'). The idea of *Pleasure*, *Pain* and *Delusion* being positive entities, and not mere negations of one another, is vouched for by common experience. If they were mere mutual negations, they would be mutually dependent; and thus the non-fulfilment of one would lead to the non-fulfilment of the other.

(100) Having thus described the nature of the Attributes, the author next describes their several functions:—"They serve the purpose of"

Their functions

*nation, action and restraint.*"—Here, too, the three members of the compound are to be construed in the same order as before. The *Rajas*-attribute, in accordance with its mobile nature, would always and everywhere be urging the buoyant *Sattva*-attribute to action, if it were not *restrained* by the sluggish *Tamas*-attribute—by which restraint it operates only at intervals; thus the *Tamas*-attribute becomes a restraining force.

(101) Having thus described their functions, the author proceeds to describe the method of their operation—“*They are mutually subjugative and supporting and productive and co-operative.*” The term ‘*vrtti*’ at the end of the compound is to be construed with each member of the compound [ thus the compound is to be resolved into the four terms (1) *anyanyā-bhībhavaovrttayah*, (2) *anyonyās'rayavrttayah*, (3) *anyanya-jananavrttayah* and (4) *anyonyamithunavrttayah* ].

Now to explain. (1) “*Mutually subjugative*”—The *Sattva* attribute is brought into subjugation by the *Rajas* attribute after having subjugated the *Tamas* attribute; similarly the *Rajas* attribute, in its turn, attains its agitated state after having subdued the *Sattva* and *Tamas* attributes; and the *Tamas* attribute attains its sluggish state only after having subdued the *Sattva* and *Rajas* attributes. (2) “*Supporting*”—in the sense of ‘support’.

(*As'raya*) here is that the operation of one is dependent upon the other. For instance, the *Sattva* attribute helps the *Rajas* and *Tamas* attributes to operate. (3) “*Productive*”—(4) “*Co-operative*”—(whic  
[Or:  
*Raja*—

Similarly the *Rajas* attribute helps the other two by its activity (or mobility) through the help of illumination and restraint,—and the *Tamas* attribute helps the other two by its restraint, through the help of illumination and activity.

(3) "Mutually productive." That is to say, one can produce

this 'modification' is not regarded as 'caused' (produced), what brings it about not being essentially different from itself; nor is it *non-eternal*, transient,—there being no merging of it into anything essentially different from itself. (4) "Mutually co-existent." That is to say, the three mutual concomitance. The particle *ca*

In support of the above, we have the following Smṛti text: "All the attributes are mutual consorts; all omnipresent; Sattva is the consort of Rajas, Rajas of Sattva, both of these again of Tamas, which latter again of both. Sattva and Rajas. The first conjunction or separation of these has never been perceived." (*Devī-Bhāgavata*, 3. 8).

(102) It has been said that the Attributes "serve the purpose of illumination, activity and restraint." Now it is going to be explained what those Attributes are, and wherefore are they so.—

### Kārikā XIII

The *Sattva*-attribute is held to be buoyant and illuminating; the *Rajas*-attribute exciting and mobile; and the *Tamas*-attribute sluggish and enveloping. Their functioning is for a (single) purpose, like that of the Lamp.

The three Attributes named and their nature explained

(103) *The Sattva-attribute, etc.*—The Sattva-attribute alone has been held by the teachers of Sāṅkhya, to be buoyant and illuminating. Buoyancy—as opposed to sluggishness—is that which enables things to shoot up; it is to this that the up-rising of the flame of fire is due. In some cases, it is conducive to lateral motion also, as in the case of air. Thus, generally, buoyancy may be said to be that which is conducive to the efficient functioning of all instruments (causes); sluggishness, on the other hand, would make the instruments inefficient. The illuminative character of the Sattva-attribute has been already explained (under Kārikā XII).

(104) *Sattva and Tamas*, being by themselves inert, are unable to produce their effects, the driving force is supplied by *Rajas*, which excites them and rouses them from their natural inertia, and urges them on to the accomplishment of their respective effects. It is for this reason that *Rajas* is said to be exciting. This exciting character of *Rajas* is next accounted for—“(it is also) mobile.” This shows that the operation of *Rajas* is necessary for all activity.

(105) On account of its ‘mobility’, *Rajas* would keep the triad of Attributes in a continuous whirl of activity, but for its being restrained by the “sluggish and enveloping” *Tamas*, which obstructs its activity, which is operative in certain cases only. Thus, in order to be distinguished from the active *Rajas*, *Tamas* has been said to be the restrainer—“Darkness is sluggish and enveloping.” The particle ‘eva’ is to be construed—not only with ‘*Tamas*’ but with ‘*Sattva*’ and ‘*Rajas*’ also.

(106) The enq . . . . . "In case of co-operating two

a s . . . . .

Objection—The  
Attributes of  
contradictory  
natures cannot  
co-operate

do . . . . .

pe . . . . .

Sunda and Upsunda (two wrestling champi-  
ons); there can be no possibility of their

combining for a single purpose" The author replies—

"Their functioning is for a single purpose,

Reply—they can, like wick and oil, in giving light

like that of the lamp." We have all

observed how the wick and the oil—each

. . . . .

bile, and phlegm—though possessed of contradictory properties, co-operate for the single purpose of sustaining the body. Precisely in the same manner, do the three Attributes, though possessed of mutually contradictory properties, co-operate towards a single end;—'for the single purpose' of the emancipation of the Spirit. This will be further explained in *Kārikā XXXI*.

(107) Pleasure, Pain and Delusion, being mutual con-  
tradictions, lead to the assumption of three

Necessity of  
postulating the  
three Attri-  
butes as causes  
of pleasure, pain  
and delusion res-  
pectively

different causes connate with themselves

. . . . .

. . . . .

. . . . .

by their very nature, they are mutually sup-

pressive. As an example (of the multiform

character of these various causes of Pleasure, Pain and Delusion), we have the following: A single girl, young, beautiful, gentle and virtuous, is a source of delight to her husband,—why?—because for him she appears in the form of Pleasure; she pains her co-wives—why?—because for them, she appears in the form of Pain; and lastly the same girl deludes or

stupefies another man who is unable to get at her—why?—because for him she appears in the form of Delusion. The case of this woman illustrates the nature of all things. In the above case, that which is the cause of pleasure is the Attribute

Goodness the cause of Pleasure; Foulness of Pain, and Darkness of Delusion

of *Sattva*, the essence of which is Pleasure; the cause of pain is the Attribute of *Rajas*, the essence of which is Pain, and lastly, the cause of delusion is the Attribute of *Tamas*, the essence of which is Delusion.

As regards Pleasure, Illuminateness and Buoyancy (which are the properties attributed to *Sattva*), these are not mutually contradictory, and as such, not incapable of co-existing in a single substratum; in fact, they are actually found together (subsisting in *Sattva*). Hence, Pleasure, Illuminateness and Buoyancy, being mutually not contradictory, do not necessitate the assumption of three different causes (one for each of them severally)—as is done by Pleasure, Pain and Delusion which are mutually contradictory (and as such unable to cohere in a

established that there are *three*—and only *three*—Attributes.

(108) *Objection*—“As regards earth, and other things known to us, we actually perceive the properties of ‘undistinguishableness’ and the rest (described in *Kārikā XI*) as belonging to them, and we admit them so far. But the *Sattva* and other Attributes can never come within the range of perceptible experience; how then, can we attri-

Question—Indiscernment, etc., of the Attributes, how proved?

Let us show that the said nature of being <sup>indistin-</sup>  
ve (as

Answer :

### Kārikā XIV

The proper

Two reasons for  
the above given.

Existence of Nature proved of these (the three Attributes) in their absence. And the existence of the Unmanifest (Nature) too is established on the ground of the properties of the effect being of the same nature as those of the cause.

(109) By "aviveki" in the Kārikā is to be understood

First Proof. From  
the existence of  
the three Attri-  
butes

the abstract form 'avivekitoa'; just as 'dvi'  
and 'eka'—in the Sūtra "Doyekayordviva-  
naikavacane" (Pāṇini 1-IV-22)—stand for  
'dvoita' and 'ekaita' respectively; if it  
were not so, then the form of the compound would be "doye  
kesa" (and not "doyekayoḥ") \* Question.—How do you prove  
the properties of "undistinguishableness" and the rest?—

sition, implied by the text, has not been stated in so many  
words because it is clearly known.—It proceeds to state the  
negative premise in the next term "the non-existence of  
these in their ab-

\* For if the

sum would be three, and would thus require a plural ending, and not the  
dual,—which is explained by making 'dvi' and 'eka' stand for 'dvaita'  
and 'ekaita' making only two nouns, and thus having a dual ending.

'being undistinguishable' and the rest are absent,—as in the *Spirit*,—the three Attributes of *Sattva* etc., are non-existent. Or, we may have the *Manifest* and the *Unmanifest* (both together) as the subject (minor term) of the syllogism, and then we shall have the reasoning—"By the existence of the three Attributes"—as a purely negative inference\* (*Avāta*), there being no other case (besides the minor term) where there could be an affirmation (of the reason, Middle term—*existence of the Attributes*).

(110) *Objection*:—"The existence of the properties of 'being undistinguishable' and the rest, cannot

**Question**—How is Nature proved to exist?

be proved before the object possessing these properties (the *Unmanifest*) has been proved to exist. The existence of the *Unman-*

*ifest* itself has not yet been proved; how then can the existence of the said properties be proved?"

*Answer*:—The existence of the *Unmanifest* is established on the ground of the properties of the effect

**Reply**: From the properties of the effect being due to those of the cause.

being of the same nature as those of the cause. The sense of the argument is as follows: All effects are found to possess properties similar to those of their respective

\* The syllogism has been previously explained as—"Whatever has pleasure etc., is undistinguishable, as the perceptible, material substances."—and here we have the affirmation (*Anāya*) of the reason in the "perceptible substances" whose connotation is different from that of the subject of the syllogism, "All things having pleasure etc." Now, what our author proposes is that we might explain the reasoning thus: "All things besides the *Spirit* (the *Manifest* and the *Unmanifest*) are undistinguishable, since they have the three Attributes and whatever is not undistinguishable does not have the three Attributes." Thus in the latter syllogism, we have for the minor term *The Manifest and the Unmanifest* which comprehend all cases where reason (the presence of the three Attributes) could be found; for nothing besides the *Manifest* and the *Unmanifest* can be said to have the three Attributes.



causes; e. g., the cloth possesses properties of the same nature as those of the yarns; similarly, we find that all products, like the Great Principle and the rest are endowed with Pleasure, Pain and Delusion; from which it follows that this must be due to the presence of Pleasure, Pain and Delusion subsisting in their cause;—it is thus that the existence of this cause, in the shape of the Unmanifest, Primordial Matter ( Nature ) is established.\*

(111) Says the enquirer, "the followers of Kaṇāda (the

Why not accept the atomic theory which discards the necessity of an Unmanifest Entity ?

Vaiśeṣikas ) and Gautama ( the Naiyāyikas ) assert that Manifest is produced out of the Manifest ; According to them Atoms are manifest, and these produce the manifest product, from the binary compound onwards to the Earth, Water and other substances ;

and the qualities of the latter, Earth and the rest, are produced in accordance with the similar qualities in the

---

\* And consequently Nature too is proved to have the properties in question, in accordance with the proposition laid down before—"Whatever has pleasure etc., has the said properties etc., also." The reasoning may be rendered clearer by reducing it to the form of two Aristotelian syllogisms —

Properties of the effect ( Intellect ) are properties of the cause ( Nature ).

Pleasure etc., are properties of the effect ( Intellect )

∴ Pleasure, etc., are properties of the cause ( Nature ).

And again :—

Whoever has pleasure, etc., has indiscreetness, etc.

Nature has pleasure, etc., ( as first proved ).

∴ Nature has indiscreetness, etc.

( constituent ) atoms.\* And in as much as all the Manifest along with its properties, being produced out of the *Manifest* what is the use of postulating an Unmanifest, an imperceptible Entity ( in the form of Nature ? ) :

We reply—

### Kārikā XV

(i) Because of the finite nature of specific objects.

Reply—we must postulate an Unmanifest Reality—reasons given (ii) because of homogeneity, (iii) because of evolution being due to the efficiency of the cause, (iv) because of separation between cause and its product, and because of the merging of the whole world ( of effects ), —there is the Unmanifest as the cause ( next Kārikā ).

(112) "Of specific objects" i. e., of the products in the shape of the Great Principle and the

rest—the cause, root-cause is the "Unmanifest (Nature)". Why so?—(iv) "because of the separation between the cause and effect and because of the merging of the whole Universe".—It has been established that the effect is already existent in its cause; the

\* The atomic theory of Kanāda and Gautama may be thus summed up—In the beginning there existed only atoms of various substances ( Earth, Water, Fire and Air ) besides, of course, Akāś's, etc., which are in themselves eternal! These various atoms were respectively endowed with four different sets of properties, latter's perceived in their compounds. By some agency or other—mainly that of Adṛṣṭa, the Unseen ( Fate )—all homogeneous atoms combine, one with one, into couples and thus form binary compounds, which latter again combining in the same manner, but three at a time, give rise to tertiary com-

... atoms are not be ried to which of the 25 Il—

already existing limbs of the Tortoise emerging out of its body, become distinguished from it—'this is the *Body* of the Tortoise and these are its limbs' and on again entering the

other substances, emerging out of their cause in the shape of the Primary Elements (Tanmātras) become distinguished from them; the already existing Primary Elements on emerging out of their cause, the 'I-principle', come to be distinguished from it; the already existing 'I-principle', emerging from its cause, the Great Principle, becomes distinguished from it; and lastly, the already existing Great Principle, emerging from its cause, the Highest Unmanifest (Nature), becomes distinguished from it. This 'distinguishing' or separation from the final cause, the Highest Unmanifest, of the whole world of effects—related to it either mediately (as with Earth, etc.)

the shape of the Jar or the Crown, merges into its cause, in the shape of the Clay or the Gold, and thereby disappears,

these latter 'unmanifest' in so far as their own form is concerned, —when the I principle merges into the Great Principle, it renders the latter unmanifest in so far as its own form is

concerned,—and finally when the Great Principle merges into its cause, Nature, it renders this latter unmanifest. In

the cause, there must be Unmanifest as the cause.

(113) From the following reason also the Unmanifest is the cause—*‘Because of evolution being due to the efficiency of the cause.’*—It is a well-known fact that the evolution of the effect is due to the efficiency of the cause; for certainly, no effect can arise from an inefficient cause. This

in the cause. The difference of *sand* from *sesamum*—the material cause of oil—lies only in the fact that it is only in the latter, not in the former, that oil exists in its unmanifested condition.

(114) *Objection:* “The above two reasons that you have urged—the fact of evolution being due to the efficiency of the cause and that the separation and merging of the cause and effect—might be taken as proving the supreme ‘Unmanifest’ character of the Great Principle itself. Why should we have one more Unmanifest entity beyond that?”

*Answer:* “*Because of the finite nature of specific objects*”;—*‘parimāṇī’* stands for *‘parimitat-vaḥ’*, ‘because of being measured, i. e., finite’. [The reasoning is stated in the syllogistic form]—The specific objects in question, the

**Objection:** These two reasons might rest with intellect

**Reply—Third proof—“From finiteness” (of all manifested existence)**

ne;  
in

have, for their cause, clay and other things, (in which inhere) the unmanifested (state of the effects); we have already shown that the cause is that wherein the effect already exists in the unmanifested state. Under these circumstances, the cause of the Great Principle must be that highest Unmanifest which must be the *final* cause, for there is no ground for postulating a further Unmanifested Reality.\*

(115) For the following reason also the specific objects in question must have causes wherein they lie

Fourth proof— unmanifested:—“Because of homogeneity”.—  
“Because of”

rest—are found to be ‘homogeneous’ in the sense that they consist in Pleasure, Pain and Delusion. And whatever is inseparably connected with a system from must have for its

the specific objects, the Unmanifested (Nature) is the cause.\*\*

Having proved the existence of the Unmanifest, the author next states the manner of its operation:—

## Kārikā XVI

There is the Unmanifest as the cause (gone before);  
 it operates through the three Attributes,  
 by blending and modification, like water,  
 on account of the difference arising from  
 the predominance of one or the other of the Attributes.

(116) "Operates through the three Attributes".—At the  
 time of the cosmic dissolution, each of the  
 three Attributes; Sattva, Rajas and Tamas,  
 continues its homogeneous modifications.  
 Modification forms the very nature of the Attributes; and as  
 such, they can never, for a moment, remain unmodified.  
 Hence even at the time of dissolution, each of the Attributes,  
 Sattva and the rest, operates through its own particular form\*  
 [This is at the period of dissolution].

(117) Another method of operation (which comes in at  
 the creative period) is next stated—"By  
 blending". The term 'samudaya' signifies  
 'sametya udaya', appearing in combination,  
 and  
 some  
 diversity among the Attributes;—this diversity again is not  
 possible without one being suppressive of the other (i. e.  
 unless the Attributes are so constituted that they suppress  
 one another)—This is the second method of operation  
 which brings about the Great Principle and other products.\*\*

\* This is the state of equilibrium of the Attributes, during which  
 no evolution is possible.

\*\* The various evolutions from Nature are due to the disturbance of  
 equilibrium among the Attributes, which rouses the hitherto dormant,  
 evolving energy of Nature, whence issue forth the various manifestations  
 —Intellect and the rest.

(118) The enquirer

of opere

each\_of

reply—

all\_kno

Objection—How  
can an Attribute  
of uniform nature  
bring about  
diverse actions

taste "

Reply—"By  
modification as  
water"

different modifications of earth and becomes transformed into the juice of fruits such as cocoanut, palm, wood-apples and so forth;

in the same manner, (owing to the *blending* and the *mutual*

*difference arising from the predominance of one or the other of the Attributes*" That is, by the peculiarities due to the predominance of one or the other of the Attributes

(119) There are some self contented (Materialists) who accept, as 'Spirit', either the Unmanifest (Nature) or the Great Principle or the 'I-principle' or the Sense-organs, or the elemental substances. As against these, the Author makes the following declaration.

### Kārikā XVII

(a) Because all composite objects are for another's use, (b) because there must be absence of the three Attributes and other properties, (c) because there must be control, (d) because there must be some one to experience and (e) because there is a tendency towards

Reason for the  
existence of  
Spirit

\* 'Sweet' according to the Naiyāyikas.

'Isolation' or final beatitude, therefore, the Spirit must be there.

(120) The Spirit exists because all compound objects are for another

The Spirit exists :  
because all  
compound objects  
are for another

form, would stand thus—Nature, the Great Principle, the 'I-principle', and other things must exist for another's use, because they are composite like the bedstead, the chair, the unguent and other things—Nature and the rest are all 'composite', being composed as, they are, of pleasure, pain and delusion.\* (represented by the three Attributes of *Saitoa*, *Rajas*, and *Tamas*).

(121) "But", says the objector, "the bedstead, the chair, and other composite things are found to exist for the Body, which is itself a composite thing, and not for the Spirit as apart from Nature etc; so that the fact of Nature &c., being composite, should only lead to the inference of another composite thing—(for whose use they exist) and not to that of a non-composite Spirit

Objection: The above reasoning would only lead to another set of compounds, not to an Elementary Spirit

whose use they exist) and not to that of a non-composite Spirit

We reply—*"Because there must be absence of the three Attributes and other properties."*—That is to say, if from the fact of Nature, &c., 'being for another's use', we were to infer only another composite object, then in that case, we would have to assume such composite

Reply—Since the reverse of that which possesses the three Attributes must exist

we would have to assume such composite

\* This sounds rather absurd. But we must not forget that the whole set of material objects are mere emanations from Nature, whose constituent elements are the three Attributes, which latter consist in pleasure, pain and delusion, respectively.



objects *ad infinitum*; for even this latter compound would lead to the influence of another for whose use it will exist and this again to another, and so on *ad infinitum*. And when we can escape this *regressus ad infinitum* by postulating a reasonable terminus, it is not proper to multiply unnecessary assumptions (in the shape of an infinite series of composites). Nor can it be urged that "Multiplication of assumptions becomes excusable when supported by evidence" because when the composite character (of the bedstead) etc., is put forward in the inferential argument, it is only in so far as it is concomitant with 'being for another's use' (and it is not meant to include all the properties of the said composite objects), in fact if one were to insist upon the Inference to be in accord with all the properties of the corroborative instance (in this case, the bedstead &c.),—then there would be an end to all Inference (no Inference being possible).\* We have explained this in our *Nyāyavārtika-tātparyatikā*.\*\* Thus then, in order to escape the *regressus ad infinitum*, if we accept

... and ourselves con-  
... being without  
... non-objective

\* Because there can scarcely be found any two occurrences in nature which could be quite identical. Even in the stock example of the *Naiyāyikas*—"Fire, because smoking as the culinary hearth"—we have a dissimilarity between the subject matter of the syllogism and the instance cited. Thus, in the culinary hearth the fire is for cooking food, and proceeding from a house made by men, &c. &c., whereas such is not the case with the fire in the mountain.

\*\* This is a commentary on Udyotakera's *Nyāyavārtika* (a gloss on the *Vākyāyanbhāṣya* on the *Nyāyasūtras* of Gautama). This work with the Paris'addhī of Udayanācārya is generally counted as closing the epoch of ancient *Nyāya*,—latterly supplanted by the modern system, introduced and most extensively expounded by Gaṅgeśa's *Upādhyāya*, in his *Tattva-Gintāmanī*.

(subjective), "uncommon (specific)", "sentient", and "not productive". Because 'being with three Attributes' and other properties are always accompanied by that of 'being composite' which latter being absent in the Spirit.

he cannot be a 'kajha' (a special class of Brahmanas). Hence when he laid down that "there must be absence of the three Attributes etc.," he means that there must be something which is not composite, and this is the Spirit.

(122) For the following reason also there must be a Spirit apart from Matter: "Because there must be *control*"; that is to say, because the objects constituted by the three Attributes are such as 'are always controlled':—as a matter of fact it is found that everything *consisting in pleasure, pain and delusion*, (i. e. in the three Attributes) is controlled by something else—e. g., the chariot by the charioteer; and the Great Principle and the rest have been proved to 'consist in pleasure, pain and delusion'; therefore, they must have a 'controller'—and this 'controller' must be beyond\* the three Attributes and independent,—and this is the Spirit.

(123) Again there must be the Spirit "because there must be some one to experience". The term 'some one to experience' indicates the objects of experience in the shape of pleasure and pain. *The objects of experience* are pleasure and pain, which are felt by everyone as agreeable and disagreeable respectively. That is to say, there must

\* Otherwise the Controller also will stand in need of another, for the presence of the Attributes in the former will necessarily lead to that of pleasure, &c. which again will necessitate its control by something beyond itself. And so we shall be landed in a *regressus ad infinitum*.

things operating upon themselves; as the Great Principle and the rest are all themselves integrally composed of pleasure and delusion. \* Then the thing which whom thing else must be the Spirit.

(124) Others, however, interpret the above reasoning of the Kārikā thus: The term '*Bhogyā*'

A different interpretation of the stands for *visible*; and the *visibility* of the

is to be inferred from the *visibls*'. The *visibility* of the Great Principle and the rest is to be inferred from the fact of their consisting,—like the Earth and other substances,—of pleasure, pain and delusion.

(125) Lastly, the Spirit must be there—"because there is tendency towards *Isolation*."—The '*Isolation*'

Because of the tendency of writers and sages towards beatitude is recognised by great sages and others possessed of divine insight—as the absolute

and dulness, cannot be properly said to feel pleasure etc., for that would imply the feeling of pleasure by pleasure;—or worse still—by pain; and vice versa, which is absurd.

since a substance cannot be absolved of something that forms its constituting element.—It is only when one is distinct from the Great Principle etc., and does not consist in pleasure, pain and delusion, that the said Isolation can be possible. Thus, the conclusion is that in as much as there is a tendency in all the scriptures and among all intelligent persons towards 'Isolation', there must be something beyond (pleasure, etc., and hence) the Great Principle and the rest,—and this is the Spirit.

(126) Having thus proved the existence of the Spirit, the author next raises the question—Is this Spirit one\* (manifesting itself) in all bodies, or many, being different in each body? And in reply, he lays down the theory of the plurality of Spirits.

### Kārikā XVIII

(1) Because there is definite adjustment of birth, death, and the organs, (2) because there is non-simultaneity of activity and (3) because there is diversity due to the three Attributes—the plurality of Spirits is established.

(127) "Because etc."—The plurality of Spirits is established,—why? "Because there is definite adjustment of birth, death and the organs. The 'Birth' of the Spirit consists in a set of body, Principle and being a composite

Plurality of Spirits—reasons

From allotment of birth, death and the organs

sen' "

feel "

of a particular character; it does not mean *modification*; since the Spirit is essentially unmodifiable (unchangeable). *Death* also consists in the giving up of the body and the rest; it cannot mean destruction, as the Spirit is unchangeably eternal. The 'organs' are thirteen, beginning with the Great Principle. The definite adjustment of these—birth and the rest, stands for the fact that one set of these—Body etc., are connected with only one Spirit—~~and the rest cannot be~~—the hypo-  
 spirit were  
 one, all  
 on one  
 becoming blind or deaf, all would become blind or deaf,—on one becoming unsound of mind, all would become unsound of mind,—so that there would be no adjustment. On the other hand, if there is a distinct Spirit, belonging to each set of Body etc., the adjustment becomes secured. Nor can one explain the above adjustment by attributing it to the single Spirit, as diversely conditioned by contact with different bodies, etc. For in that case he would lard himself on another absurdity—that of attributing (on analogous ground, the birth or death of the Spirit), in connection with the hands, the wrists and others. Thus, however, can never be right, for a girl does not become 'dead' by the derangement of her hands, or 'born' on the appearance of her breasts or other parts of her body.

(128) For the following reason also, the Spirit must be different with different bodies: "*Because activity is not simultaneous*" Though 'Activity' in the form of effort, is a function of the internal organs, yet it is here attributed to the Spirit. If the Spirit were one, the activity of one man would lead to similar activity in all other men—as the Spirit would be the same; so that the moving of one man

"Since activity  
 is not simulta-  
 neous"

lead to the moving of all others at the same time—a palpable absurdity, which is avoided on the hypothesis of *plurality*.

(129) Again, the Spirits must be many—“because there is diversity due to the three Attributes.” The particle ‘eva’ should be constructed with ‘siddham’, not with ‘viparyayāt’; the sense being that ‘the plurality of Spirits must be taken as proved, not as unproved.’ The term ‘*traigunya*’ stands for the ‘three Attributes’;—by the ‘diversity’ of these is meant ‘differentiation.’ Some persons abounding in the Sattva-attribute, represent aggregates of that attribute—e. g. the Rajas-attribute,—such as due to the distribution of the Attributes in the various entities, could not be explained if the Spirit were one and the same in all. On the hypothesis of plurality, however, there is no difficulty.

(130) Having thus established the plurality of Spirits the author now states the properties of the Spirit—as a knowledge of these is conducive to discriminative wisdom—

### Kārikā XIX

And from that contrast, it follows that the Spirit is ‘Witness,’ and has ‘Isolation,’ ‘Neutrality,’ and is the ‘Seer,’ and ‘Inactive.’  
 “And” connects the following properties of the Spirit with its plurality.

The properties of the Soul

‘Witness,’ and has ‘Isolation,’ ‘Neutrality,’ and is the ‘Seer,’ and ‘Inactive.’

‘From that &c.’—The particle ‘Ca.’

A subject, immediately preceding, is referred to by the pronoun *this*; whereas one not so immediate is denoted by *that*; hence the *that* here refers to Kārikā XI.

(132) Thus, the 'contrast' of the character of "having the three Attributes, etc." and the rest (which have been set forth in Kārikā XI as belonging to the Unmanifest, Nature, as also to the Manifest, Products.)—connotes the Spirit's property of being without the three Attributes and being 'distinguishable', 'non-objective', 'not common', 'sentient and non-productive'. Now the characters being 'sentient' and 'non-objective' also indicate the characters of being 'witness' and 'seer'. Since it is only a 'sentient' being that can be a witness, and only a 'non-objective' being that can be a seer, we dispute to the witness; similarly does the Nature exhibit its witness-ship before the Spirit, which latter, therefore, cannot be a witness. For the same reasons, the Spirit is also the 'seer'.

(133) Further, from the absence of the three Attributes in the Spirit follows its Isolation—by which is meant the final isolation of the Spirit from the three kinds of matter and their qualities.

#### *Delusion.*

(134) From the absence of the Attributes, again, follows neutrality: since this latter property is such as cannot belong either to the happy and satisfied, or to the sad and grumbling. It is only one who is devoid of both pleasure

and pain, who can be called *neutral*—also called *Uddisina* (indifferent). Lastly, the *inactivity* of the Spirit follows from its being 'distinguishable' and 'non-productive.'

(135) *Objection.* "We grant all this; but in ordinary

**Objection-Intelligence and activity always found co-existent** experience, we first decide, what is to be done by us and then think in the following strain—"I, who am a sentient being, wishing to do a certain act, am going to do it;" so that, we find by our experience that 'sentience' and 'activity' are co-existent in the same person." And this goes against the Sāṅkhya tenets which make the 'Sentient' being 'inactive' and the 'active' agent 'insentient.'

*Answer:—*

### Kārikā XX

**Reply:—**The apparent activity of the soul due to union with Buddhi and the apparent intelligence of the latter due to union with Purusa

Thus from this union, the insentient 'Evolute' appears as if 'sentient'; and similarly, from the activity really belonging to the Attributes, the Spirit, which is neutral appears as if it were active.

(136) The sense is that in as much as 'sentience' and 'activity' have been proved by reasons to be differently located, therefore, the feeling referred to by the objector must be a mistake. The word 'Liṅga' 'Evolute', here stands for everything from the Great Principle down to the primary elements to be described later on. The cause of the mistake is said to be the 'union' i. e., proximity of the Spirit with the 'Evolute.' The rest is clear enough.



(137) *Objection* :—“ You say that the feeling is due to Union, etc. But no union between two distinct things is possible, without some need, which again is not possible without the relation (between the two things) of the helper and helped. [How is this possible in accordance with your tenets, with regard to the union of the Spirit with the Evolute ?]”

In reply, the author explains the ‘help’ or ‘benefit’ which forms the basis of the need.

### Kārikā XXI

For the perception of Nature by the Spirit and for the isolation of the Spirit, there is union of both,—like that of the halt and the blind; and from this union proceeds evolution.

(138) In the term “*Pradhānasya*” the genitive affix has the accusative force, the meaning being—“for the perception by Spirit of Nature, the source of all things, thus implying the fact of Nature being an object—something to be enjoyed. This enjoyability, however, is not possible without an enjoyer, whose existence thus becomes needed by Nature.”

tion, this isolation is dependent upon due discrimination between the Spirit and the three Attributes; thus discrimination is not possible without the Nature (and its evolutes in the shape of Buddhi and the rest, without which no knowledge

of any kind is possible);—thus it is that for his own Isolation the Spirit needs Nature. In as much as this series of unions (between the Spirit and Nature) is eternal, it is only right and proper that the Spirit, though he had been already united for the purposes of 'enjoyment', should be united with it again, for the purpose of 'Isolation'.

(140) "Granted that there is this union between these two; but whence the evolution of the Great

The necessity of  
the creation of  
Buddhi etc.

Principle and the rest? "Answer" "From this union proceeds evolution." The said union (of Spirit with Nature) cannot by

itself suffice either for 'enjoyment' or 'Isolation' if the Great Principle and the rest be not there; hence the union itself brings about the Evolution for the sake of 'enjoyment' and 'Isolation.'

The process of Evolution is now explained.

### Kārikā XXII

From the (Prakṛti Primordial Matter, Nature) issues

The process of  
Evolution from  
Prakṛti down-  
wards

Mahat (Buddhi, the Great Principle);  
from this issues Ahaṅkāra (I-principle);  
from which proceed the 'set of sixteen'  
from five of this 'set of sixteen' proceed

the five elementary substances.

(141) From Prakṛti, etc.—Prakṛti is the Unmanifest (Nature); Mahat (Great Principle) and Ahaṅkāra (I-Principle) will be described later. The 'set of sixteen' is made up of the eleven sense-organs, to be described later on, and the five primary elements. Out of these sixteen, from the five primary elements, proceed respectively the five elementary substances (Ākāśa, Earth, Water, Air and Fire).

(142) Thus, (a) from the primary element of 'sound' proceeds Ākāśa, having sound as its characteristic property; (b) from the primary element of 'touch' as combined with that of 'sound' proceeds Air, with sound and touch as its characteristic properties; (c) from the primary element of 'colour' combined with those of 'sound' and 'touch' proceeds Fire, with sound, touch and colour for its characteristic properties; (d) from the primary element 'taste' combined with those of 'sound', 'touch' and 'colour' proceeds Water, with sound, touch, colour, and taste as its characteristic properties; and lastly, (e) from the primary element of 'odour' combined with those of 'sound', 'touch', 'colour' and 'taste' proceeds Earth with all sound, touch, colour, taste and odour as its characteristic properties.

(143) The Unmanifest Nature has been already defined in general terms in Kārikā X, and specifically in Kārikā XIII; the Manifest also has been generally defined in Kārikā X; now the author defines *Buddhi*, a particular form of the Manifest, the *Buddhi*—the knowledge of which is helpful towards discriminative wisdom.

### Kārikā XXIII

Buddhi, the Great Principle of Determination

Buddhi defined.  
Its properties  
stated

when abounding in the Tamas-Principle.

he does is to review the situation: he ponders over it, regards himself as entitled to do it and then makes up his mind (determines) that he should do it and then does it. Now eristic which acuity

(of the Spirit); and *Buddhi* is regarded as *not different* from the said 'determination' (on the principle that the *action* is not different from the *active agent*); thus also constitutes the 'definition' (differentia) of *Buddhi*, in as much as it distinguishes it from all like and unlike things

(145) Having thus defined *Buddhi*, the author, in order

The properties of *Buddhi-Virtue, Wisdom, Dispassion and Power, and the reverse of these*

to help the attainment of discriminative wisdom states the properties of *Buddhi*, as abounding in the *Sattva* and *Tamas* attributes: "*Virtue, etc, etc.*". '*Virtue*' leads to prosperity and the Highest Good,—that brought about by the performance of sacrifices, charity and the like lead to the former, and that due to the practice of eight-fold *Yoga* lead to the latter. Wisdom

15

(146) Of this *Dispassion* there are four stages named

The four kinds of *dispassion* (1) '*Yatamāna-Samjñā*,' (2) '*Vyatireka-Samjñā*' (3) '*Ekendriya-Samjñā*' and (4) '*Vas'ikāra-Samjñā*.' (1) Love (Attachment) and other emotions are so many impurities residing in the mind, and

they incite the sense-organs to activity towards their respective objects in order that the sense-organs may not turn towards impurities should institutes the "Endeavour-

stage. (2) After this process of cure has commenced, it may be found that while some are already cured, others have still got to be cured, this sequence being there, those

stage. (3) After the sense-organs have been rendered incapable of action, the impurities that have been cured continue to lie there in the mind in the form of a mere 'longing' (or eagerness); this is the third stage of Dispassion, the 'Fhandaia', 'Sāmīñā' the 'One organ stage.' (4) The cure

Patañjali: "The dispassion named '*Vas'ikara-Sāmīñā*' belongs to one who has no desire for either sensuous or super-sensuous objects." [Yoga-Sūtra 1-15].—Such is Dispassion, a property of *Buddhi*

(147) Power also is a property of *Buddhi*, and it is to

The eight kinds of power

is the power by which one can enter the densest substances, such as stones. (2) *Laghimā*, 'Buoyancy' is that to which

\* There is some confusion as to the number of these perfections. As enumerated here, they appear nine, but they ought to be eight only; hence I have taken *Vas'itra* and *Is'itra* as one.

is due the ability to traverse the solar regions by means of the sun's rays. (3) *Garimā*, 'Gravity' leads to heaviness; and (4) *Mahimā*, 'Grandeur' brings greatness. (5) *Prāpti*, 'Approach' is the ability to touch the moon with the fingers. (6) *Prākūmya*, 'Fulfilment of desires, is such as can enable one to dip into the earth and rise again as in water. (7)

ereig-  
intan  
matter and material things. (8) *Kāmōvasāyitā*, Infallibility of purpose is that by which all objects follow the course dictated by the will of the person. The decisions of ordinary mortals follow the course of events, where as those of the trained devotee precede them and dictate their course. 1

(148) These four are the properties of *Buddhi*, abounding in the *Sattva*-Attribute. Those abounding in the *Tamas*-attribute are the reverse of these—viz., Vice, Ignorance, Passion and Weakness

The author next defines *Ahankāra*—the 'I-Principle'—

### 'Kārikā XXIV

The 'I-Principle' is self-consciousness; from that proceeds a two-fold evolution—the set of eleven and the five rudimentary substances.

The principle of *Ahankāra* defined. Its effects

(149) "The I principle is egotism" and this 'I-principle' is perceptible in such ideas as— "To what I have observed and thought of I am entitled.—'I am able to do this'—'all these things are for my use'—'there is no one else entitled to it'—'hence I am;'"—the egotism involved in all such notions forms the characteristic function of the 'I-principle':—it is through this principle that the Will performs its deter-

minative function appearing in such decisions as "this is to be done by me"

(150) The different products of this Principle are next mentioned—"From that proceeds a two-fold evolution." The two forms of this evolution are next mentioned—"The set of eleven consisting of the sense organs, and the five rudimentary substances,"—only these two forms of evolution proceed from the I-principle;—this is what has been emphasised by the particle 'eva'.

**Objection:**—"The I-principle itself being of one uniform nature, how can two different kinds of evolution the 'dull and inert (elements) and the illuminative (the sense organs) proceed from a uniform Egotism?"

**Answer.**

### Kārikā XXV

The 'set of eleven' abounding in Sattva attribute, evolves out of the 'Vaikṛta' form of the I-principle; the set of Rudimentary substances from the 'Bhūtādi' form of the I-principle; and both of them from the 'Taijasa' form of the "I-principle."

Reply—The difference due to the diversity of the operating Attributes.

(151) "The set of eleven", sense-organs, being illuminative and boyant is said to abound in the Sattva-attribute;

\* (a) 'Vaikṛta,' (b) Bhūtādi and (c) Taijasa are purely technical terms names applied to the three forms or states of the 'I-principle' When the 'I-principle' is dominated by the Sattva-attribute, it is called 'Vaikṛta', when it is dominated by the Tamas attribute, it is called 'Bhūtādi' and when it is dominated by the Rajas attribute, it is called 'Taijasa'. These are mere technical names, and do not connote anything—Gauḍapāda.

and it proceeds from the 'Vaiṛta' 'I-principle'. From the 'I-principle' as dominated by the Tamas-attribute proceeds the set of Rudimentary substances. How so? Because these substances abound in Sattva attribute. That is to say—though the I-principle is one and uniform, yet by reason of the domination or suppression of one or other of these Attributes it evolves products of diverse kinds.

(152) *Objection*.—When all the necessary products

*Objection: The purposelessness of Passions*

are brought about by the action of the attributes of *Sattva* and *Tamas* only, have done with the attribute of *Rajas*, which serves no useful purpose.

*Answer*.—"And both of these from the 'Taijasa' form

*Reply-Passion necessary for urging the other Attributes to action*

of the I-principle" i. e., from the 'Taijasa Form', that is from the form abounding in the set of sub-

product from the *Rajas-attribute* exclusively by itself, yet

not energised in the

evolving of both the sets of products mentioned above, through the exciting of activity of the other two attributes, *Sattva* and *Tamas*. Thus it is not true that the *Rajas-attribute* serves no useful purpose.

In order to describe the 'set of eleven' abounding in the Sattva-Attribute, the author first describes the ten external sense-organs.



## Kārika XXVI

The 'organs of sensation' are, the Eye, the Ear, the Nose, the Tongue and the Skin; those 'of action' are, speech, hand, feet, the arms and the generative organ.

The ten External Organs

(153) 'Sense-organ' has been defined as that which

they are characteristics of *'Indra'* (the Spirit).

The Sense-organs are named. "*The eye etc*"—Of these, the eye is the organ for perceiving colour, the ear for perceiving sound, the nose for perceiving odour, the tongue for perceiving taste, and the skin for feeling touch. These are the names of the *'Sensory'* sense-organs. The function of the organs of speech and the rest will be spoken of later on (Kārika XXVIII.)

Named. Functions

The eleventh sense-organ is next described—

## Kārika XXVII

Of these (sense-organs) Mind partakes of the nature of both (*Sensory and Motor*): it is the

The eleventh sense Mind defined

common to sense-  
its diverse exter-  
modifications of the Attributes.

(154) "*Partakes, etc.*"—Among the eleven sense-organs the mind partakes of the nature of both—i e., it is an organ of sensation, as well as one of action: Since the eye and the other *sensory*

The double nature of mind

organs, as well as speech and other *motor* organs are able to operate on their respective objects only when influenced by the Mind.

(155) The author next gives specific definition of the Mind defined *Mind*—"It is the observing principle"—That is to say Mind is defined by *observation*, when a certain object has been just vaguely apprehended by a sense organ as 'a thing' there follows the

writer—"At first, one apprehends a certain object vaguely as a *thing* and then the *mindful* people *observe*—cognise—definitely as belonging to a certain *genus* and possessing certain well-defined properties".—Again (says another writer)—"It is a well-known fact that on the first apprehending an object, the first idea that one has of it is that *it is a thing*, this idea being indeterminate and vague, like the idea in the Mind of the infant, the dumb and other people; after this the thing comes to be cognised as possessing certain properties and belonging to a certain genus; the cognition that observes and apprehends all this has also been regarded as *sense-perception*"—This function of *observing* belongs to the Mind and as it serves to differentiate the Mind from all other like and unlike things, it serves as its *differentia*.

(156) *Objection*:—"Granted all this: But we have seen that the I-principle and the Will,

*Objection*:—Why make Mind a sense when it has a distinct function of its own?

distinct function of its own, should not be classed among 'sense-organs.'

The author replies— 'It is a sense-organ'. Why?

Reply—It is a sense in so much as "Because it has properties common to sense-organs." The property meant is that consist-

a Sense belongs to the Will and the I-principle also; and as such these two also would have to be issued among 'sense-organs'. Thus then "being the characteristic of the Spirit" should be regarded only as an explanation of the derivation of the term *Indriya*; it cannot be to form its connotation.

(157) Question—"How can the eleven sense-organs proceed out of the single entity in the shape of the 'I-principle' abounding in the "Sattva-attribute?"" Answer.—"Its multifariousness as well as its diverse external forms are due to the particular modifications of the Attributes"—The diversity in the products is due to the diversity of auxiliaries in the shape of the 'Unseen Force' which brings about the experiences due to the perception of sound and other objects of sense; and the 'Unseen Force' also is only a 'modification' of the Attributes.

(158) The 'diverse external forms' has been added by way of illustration, the sense being that just as the diverse external forms, so the multifariousness also is due to the modification of the Attributes.

(159) Having thus described the forms of the eleven sense-organs, the specific functions of the first ten are next described.

## Kārikā XXVIII

The function of the five senses, in respect to Sound, etc., is said to be mere 'perceiving':

The functions of the external organs

'speaking,' 'handling', 'walking', 'excretion' and 'gratification' are (the functions of) the other five.

By "Perception" here is meant the primary abstract apprehension (Nirvikalpa) through the

Observation—the function of the five intellectual senses. Speech, handling, walking, excretion pertain to the senses of action.

sensory sense-organs. "Speaking, Handling, Walking, Excretion and Gratification are the functions of the other five," i. e., of the five motor organs (of action). The vocal organ is located in the throat, the palate, etc. and the function of this organ is 'Speaking'.

The functions of the sensory organs are quite clear\*.

The functions of the three 'Internal organs' are next described:—

## Kārikā XXIX

Of the three (the internal organs), the functions

Function of the internal organs

consist of their respective characteristics; this is peculiar to each. The function common to the organs consists in

the five Prāṇa and the rest.

(100) "The functions of the three..."

Reflection of Manas, Self Consciousness of Ahankara and determination of Buddh

stands for 'those that have their own distinctive characteristics',—that is, the Will.

delist... (comprehending) sound—and thus the function of the ear is perception of sound, and so with the others.

stands for those *distinctive characteristics* themselves; the sense, therefore, is that the property which serves as the ns,  
in  
of

the Mind.

(161) The next sentence describes the dual character of these functions based on the fact of their being *specific or common*—“*These are peculiar.*” etc. “*The five Breaths constitute the common function.*” The five ‘vital airs’ i.e. the *Life* itself—forms the common

The five vital  
airs, the common  
function of the  
three internal  
organs

function of the three internal organs; since the latter exists while the former do and ceases to exist when these are absent. Of these five, the ‘Air’ called ‘*Prāṇa*’, is located in the nape of the neck, the back, the arms and the generative organ; that called ‘*Samāna*’ in the heart, the naval and all joints; that called ‘*Udāna*’, in the heart, the throat, the palate, the head and between the eye brows, and that called ‘*Vyāna*’, in the skin—These are the ‘five vital airs.’

The author now describes the order of the functions of these fourfold organs (*the external organs and the three internal organs*)

### Kārikā XXX

With regard to perceptible things, the functions of the whole set of the four organs are said to be simultaneous, as well as gradual; with regard to imperceptible (as well as perceptible) things, the functions of the three (internal organs) are preceded by

The instantaneous  
and the gradual  
character of these  
functions

hat: (i. e., the cognition of some perceptible object.)

(162) "Simultaneous,"—"With regard to perceptible things"; e. g., when one sees in the dark by means of a flash of lightning, a tiger facing him, his perception (by the Eye), observation (by the Mind), Egoism or self-consciousness (by the I-principle) and determination (by the Will) are instantaneous and accordingly he runs away from the place at once.

(163) "Gradual": e. g., in dim-light, a person has at first only a vague perception of a certain object; then fixing his Mind intently he observes that it is a robber with his drawn bow and arrow levelled at him; then follows the self-consciousness that 'the robber is advancing against me'; and lastly follows the determination to run away from the place.

(164) With regard to imperceptible things, on the other hand, the (three) internal organs operate without the aid of the external organs—"The function of the three is preceded by that," i. e., the instantaneous as well as the gradual functions of the three internal organs are preceded by some perception of a visible object; since Inference, Testimony and Remembrance—which are the means of cognising imperceptible things,—operate only when they have for their background some sort of perception (of perceptible things). The sense is that in regard to 'perceptible' as well as 'imperceptible' things the functioning of the internal organs is always preceded by the perception of some external object.

(165) *Objection* : “ The functions, either of the four or of the three ( organs ), cannot depend on

*Objection* : Functions permanent or otherwise ? themselves alone; for in that case, as these organs are everlasting their functions also would be everlasting; if, on the other hand, the organs were transient, adventitious, then their functions also would be transient and adventitious, and this would lead to a commingling of the functions, as there would be nothing to regulate them.”

*Answer* :—

### Kārikā XXXI

They ( the organs ) betake themselves to their respective functions, through mutual impulse. The purpose of the Spirit is the sole motive; by nothing ( else ) is an organ made to act.

*Reply*—Functions of the organs due to mutual impulse Soul purposes the incentive

The word ‘ *Kāranāni*, ’ ‘organs’, has to be supplied (as the subject of the sentence).

(166) When a number of persons wielding different weapons,—lances, sticks, bows and arrows, swords etc.,—combine for suppressing a common enemy, and proceed to act, they do so only after knowing each other’s ‘ impulse ’ (motive).—and in so doing the man with the lance takes up the lance only, not the stick or other weapons,—similarly the man with the stick takes up the stick only, not the lance and the other weapons. In the same manner each of the organs

(167) Another objection—"The lancers, etc., being sentient beings, it is only right that they

Objection—How can the non-intelligent organs understand each other's motives?

should comprehend each other's 'impluse' (motive) and act towards the fulfilment thereof. The organs, on the contrary, are all in-sentient, and as such can never act in the said manner (and hence your analogy does not apply to the case in question). Consequently the insentient organs must have an intelligent controller who is cognisant of their nature, capacity and uses."

Answer :—" The purpose of the Spirit is the sole motive, by nothing (else) is an organ made to act"

Reply—Soul's purpose urging them to action

What urges the organs to act is the 'Spirit's purpose'—in the shape of, 'Experience' and 'Isolation',—prior to its fulfilment; so that there is no need for the postulating of a 'Controller' cognisant of their nature. This point will be further elucidated in Kārikā LVII.

(168) It has been declared that "by nothing is an organ made to act." The author next proceeds to classify the organs :—

### Kārikā XXXII

✓ Organs are of thirteen kinds, having the functions of 'seizing', 'sustaining' and 'illuminating.' The objects of these are of ten kinds,—the 'seized', the 'sustained' and the 'illuminated.'

The organs divided—their functions—seizing, retaining and manifesting



(169) The 'thirteen organs' consist of the eleven sense-organs, the I-principle and the Will.

The thirteen organs—the ten external organs, *Manas*, *Ahaṅkāra* and *Buddhi*.

*Seizing*—the function of the senses of action.

*Retention*—the function of *Buddhi*, *Ahaṅkāra* and *Manas*.

*Manifestation*—of the intellectual organs

An organ is a particular kind of active agent, and nothing can be an 'active agent' unless it has a function; hence the author next states the functions of the organs—

*seizing*; that is, they take up their respective objects; i. e., extend their activities over them;—the Will, the I-principle and the

(170) Since every action must have an object, the objects of the above-mentioned functions are next named and classified—"The

The objects of these functions,

of sound, touch, colour, taste and odour. Each of these five being both 'celestial' and 'non-celestial'; these objects 'to be sustained' also come to be tenfold. Similarly the objects affected by the five sensory organs are five—sound, touch,

colour, taste, and odour; and each of these being both 'celestial' and 'non-celestial,' the objects 'to be illumined' also become *tenfold*.

(171) A further subdivision of the thirteen organs is next stated —

### Kārikā XXXIII

The *internal* organs are three; and the *external*, ten. The organs numbered and the difference between the external and internal in point of time noted

exhibiting objects to the former three. The 'external' organs act at the present time and the 'internal' at all the three points of time.

(172) "*The internal-organs are three;*" (1) Mind, (2) I-principle and (3) Will; these are called *internal* because located *inside* the body.

(173) *The external-organs are ten; viz., the ten sense-organs. These latter exhibit objects to the three internal organs, i. e., they supply the means for observation, self-consciousness and determination regarding objects,—the sense-organs doing this through perception, and the motor-organs through their respective functions.*

(174) The author next states a further point of difference between the *internal* and *external* organs. "*The external organs act at the present time.*" The "present" here includes also the time closely preceding and following the immediate present; so that, Speech\* also pertains to the present. "*The internal*

\* The special qualification is necessary for the case of Speech, because no two letters can be pronounced at the same moment, and, as such, no word could be uttered at the present if by this were meant the present moment only. This difficulty, however, is avoided by counting a few moments before and after the present moment as 'present.'

organs at all the three points of time." e. g. the idea that "there has been rain, because the river has risen" (for the past); "there is fire in the mountain, since there is smoke" — (for the present); and lastly, "unless there is something to prevent it, we shall have rain, since we see ants carrying their eggs" — (for the future).

(175) According to the Vaiśeṣikas, Time is one (indivisible) and hence it cannot admit of such divisions as 'past', 'present' and 'future'. They attribute these divisions to certain 'accidents' (adventitious conditions), but what the Teachers of Sāṅkhya hold is that these same 'accidents' themselves may be regarded as the basis of the notions of 'future', 'present' and 'past', and there is no need for the postulating of an intervening entity as 'Time'. This is the reason why we do not accept Time as a distinct Entity.

(176) The author next discusses the objects of the external senses operating at time present —

### Kārikā XXXIV

Of these, the five sensory organs are concerned with objects specific as well as non-specific. Speech is concerned with sound; the rest are concerned with five objects.

The intellectual sense touching specific as well as unspecific objects; speech touching sound, the rest regarding the five objects of sense

(177) Of the ten external organs, the five sensory ones are concerned with 'specific' as well as 'non-specific' objects. The term 'specific' here stands for the 'gross Sound (Touch, Colour, Taste, and Odour) in their 'calm,' 'turbulent' and 'deluding' forms, as manifested in the form of Earth (Water, Air, Fire and Akāśa);—and

'non-specific' stands for the subtle forms of Sound etc., manifested as the Rudimentary Elements. (Tanmātrās). In this name 'tanmātra', the particle 'mātra' serves to exclude the Gross forms of the Elements. Thus the sensory organs that have to do with the gross and subtle forms of the elements are:

Sound; but the Ear of the people like ourselves can perceive the gross Sound; similarly the Tactile organ of those beings can perceive gross as well as subtle Touch, while our organ can perceive gross Touch only; similarly, the Eye and other organs of those beings can perceive Colour and other things in their gross as well as subtle forms, while our organs can perceive these in their gross forms only.

(178) Among the Motor-organs, Speech is concerned with sound, in its gross form, because organ of Speech is the producer of such sound. The organ of Speech, however, cannot produce Rudimentary Element of sound, which is the direct effect of the I-principle (Āhankāra), and as such has the same cause as the organ of speech itself (which also being one of the sense-organs, proceeds directly from the I-principle).

"The rest" i. e., the four other motor-organs—the Arms, the Generative organ, the Hands and the Feet are 'concerned with five objects'; because the jar and such other objects—which are what are dealt with by those organs, are all made up of the five primary elements of Sound, Colour, Touch, Taste and Odour.

Among the thirteen organs, some are described as superior to others, reasons for which are given :

## Kārikā XXXV

The superiority of internal over external organs Since the Will along with the other internal organs extends over all things, these three are the 'warders', and the others are the gates.

(179) 'Warders' i. e., most important, superior, 'Gates', i. e., mere instruments; the external organs are mere instruments. Since the Will

The superiority accounted for

The Will, Buddhi is superior, not only to the external organs, but also to the other internal organs, the I-principle, and the Mind. To this effect it is said —

## Kārikā XXXVI

The (external organs together with the Mind and the I-principle) characteristically different from one another and being different modifications of the Attributes, resemble a lamp in action; (and as such) having first illumined (rendered manifest) the whole of the Spirit's purpose, present it to the Will.

The superiority of Buddhi over all others accounted for

(180) As the village-officer collects the rent from the different heads of families and delivers the collection to the Governor of the District, who again, in his turn, delivers it to the Governor of the country, who finally makes it over to the king: so, in the same manner, the external organs, having 'perceived' an object, present it to the Mind, which 'observes' it (and thereby imparts thereto its qualifications) and pre-

sents it to the I-principle, and finally of them, and finally Hence it is said: "the Spirit's purpose presents its impressions to the Will."

(181) The external organs, the Mind and the I-principle are various modifications of the Attributes, i. e., phases of Sattva, Rajas and Tamas. Even though these are mutually nugatory yet they are led to co-operate for the supreme purpose of Spirit; just as the wick, oil and fire (though variously opposed to the action of one another,) yet combine, in the form of the lamp, in removing darkness, and thus illumine (manifest) the different colours. The same is the case with the modifications of the Attributes; such is the connection.

*Objection.*—"Why should it be said that the other organs present their impressions to the Will? Why should not we make it the other way: the Will presents its impressions to the I-principle and the Mind, which latter being 'superior'?"

*Answer:*—

### Kārikā XXXVII

In as much as it is the Will that accomplishes the Spirit's experiences, and again it is Will that discriminates the subtle difference between Nature and Spirit [it is Will that is regarded as superior to the other two].

*Reply.* the superiority of Buddhi accounted for, because it directly fulfils the soul-purpose, and bridges the gap between Spirit and Matter

*Answer*—“ It afterwards discriminates the difference between Spirit and Nature.” —

Reply—It latterly shows to the soul its distinction from Matter

tes “*Visinaṣṭi*” here stands for ‘bringing about’ the construction of clause ‘*Antaram Visinaṣṭi*’—‘discriminates the difference’; and is similar to that of ‘*Odanpākam pacati*\*’ (cooks the cooking of rice); and ‘bringing about’ in this context stands for ‘showing’ or ‘expressing’.

The objector retorts: “The difference between Spirit and Nature being thus, according to your-

The difference . . . . . must have . . . . . relation or . . . . . at differ-

The answer to this is contained in the word ‘discriminates’, the meaning is that the idea that

Reply—the dif- ‘I am one thing and Nature with its evolutes

non-discrimination, has appeared to be <sup>this</sup> <sup>ough</sup> non-existent; the Will does not produce the difference, whereby it would be transitory. This shows that *Emancipation* (Isolation) is the end or purpose of the Spirit.

\* *Subtle*—the said difference is ‘subtle i. e., ‘hard to perceive.’

The organs having been described, the author next describes the specific as well as non-specific (objects):—

\* *Viṣinaṣṭi* itself has been explained as “expresses the difference”, then the mention of *Antaram* would seem superfluous. But it is not so, it helps to intensify the meaning of the sentence.

## Kārikā XXXVIII

The Rudimentary Elements are 'non-specific;' from these five proceed the five gross elements; these latter are said to be 'specific,' because they are calm, turbulent and deluding

The division of objects into specific and non-specific

(184) The Rudimentary Elements *i. e.*, Sound and the rest in their subtle form; what the particle 'Mātra' (in the term 'tanmātra,' which is the name of the Rudimentary Elements,) connotes is that these subtle elements are devoid of that 'specific character' consisting of the 'calmness, turbulence and delusiveness' which would make them objects of direct experience.

(185) Having thus described the 'non specific' things, the author, with a view to describing the 'specific' objects, mentions the manner of their production. "From these etc.," from the five Rudimentary Elements of Sound, Touch, Colour, Taste and Odour proceed respectively the five gross Elements—Ākās'a, Air, Fire, Water and Earth—these 'five' proceeding from the aforesaid 'five' Rudimentary Elements.

(186) *Objection* — "We grant that these are thus produced, but what about their being 'specific'?"  
*Specific because soothing terrific and deluding* *Answer*. "These are said to be specific;"—why? because "they are calm, turbulent and deluding. The first च indicates the reason (meaning because) and the second च has the cumulative force (meaning that the things have all the three characteristics). The sense is that, in as much as among the gross elements, Ākās'a and the rest, some abounding in the Sattva attribute,  
 are  
 in  
 the  
 con"



perceived to be distinguished from one another are said to be *specific* and *gross*. The Rudimentary Elements on the contrary cannot be similarly distinguished by ordinary people; and as such they are said to be *non-specific* and *subtle*.

A further sub-division among the 'specific' objects is next stated.—

### Kārikā XXXIX

(1) The 'subtle' bodies, (2) 'those born of parents', and (3) the 'gross' elements.—these are divided into (1) subtle bodies, (2) bodies produced of parents and (3) the great elements the three kinds of the 'specific'. Of these the 'subtle' bodies are everlasting, and 'those born of parents' are perishable.

(187) "*The specific objects are of three kinds*": these three forms are mentioned: (1) *subtle bodies* which (are not visible, but) are postulated (in order to explain certain phenomena); (2) *Those born of parents, i. e.,* those consisting of the six 'sheaths' (Kośas) Among these six, hair, blood and flesh are from the mother; and the arteries, bones and marrow from the father; these six are the six 'sheaths' (of the physical body). (3) The last are the '*prabhūta*' i. e. the '*prakṛṣṭa*', Great, '*bhūta*', Elements, along with these, the other two constitute the 'specific'. Thus subtle bodies form the first kind of 'specific' objects, 'bodies born of parents,' the second kind and the 'gross elements' the third kind. Ordinary things like the jar, are included in this last.

(188) The difference between the 'subtle' body and the body 'born of parents' is next explained—  
 The subtle bodies are permanent, those produced of parents perishable. "*The subtle bodies are permanent and those born of parents, perishable*"; that is to say, among the specific things, those that are subtle are lasting, while those 'born of

parents', are *perishable*, i. e., ending in (dissolving into) either fluids or ash or dirt.

The subtle body is described—

### Kārikā XL

The 'mergent' (subtle) body formed primevally, unconfined, lasting, composed of Will

The Body is unconfined, permanent and migrating, invested with dispositions

and the rest down to the Rudimentary

(189) 'Formed primevally':—when the emanations

Unconfined and Permanent

untrammelled; as such, it can enter even a solid piece of stone. It is "lasting"\*. since it continues to exist all the time from the first Evolution to the Final Dissolution. This Body is "composed of the Will and the rest, down to the Rudimentary Elements." The sense-organs which are 'calm, turbulent and delusive'.

sense-organs which are 'calm, turbulent and delusive'.

(190) *Objection*.—"This Subtle body might be the only vehicle of experience for the Spirit;—what is need of the Physical Body comprised of the six 'sheaths'?"

*Objection*.—unnecessariness of postulating two bodies, subtle and gross

\* The word *niyata* is differently interpreted by Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha (in his Sāṅkhyā Candrikā). He takes it in the sense of "restricted" i. e., the Subtle Body is restricted to one particular Spirit; and so there is a distinct subtle body for each Spirit. The interpretation of Gaudapāda closely resembles that of the Kaumudī.

**Answer.**—“It migrates” *i. e.* the Subtle Body goes on deserting and occupying one six-sheathed (physical) body after the other.—“But why?”—Because it is “devoid of experience”, that is to say, because the subtle body by itself, without a corresponding physical body of six sheaths to afford the vehicle of experience—would be devoid of experience; that is why it migrates.

**(191) Objection.**—“As a matter of fact, transmigration is due to Virtue and Vice; and these have no connection with the Subtle Body (belonging as they do primarily to the Will, and then, by reflection, to the Spirit); then how can this Subtle Body migrate?”

**Answer.**—(Because) “it is invested with dispositions.”  
 Reply—It has dispositions?  
 sion, Power and Weakness; and it is the Will which is endowed, that is, directly connected with them; and the Subtle Body is connected with the Will; hence the Subtle Body becomes invested with those dispositions; just as a piece of cloth becomes perfumed with the fragrance of the Campaka flowers by coming into contact with them. Thus then, it is because it is invested with dispositions, that the Subtle Body migrates.

**(192) Question.**—“Why should not the Subtle Body—The subtle Body like Nature—last even after the Final dissolving at each Dissolution?”

**Answer.**—(Because it is) “mergent,” that is to say, because it dissolves (into Nature) This mergent character of the Subtle Body is inferred from the fact of its being product; *i. e.*, having a cause it must merge into it.

*Objection* :—“ We grant all this. But why not attribute migration to the Will itself as equipped with the I-principle and sense-organs? There is no need for the postulating of the Subtle Body, for which there is no authority. ”

*Objection—Why not attribute migration to Buddhi etc ?*

*Answer* —

### Kārikā XLI

As a painting stands not without a ground, nor a shadow without a solid object like the pillar,—so neither does the ‘*Linga*’ (Will etc.) subsist supportless, without ‘*Specific Bodies*’.

*Reply—the Buddhi cannot rest without substrate*

(193) The term ‘*Linga*’ here stands for the Will, the I principle and the Rudimentary Elements, *because they are the means of knowing* (liṅganāt) and these cannot subsist without a substrate.\* In support of this the author puts forth a syllogism—During the time intervening between death and re-birth, Will and the rest must have some sort of evolved body for their receptacle, because they are such Will and the rest as are equipped with the five Rudimentary Elements; like the Will etc., found in the ordinary physical body.

“*Without specific bodies*” i. e., without Subtle Bodies. In support of this assertion, we have the following

scriptural text (from the Mahābhārata).

“Then Yama extracted from Satyavān’s body the thumb-sized body which he had

entrapped and under his control.” Here the mention of the

extracted body as “thumb-sized” implies the fact of its having been the Subtle Body, since it is impossible that the Spirit

*The existence of the Subtle Body corroborated by the Mahābhārata*

\* Cf. ‘The Pañcīkarana-vivaraṇa-Tattvacandrikā’—where a similar explanation of the word is given.

could have been so extracted. 'Puruṣa' in the above extract, stands for the Subtle Body, in the sense that it sleeps (lies—s'ete) in the body (puri)

Having thus proved the existence of the Subtle Body, the author states the reason and method of its migration.—

### Kārikā XLII

Formed for the sake of Spirit's purpose the Subtle

Reasons and  
manner of the  
migration of the  
Subtle Body

Body acts like a dramatic actor, on account of the connection of 'causes and effects' and by union with the all-embracing power of Nature.

(194) "Formed for the Spirit's purpose", the Subtle Body acts like a dramatic actor, on account of its connection with the 'causes' in the shape of Virtue, Vice, etc.—and 'effects' in the shape of the taking up of different kinds of physical bodies, the latter being the effects of Virtue, etc. That is to say, just as a dramatic actor, playing different parts, acts like Paras'urāma or Yudhiṣṭhira or Vatsarāja, so does the subtle body, occupying various physical bodies, act like a man or a brute or a tree

(195) Question :—"Whence this capacity of the Subtle

The capacity of  
the Subtle Body  
is due to the Power  
of Nature

Body ?" Answer :—"By union with the all-embracing Power of Nature." As is declared in the Purāṇa—"All this wonderful evolution is the all-embracing Power

of Nature."

It has just been said that the Subtle Body acts "on account of connection with causes and effects"; the author next describes the causes and effects :—

## Kārikā XLIII

Virtue and other dispositions are—(a) natural, which are innate and (b) incidental; and these are related to the 'cause'; and the ovum etc., related to the 'effect.'\*

The means and consequences  
Dharma, etc.

(196) 'Incidental,' adventitious; i. e., brought about after the man's birth, by the subsequent propitiating of the deities and such other causes.

I. 'Incidental dispositions

"The natural dispositions are innate," e. g., it is declared that at the beginning of the Evolution the revered primeval sage Kapila emerged into existence fully equipped with Virtue, Wis-

II Essential, innate

dom, Dispassion and Power. The 'incidental' dispositions, on the other hand, are not innate, that is to say, they are brought about by the personal effort of the man; such Virtue etc. are those belonging to Vālmīki and other great sages.

The opposites of Dharma etc., similarly explained Vice, Ignorance, Passion and Weakness.

(197) The aggregate formed of the ovum, foetus, flesh, blood, etc., of the child in the mother's womb is related to the gross physical body; that is to say, they are particular states of the latter; so also are the childhood, youth and old age of the person after the birth.\*\*

Flesh, blood, etc.  
related to the  
Gross Body

\* It may be pointed out that Davses has quite misunderstood this Kārikā. In the first place he renders *Sāmsiddhikāḥ* by "transcendental" the very reverse of what it does mean. Secondly, he renders *Karaṇās rayināḥ* by "including cause" though in reality the compound means "located in organs"—as explained by the *Kaumudī* as well as the *Candrikā*.

\*\* Gauḍapāda has taken the kārīkā as setting forth three kinds of dispositions—(1) '*Sāmsiddhika*' innate, (2) '*Prākṛtika*' natural due to the operation of Nature, Primordial Matter and (3) '*Vākṛtika*' incidental.

(198) Question:—“ We have understood what are ‘causes’ and ‘effects’ in general; what are the particular effects of particular causes ? ”

Answer:—

### Kārikā XLIV

By virtue (is obtained) ascent to higher planes .  
by vice, descent to the lower; from  
‘Consequences of the various means wisdom (results) the Highest Good; and bondage from the reverse

(199) “ By virtue etc ” i. e., to the Heaven and other  
Virtue leads to higher planes regions

“ By vice, etc.,” i. e., to the nether regions known as  
Vice to lower Satala etc.

“ From wisdom, the Highest Good ” Nature ministers  
Wisdom brings about beatitude to the emergence of the Spirit so long brought  
accom-

plished, Nature finds its work in connection with that particular Spirit entirely fulfilled, and accordingly retires from activity so far as that Spirit is concerned. As is declared, “ The Operations of Nature continue only till the attainment of discriminative knowledge ” “ From the reverse, etc. ”, i. e., from wrong knowledge, results bondage.

(200) This bondage is of three kinds: ‘ Natural ’,  
‘ Evolutional ’ and ‘ Personal ’, (1) The  
From the reverse of the above, respectively, contradictory results The three kinds of bondage  
‘ Natural ’ bondage is that of those who worship Nature as the Spirit; with reference to such men, who are called ‘ Prākṛtika ’ ( ‘ Merged into Nature ’ ), it is said in the Purānas: “ The contemplators of the Un-

manifest ( Nature ) continue ( in the chain of metempsychosis ) till a hundred thousand years ”; (2) The ‘Evolutional’ bondage is of those who worship the various evolutes of Nature,—the elements, the sense-organs, the I-principle, and the Will-as Spirit. With regard to these it is said. “The contemplators of the sense-organs continue till ten Manvantaras; those of the elements, till a hundred Manvantaras, those of the I-principle till thousand; and lastly, those of the Will, do away with all feverish excitement, and continue till ten thousand Manvantaras” bondage are Videhava.

due to Istāpūrta ( actions — tanks etc., done with the sole motive of personal gains hereafter ). Those performing such actions, having their minds influenced by desire, are ignorant of the true nature of the Spirit, and as such undergo bondage.

### Kārikā XLV

From Dispassion results ‘mergence\* into Nature’;

Consequences of  
various means:

from Attachment which abounds in the  
Rajas-attribute, transmigration; from  
Power, non-impediment, and from the

reverse, the contrary.

\* Davies takes the Hindu commentators to task, and remarks

“It (the soul) is absorbed into N. by the destruction of All the”

the “Hindu Commentators,” who, at least Vācaspati Miśra, do not assert the final absorption of the bodies into Nature, all that they mean is that by dispassion, the soul—or more properly its seat, the subtle body—is absorbed into Nature and rests there till it is born again.



(201) "From Dispassion results Mergence into Nature."

Those who are in passion, but are  
ature of the Spirit.  
nature. 'Nature'

here stands for the whole set consisting of Nature, Will, I-principle, the elements, and the sense-organs. Those who worship these as 'Spirit', become absorbed into these (i. e., those mistaking the senses for the Spirit become absorbed in the senses, and so on), that is to say, they rest there till, in the course of time, they are born again.

(202) "From attachment which abounds in the Rajas-attribute, results transmigration." The epithet  
II Transmigra- tion from passion- "Rajasa" implies the painful character of  
III attachment  
transmigration; because (as has been previously described) the Rajas attribute is the source of pain

(203) "F . . . . . e., the non-  
"with power

III. Non-impedi-  
ment from powe

"From the reverse", i. e., from absence of Power "the  
IV Obstruction contrary" i. e., the obstruction of one's de-  
of desires from sires everywhere  
weakness

With a view to describe collectively as well as severally the eight dispositions of the Will—Virtue, Vice etc.,—in order to show which of these are to be adopted, and which relinquished, by those desiring Isolation—the author first describes them collectively:—

### Kārikā XLVI

Such is the 'volitional' (Subjective) Evolution distinguished by Error, Disability, Con-

The intellectual creation described sentiment and Success. By reason of the mutual suppression of the Attributes due to their inequalities, the different forms of this Evolution become fifty.

(204) 'Pratyaya' is that by which anything is known i. e., Will; and 'pratyayasarga' is the 'sarga' evolution proceeding from the Will i. e., the volitional or 'Subjective' evolution.

- I. Error  
II. Disability  
III. Contentment  
IV. Success

"Error" i. e., ignorance, illusion, is a property of the Will; so is also "disability" which results from the incapacity of the sense-organs;—"contentment" and "success" also are properties of the Will, as will be described later on.

Of these, the three former,—"error," "disability" and "contentment"—include Virtue and the other six dispositions leaving aside Wisdom which is included in "success".

Virtue &c. included in the above four

(205) These properties are next described severally.

Subdivisions of the above are fifty

"The forms of these are fifty." How so? "By reason of the mutual suppression of the Attributes due to their inequalities." This

the two conjointly with that of the third. The various grades of this 'inequality' are assumed in accordance with the re-

The 'fifty forms' are next enumerated:

### Kārikā XLVII

There are five forms of Error: twenty eight of <sup>5 forms of Error.</sup> Disability, arising from the imperfection <sup>28 of Disability.</sup> of the organs; Contentment has nine <sup>9 of Contentment.</sup> forms; and Success eight. <sup>8 of Perfection</sup>

(206) The five forms of Error are *ignorance, egoism, love, hate and clinging*, respectively named '*obscurity*' (*Tamas*), '*delusion*' (*Moha*), '*extreme delusion*' (*Mahāmoha*) '*gloom*' (*Tāmisra*) '*blind gloom*' (*Andhatāmisra*). Egotism and the rest partake of the nature of 'Error'; though, as a matter of fact, they are the products of Error. Or, the idea may be that it is only after a certain thing has become the object of Error that Egotism and the rest also, partaking of the nature of Error, come to bear upon that same thing. It is for this reason that the revered Vārṣaganya has declared that 'Ignorance is five-jointed.'

(207) The author next describes the sub-divisions of the five forms of Error.—

### Kārikā XLVIII

Of Error there are eight forms; as also of Delusion;

Sixty-two subdivisions of Error

Extreme Delusion is ten-fold; Gloom is eighteen-fold, and so is also 'Blind Gloom'.

(208) "Of Error"; i. e., of Ignorance. "there are eight forms".

of Ignorance eight forms

Of 'Darkness' i. e., Ignorance, there are eight forms; it consists in the notion of 'Spirit' with principle, of which institutes

'Darkness' or Ignorance.

(209) The particle 'ca' connects 'eight forms' with Delusion also. The Deities having attained the eight occult powers, regard themselves as immortal, and their several powers—'*anima*' and the rest—also to be everlasting; this is the error of Egotism, and since this appertains to the eight Powers it is said to be eight-fold.

(210) "*Extreme Delusion is ten fold*". By *Extreme Delusion* is meant the attachment to the objects of sense, sound, odour and the rest—

Ten of Extreme  
Delusion

which are ten-fold, each of the five being

earthly and heavenly; and having these ten for its object,  
Extreme Delusion is said to be *ten fold*.

(211) "*Gloom*", i. e., Hatred, "*is eighteen-fold*"

Eighteen of  
Gloom

The ten objects of sense, sound, &c. are *loveable by themselves; the eight occult powers*—Attenuation &c., however are

not *loveable*, by themselves, but only as means to the attainment, of the various objects of sense. And the objects of sense, being mutually suppressive, the means to the attainment,—in the shape of Attenuation and the other Powers also become obstructed. So that the eight Powers together with the ten objects of sense become *eighteen-fold* and the *eighteen*

Eighteen of Utter  
Darkness

for *Clinging*). The word "*tathā*" applies *eighteen-fold-ness* to Blind Gloom. The deities having attained the eight occult

powers—Attenuation and the rest—and enjoying in consequence, the ten objects of sense,—Sound and the rest—

and objects) being  
and this dread  
ide which is 'Blind  
objects the aforsaid

eighteen things—the eight powers and the ten objects—is  
said to be *eighteen-fold*.

(213) Thus the five forms of Error—which is a sort of Fancy,—with their sub-divisions become sixty two.

(214) Having thus described the five forms of Error, the author next describes the twenty eight forms of Disability.

## Kārikā XLIX

The injuries of the eleven-organs, together with those of the Will are pronounced to constitute Disability; the injuries of the Will (itself) are seventeen—due to the reversion of 'contentment' and 'success'.

Twenty-eight forms of Disability

(215) The 'injuries of the organs' are mentioned only as causes of so many injuries of the Will, and not as, by themselves, independent forms of Disability. These injuries—Deafness, insensibility to touch, blindness,

The eleven caused by injuries to the sense-organs

numbness of tongue, insensibility of the olfactory nerves, dumbness, palsy of hands, lameness, impotency, intestinal paralysis and idiocy,—consequent on the failure of the several sense-organs—auditory and the rest—are the eleven forms of disability. The disability of the Will in regard to its own function also due to the said injuries of the senses, is of eleven kinds, as it is due to *eleven* causes. These two have been mentioned together with those of *Buddhi* (itself) in accordance with the theory of non-difference of cause and effect.

(216) Having thus described the disabilities of the Will, arising from the injury of the sense-organs, the disabilities of the Will by itself are next described—*With injuries of the Will.* Question—"How many Disabilities are there of the Will itself?" Answer—"Seventeen are the injuries of the Will;" why? "due to the reversion of content-

Seventeen caused by the reversion of contentment and success

fold,—thus making the seventeen disabilities proper of the Will.

(217) The author next enumerates the nine forms of Contentment.—

## Kārikā L

The nine forms of Contentment have been held to be the following:—Four internal named 'Prakṛti' (Nature), (2) 'Upādāna' (Means), (3) 'Kāla', (Time) and (4) 'Bhāgya' (Luck); and five external due to the abstinence from objects.

(218) The

The four internal forms

do not make further attempts to obtain the direct apprehension of that difference by such means as 'Hearing', 'Contemplating' and the like;—these forms are called 'Prakṛti', 'Upādāna', 'Kāla' and 'Bhāgya' presuppose the 'Nature'. It being 'named' 'Nature', 'Means', 'Time' and 'Luck' i. e., whose names are 'Nature' and the rest.

(219) The Contentment called "Nature" consists in

I. Amba

is only every need of

So, my child, remain as you are! This Contentment is called 'Ambha'.

(220) The second form of Contentment arises from the following instruction; 'wisdom cannot be attained in the ordinary course of nature;

II. Saṁdha

because

Renunciation, and so, O long living one, thou must have recourse to Renunciation and give up all practice of meditation. The satisfaction arising from this instruction is named 'Upādāna' (Means), also called 'Salila'.

(221) The Contentment that follows upon the feeling of satisfaction arising from the instruction that "Renunciation also cannot bring about

Contentment named 'Time', also called 'Ogha' :

(222) The fourth form of Contentment is the feeling of satisfaction arising from the following:  
 IV Vṛṣṭi "Discriminative-wisdom proceeds neither from nature nor from any other means (such as Renunciation) nor does it depend solely upon time, but it comes only by luck; thus it was through mere luck that the children of Madālasā obtained wisdom in their infancy through their mother's instructions and thereby attained Emancipation. This form of contentment is named 'Luck' also called 'Vṛṣṭi'.

(223) The external forms of Contentment are next described. The external forms are five.

The five external forms are—  
 1. Nature  
 2. Will  
 3. I-principle  
 4. the non-Spirits—Nature, Will, I-principle and the rest—to be  
 5. the rest—

ment is first of all the form of Contentment in question also

(224) To explain :—The means of acquiring wealth consist of service etc., and these are sources of pain to the servants;—as is declared in the following words:—“ who would ever be attracted towards service, when one thinks of the pain caused by the insults suffered at the hands of the wardens of a haughty and wicked master ?” Similar is the case with other means of acquiring wealth. The contentment resulting from the abstinence from objects of sense due to the consideration of such troubles, is called ‘Pāra.’

(225) And then, the wealth having been acquired, it brings with it further trouble of saving it from the ravages of the king, thieves, floods and fire;—the contentment due to abstinence arising from such considerations is the second one called ‘Supāra’.

(226) Thirdly, the wealth having been acquired with great effort ( and safely hoarded ), there arises the fear of its being spent up.—this is the third form of abstinence lead-

III Parapāra

con-  
i



Thus the five *external* forms of Contentment, along with the four internal ones, make up the nine forms mentioned above.

(229) The author next describes the primary and secondary forms of success:—

### Kārikā LI

The eight forms of success are—(1) reasoning, (2) oral instruction, (3) study, (4-6) *The eight powers* three-fold suppression of pain, (7) acquisition of friends, and (8) purity. The three before-mentioned are checks to success

(230) The most important 'Success' among those enumerated above is the three-fold suppression of pain—three fold, on account of the three kinds of the pains to be suppressed.

The other 'successes' mentioned are only the means to said suppression of pain, and as such are regarded as *secondary* in relation to it. And these five are both causes and effects; e. g., of these study is only a cause; those of the more important kind are only effects; while the rest, of the middle class are both cause and effect.

(231) The first study consists in reading in due form with the teacher, of the philosophical texts; (1) *Tāra* thus is also called '*Tāra*'.

(232) ... from this last ... instruction which

ing). This constitutes the second *success* also called '*Satūra*'.  
 —These two—reading of the text and comprehension of the meaning together constitute the 'Śravaṇa' (Hearing) [which along with *manana* and *nididhyāsana* is the means of realising the highest Truth.]

(233) Reasoning consists in the investigating of the meaning of the scriptures by a process of

(3) *Tāratāra*

themselves  
ultimate  
regard to

by writers on the Vedas. This success is called '*Tāratāra*'.

(234) The ... of ... Even

(4) *Ramyaka*

conf ... until he has discussed them or and fellow- ends as the fourth success

... '*Ramyaka*'.

(235) By *dāna* here is meant purity, of discriminative wisdom—the word being derived from the

(5) *Sadāmudita* root 'Daip', to purify. This 'purity' has been thus described by the revered Patañjali: "An unim-

different kinds of cravings or desires. \* This purity is no obtainable without the refinement arising from a long, careful and uninterrupted course of practice; hence the word *Dīna* 'purity' includes (as a means to success) this practice also. Thus the fifth success called '*Sadā-mudita*'.

(236) The aforesaid three primary 'successes' (three suppressions of Pain) are called, '*Prāmōda*', '*Mudita*' and '*Modamāna*'. And these three with last five are eight forms of Success.

(237) Other people explain the text as follows:—(1)

Another explanation of the Powers the perception of truth, without the instruction of others, brought about purely by means of practices during past lives, is what is the first 'success' meant by *āha*. (2) And that which is obtained by listening to another person reading the texts of the Sāṅkhya Philosophy, is the 'second success' called '*Sādā*', because it follows solely from the verbal text. (3) Where the truth is learnt from the study of the words and meaning of the Sāṅkhya texts in the course of regular residence at the Teacher's,—it is the third form of success, due to study, and is called '*adhyāyana*'. (4) The fourth consists in the attainment of wisdom by coming in contact with a true teacher. This form of Success is called '*śikṣā-prāpti*'. (5) Fifthly, true wisdom is imparted by the teacher duly propitiated with gifts.

The propriety of either interpretation we leave to the learned to judge; and we desist from pointing out the faults of others, because our business lies only in elucidating the cardinal doctrines of the Sāṅkhya Philosophy.

(238) The Disabilities of the Will arising from the 'reversion of Contentment and Success' thus become seventeen

in number. It is well known that in the whole range of 'Subjective Evolution' and 'Success' three are checks to Success." "The aforesaid three' are Error, Disability and Contentment. And these act as curbs on the various forms of Success,—because they retard their progress: the Success being likened to so many elephants whose movement is curbed by the goad, 'Ankas'a,' and thus being opposed to success the latter three are ever to be abandoned.

(239) *Objection* — "Granted all this. But it has been said that Evolution is for the Spirit's purpose. This purpose can be fulfilled either by the 'Subjective Evolution' or by 'Objective Evolution' alone. Why have both the Evolutions?"

*Answer* —

### Kārikā LII

Without the 'Subjective', there would be no 'Objective', and without the 'Objective' there would be no 'Subjective.' Therefore, there proceeds two fold evolution, the 'Objective' and the 'Subjective'.

(240) The term 'Linga' 'Objective' stands for the Evolution out of the Rudimentary elements, and 'Bhāva' 'Subjective' for the evolution out of the Will.

The meaning of the Verse is that the 'Objective' E

the objective. Hence the necessity of a two-fold evolution.

That is to say, *Experience*, which is the purpose of the Spirit, is not possible unless there are the objects of experience and also the vehicle of experience in the form of the two bodies (Subtle and Physical) evolution;—converse without the organs of other Dispositions. Lastly, the Discriminative wisdom, which leads to the final End (Emancipation), is not possible without both these forms of Evolution. Thus is the need for both forms of Evolution established.

(241) The possible objection of 'mutual interdependence' is explained away on the analogy of the fact of Evolution. The fault of reciprocal causality explained as due to the eternity of creation beginning of the present cycle are due to the impulse of residual tendencies left by the corresponding evolutions of the previous cycle—Thus the whole theory is free from difficulties.

(242) The various forms of the 'subjective evolution' have been described; the author next describes those of the elemental (objective, material) evolution:—

### Kārikā LIII

The 'celestial' evolution has eight forms, the 'animal' has five; the 'human' has only one form; thus in brief is the 'material' evolution.

The force of elemental creation

(243) The eight divine sorts

The eight divine  
sorts

(244) The five animal forms are cattle, deer, bird, reptile, and the immobile things.

Five of the lower  
animals

(245) *Mankind is single, not counting its sub divisions—*  
Brahmāṣas &c. as separate; as the bodily form is the same in all classes of men.

Mankind single

Such, in brief, is the *material* evolution. Such objects as the Jar and the like,—though not having a 'body' in the ordinary sense,—are all included under the category of the 'Immobile'.

(246) The author next describes the three-foldness of this 'material evolution', based on the higher and lower degrees of intelligence,—in the form of the 'higher', the 'middle' and the 'lower'.

### Kārikā LIV

The 'higher' evolution abounds in the Sattva attribute; the 'lower' evolution abounds in the Tamas attribute; and the 'Middle' evolution abounds in the Rajas-attribute;—all these comprising the entire Universe, from Brahmā down to the tuft of

The different divisions of beings based on the predominance of the Attributes

grass.

(247) All the Heavenly regions—Bhuvah, Svah, Mahah Jana, Tapas and Satya—abound in the Sattva-attribute.—*The 'lower' evolution abounds in the Tamas attribute; that all*

The six Heavenly Regions

things from the cattle down to the *Immobile* things, abound in the *Tamas*-attribute, as full of 'Delusion'. The regions of the earth—consisting of the seven *Dvīpas* (continents) and Oceans—form the 'middle' evolution abounding in the *Rajas*-attribute, as it is full of pain and because in it actions, righteous and unrighteous, are performed.

The entire Universe is summed up in the phrase "from *Brahmā* to the tuft of grass"—the 'tuft of grass' including the trees and such other things.

(248) Having thus described the evolution, the author proceeds to show that it is the source of pain,—a fact the knowledge of which would be conducive to that "Dispassion" (Freedom from attachment) which is helpful in attaining the Final Goal.

### Kārikā LV

Therein does the Sentient Spirit experience pain arising from decay and death, due to the non-discrimination of the Spirit from the body [or, until the dissolution of the subtle body]: thus Pain is in the very nature of things.

'*Therein*'—in the body. Among corporeal beings the body is the vehicle of various forms of Pain—decay and death, the common lot of all creatures. The fear may I

continue to be" &c.,—being common to man as well as to the smallest insect; and the cause of fear constituting pain, death is a source of pain.\*

(249) *Objection* :—“Pleasure and pain, (according to the Sāṃkhya) are material and are the properties of the Will; as such how can these be said to belong to the Sentient Spirit?”

*Answer* :—The term “Puruṣa,” literally means “one who lies in the subtle body;” and this latter being connected with the Will and its properties, leads to the idea of the Spirit being connected with them

Explanation of  
the word Puruṣa

(250) *Question* .—How can pain which is related to the body be said to belong to the Spirit?

*Reply* :—“Due to the non-discrimination of the Spirit from the body;” the Spirit cognising its distinction from the body, mistakes the fluctuations of the latter for its own. Or the आ in आविनिवृत्ते, may be taken as pointing to the limit of the Spirit’s pain—the meaning being, “Until the subtle body has ceased to be, the Spirit suffers pain.”

(251) The author next deals with the different views that have been held regarding the cause of ‘Evolution’ or ‘Creation’.

### Kārikā LVI.

This evolution from the Will down to the specific elements, is brought about by the (modifications of) Prakṛti. This work is done for the emancipation of each Spirit, and thus is for another’s sake, though appearing as if it were for the sake of Nature herself.

The question as  
to the Maker of  
the Universe  
decided



(252) The term 'ūrambha' stands for *what is brought*

The different views of the cause of creation set aside *about, i. e. evolution; 'this' evolution—from*

yika) nor is it an evolution from Brahman (as held by the Vedāntin); nor is it without cause (as held by the Atheist). If it were the latter, there would never be any evolution at all or it would be eternally going on;—nor can it be said to be evolved from Brahman (the Vedānta view), for there can be no modification of what is pure intelligence, (which is Brahman, as postulated by Vedānta) Nor, again can evolution be brought about by Nature, as controlled by God; as no controlling can be done by one who is not active, e. g. an inactive carpenter does not manipulate his tools

(253) *Objection* —“Granted that the evolution is due

*Objection* — Nature being eternally active, no emancipation possible to Nature alone. But Nature is eternally active, and as such, her operations should never cease, so that there would be no emancipation for the Spirit “

*An-*

*Reply*— he was engaged retires from the work; purification of

sake is just like the action for one's own benefit

(254) *Objection*: "Granted all this. But it is only a sentient being that acts either for its own or for another's purpose, and Nature, being insentient, cannot act in the manner described; and, as such, she requires a sentient controller (over her blind force); the Spirits residing in the body cannot be such controllers, because such conditioned Spirits are ignorant of the true character of Nature: consequently there must be some other omniscient sentient being who controls *ab extra* the operations of Nature,—and to this Being we give the name God"

*Answer* :—

### Kārikā LVII

As the insentient milk flows out for the growth of the calf, so does Nature act towards the emancipation of the Spirit

(255) It is a fact of observation that insentient objects also act towards definite ends; e g., the milk which is insentient, flows for the nourishment of the calf. Similarly Nature, though insentient, could act towards the emancipation of the Spirit.

(256) It would not be right to urge that "the flow of the milk being due to the superintending care of God, its action does not afford an instance vitiating the general proposition that the action of insentient things are due to the control of sentient beings";—the activity of every sentient

The view of a Personal, Universal Lord overthrown

Further, God, being the Lord of the Universe, has all that He

'be roused? And if the pain subsequent to creation be held to be the cause of creation, then we should be in the inextricable nooze of 'interdependence': creation due to pity, and pity due to creation! and again, if God were moved to create on humanity, then He would create only happy mortals.

for God's compassion].

(257) As regards the action of the insentient Nature, on the other hand, it is due neither to selfishness nor to pity; and thus in this case, none of the above incongruities arise; the only motive of Nature is the fulfilment of another's purpose. Thus, therefore, the instance cited in the Kārikā is quite appropriate.

(258) It has been said—"as if for its own purpose;" The author proceeds to explain this:—

## Kārikā LVIII

As people engage in acts to satisfy desires, so does  
 The Spirit's end—the Unmanifest (Nature) act for the  
 the motive of  
 Nature emancipation of the Spirit.

'Autsukya' is 'icchā,' desire. Desire is satisfied and ceases on the attainment of the desired object; the object is the purpose of the agent; because the end of an action is that which is desired.

The analogy is pointed out. "So does the Unmanifest (Nature) act for the Emancipation of the Spirit"

(259) *Objection* — "We grant that the purpose of the Spirit is the motive for the action of Nature, but whence the cessation of her operations?"

*Answer* —

## Kārikā LIX

As a dancing girl, having exhibited herself to the spectators of the stage, ceases to dance, so does Nature cease to operate when she has made herself manifest to the Spirit.

The word "Stage",—the place—implies the spectators—th.  
 i e., hav  
 &c., are

(260) *Objection* — "We grant that the action of Nature is for the Spirit's purpose. But she could surely expect some recompense for her pains, from the Spirit,—just as a servant does from his gratified master, and as such the action of Nature cannot be said to be entirely for another's purpose."

*Answer* :—

## Kārikā LX

Generous Nature, endowed with Attributes, brings about by manifold means, without benefit to herself, the good of the Spirit, who is devoid of Attributes, and confers no benefit in return.

Nature expects no compensation

As a qualified servant accomplishes the good of his unqualified master—who is devoid of good qualities and confers no benefits,—through purely unselfish motives, without any benefit to himself; so does poor generous Nature, endowed with the three Attributes, benefit the Spirit without any good in return to herself. Thus the pure unselfishness of Nature's motives is established

(261) *Objection* :—“ We grant all this : But a dancing girl having retired from the stage after her exhibition, returns to it again, if so desired by the spectators; similarly would Nature act even after having manifested herself to the Spirit.”

*Answer*—

## Kārikā LXI

Nothing is more modest than Nature, such is my conviction; once aware of having been seen, she does not again expose herself to the view of the Spirit.

The reason why Nature does not revert to her actions

By modesty here is meant extreme delicacy (of manners), the unbearability to suffer exposure to the Purusa's view. If a well-bred lady who is not to be seen even by the Sun, with her eyes cast down, happen to have her body uncovered by chance and thus seen by a stranger, she tries to hide herself in such a way as not to be seen again; so Nature also—even more modest than such a lady—having once been seen by the Purusa (Spirit) will in no case show herself again

(262) *Objection*.—"This may be so. But Parusa  
(Spirit) being . . . . .

tion, and troubles, it is not possible for the unmodifying  
Parusa. And as the Parusa is devoid of action, it can  
have no migration—which latter is only another name for  
Rebirth. Hence it is meaningless assertion that 'Evolution'  
is for the purpose of the Parusa.

The author meets the above objection by accepting it in  
the course of winding up his disquisition

### Kārikā LXII

Thus verily no Spirit is bound, or emancipated; nor  
does he migrate; it is Nature alone that  
Bondage and release in reality apply to Nature having many vehicles is bound, or is  
released, or migrates

(263) Verily no Spirit is bound; nor does any migrate;  
nor is any emancipated. Nature alone, having many vehicles,  
is bound, migrates and is released. Bondage, migration and  
release are ascribed to the Spirit in the same manner as  
in actually that take  
of or profit  
experience and  
are attri-  
bution of  
1. So our

doctrine is entirely sound.

(264) *Objection*:—"We understand that bondage,  
migration and emancipation, though really belonging to  
Nature, are ascribed to the Spirit; but of what good are these  
to Nature herself?"

*Answer*:—

## Kārikā LXIII

Nature by herself binds herself by means of seven forms; and by means of one form, she causes deliverance for the benefit of the Spirit.

Nature binds and releases herself by means of her own developments

"Nature binds herself by means of seven forms; and by means of one form, she causes deliverance for the benefit of the Spirit."

'by means of one form', i e by wisdom—by discrimination. That is to say, she does not again bring about the experience or emancipation of that same Spirit.

Objection:—"We have understood all this; what then?"

## Kārikā LXIV

Thus it is that from the practice of truth follows wisdom in the form,—“I am not, naught is mine, and not—I”—which is complete-pure on account of the absence of error, and absolute.

The form and character of discriminative wisdom

(265) The term “truth” stands for the knowledge of Truth—From the practice of the knowledge of truth, in the formal manner described, through a long course of repeated, uninterrupted and devoted exercise,—there follows the wisdom, manifesting the distinction of Spirit from Matter. All practice brings about the knowledge of the same object to which the practice pertains; so in the present case practice pertaining to Truth results in the direct perception of Truth. It is for this reason of its leading to Truth that the wisdom is called “pure.”

(266) "Why pure" ?—"On account of the absence of Error." Doubt and Error are the two im-

The purity of the wisdom explained is

what is meant by in thinking as uncertain what is certain, and hence doubt also is a form of Error. Thus 'absence of Error' means the absence of both Doubt and Error (mistake); this 'absence of Error' also is due to the fact of the wisdom relating to Truth

(267) *Objection* — "It may be that the knowledge of Truth follows from the said Practice, but the eternal tendency towards false knowledge is sure to bring about its results in the shape of false knowledge, which will lead to its inevitable effect, the miseries of birth and rebirth of which thus there would be no end."

In reply to this, it is added that the knowledge is 'Absolute,' i. e., unmixed with error. Though tendency towards error is eternal, yet it is capable of being removed by the tendency towards the knowledge of Truth, culminating in that knowledge.

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dec  
of  
tru

(268) The form of the knowledge

The form of the knowledge

root as (as in 'asmi') together with bhū and kr signify action in general." Hence all actions, external as well as internal,—such as determination, self-consciousness, observation and apprehension—all become precluded from the



Spirit. . . . . it, there arises  
the idea . . . . . the agency in  
general, . . . . . for libations",

in all of which the active agent is represented by "I";  
. . . . . there can be no active  
From this  
it is only an

active agent that can be a possessor; and hence the preclusion  
of action implies the preclusion of possession also.

Or we may interpret the three forms in another way.  
The sentence "I am not," means that "I am the Spirit,  
not producti . . . . . having no  
action . . . . .  
possessions,

(269) *Objection*:—"Even after the knowledge of all  
this, there might be left something yet unknown, which would  
lead to Bondage."

*Answer*:—"It is complete," i. e. there is nothing left  
unknown after the attainment of such knowledge as the  
above, which want of knowledge could lead to Bondage

(270) *Question*:—"What is it that is accomplished by  
the said knowledge of truth?"

*Answer*:—

### Kārikā LXV

Thus (possessed of this knowledge) the Spirit, as a  
spectator, pure, at ease, beholds Nature,  
which has ceased to be productive and  
The cause of the . . . . .  
cessation of . . . . .  
Nature's operation . . . . .  
has turned back from the seven forms  
of evolution, under the influence of the  
purpose (of the Spirit).

The two things for the production of which Nature had  
begun her action were experience and the perception of truth; so

## Kārikā LXVI

“She has been seen by me”, thinks the one and hence loses all interest; “I have been seen,” thinks the other, and ceases (to act). Hence though their connection is still there, there is no motive for further evolution

do “this after she has once brought about discriminative wisdom. Because experience (enjoyment) is due to erroneous

under

is the

only

the Spirit

and

the

also.

which is a modification of Nature, is regarded by the Spirit as ‘for himself’—only by reason of the want of discrimination.

When however, right discrimination has been brought about, the connection of the Spirit with Nature ceases, and so he ceases to enjoy the things; nor is the Spirit by himself

Spirit, supply the only motive to the operations of Nature; but when these two have ceased to be the ‘purpose of the Spirit’, there is no motive for the operation. This is what is

\*. Because wisdom is a property of Buddhi which is an emanation from Nature.

meant by the words—" *There is no motive for evolution* " A 'Motive' is that which moves Nature to act towards evolution; and no such motive is possible, when there is no purpose of the Spirit.

(273) *Objection* :—" We grant all this. But no sooner would wisdom be attained than the body would fall off; and then how could the bodiless Spirit behold Nature (as distinct from himself)? If it be asserted that emancipation does not follow immediately on the attainment of wisdom, on account of the unspent residuum of past deeds"—then, we ask,—how is this residuum destroyed? If by mere fruition (i. e. by experience), then you tacitly imply the inability of wisdom alone to bring about emancipation; and hence the assertion that "emancipation follows from a knowledge of the  
"emancipation would be obtained on the destruction of the residua of Karma, by means of experience extending to an uncertain period of time"—is too sanguine ever to be realised."

*Answer* :—

### Kārikā LXVII

By the attainment of perfect wisdom, Virtue and the rest become devoid of causal energy: yet the Spirit remains awhile invested with the body, just as a potter's wheel continues to revolve through the momentum of the impulse previously imparted

Reason why the body does not dissolve immediately on the attainment of wisdom

to it.

(274) When true knowledge appears, the 'Karmic

and life's experiences'. It is only when the 'soil of the Will' is watered with the waters of the 'Kles'as' (i. e. Ignorance, Egotism, Love, Hate and Clinging), that the 'Karmic seeds' give out sprouts; so that when the said soil is rendered barren by reason of the waters of Ignorance and the rest having been sucked up by the heat of the 'knowledge of Truth',—how could there be any possibility of the 'Karmic seeds' sprouting up? With this view it is said—*"Virtue and they cease to tained, the body obvious impulse:*

just as, even after the action of the potter has ceased, the wheel continues to revolve on account of the momentum imparted to it. In due time, however, when the impulse becomes exhausted, it becomes inactive. In the continuance of the body, the impulse is supplied by such virtue and vice whose fruition has already commenced; as is declared in *S'ruti*—*"Having exhausted the others by means of experience, the soul attains beatitude"* and *"The delay is only so long as beatitude is not attained"* [Chāndogya VI. 1. 2]. The 'impulse' (to which the continuance of the Body is due) is in the remnant of that impulse which had been imparted by the Disappearing Ignorance, it is true that on account of the momentum of this impulse the Spirit continues to be invested with the body for a time.

(275) Question.—*"This may be so; but if the Spirit remains invested with the body by some sort of impulse, when will his Emancipation come about?"*

Answer:—

### Kārikā LXVIII

When the cessation from the three kinds of pain

Final

cease

Isolation.

The productivity of those actions, whose fruition has not commenced, having been destroyed, and those also whose fruition has commenced having been exhausted by experience,—the purpose having been fulfilled, Nature desists from her activity with respect to that particular Spirit, who thus obtains eternal and absolute Isolation, i. e. cessation of the three kinds of pain

(276) Though the Philosophy has been established by reasoning, yet in order to inspire respect towards it, the precedence of the great Sage is stated :

### Kārikā LXIX

This abstruse knowledge adapted to the fulfilment of the purpose of the Spirit, wherein (wherefore) the origin, duration, and dissolution of beings are considered, has been expounded by the great sage.

The precedence  
of Kapila

“Abstruse”,—*guhya* (lit. in a case) i. e. hard to be grasped by dull-brained persons.

“By the great sage” i. e. by Kapila. The feeling of reverence, thus aroused is strengthened by declaring that the doctrine is scriptural. “Wherein are considered, etc ; ‘in which’ knowledge means for the sake of which knowledge; as in the expression ‘*Carmani dvīpinam hanti*, the word ‘*carmani*’ (lit. in the skin) is taken to mean ‘for the sake of the skin, one

# TATVA - KAUMUDĪ

## NOTES

### I

The first benedictory stanza—अज्ञामेकां etc., is taken from ५० (४. ६). वाच० has changed the readings as follows — (b) नमाम् in place of सरूपाः; (c) अज्ञा ह्येते ज्ञयमाणा भजन्ते in place of अज्ञोऽज्ञेको ज्ञयमाणोऽनुसेते; (d) जहत्येनां भुक्तभोगां दुमस्तान् in place of जहात्येनां भुक्तभोगामजोऽन्यः। The change was, of course, necessary in view of the idea of plurality of souls in सांख्य, which is not favoured by the readings of the उपनिषद्. The वेदान्तिवः explain this verse quite differently. शङ्कराचार्य has refuted the claim of the सांख्य that this verse lays down the principles of the सांख्य system. For fuller discussion, see शङ्करभाष्य on चमसवदविशेषात् (त्र. घ. १. ४. ८) It has already been pointed in the Introduction that this verse gave rise to the idea of the three गुणः. It is, therefore, in the fitness of things that this verse should have been chosen by वाच० for मङ्गलाचरण.

About कपिल, आसुरि, पञ्चशिख and ईश्वरवृष्ण, see Introduction. आधिर्भानिक. The word भुक्त stands for living beings according to चन्द्रिका.

आधिर्भानिक, according to गौड०, includes miseries due to cold, heat, wind etc., because these are due to supernatural powers. On देवानामिदं देवं, Davies remarks—"But in old time, gods of higher class, and not demons merely, were supposed to afflict men with disease and pain. In the Rig-Veda (ii 33, 7), Gṛtsamada prays to Rudra that he may be freed from his bodily pains, which he affirms to have been sent by the Devas or gods (*daivya*) " (p 15)

The reading adopted by गौड०, *viz.* तरभियातके is more expressive of the सांख्य idea of complete cessation of pain, than तरयघातके of वाच० (See, S. N. S., 1, 1n.) cf. तत्र त्रिविध-इच्छात्यन्तानिवृत्तिरत्यन्तदुःखार्थं (सां घ. १. १) The reading of जय०

ric., तद्व्यापकः does not materially differ from तद्व्यापके. Compare also Wilson, pp. 6-7; Davies, pp. 13-14, note on this reading.

विष्णुराण describes the three दुःखः in the following verses:

अध्यात्मिकोऽपि द्विविधः शारीरो मानसस्तथा ।

शारीरो यदुभिर्भेदैर्भिद्यते धूयतां च सः ॥ २ ॥

शिरोग्रप्रतिदपायज्वरग्लभगन्दरीः ।

गुल्माशःशययुधासद्योर्दिभिरनेकधा ॥ ३ ॥

तथाक्षिरोगातीमारुष्टांगामयसंज्ञितैः ।

निद्यते देहजन्तापो मानस्यं शंलुमहंमि ॥ ४ ॥

कामकोपभयद्रेपलोमतोहविपादजः ।

शोकाभ्यावमानेप्यांमात्मर्थादिमयस्तथा ॥ ५ ॥

मानसोऽपि द्विजश्रेष्ठ तापो भवति त्रैकधा ।

इत्येवमादिभिर्भेदैस्तापो क्षाध्यात्मिको मतः ॥ ६ ॥

मृगप्रभिमनुष्याद्यैः पिशाचोरगराक्षसैः ।

मरीमृगाद्यैश्च नृणां जायते चाधिर्भानिकः ॥ ७ ॥

दानवानोष्णवर्षाम्बुवैद्युतादिममुद्भवः ।

तापो द्विजवरश्रेष्ठः कथ्यते चापिर्देविकः ॥ ८ ॥ ( ६. ५ )

The reading अर्के, ( found in some editions ), in the verse अर्के चेन्मयु etc., has अर्के as its variant. On this बालराम remarks—अर्के इति पाठे तु—समीपे—गृहकोणे, इति वार्थो बोध्यः । वस्तुतस्तु जैमिनी-एकत्रमाप्ये शबरस्वामिभिः पपि जातेःके मधूरमुज्य तन्नैव यथा यथा मध्वार्थिनः पर्वतं न गच्छेत्परित्यभिवाय ' अर्के चेन्मयु विन्देन ' इत्येवमुपन्यासाद् अर्के-इत्येव पाठः साधीयान् ॥ ( p. 14, note 1 ).

## II

The quotation ' यत्र दुःखेन सम्भिमन् ' etc., is ascribed to श्रुति by बालराम. On this बालराम remarks—' यत्र दुःखेन सम्भिमन् ' इति महत्त्वानिश्चयमिति वेचिन्, स्मृतिरिपमिति विज्ञानभिक्षयः, परिमलादिषु प्रामाणिक-ध्वेषु श्रुतित्वेन व्यवहारार्थवादरूपा श्रुतिरिपमिति मादशा. ॥ ( p. 16, note 3 ) The word स्वर्ग in this quotation has been variously

explained by different writers as temporary pleasure or heaven or salvation. See बालराम ( pp. 39-40 ) who has dwelt exhaustively over this question.

अपाम सोमममृता अभ्रूम etc., is from ऋग्वेद VIII. 48. 3, and is fully quoted and explained by गौड०, मांडर and त्रय०

With the sense of this कारिका, cf. श्रीमद्भागवत—

श्रुतं च दृष्टवद्दुष्टं स्वर्गसूयान्दयव्ययीः ।

यद्दन्तरायकामत्त्वान् कृपियच्चोपि निष्फलम् ॥ ( ११.१०.२१ )

एवं लोकं परं त्रिधाक्षरं कर्मनिर्मितम् ।

सनुन्यातिशयध्वंसं यथा मण्डलवर्तिनाम् ॥ ( ११.३.२० )

It is interesting to compare —त्रय०— अत्या भार्याया वक्ष्यमाणो याः सर्वा एवार्थेन माप्यधार्मीया द्रष्टव्या- ( p. 4 ), with the remark of Davies, quoted in the foot-note in the translation ( p. 5 ).

The quotation of पञ्चशिख, *vis.*, स्वल्प सद्दरः etc., is found in full in व्यासभाष्य on यो० सू० २. १३. See Introduction also.

The reconciliation of वैदिकी हिंसा with the श्रुति text—मा हिंस्यात् सर्वा भूतानि—, is an interesting topic which has taxed the ingenuity of all the orthodox systems of philosophy ( See, S. N. S., p. 5, In. ; Sovani, p. 400 ). बालराम has discussed this question at length, quoting extensively from the standard authors ( See pages 24-36 ).

न च कार्यत्वेनानित्यता फलस्य युक्ता, भावकार्यस्य तथात्वात् etc., ( para 14 )—Says an objector : Just as स्वर्ग has been declared to be अनित्य, because it is an effect ( यत्कार्ये तदशित्यम् ), similarly, this दुःखध्वंस should also be अनित्य, because it is an effect. To this वाच० replies that this maxim of अनित्यत्व holds good in the case of positive effects only, and not in the case of negative effects like दुःखध्वंस. But how can दुःखध्वंस be called मोक्ष according to the सांख्य philosophy, which advocates सत्कार्यवाद ? To this बालराम replies—यद्यपि सांख्यनये सत्कार्यवादोऽस्ति; कारणेन दुःखप्रध्वंसस्य मोक्षत्वाभिधानं व्याहृतं, तथापि दुःखप्रध्वंसपदेनात्र दुःखान्नाशव्याया एव तात्पर्यविरयदन्वेनाभिधानान् व्याहृत्यभाजोऽत्रमेव ॥ ( p 43 ).



Compare the notion of मुक्ति according to the वैशेषिक philosophy—दुःखनिवृत्तेष्वत्यन्तिकत्वं समानाधिकरणदुःखप्रागभावात्समकार्थानन्वं, सुखदुःखप्रसमानाधिकरणसर्वात्मविशेषगुणध्वंससमानकार्थानन्वं वा, ओषधिविशदुषध्वंसाधिकदुःखप्रागभावा वा ॥ ( उपलक्षार on वैशेषिकसूत्र १. ४ )

The order of व्यक्ताव्यक्तज्ञविज्ञान is based on the procedure of cognition. The same order is observed in the following सूत्र—  
—स्थूलात् पञ्चतन्मात्रस्य ( १. ६२ ); वाचाभ्यन्तराभ्यां तेषाद्द्वारस्य ( १. ६३ );  
तेनाद्द्वारस्य ( १. ६४ ); ततः प्रकृतेः ( १. ६५ ); and संहतपरार्थत्वात् पुरुषस्य ( १. ६६ ).

Sovani is quite pertinent in pointing out the confusion with regard to the meaning of the word व्यक्त. Some call the महाभूतस as व्यक्त, whileas, the author of कारिकास seems to regard everything व्यक्त ( and, therefore, प्रत्यक्षयोग्य ), except the प्रकृत and पुरुष. वाच० agrees with the latter explanation, in his commentary on this कारिका, but, changes his opinion in the comment on the 6th कारिका. At the latter place he says—सामान्यतो दृष्टाद्दुःखानात् अतीन्द्रियाणां प्रधानपुरुषादीनाम् प्रतीतिः. He would seem to include महत्त्व etc., by the word आदि ( See वाचराम p. 16 In. ). In order to avoid the contradiction, we should interpret the word आदि, according to बंशीधर, to mean the union between प्रकृति and पुरुष. cf. आदिना तत्संयोगग्रहः । प्रकृतिपुरुषवत्संयोगनित्याश्रमेया इत्यनेनः ( बंशीधर, p. 183 ) । See Sovani, pp. 401 and 402 and notes 36 and 37.

### III

In connection with Jacobi's remark that it is very strange that intellect should be regarded as a form of matter by the Sāṅkhya ( See Ent. Gott. Ind. p. 32 ), it is interesting to compare Davies ( p. 17, 3n )—Modern Science, like the system of Kapila, makes intellect, a mere form of matter. "Mind, used in the sense of substance or essence, and brain, used in the sense of organ of mental function are at bottom names for

the same substance." ( Maudsley's Physiology of Mind, 3rd Ed., p 38).

The nature of पुरुष is explained by चन्द्रिका as अजनकत्वे सत्त्वजन्य इत्यर्थः । आयविशेषणेन प्रकृतिनिपातः, द्वितीयेनेन्द्रियसामान्यादिनिपातः । Unlike the नैयायिकs, the सांख्यs maintain that सामान्य is a product.

On पुरुष as pure inward light, Davies quotes ( p. 18, ln. ) Hegel on Thought (Das Denken), in connection with the Absolute:—"It is that light which lights; but it has no other content except that light." (Phil der Rel., 1. 117) [Translated from German by H. Sharma].

From अहङ्कार (Ego) proceed not only the इन्द्रियs, but everything material cognised by them. That is, the Ego (which is the I principle) is the 'base of the reality of all our sense-perceptions' (Davies, p 21, note 1), and consequently of all the existence. Davies quotes Schelling (System des Transcendentalismus, p 60) in support of this idea—"If at all there exists *Something Real* as opposed to *ideal*, then that *Something Real* must be I, because it is the principle of all reality." (Translated from German by H. Sharma). This position, of course, differs from that of the वेदान्तिन्, who does not regard the reality of the I-principle (अहङ्कार) even, but that of the Pure Consciousness (सुहृद्वद्म),—the I-principle itself being imaginary and due to माया. Distinction should be drawn from the विज्ञानवादी-वाद् also, who denies the existence of everything external, except consciousness. The सांख्यवादिन् does not deny the external existence, but considers it to be a modified product of consciousness, in which it lies latent, cf. न विज्ञानमात्रं बाह्यप्रतीतेः (सां. सू. १, ४२.).


#### IV

Apart from the three Means of Right Cognition, *viz.*, प्रत्यक्ष, अनुमान and शब्द, recognised by the सांख्यकारिका, the commentators discuss the other Means of Right Cognition, recog-

प्रमाण has been defined as the instrument of प्रमा. प्रमा is that state of mind which is free from doubt, mistake, indecision and memory—, and which arises from the contact of the sense-organs with their objects. The result is the cognition by mind. But वाच० says—बोधश्च परिप्रेयः कर्तुं प्रमा. This might mean that the result of the mental state is cognition in the Spirit. Does it mean that the cognition arises in the spirit? No, we reply—what happens is that when the Spirit is reflected in the mind, which has assumed the shape of the object with which the sense-organs come into contact, it (the Spirit) also appears to be cognising. This is a kind of misapprehension arising from the mistaken identity between the Spirit and the mind. This is what is expressed in the योगसूत्र—  
—' द्रष्टा दृशिमानः शुद्धोऽपि प्रत्ययानुपश्यः ' ( II. 20 ) and ' वितेज्यति न-  
कमायास्तदाकारापत्तौ स्वशुद्धिसंवेदनम् ' ( IV. 22 ).

### V

Following the न्यायसूत्र—तत्पूर्वकं त्रिविधमनुमानं पूर्ववत् शेषवत् सामान्यतोद्भूतं च । ( 1, 1, 5 ), वाच० first divides अनुमान into three kinds. Again he gives another classification :



The commentators differ in the explanation of these terms. वाचस्पयि himself proposes two alternative explanations.

(1) (a) पूर्ववत्—*A priori* or inference of effect from cause,—as of rain from the clouds in the sky.

(b) शेषवत्—*A posteriori*, or an inference of cause from effect,—as of rain from the flood in a river.

(c) सामान्यतोद्दृष्ट—*Commonly seen*, or based on Analogy.— e. g., we observe that a particular man in one town now, is seen in another next day, because he has moved. Similarly, the Sun must also move, as he is seen at different places in the sky at different times.

Or

(2) (a) पूर्ववत्—If we have seen two things together in the past, then when we see one of them now, we infer the existence of the other also. For example, from smoke on the hill, we infer fire.

(b) शेषवत्—Inference by exclusion (प्रसक्तप्रतिषेधेऽन्यत्रा-  
प्रमहान् शिष्यमाणे संप्रत्ययः परिशेषः.). The question is—, under which of the seven categories (द्रव्य, गुण etc.) should we include शब्द (sound)? Now, शब्द cannot come under सामान्य, विशेष and the rest, and its inclusion under द्रव्य has been denied. Therefore, by the law of the residue, शब्द falls under गुण.

(c) सामान्यतोद्दृष्ट—Where the relation of the व्याप्ति is not within ordinary perception, there we take another object within ordinary perception and similar to the हेतु in question; and on this similarity or Commonness, we transfer the व्याप्ति from the perceived to the unperceived instance. For instance, we have got to infer the existence of the Spirit. We do so on the basis of the qualities like the desire, etc. The desire, etc., are qualities. Qualities always reside in objects (as we perceive in the case of form, taste and the rest). Therefore, the desire etc., must also reside in some object; and that object is the Spirit.

The two alternative explanations given by वात्स्यायन show that the meaning of these terms had become doubtful at his time. Cf Principal A. B. Dhruva's paper—'Trividham anumānam', POC, Poona, pp. 251-280.

वाच० agrees with the second explanation of वात्स्यायन. But भवति or शेषवत् according to वाच०, is a negative reasoning.

वात्स्यायन's instance of शेषवत्, viz. शब्द is a गुण, is rejected by वाच° in his तात्पर्यटीका (p. 183, काशीमंस्कृतसीरीज). According to him शेषवत् or परिशेष stands for व्यतिरेक्यनुमान. The inference of शब्द being a गुण is not a व्यतिरेक्यनुमान but अन्वयव्यतिरेकि. The correct example of शेषवत्, therefore, is that the qualities—desire etc., reside in the आत्मन्. These qualities cannot reside in पृथिवी, जल, तेजस् and वायु; nor can they reside in आकाश, because the qualities of the latter are perceived by the external sense—organ (ear). Similarly the desire etc. being विशेषगुणः cannot be the qualities of दिशा, काल and मनस्—for the qualities of the latter three द्रव्यः are साधारण. Thus ultimately the desire etc., reside in the ninth द्रव्य, viz., आत्मन्. So there being no सपञ्च of आत्मन्, it is an instance of व्यतिरेक्यनुमान जय° and गौड° agree with the first explanation of वात्स्यायन. गौड° and माठर explain शेषवत् differently—समुद्रादेकं जलपलं लवणमासाद्य शेषस्याप्यस्ति लवणभाव इति ( गौड° ) ॥

लिङ्गलिङ्गिपूर्वकम्—वाच° would read one more लिङ्ग i. e. लिङ्ग-लिङ्गलिङ्गिपूर्वकम्. गौड° has a curious explanation to offer—तदनुमानं लिङ्गपूर्वकं यत्र लिङ्गं लिङ्गा अतुमीयते, यथा दण्डेन यतिः । लिङ्गिपूर्वकं च यत्र लिङ्गिना लिङ्गमनुमीयते, यथा दृष्ट्वा यतिं, अभ्येदं त्रिदण्डमिति । जय° agrees with it. It enumerates seven kinds of सम्बन्धः which ought to exist between the लिङ्ग and the लिङ्गि. They are—

- |                      |            |          |     |               |
|----------------------|------------|----------|-----|---------------|
| (1) स्वभ्यामिभाव     | as between | राश      | and | पुण्य.        |
| (2) प्रवृत्तिविकार   | .. ..      | यव       | ..  | सकतु.         |
| (3) कार्यकारणभाव     | .. ..      | धेनु     | ..  | वाम्          |
| (4) पात्रपात्रिक     | .. ..      | परिवृद्  | ..  | त्रिविष्टप्य. |
| (5) सादृश्य          | .. ..      | शत्रुवाक | ..  | चक्रशर्पा.    |
| (6) प्रतिद्वन्द्व    | .. ..      | शीत      | ..  | वप्य.         |
| (7) निमित्तनिमित्तिक | .. ..      | भोग्य    | ..  | भोग्यक.       |

The conversation between आद्वय and जैमीपय्य, referred to by वाच°, occurs in व्यासभाष्य on यो, सू 3, १८.

The भयः mentioned by वाच° are—

(a) साक्यभिक्षुः or the Buddhist monks, described in the शिखण्डिनाम, vii 275 (as quoted in the सर्वदर्शनसंग्रह) as—

कृत्तिः कमण्डलुर्मोण्डयं चीरं पूर्वाह्नभोजनम् ।

मघो रक्ताम्बरत्वं च शिधिये रौद्रभिक्षुभिः ॥

(b) निर्ग्रन्थकः or the Jains, and

(c) संसारमोचकः or the materialists, बालराम observes—  
संसारमोचकः—(संसारमोचकादेश्च हिंसा पुण्यत्वममता) इत्याभिहिता हिंसादि-  
परायणाः षट्भङ्गे तदन्तर्गतमलिदविलयत्रयं देहभङ्गे तदन्तर्गतजीवभङ्ग एव मोक्ष  
इत्येवं बुवाणाधार्वाकविशेषाः ॥ (p. 82)

'तु' शब्देनानुमानाद् व्यवच्छिनत्ति—As pointed above, the Bud-  
dhists and the followers of the वैशेषिक school do not recognise  
इत्य as a separate प्रमाण, but include it under अनुमान. वाच०  
says that the relation between a वाक्य and its अर्थ is not that of  
लिङ्ग and लिङ्गिन्, as between धूम and वह्नि. वाक्यार्थे, being only  
an object of cognition cognised by the वाक्य, cannot be known  
by inference.

उपमान. According to the नैयायिक (प्रसिद्धसाधर्म्यात् साध्यमात्र-  
मुपमानम्—न्या० सू० 1 1 6), उपमान is that sentence which esta-  
blishes a relation between a word and its sense. But, ac-  
cording to the सांख्य, a वाक्य is not a प्रमाण, but the knowledge  
(ज्ञान) derived from the वाक्य. It is the चित्तवृत्ति alone which is  
प्रमाण. So, उपमान cannot be a separate प्रमाण, but is included  
under अनुमान. According to the मीमांसक, उपमान is the सादृश्य-  
ज्ञान (or the cognition of similarity, as of गौ residing in the direct-  
ly perceived गवय). A man who saw a cow in the town, now  
observes a गवय in the forest. At this moment he is reminded  
of the cow which is qualified by the similarity of गवय directly  
perceived. This is the फल of उपमान. वाच० replies that this  
उपमान and its फल are both included under प्रत्यक्ष. For, सादृश्य  
is like the सामान्य. Just as we have गोत्व in गौ, so we have  
गौसादृश्य in गौ. And as we directly perceive गोत्व along with गौ,  
so we perceive गौसादृश्य and गवयसादृश्य along with गवय. There-  
fore, गौसादृश्यज्ञान (उपमान) and गवयसादृश्यज्ञान (उपमानफल) both  
are प्रत्यक्ष. सादृश्य is not a relation (like संयोग) which should  
reside on two objects; it is only भूयोऽवयवसामान्ययोग, that is, the

existence of a large number of qualities of one object in another. This सादृश्य is, thus, one like गौत्व; and if it is perceived in गो, then it is perceived in गवय also.

अर्थापत्ति is Presumption We presume the existence of living चैत्र outside the house, if he is not visible inside the house. But, the मीमांसक objects— देशसामान्येन गृहविशेषाक्षेपेऽपि पाक्षिकः etc He says that when we hear जीवन् चैत्रः क्वचिदिति, then the substratum of the existence of चैत्र is देशसामान्य (or space in general), which includes the particular space of गृह also. Thus, चैत्र's non-existence in the गृह is opposed to his existence in देशसामान्य. And, in order to remove this opposition, we have to resort to अर्थापत्ति. वाच० replies that गृह (in which the non-existence of चैत्र has been established by means of Right Cognition) cannot be included in देशसामान्य. Similarly चैत्र's non-existence in गृह ( which is opposed to his existence in गृह ) cannot be a case of opposition to his existence everywhere.

अभाव is no प्रमाण, but is included under प्रत्यक्ष. For, पदमात्र-यद्भूतत्वं is merely a modification of भूतत्वं. But, says an objector, how can अभाव (a negation) be a परिणाम (something positive)? Answer. • Under एतेन भूतेन्द्रियेषु परमैकप्रणापस्थापरिणामा इत्याख्यायाः यो० न० III. 13), इयम has defined परिणाम as अवस्थितस्य प्रत्यक्ष पूर्वपरमैकनिवृत्ता पराम्भोत्तरोत्पत्तिः परिणाम इति—i. e. modification is the manifestation of another characteristic on the removal of the previous characteristic of an object, which (object) always remains constant. So, when पट was on the भूतत्वं, then it was अद्वितीयपरिणाम of भूतत्वं; and when there is no पट, then it is the चैत्रत्वं or अद्वितीयपरिणाम of भूतत्वं

## VI

Things directly perceived by the senses need not be taught by the गुरु, as they can be easily cognised by even an ordinary person. Now " things beyond the senses are not

only those which are too subtle for organs of the sense, but those which are imperceptible by accident, as the fire in a mountain that smokes" (Davies, p 27). The latter is an instance of पूर्ववत् अनुमान, which वाच० regards to be as unimportant for our inquiry as the प्रत्यक्ष. The most important kind of अनुमान, from our point of view, is सामान्यतोद्देश (and शेषवत्, which is not mentioned by the कारिका, but added by वाच०), which leads us to infer things which are too subtle for the organs of sense. But जय० rejects पूर्ववत् and शेषवत् both (p 9)

## VII

पतञ्जलि lays down six causes of अनुपलब्धि (महाभाष्य IV, I 3). See Introduction. The eight causes of अनुपलब्धि mentioned in the कारिका are reduced to four by जय०—

(1) देशदोष includes अतिदूर and अनितामीप्य

(2) इन्द्रियदोष .. इन्द्रियपात and मनोऽनवस्थान

(3) विषयदोष = सांक्ष्य, and

(4) अर्थान्तरदोष includes व्यवधान, अभिभय and समानाभिहार.

Sovanı is right in remarking that all these can be reduced to two— इन्द्रियदोष and विषयदोष (See p 405). माडर lays down the causes of अनुपलब्धि of अमत् (non-existent) things even—  
इक्षणीमसतां चतुर्था भवति । तत्रोप्यते-प्राक्प्रध्वंमेतरेतरात्यन्ताभावभेदात्.....  
एवमियं द्वादशधनुपलब्धिः । सतामष्टया अमतां चतुर्था ॥

## VIII

On the reading प्रकृतिसरूपं, Davies remarks—'Lassen has in the text स्वरूपं (having its own form), from the सांक्ष्यकौमुदी, which must be referred to intellect (महत्.) All the Mss. but one have सरूपं (like), which the sense requires. In his translation he has "dissemble et simile".' (p 27, ln).



## IX

वाच० here lays down the opinions of ( 1 ) the बौद्धs, ( 2 ) the नैयायिकs and the वैशेषिकs, and ( 3 ) the वेदान्तिन्s as पूर्वपक्ष.

( 1 ) The बौद्धs maintain that *existence* comes into "being" from *non-existence* ( असतः सञ्जायते ).

( 2 ) The नैयायिकs and the वैशेषिकs maintain that an *existent* cause produces a *non-existent* effect ( सतोऽमञ्जायते )

( 3 ) The वेदान्तिन्s maintain that the cause alone is *existent*, the effect being only an apparent change ( एकस्य सतो विवर्तः न कार्यजातं वस्तु सत् ). All these views are fully discussed in the Introduction.

उपादानग्रहणात्—वाच० interprets ग्रहणात् as मन्वन्व्यात्. But जय०, गौड०, माडर and चन्द्रिका explain it as taking or seeking. S. N. S. observes that although गौड०'s explanation is simpler, yet apparently, the same idea is repeated in शक्तस्य शक्यकरणात्. वाच०'s explanation is also included in सर्वसम्भवाभावान् "It is also to be noted that while उपादानग्रहणात् emphasises the adequacy of the cause to the effect, शक्तस्य शक्यकरणात् looks at the adequacy of the effect to the cause; hence, the latter does not merely repeat the idea of the former." ( S. N. S. p 28, In ).

कारणमावाह—जय० gives two explanations of this phrase—कारणस्य सत्त्वादिरयम्. । यमत्कार्यमुत्पद्यते किमिति कारणभावेन कार्यस्य भावो भवति । भवति च । तन्मात्तल्लिङ्गरूपेणावस्थितमिति गम्यते । अथवा—कारणभावमिति कारणम्भवात् । यस्त्वभावं कारणं तत्त्वभावं कार्यम् । यथा स्निग्धत्वभावम्यस्तित्तेभ्यः क्षिण्यमेव तैलम्, मृदो मृत्त्वभावो घटः ॥ ( p. 12 ). माडर and गौड० agree with the latter explanation. वाच०, on the other hand, explains it as कार्यस्य कारणान्मकत्वान्—on account of the identity of cause and effect.

तन्मादिर्यं पदोत्पत्तिः स्वकारणममवायो वा स्वमताममवायो वा, उभयधापि नेत्वपत्ते etc. ( para 75 ). After having disproved the नैयायिक's theory of origination of effect ( उत्पत्ति ), वाच० proceeds further—Now, what is your उत्पत्ति? Is it the नेमराय ( Inherence ) of the effect in its cause? That is, is it the समवाय which is

produced? If you say yes, then your उत्पत्ति produces only the समवाय and not the effect. Or, do you mean to say that उत्पत्ति is the समवाय of सत्ता (existence) in the effect? That is, सत्ता is the genus presiding over the effect. It is by means of this सत्ता (genus), that we call an existing object as existent. Just as गो is गो, because she is related to गोत्व, similarly, a सत्पदार्थ is सत्, because it is related to सत्ता. So, the other alternative of the भेदाधिक्य is that what is originated is the समवाय (Inherence) of सत्ता in the effect. Here also, as above, what is originated is समवाय and not the effect. Moreover, asks बालराम, how can you establish the समवाय relation of the non-existent पद with the existent तन्मू? And, how again, can there be the समवाय of सत्ता in the असत् पद, when there can be no relation between the existent and the non-existent objects?

Thus, it will be seen that a कारण is related with the आविर्भाव of कार्य. The opponent asks—why should a कारण be not related with the रूप of कार्य? वाच<sup>०</sup> replies.—Because आविर्भाव is a क्रिया and रूप is a गुण. A कारण can be related with क्रिया only and not with गुण; otherwise, a कारण will not be a कारण. The very derivation of the word कारण—क्रियतेऽनेनेति कारणम्—implies its relation with क्रिया.

## X

हेतुमत्—, i. e., caused. व्यक्त or the evolved is caused. Cause, according to माडर, is of two kinds: कारक (producer) and ज्ञापक (illuminator or indicator). प्रधान, इन्द्रि, अहङ्कार and पञ्च-तन्मात्रा's are the कारकहेतु's, as they produce effects. That is, इन्द्रि, अहङ्कार and पञ्चतन्मात्रा's are हेतु's and हेतुमत्'s both; whereas, अभ्यक्त (i. e. प्रधान) is only a हेतु. The ज्ञापक हेतु's are five-fold, गुरु, विपर्यय, अशक्ति, मुष्टि, सिद्धि and अनुग्रह. Now, विपर्यय, अशक्ति, मुष्टि and सिद्धि are the प्रत्ययसर्गा (i. e. creations of Intellect), and thus they pervade all the twenty-three तत्त्व's. (But what is this अनुग्रह?) Thus अभ्यक्त is only a कारक हेतु

अनित्यम्—non-eternal, destructible. Destruction is the return of a product to its cause cf.—नाशः कारणद्वयः ( सां० म० १. १२१ ). For, according to the theory of सत्कार्य, there can be no real destruction or annihilation. प्रधान is नित्य, because it has no कारण to which it could return

अव्यापि—The twenty-three तत्त्वs are not all-pervading, like प्रधान and दुरः; "each of these principles (tattwa) is not found in every form." (Davies, p. 34). But, is not the महत्त्व all-pervading? To this वंशीयर replies—महद्भेदः स्वस्वकारणाव्यापकत्वादुपचरितव्यापकत्वमित्यर्थः (p. 201).—the pervading-ness of महत्त्वं, etc., is secondary, as they do not pervade their causes. And as प्रधान has no cause to pervade, it is व्यापि

सक्रियम्—परिस्पन्द means the action of leaving one body and entering another. विज्ञान०, on the other hand, says—सक्रियत्वमध्यवसायादिरूपनियतकार्यकारित्वम्। प्रधानस्य तु सर्वक्रियासाधारण्येन कारणत्वात् कार्यकदेशमात्रकारित्वम्। न च क्रिया कर्मैव वक्तुं शक्यते। प्रकृतिधोमान् सृष्टि-श्रवणेन प्रकृतेरपि कर्मवतयात्र सक्रियत्वापत्तेरिति ( १. १०४ ). On this बाळराम remarks—धोभादिपरिणामलक्षणक्रियायाः प्रधाने सत्त्वेऽपि गमनागमन-लक्षणपरिस्पन्दात्मकक्रियाया अमत्यात् प्रकृतावतिव्याप्तिरिति व्यर्षोऽयं भिक्षोः प्रयास इति बोध्यम् (p 121).

अनेकम्—i. e. सजातीयभेदतः, having a variety of similar objects; as a mango-tree has सजातीयभेद, several other mango trees of the similar type So, बुद्धि, etc., although alike, are different in different individuals. But विज्ञान० explains it otherwise—अनेकत्वं सजातीयेन भिन्नत्वम्—सर्गद्वयसाधारण्यमिति यावत्। न पुन. सजातीयानेकव्यक्तित्वम्, प्रकृतावतिव्याप्तिः। प्रकृतेरपि सत्त्वायनेकरूपत्वात्. The fallacy of विज्ञान० is pointed out by बाळराम—प्रकृतेनेकरूपत्वेऽप्यनेकव्यक्तित्वाभावेन प्रकृतिप्रतियोगिकान्वोन्याभावस्य प्रकृतायमम्भवात्, किञ्च—'अजायवाम' इति श्रवणादप्रामाणिकं प्रकृतेनेकव्यक्तित्वाभिधानमित्यन्वयान एव व्यामोहो भिक्षोरिति । ( pp 121-122 )

विद्म—According to गौड० and माडर, it means, that which merges into its primary cause. In addition to the above explanation, जण० and विज्ञान० give another alternative explana-

tion, *viz.*, that which indicates, or which is the characteristic of प्रधान. This is the sense taken by वाच० also. But प्रधान itself is a characteristic ( लिङ्ग ) of पुरुष. It is for this reason that वाच० remarks—प्रधानं तु न प्रधानस्य लिङ्गं पुरुषस्य लिङ्गं भवदपीति भावः. On this, S. N. S. remarks that it "seems hardly adequate to the contrast intended between the evolved and the unevolved." ( p. 32, Inr )

Why can there be no अवयवावयविसंयोग between प्रधान and बुद्धि, etc. ? Because, between these, the relation is समवाय (= identity or तादात्म्य ), and not संयोग. There can be no संयोग between the तन्तुs and the पट produced out of them. But, will there be any संयोग between बुद्धि and अहङ्कार, etc. ? No commentator answers this, although, here also we can show that अहङ्कार, being a product of बुद्धि, stands in समवाय relation to बुद्धि. It is for this reason that गौड०, माडर and जय० explain the word अवयव as शब्द, रूप, स्पर्श etc.,. But they land themselves in another difficulty; for, the entire व्यक्त ( *viz.*, बुद्धि, अहङ्कार etc. ) cannot be called as शब्दस्पर्शादिसम्पन्न. If it be urged that these शब्द and the rest do reside in a latent form in बुद्धि and the rest, then it may be pointed out that शब्द and the rest do reside in a latent form in प्रधान also. Even वाच०, who tries to avoid this difficulty, has illustrated this संयोग as—तथा हि पृथिव्यायः परस्परं संयुज्यन्ते एवमन्येऽपि ।

परतन्त्रम्—Although, each of the twenty-three तत्त्वs is subordinate to the other in the ascending order, yet, ultimately, all are subordinate to प्रकृति. Again, although बुद्धि is independent in producing अहङ्कार, and the latter in producing the इन्द्रियs and the तन्मात्राs, yet each one is ultimately dependent upon प्रकृति, the fountain-head of all energy.

## XI

त्रिगुणम्—The three गुणs or Attributes are the essence of प्रकृति. प्रकृति is nothing but these three गुणs in equilibrium.

The kinds of temperaments observed in living beings may broadly be divided into three—spiritual, passionate and dull. Therefore, the सांख्य theory of three गुण, although a mere hypothesis, is yet a very useful and appropriate hypothesis. Davies remarks—“In the system of Valentinus the Gnostic, all men and all substances are divided into three classes: (1) spiritual, (2) the vital and (3) the material (Hylic). This corresponds to the गुण of कपिड and is probably an importation from India.” ( p. 37, 2n. )

विषयः—The view-point of the विज्ञानवादिन् बोद्ध is that there is no existence of the external objects, except in mind. That is, concept and the object denoted by the concept are identical, because both are comprehended simultaneously. Things, which are not identical, are not necessarily comprehended simultaneously; cf. ‘सहोपलम्भनियमाश्चेदो नीलतद्विद्योः । भेदश्च भ्रान्ति-विज्ञानैर्दृश्येन्द्राविवादे ॥’ (सर्वदर्शन०, p. 32), वाचस्पति’s refutation of this view has been thus illucidated by बालराम—एव किंलक्ष्मिन्नेव योपिदृषे वस्तुनि रक्तद्विद्यविमृदानां जनानां विभिन्नानि सुखादिज्ञानानि जायमानान्युपलम्बन्ते तत्र प्रमानृणां परस्परप्रतिमन्यानाद् वस्त्वैक्येऽपि ज्ञानानात्वं दृश्यते । यदि हि वस्तु विज्ञानात्मकं भवेत् तर्हि विज्ञानस्यामाधारण्यादनेकविज्ञानालम्बनमेकं साधारणं वस्तु न सम्भवेत् । अतः वस्तुमाधारण्योपपत्तये विज्ञानातिरिक्तं तद्वस्तुपेयमिति । ( p. 123 ).

अचेतनम्—बुद्धि ( intellect ) is merely an instrument of Pure Intelligence or चैतन्य, and not identical with it, because बुद्धि is a material product of प्रकृति.

The phrase तद्विषयितस्तथा च पुमान् means that in some respects the Spirit is similar to व्यक्त and अव्यक्त, and in other respect it is different from व्यक्त and अव्यक्त.

Difference of पुरुष from व्यक्त and अव्यक्त—

व्यक्तः and अव्यक्तः

त्रिगुण

अविशेषः

विषय

पुरुष

अगुण

विशेषः

अविषय \*

## व्यक्त and अव्यक्त.

सामान्य

अचेतन

प्रमवधर्मि

पुरुष

असामान्य

चेतन

अप्रमवधर्मि

Similarity of पुरुष to व्यक्त and अव्यक्त and difference of व्यक्त from अव्यक्त—

व्यक्त	अव्यक्त	पुरुष
हेतुमन्	अहेतुमन्	अहेतुमन्
अनित्य	नित्य	नित्य
अव्यापि	व्यापि	व्यापी
सक्रिय	निक्रिय	निक्रिय
अनेक	एक	अनेक
भाषित	अभाषित	अभाषित
अदिङ्ग	अदिङ्ग	अदिङ्ग
स्वययव	निरवयव	निरवयव
परतन्त्र	स्वतन्त्र	स्वतन्त्र

It should be noted that गौड० and माडर say पुरुष एक, which is opposed to the doctrine of पुरुषबहुत्व, जय० and वाच०, therefore, rightly point out that पुरुष is similar to व्यक्त with regard to अनेकत्व. After discussing this point, Wilson concludes— "Either, therefore, Gaurapāda has made a mistake, or by his *eka* is to be understood, not that soul in general is one only, but that it is single, or several, in its different migrations, or, as Mr. Colebrooke renders it (R. A. S. Trans Vol I, p. 31), 'individual'. So in the Sūtras it is said, 'that there may be various unions of one soul, according to difference of receptacle, as the ethereal element may be confined in a variety of vessels' (I, 150). This singleness of soul applies, therefore, to that particular soul which is subjected to its own varied course of birth, death, bondage and liberation; for, as the commentator observes 'one soul is born, not another (in a regenerated body)'. The singleness of soul, therefore, as asserted by Gaurapāda, is no doubt to be understood in this sense." (p. 65)

## XII

गुणः do not mean qualities residing in a substance, as understood in the न्याय and वैशेषिक systems. They are of the nature of substance; they are the constituent elements of प्रकृति. Hence, वाच० says—गुणा इति परार्थाः. That is, they are called गुणः (secondary), because they exist for the Spirit and not for themselves.

तन्त्रयुक्ति literally means 'device of science', and probably refers to the device of the मीमांसकः known as स्थान (position or order). So it will mean that प्रीति, अप्रीति and विपाद stand for मत्त्वं, रजम् and तमम् respectively.

गौड०, माडर and जय० mention अन्योन्यवृत्तयः also, while वाच० and चन्द्रिका add अन्योन्य before and वृत्ति after अभिवन, भाष्य, जनन and मिथुन each. वृत्ति according to वाच०, means क्रिया (operation) जय० explains वृत्ति as सुखादिरूपेण परिणतिः. According to गौड०, अन्योन्यवृत्तयः means परस्परं वर्तन्ते, i. e. are reciprocally present. माडर, however, seems to take वृत्ति in the sense of function. In a note on this word, Davies remarks—"वृत्ति means state, condition, or manner of being, and the meaning is that each गुण may, in some circumstances, assume the nature of the others or be the same in effect." (p 36, 1a.)

The quotation, अन्योन्यमिथुनाः सर्वे, etc., ascribed to आगम by वाच०, is found in the 8th chapter of the 3rd स्कन्ध of देवी-भागवत. गौड० माडर and जय० quote only one verse, viz., रजसो मिथुनं मत्त्वं, etc., जय० ascribes this verse to दिण्डुगीता, which it is difficult to identify, unless it stands for इरिगीता = भगवद्गीता. But there is no such verse in the भगवद्गीता. The verse found there is—रजस्तमथाभिभूय मत्त्वं भवति भारत । रजः मत्त्वं तमश्चैव तमः मत्त्वं रजस्तथा ॥ (XIV. 10). We find a similar verse in the अथमं पर्वण्ड of the महाभारत—तमसो मिथुनं मत्त्वं मत्त्वम्य मिथुनं रजः । रजस्तथापि मत्त्वं म्यात् मत्त्वम्य मिथुनं तमः ॥ ( ३६. ६ )

## XIII

सांख्याचार्यैः—stands for पञ्चाष्टय and others. विशान० quotes पञ्चाष्टय on प्रीत्यप्रीतिविषादार्थगुणानामन्योऽन्यं वैषम्यम् ( मां. द. I. 127 )—  
 “सत्त्वं नाम प्रसादाद्यवाभिष्वङ्गप्रीतितिनिशासन्नोपादिरूपावन्तभेदं समासतः  
 सुखात्मकम् । एवं रजोऽपि शोकादिनाभेदं समासतो दुःखात्मकम् । एवं तमोऽपि  
 निद्रादिनाभेदं समासतो मोहात्मकम् । ”

अर्थतः—जय० and वाच० explain it as पुरुषार्थत, but गौड० takes it in the sense of साधना, and माडर explains it as कार्यवशात्.

Now, these गुणs, on account of their having the characteristics of अन्योऽन्याभिष्व, etc., assume different shapes. But, how do these गुणs perform functions of so different a nature? In reply to this वाच० gives an example of a woman, who, according to him, illustrates all the different functions of the गुणः. गौड०, माडर and जय०, on the other hand, illustrate सत्त्वं by a lady, रजम् by warriors and तमम् by clouds. A virtuous woman ( and therefore, a सात्त्विक type ) pleases her husband, pains her rivals and deludes the passionate people. The brave soldiers ( and therefore, representing रजम् ) of a king please their master, pain their opponents and delude the fugitives. The dark clouds covering the sky ( and therefore, a तामस type ) please the people suffering from heat, rouse activity among the peasants and delude the lovers in separation. But, there is one difficulty. The 3 गुणs ( = प्रकृति or मूलकारण ) assume various shapes by permutation and combination. This amounts to saying that the मूलकारण is not one but many. Now, how does this position differ from that of the वैशेषिकs who also assume the plurality of causes? Cf.—नन्वेवं मूलकारणस्य परिच्छिन्नसंख्यव्यक्तित्वे वैशेषिकमताद्ब्रह्म को विशेष इति चेत्—The reply is कारणद्रवस्य स्पर्शादिराहित्यमेव ॥ ' ब्रह्मस्पर्शविहीनं तु रूपादिभिरसंप्रुतम् । विष्णुं तजगदोविरत्नादिप्रभवाप्ययम् ॥ ' इति विष्णुपुराणादिभ्यः ॥ विशान० ( I 123 ).

But are not these गुणs opposed to one another? The reply is—yes. Still they unite for पुरुषार्थ, as wick, oil and lamp. The illustration is not a happy one, as we do not find any apparent opposition between तैल, वति and दीप in spite of



the attempt of चन्द्रिका; cf.—दीपोपरि तैलपतनेन दीपनाशात् तैलमपि दीप-  
विरोधि, एवं वर्तिरपि स्वरूपकेन दीपनाशिकेति ॥ For this reason वाच°  
gives another example of this विरोध,—*vid.*—यथा वा वातपित्त-  
श्लेष्माणः etc., बालराम quotes a parallel passage from the देवी-  
भागवत ( 3.9 )—“प्रदीपश्च यथा कार्यं प्रकरोत्यर्थदर्शनम् । वर्तिस्तैलं यथाचिंश्च  
विरुद्धाश्च परस्परम् ॥ २९ ॥ विरुद्धं हि तथा तैलमग्निना सह सङ्गतम् । तैलं ‘वर्ति-  
विरोध्येत्र पादकोऽपि परस्परम् ॥ ३० ॥ एकत्रत्या-पदार्थानां प्रकुर्वन्ति प्रदर्शनम् ॥”  
( pp. 139-140 ). Really speaking, there can be no विरोध of  
these गुणः in any evolved thing ( say, a human body ). If at  
all there could be any विरोध, then it would be in the साम्यावस्था  
*i. e.* प्रकृति. In no परिणाम of प्रकृति are the गुणः in equal quantity.  
On the other hand, there is predominance of one over the  
others. So, there is no तुल्यबलत्व in the विकारः. Cf. रूपातिशया  
वृत्त्यतिशयाश्च परस्परेण विरुध्यन्ते सामान्यानि स्वतिशयः सह प्रवर्तन्ते—( व्याम-  
भाष्य on यो. सू. II. 15 )

अत्र च सुखदुःखमोहा परस्परविरोधिनः etc.—Here वाच° has in  
his view the attack of the वेदान्तिद् against the सांख्य philosophy.  
According to the latter, all the *objects* ( or evolved entities )  
are of the nature of pleasure, pain and delusion. The वेदान्तिद्  
( वाच° himself ) retorts—भान्तरा-ल्लवमी सुखदुःखमोहविपादा बाणो-  
भ्यश्चन्दनादिभ्योऽतिविच्छिन्नप्रत्ययवेदनीयेभ्यो व्यतिरिक्ता अध्यक्षमीक्ष्यन्ते । यदि  
पुनरेत एव सुखदुःखादिस्वभावा मयेषुस्ततः स्वरूपत्वान् देमन्तेऽपि चन्दन-सुख-  
स्यात् । न हि चन्दन-कदाचिदचन्दन-।.....तस्मादसुखादिस्वभावा अपि  
चन्दनवदुःखमाशयो जातिकालव्यवस्थापेक्षया सुखदुःखादिहेतवो न तु स्वयं सुखादि-  
स्वभावा इति रमणीयम् ॥ ( भामती on प्र. सू. II. 2 1 ). To this argu-  
ment वाच° ( as an exponent and defender of सांख्य ) replies  
—स्वत्वानुरूपणि सुखदुःखमोहान्मकान्येव निमित्तानि कल्पयन्ति । Although  
सुख, दुःख and मोह are all present in every object, yet, they are  
not experienced simultaneously. For the experience of one  
or the other of these ( सुख, दुःख and मोह ), they stand in need  
of excitant causes, which themselves are of the nature of सुख,  
दुःख and मोह. For example, सुख, for its own experience,  
stands in need of the predominance of धर्म, which is of the  
nature of सत्त्वगुण ( or सुख ).

## XIV

The difficulty lies in the expression तद्विपर्ययाभावात्. गोड० and माडर explain it as—'on account of the absence of the contraries of वैगुण्य in the प्रधान, अविवेक्यादि resides in the प्रधान.' जय० offers an alternative explanation—'on account of the absence of अविवेक्यादि in the contrary of व्यक्त, i. e., पुरुष, अविवेक्यादि resides in the प्रधान and its constituents.' चन्द्रिका adopts the second explanation. जय० also agrees with it cf. वैगुण्यस्याभावेऽविवेक्यादयोरभावात् (?). न हि निर्गुणस्य पुरुषस्याविवेक्यादिः संभवति । तस्मात् वैगुण्यादेवाविवेक्यादिः सिद्धः ॥ ( p. 20 ) The explanation of गोड०, as rightly pointed out by S. N. S ( See p. 41, in. ), renders the other half of the कारिका redundant, because, it simply repeats the same argument.

## XV and XVI

The term भेद stands for the diverse forms of the evolved which differ from one another. As compared with its effects, a cause is unlimited and thus unmanifest. जय० uses a curious expression, ( संसर्गिन् ) for cause. It seems that the word संसर्ग stands for the union or contact of different effects in their cause; cf.—तस्यापेतेषामेकेन संसर्गिणा मवित्त्यम् । संसर्गो संसर्गस्तद्व्यक्तं कारणमस्ति ( p. 21 ).

समन्वय = एकरूपता, similarity, or एकजात्यशुभम ( i. e. belonging to one genus ), according to जय०. गोड० understands समन्वय in the sense of 'inference—' यथा वृत्तकारिणं बद्धं हृदयं समन्वयति, नूतनस्य पितरो ब्राह्मणविति । The explanation of समन्वयान् ( भा. सु. I 131 ) as offered by विज्ञान०, viz., उपशान्तिना धीर्जे हि ब्रह्मादित्तत्त्वमप्रादिभिः समन्वयेन समनुगतैः पुरुषपचीयते ( i. e. intellect and the rest, emaciated by fast are again strengthened by food, etc. ), does not directly fit in this Kārikā, as rightly pointed out by Sovani ( p. 41 )

कारणकार्यविभागात्—वाच० understands the word विभाग as 'emergence';—just as the jar, etc., emerge from the clay, etc. जय०, माडर and गौड० explain it as 'separation' or 'distinction' between the functions of the cause and the effect:—just as you can bring water in a jar but not in clay. Thus there is a distinction between a cause and its effect, because both serve different purposes ( पृथगर्थक्रियाकरणात् ). But, it is difficult to understand how one can conclude from this argument that तस्मात्स्य कारणेन भवितव्यम्. जय० here quotes the explanation of some other commentary (which is not traceable):—अस्मिन् व्याख्याने, 'कार्यतस्तदुपलब्धेर्महदादि तत्र कार्यम्' इत्यनेनैवमिदं तद्वदन्त्यन्यथा व्याख्यायते—यदुपकरोति तत् कारणम्, यदुपक्रियते तत्कार्यम्, 'तयोर्विभागात्, उपकार्योपकारकभावादित्यर्थः । यथाध्यात्मिकानां बाह्यानां चोपकार्योपकारकभावो बुद्धिद्वय इव दृश्यते तदस्य कश्चिद् व्यवस्थापिता [पायिता] स्यात्, दृष्टोऽयं विभाग इत्यन्यथानुपपत्तेः ॥ ( pp 21-22 ).

अविभागात् वैश्वरूप्यम्—According to वाच०, गौड० and माडर, the term अविभाग means 'merging':—because this diverse evolved merges into the unevolved. जय० also quotes the opinion of some unknown commentator who adopts the reading अविभागे, where अविभाग means एव. जय०'s own explanation is different. It takes अविभाग in the sense of अविभक्त, and explains the phrase as—'because this diversity is produced out of unity.' cf. इह एते प्रविभक्तादेव तस्मादिष्टद्वय्यात्मकाणितमुदस्यद्वयकारादिवैश्वर्यं मानात् दृश्यते..... एतमाध्यात्मिकानां बाह्यानां च वैश्वरूप्यम् । तस्माद्देशामविभक्तैरेव भवितव्यम् । ( p. 22 )

another in different proportions, one predominating over the others. The other commentators take त्रिगुणतः and समुद्भवात् both, as referring only to the creative activity of प्रकृति

## XVII

तौष्टिकाः—Those who are contented or those whose aim is to get the nine kinds of बुद्धिः (dealt with in कारिका 50). But वाच० here refers to only the five external (बाह्य) बुद्धिः. The internal (आध्यात्मिक) बुद्धिः are gained after the attainment of the discriminative knowledge of the Spirit and the non-Spirit. The internal बुद्धिः are not referred to here. Therefore, वाच० says—अन्यत् वा महान्तं वा, etc.

The reading संहतपरार्थत्वात्, adopted by Wilson, is not supported by गौड०, who reads संघातपरार्थत्वात्. Wilson's reading of the text is an obvious mistake (based upon, perhaps, the सं. मू.—संहतपरार्थत्वात्, l. 140), as it is not supported by any commentary.

दृष्टान्तदृष्टमंत्रपमानुरोधेन, etc. In order to prove that a संघात is पार्थ, शय्या, etc., are given as an illustration.—Just as शय्या, भ्रमण and the rest, being संघातः, are पार्थ, so अन्यत् and its constituents are for another person, viz., पुरुष. But in this illustration, पर is शरीर, which is itself a संघातः and thus पुरुष also becomes a संघातः. On this वाच० remarks that if you go to establish the similarity of all the qualities found in a दृष्टान्त with all the qualities found in a पद, then there can be no inference. The point is cleared in the न्यायवार्तिक (Chowkhamba edn. pp. 311-343) and the न्यायवार्तिकालयटीका (Kāshi Sanskrit Series, No. 21, p. 600).

अभिज्ञान—पुरुष is the अभिज्ञान of प्राणि, as a charoteer is that of a chariot. Question:—But, a charoteer is active, and your पुरुष, being त्रिगुण = त्रिभिद्य, is not active, how can he become an अभिज्ञान? Reply.—It is not essential that only an

active entity can move or urge anything. Sometimes mere proximity or contact brings about activity, as we see in the case of iron and load stone Cf. *सत्प्रतिपादाभिधानं मणिवत्* (मं. सू. 1. 96). Or, mere presence also can bring about an activity, as in the case of a King. Cf.—

न च सर्वत्र तुल्यार्थं स्वाश्रयोत्पत्तमंगाम् ।  
 चन्द्रेण ह्यसिं योद्धा प्रयुञ्जेः ह्येदं प्रति ॥ ८५ ॥  
 मेनारनिम्बु वाचय भृत्यानां त्रिनियोजकः ।  
 राजा साक्षिधिमात्रेण विनियुञ्जेः कदाचन ॥ ८६ ॥  
 तस्मादचरतोऽपि सदाशब्दे कर्तृतामनः ।

(Kumaril's *Śloka-tīkā* on Mī. सू. 1. 5,  
 Chowkhamba edn., p. 710)

शारदाश्रम thinks that this argument about the *अभिधानत्व* of *पुरुष* answers all the criticisms brought forward by शङ्कराचार्य in his *भाष्य* on *रचनातुल्यत्वे* and *प्रवृत्ते* ( *ब्र. सू. II. 2. 1 and 2* )

*स्वामिनि वृत्तिविशेषात्*—It is very succinctly explained by शारदाश्रम as follows—*न कामिधारात्मानं दिनति वद्विवात्मानं ददतीति भावः* ।

अन्ये न्वाहुः—भोग्या इत्यादि इहपाश्य *etc.* अन्ये refers to those who cannot reconcile the *निष्कृता* of *इह* with his *भोक्तृत्व*. They would, therefore, explain *भोग्या* as *इह*. But the same objection can be brought against these people also.—*पुरुष* being *निष्कृत* can be a *इह*, only through *बुद्धिः*; see *व्यासभाष्य* on *इह इतिमात्रं बुद्धोऽपि प्रत्ययादुपपद्य*—(यो. सू. II. 20). Similarly, he can be a *भोग्या* also through *बुद्धिः*.—“*एवं च ददृत्ववद् भोक्तृत्वस्यापि सम्प्रवाशयव्याख्यानमपि समीचीनमेवेति ध्येयम्* ॥” (शारदाश्रम, p. 160).

*कैवल्यार्थे प्रवृत्तेषु*—शारदाश्रम assigns this *प्रवृत्ति* to *प्रधान*, whereas वाच<sup>०</sup> and others take this *प्रवृत्ति* as belonging to the *शान्त* and the sages—*अज्ञानानां महाशियां च* ॥

“ एकत्वधृतीनां च प्रमाणान्तरविरोधान् कथंचिदेशकादत्रिभागाभावेन भक्त्याप्युपपत्ते । प्रकृत्येकपुरुषनानास्वयोश्च श्रुत्येव साध्याद् प्रतिपादनात् । ‘अज्ञानेकां सोहितशुक्रकृष्णां बद्धीः प्रजा. मृजमानां मरुपाः । अजो हंको जुपमाणोऽनुगेते जहास्येनां सुक्तभोगामजोऽप्य ॥’ ( तै. आ ६ १० ) ॥ ” तत्त्ववशाद्दी, on यो. म. 11. 22.

Further on, says the संख्य, if you are going to explain away this नानात्वं by उपाधिस, then you will land yourself into another absurdity. For, as शरीर is the उपाधि of आत्मन्, so the limbs ( अवयव ) are the उपाधिस of a body ( a संघात ) And when we see the appearance and disappearance of the limbs in a body, will the वेदान्तिन् call these phenomena the births and deaths of the same body ?

## XIX, XX and XXI

माध्यस्थ्य or आर्शासन्य is of seven kinds according to जय०:—सप्तविधं चार्श्यादार्शन्यम् । तथा चोक्तम्—पश्यति शृणोति सर्वं करोति स्थितिं प्रसन्नं च नापि । स्वतो न परतो...नोभयतश्चाप्नुदासीनः ॥ जय०, further raises the question that if पुरुष is माध्यस्थ्य and अकर्ता, then how is he a भोक्ता?—ननु च ययकर्ता तत्कथं भोक्तृभावादस्ति पुरुषः ? तथा चाहुः—आलङ्घ्यताश्चतस्रः स्वयमवृत्तानां यथा हि भोक्तारः । पुरुषोऽपि विषयकलानां स्वयमवृत्तानां तथापि भोक्ता ॥ इति ।

अचेतनं चेतनावदिव लिङ्गम् etc. Intellect and the rest, although non-intelligent, seem to be intelligent, on account of the proximity of the Spirit. Thus alone can the experience—‘ I know ’ be explained. Although the entire activity belongs to the Attributes ( transformed into महत्, अहङ्कार and the rest ), yet, on account of its reflection in the Intellect, the really indifferent Spirit seems to be active. Cf: उपरागान् कर्तृत्वं किम्मानविध्यात् ( मां सू. I, 164 ). The Spirit in its turn transfers its intelligence to matter. This transference is thus illustrated by various commentators—‘ यथाग्निर्मयोगान् सोहमग्निरित्युच्यते । ( जय० ) ‘ भ्रुकृष्णाग्नीनो घटः शीताभिरदग्निः संसृष्टः शीतो भवति, अग्निना संयुक्त उष्णो भवति । ( माडर ) ॥ ‘ यथाग्नेयसोः परस्परं संयोगविशेषान् परस्परार्थमप्यवहार

आयाधिको यथा वा जलमययोः संयोगान् परस्परव्यर्माणोपस्तर्ध्व बुद्धिपुरुषयोपिति  
मात्र । ( विशान०, सां. म. I, 164 ) ॥

अकर्तृत्व of पुरुष is further supported by जय० by the following  
quotation—प्रवर्तमानान् प्रकृतेरिमान् गुणांस्तमोऽभिभूतो विपरीतदर्शनः । अहं  
करोमीत्यनुषोऽभिगन्त्यते नृणस्य कुञ्जीकरणेऽप्यनीश्वरः ॥ This quotation  
is found in the तत्त्वमसामुद्रवृत्ति (Chow. S S No. 246, p 124) and  
सांख्यनरविवेचन also (ibid, p. 12) with slight variants.

वाच० connects दर्शनार्थे (in पुरुषस्य दर्शनार्थे केवल्यार्थं तथा प्रधानस्य )  
with प्रधानस्य, and केवल्यार्थे with पुरुषस्य. The other commenta-  
tors take the line as it stands, i. e. पुरुषस्य दर्शनार्थे and प्रधानस्य  
केवल्यार्थम्. While explaining 'विमुक्तमोक्षार्थं स्वार्थं वा' ( सां. म.  
II, 1) विशान० also connects केवलय with प्रधान.

## XXII

In the माय ( on यो म. II 19 ) व्यास describes the तन्मात्रs as  
the products of महत्त्व (—एते सत्तामात्रम्यात्मनो महत्त पदविशेषपरिणामाः).  
But there the महत्त्वं should not be taken as the immediate  
cause ( i. e. producer ) of these तन्मात्रs व्यास has himself said  
at another place ( यो. म. I 45 ) that these तन्मात्रs are the  
products of अहङ्कार.

माडर and गौड० hold that these तन्मात्रs singly produce the  
महाभूतs. The other commentators hold that प्रत्येकं each succeed-  
ing महाभूत is produced from the combination of the preceding  
तन्मात्रs. For example, शब्दतन्मात्र and स्पर्शतन्मात्र produce वायुः  
रूपतन्मात्र, स्पर्शतन्मात्र and रूपतन्मात्र produce तेजसु and so on. But  
this theory of वाच० violates the orthodox पञ्चीकरण theory of  
the वेदान्तिन्s. The point is noticed by जल्पतट्टार, who says—

सम्प्रदायाध्वना पञ्चीकरणं यद्यपि स्थितम् ।

तथापि युक्तिदृष्टत्वाद्वाक्यनिमित्तं शुभम् ॥

पृथिच्यनन्त्यात्मन्यं यगने पवने ऽरि केत् ।

रूपवायमहायाग्यां चाधुन्यं प्रमथने ॥

अर्द्धभूयस्वतः क्षित्वाद्यविभाजनकल्पने ।  
 व्ययहारयथाप्राप्ता मुधा पञ्चीकृतिर्भवेत् ॥  
 अनपेक्ष्य फलं वेदनिष्ठेत्येवेत्यते यदि ।  
 त्रिवृत्कृतिः ध्रुता पञ्चीकृतिर्न कचन ध्रुता ॥

( quoted by वंशीधर in his comm. on तत्त्वकौमुदी, p. 293  
 Chow. S. S ).

माडर gives a queer and fantastic derivation of the word  
 अहङ्कार—चतुःषष्टिर्षणः परादिर्विस्वरीपर्यन्ताभिर्षयैर्यत्किमप्यभिधीयते बुद्ध्या समर्थं  
 तत्सकलमागन्ताकारहकारवर्णद्वयपद्वेनोपारिस्थितविष्ठादुकारिणा विन्दुना भूयितः  
 प्रत्याहारन्यायेनाहङ्कार इत्यभिधीयते ॥

### XXIII

गौड<sup>०</sup> and माडर curiously divide ज्ञान and वैराग्य into two  
 kinds—internal and external. Sovani is right in criticising  
 this classification ( p. 414 ), as ज्ञान means only प्रधानपुराण्यताज्ञान  
 in this कारिका, and not the knowledge of the वेद and the rest.  
 Similarly, the आभ्यन्तर-वैराग्य ( viz., प्रधानमप्यत्र स्वप्नेन्द्रजादसदुन्नमिति  
 विरक्तस्य मोक्षेणसोर्षदुत्पत्तये ) is the principal वैराग्य which leads to  
 the बाह्यवैराग्य also. For, who will be indifferent towards the  
 worldly objects unless he is मोक्षेणसु ?


बाडराम does not read गरिमा in his text of तत्त्वकौमुदी. Our  
 edition of तत्त्वकौमुदी, जय<sup>०</sup>, माडर and गौड<sup>०</sup> mention nine kinds of  
 ऐश्वर्य although each one ( except वाच<sup>०</sup> ) says अष्टविधमैश्वर्य. It  
 seems, therefore, that बाडराम's text is the correct one. Our  
 edition of तत्त्वकौमुदी and वंशीधर's edition, however, combine  
 ईशित्व and यशित्व and thus make the total eight.

जय<sup>०</sup> reads एतद्वैश्वर्यमष्टविधम् — — — — — शित्वम्,  
 and c . . . . . । तस्य  
 भावः एत . . . . . ।



## XXV


अहङ्कार is divided into three kinds —



the eleven इन्द्रियस

सन्मानापञ्चक

This is the scheme adopted by वाच<sup>०</sup> and others. But विज्ञान<sup>०</sup> (on सं. सू. II. 18) would have—



the ten इन्द्रियस

पञ्चतन्मात्रास.

In support of his classification, विज्ञान<sup>०</sup> quotes from some श्रुति—

वैकारिकरजसश्च तामसश्चेत्यहं त्रिधा ।  
 अहंत्वाद्द्विकूर्वाणामनो वैकारिकाहभूत् ॥  
 वैकारिकाश्च ये देवा अर्थाभिव्यजनं यतः ।  
 तेजसादिन्द्रियाण्येव ज्ञानकर्ममयानि च ॥  
 तामसो भूतसूक्ष्मादिर्यतः सन् विद्मन्मात्मनः ।

But this explanation is wrong; for सत्य and तमस are inactive by themselves, and cannot produce anything unless helped by the mobile राजसु वैशीषर's explanation, viz.,— "मम-इन्द्रियाणि मनोऽपेक्षयाऽप्यमत्त्वत्वेन रात्रसत्तापेक्षेना स्मृतिः निर्दिशन्त्येव नु व्यर्थाद्विरापोऽप्यपि मत्त्वत्वेन सात्त्विकाहङ्कारात्पुनरपेक्षानीत्यभिप्रेतम् ।" is very lame (See सात्त्विकराजसतामस-विद्यया of वैशीषर Chow S. S., p. 343; see further वाचराम, pp. 177-178 and Sovani, p. 415)

## XXVII

The first phrase **वमयात्मकं**, gives the general characteristic of the mind and the second phrase **संकल्पकं मनः** gives the proper function of the mind. **गौड०** interprets **संकल्पकं** as **प्रवृत्तिं कल्पयति**, i. e., which determines the functioning (of the two sets of **इन्द्रिय**s). **वाच०** understands **संकल्पकं** as **विशेषणविशेष्यभावेन कल्पयति** i. e. perceives the definite properties as belonging to the thing apprehended **जय०** and **चन्द्रिका** agree with **वाच०**. What **वाच०** means is that all the senses of perception cognise their respective objects vaguely, and thus is **निर्विकल्पकप्रत्यक्ष** or simple-perception. But as mere simple-perception of an object is of no use in our every-day life, so the help of mind is sought to give a definite and concrete shape to that percept. This is what is called **सविकल्पकप्रत्यक्ष** or complex-perception. The first is **नामजात्यादिपौजनादीनि आलोचनज्ञानं**, and, therefore, **निर्विकल्पक**, the second is **नामजात्यादिसंयुक्तं ज्ञानं**, and, therefore, **सविकल्पक**. In his support, **वाच०** cites **अस्ति आलोचितज्ञानं** etc. from **कुमारिले**'s **श्लेषवार्तिक** (on **मी. सू. I 4**, verses 112 and 120, pp 168 and 172, **Chow. S. S** ). The phrase **ततः परं पुनर्वस्तु धर्मजात्यादिभिर्यथा । बुद्ध्यावसीयते**, has been thus explained by **पार्थसारथि** in his commentary on the above—**ततो निर्विकल्पादुत्तरकालं जात्यादिनिर्विकल्प्य वस्तु यथा बुद्ध्या गृह्यते**—, which is the same as **विशेषण-विशेष्यभावेन विवेचयति** of **वाच०**. **S N. S** is beside the point when he says that according to **वाच०** "mind explicates what is indeterminate, it does not add to the given material. But the verses cited by **Vācaspati** would suggest that forms and qualifications are created or added to the original perception by the mind" ( p 61 ). For, according to the author of the **श्लेषवार्तिक** whose verses are quoted here, we have the knowledge of **सामान्य** and **विशेष** both in the **निर्विकल्पक** stage; but this knowledge is not combined into a definite concept, as in the **सविकल्पक** stage. We are cognisant of both, **घट** and **पटल** in the **निर्विकल्पक** stage, but separately; but we cognise

षट्त्वविशिष्टो षटः in the सविकल्पक stage. So, there is no new addition or creation of anything new by the mind. That this is the sense of कुमारिल, is evident from his own verse in this context :—“ निर्विकल्पकबोधेऽपि व्यात्मकस्यापि वस्तुनः । प्रहणं लक्षणाख्येयं शाश्वतं तु गृह्यते ॥ ११८ ॥ ” ( p 171 ). पार्थसारथि explains it— व्यात्मकस्य, सामान्यविशेषात्मकस्येत्यर्थः । सामान्यावभासोऽपि प्रतीतिमिद एव । न हि निर्विकल्पकेनाऽगृहीतस्य सविकल्पकेनापि प्रहणं सम्भवति, न वाऽगृहीते सामान्यं व्यक्त्यन्तरे प्रत्यभिज्ञा संभवति । तस्मान् सामान्यं विशेषश्च निर्विकल्पेऽपि प्रकाशत एव etc.

इन्द्रियं च साधर्म्यात्—जय० remarks :—यथान्यदिन्द्रलिङ्गं तथा मनोऽपीत्यर्थः. But वाच० criticises this view :—इन्द्रियान्तरेः सात्त्विकाहङ्कारोपादानत्वं च साधर्म्यं, न त्विन्द्रलिङ्गत्वम् । महदहङ्कारयोरप्यात्मलिङ्गत्वेनेन्द्रियप्रमत्तान् । तस्माद्भ्यन्तपतिमात्रमिन्द्रलिङ्गत्वं, न तु प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तम् ।

मातर reads प्राचभेदाच्च in place of वाचभेदाच्च. This is noted by चन्द्रिका also. मातर's reading is preferable, because the second line of the कारिका lays down the reasons of the वानात्व of इन्द्रियस, the two reasons being, गुणपरिणामविशेषात् and प्राचभेदात्.

The question is—how can one अहङ्कार create these manifold इन्द्रियस whose functions differ? This question is raised by बभ्रुवर्कर in his न्यायवार्तिक ( Chow S. S., p 70)—यदि पुनरिन्द्रियाण्येवात्मकानि स्युः, कारणस्वभावानुविधानादेवात्म्याद्विषयव्यवस्था न स्यात्, सर्वे मर्शार्थमेकं वा सर्वार्थमनि स्यात् । The reply to it is—गुणपरिणामविशेषात्. Although अहङ्कार is one, yet the three गुणस, accompanied by चमं and अरमं, act and react upon one another; therefore, the modified effects of अहङ्कार ( i. e. the इन्द्रियस ) differ in their functions.

## XXVIII

मातर reads क्वादिभु in place of शब्दादिभु in the text. वाचराय also adopts this reading and observes :—क्वदादिभुमणं पूंदिन्द्रियात्मनिधायान्, क्वादिभु इति पाठो न सतिवेमिन् । ( p. 154, ln )

## XXIX

सामान्यकरणवृत्तिः प्राणायामा वायवः पञ्च । Does the word करण stand for त्रिविध अन्तःकरण or त्रयोदशविध करण? While वाच<sup>०</sup> adopts the former view all the other commentators agree to the latter interpretation, although माडर curiously says at one place—समस्तान्तःकरणस्येत्यर्थः । विज्ञान<sup>०</sup> also explains the word करण as अन्तःकरण in his भाष्य (on सप्त. सू. II 31). But वाच<sup>०</sup>, while commenting on समस्तेन्द्रियवृत्तिः प्राणादित्थं जीवन्म (योगभाष्य on III 39), has given a different interpretation, viz., न हि प्रप्लवेः शरीरोपगृहीतमास्तनियामेद्वेष्टुः सर्वकरणासाधारणः यथाह 'सामान्यकरणवृत्तिः प्राणायामा वायवः पञ्च' इति । वाडराम correctly points out the discrepancy. He suggests that योगभाष्येऽपि समस्तेन्द्रियवृत्तेनान्तःकरणत्रयमेव ध्यायं, न तु बाह्येन्द्रियमपि, because in deep sleep when all the external sense-organs are dormant, we see the five vital airs functioning. Therefore, these vital airs cannot be said to be the function of external sense-organs.

## XXX

Cognition has been divided into three kinds in the सांख्य philosophy, viz., perception (प्रत्यक्ष), inference (अनुमान) and valid testimony (शब्द). Now, in प्रत्यक्ष, the three अन्तःकरण<sup>१</sup> and one of the organs of sense,—all four seem to function simultaneously and gradually. But, according to the नैयायिक<sup>२</sup>, there are only gradual stages, which, however, are not observable on account of the swiftness of the different functions. Cf. ज्ञानार्थोपपत्तौ र्कं मनः (न्या. सू. III. 2. 57), न युगपदेक-कियोपलब्धेः (ibid, III. 2. 58), अल्पतश्चरुदर्शनवत् तदुपलब्धिगन्तव्यत्वात् (ibid, III. 2. 59). For, according to the नैयायिक<sup>३</sup>, the mind is अनुपरिमाण. The followers of सांख्य, on the other hand, regard the mind to be of मध्यपरिमाण, and, therefore, there can be a युगपदवृत्ति.

In the case of अनुमान and शब्द, only the three अन्तःकरणसु-  
 function. They can operate simultaneously and gradually  
 both, but they do not depend upon the cognition of senses at  
 that particular moment.

## XXXI

आहूत—Davies observes:—“*Āhūta* is glossed in the  
 Petersb. Lexicon by *Absticht* (= purpose), *Antrieb* (= motive).  
 Colebrooke's translation is “incited by mutual invitation.”...  
 ....The meaning of “incitement to activity,” mentioned by  
 Wilson, expresses more nearly the sense of *āhūta*.....It is  
 composed of *ā*, to, towards, and *hū*, to cry. Gaudapāda  
 says that it means *ādarasambhrama* (respectful eagerness in  
 action).” (p. 68, 1n).

Davies is wrong in considering that शां० is correct in  
 applying this verse to the three internal organs only (See  
 Davies, p. 68, 1n). All the other commentators apply it to  
 all the organs, for each and every इन्द्रिय functions for उदघापे

The spirit of the सां. सू., “स हि सर्वविद् सर्वज्ञः” (III. 56)  
 and “इंद्रो ज्ञेयसिद्धिः सिद्धा” (III. 57), goes directly against the  
 theory of the पारिषदसु, where no ईश्वर is mentioned. Nor is  
 the position helped by विज्ञान०'s remark, *तिसु*, प्रकृतितीतस्य जन्म-  
 चरस्य सिद्धिः ‘यः सर्वज्ञः सर्वविद् यस्य ज्ञानमपं तपः’ इत्यादिपुनिस्य सर्व-  
 ज्ञस्यैव, निरुप्यो ज्ञेयस्यैव विद्याशास्त्रादित्यर्थः ॥ ..... नन्वेवमीश्वरप्रतिषेध-  
 निरोपस्तथा—“इंद्रो ज्ञेयसिद्धिः सिद्धा” । साविध्यपदानेनेश्वरस्य सिद्धिस्तु सर्व-  
 ज्ञस्यैवत्यर्थः । (सां. सू. III. 57).

## XXXII

The three functions of seizing, retaining and manifesting  
 are, as Davies rightly points out (pp. 69-70), common to  
 all the organs. Thus “the organ of sight seizes and holds  
 the impression conveyed by an external object and manifests  
 it to manas.” (*ibid*). According to शां०, आहूत and धारण

belong to कर्मेन्द्रियs and प्रकाशन to बुद्धीन्द्रियs. मातर ascribes आहरण to इन्द्रियs in general, and धारण and प्रकाशन to अहङ्कार and बुद्धि respectively. वाच० followed by चन्द्रिका, would relegate आहरण to कर्मेन्द्रियs, धारण to बुद्धि, अहङ्कार and मनसू, and प्रकाशन to बुद्धीन्द्रियs.

The word दशधा in the second half of this verse presents a difficulty. वाच० takes दशधा with आहार्यं, धार्यं and प्रकाश्यं each. The objects seized by the इन्द्रियs, being only five, are doubled by dividing them into दिव्य and अदिव्य. Similarly, the body which is retained by the अन्त करण, is made up of five vital airs; but these are also दिव्य and अदिव्य, and so tenfold. The objects manifested by the बुद्धीन्द्रियs are also tenfold because of being divided into दिव्य and अदिव्य varieties. I think there is another and better way of explaining the कारिका. The objects seized, retained and manifested are altogether ten, viz., five objects of organs of action and five objects of organs of sense. These ten are supervised by the three internal organs.

### XXXIII

वाच० explains why काल is not recognised as a separate category in the सांख्य philosophy. According to the वैशेषिकमून "अपरस्मिन्नपरं पुण्यपश्चिरं क्षिप्रमिति तिङ्गानि" (II. 2 6), काल is one category which is divided into three parts—past, present and future—, according to different circumstances. प्रब्रह्मपार clarifies this point—"एकत्वेऽपि सर्वकार्याणामारम्भकियाभिनर्तुतिरिधिनित्तेषोपाधिभेदान्मणिवत्पाचकादिवद्वा नानात्वोपचार ; that is, just as one and the same man is called a पाठक or a पाचक in different circumstances, or just as one and the same piece of crystal assumes different colours according to the objects placed near it, so all the effects, though of one nature, become different under the different circumstances of beginning, ending, remaining and perishing. Thus, there is only one काल. To this वाच० replies—  
Why should we first assume one काल and then assume differ-

ent circumstances or उपायिs to make this काल multifarious ? Why should we not recognise the उपायिs only ? Cf. स ह्यत्वयं कालो वस्तुगन्धोऽपि बुद्धिनिर्माण-शब्दज्ञानानुपाती लौकिकानां व्युत्थितदर्शनानां वस्तुस्वरूप इवामासते-योगभाष्य on III, 52.

## XXXIV

अविशेष = non-specific, *i. e.*, तन्मात्रसः. विशेष = specific, *i. e.*, पञ्चमहाभूतसः.

पाष्याशादायाणां घटादीना पञ्चाशब्दायात्मकत्वान्—Here वाच० suggests that the विषयs of the कर्मेन्द्रियs (except वाङ्) are endowed with all the constituents of the five elements in some measure. But this will lead to accepting the theory of पञ्चीकरण, which is opposed to वाच०'s view on कारिका XXII, where he says आप-शब्दपत्ररूपरसगुणा. Can a person not bring water with his hands ? If so, then water must also be पञ्चाशब्दायात्मक. See notes on Kārika XXII and S. N. S., pp 72-73 with footnotes.

## XXXV

The word द्वारि has been translated by S. N. S., as 'principal'. The translation is based upon जय०'s phrase द्वाराण्यन्य सन्तानि. I think that 'warder' expresses the sense of द्वारि better than 'principal'. For, in spite of the fact that all the sense-organs bring their percepts to the अन्त करण, the latter itself receives these percepts for delivering them to पुरुष, as is clear from the next कारिका. The criticism of S. N. S would have been right if अन्तःकरण were to retain these percepts for itself and not present them to the Spirit. Therefore, the three-fold अन्तःकरण acts as a warder for the Spirit and not as the principal (one).

## XXXVII

वाच० interprets both the lines of this कारिका as the causes of the superiority of बुद्धि. गौड०, on the other hand, inter-

prets the first line as the cause of the second;—because intellect brings about the entire enjoyment of the Spirit, therefore, it brings about also the discrimination between the Spirit and the Nature. माडर quotes the following speech of अहङ्कार—

अहङ्कारो धियं ब्रूते मैत्रं सुप्तं प्रबोधय ।  
 प्रबुद्धे परमानन्दे न त्वं नाहं न तज्जगत् ॥  
 मयि तिष्ठत्यहङ्कारे पुरुषः पञ्चविंशकः ।  
 तत्त्ववृन्दं परित्यज्य स कथं मोक्षमिच्छति ॥  
 योऽस्मीं सर्वेश्वरो देवः सर्वव्यापी जगद्गुरुः ।  
 देहीति पद्मसुचार्यं हा मयात्मा लघुः कृतः ॥

माडर further remarks—न हि भगवतः कपिलस्य मते किमपि कर्तव्यमनुष्ठेयतया, किं तु सांख्यानां पञ्चविंशतितत्त्वज्ञानमेव साधर्म्येण विधर्म्येण च निश्चेयतदेतु । उक्तं च—

हम पिव लठ मोद नित्यं विषयानुपभुञ्ज कुठ च मा शडाम् । यदि विदितं ते कपिलमतं तत्प्राप्त्यसे मोक्षमार्ग्यं च ॥ This verse is more of trade against the सांख्य philosophy than an exposition.

### XXXVIII

In para 185, read भूतान्याक्तागानिजानल्लज्जिल्लापनिरुपाणि.

Why तन्मात्राः are called अविशेषाः?—This has been explained by गौड<sup>०</sup> and माडर as देवानामेते मुखलक्षणा विषया दुःखमोहरहिता, which is wrong. For, तन्मात्राः, being evolved out of त्रिगुणान्मिरा प्रकृति, cannot be said to be devoid of दुःख and मोह (= रजस् and तमस्). Therefore, the explanation of वाच<sup>०</sup>, viz., न चैषां शान्तव्यारिरस्त्युपभोगयोग्यो विशेष इति मात्रशब्दार्थः, is better. That is, all the Attributes are present in the तन्मात्राः, but they are not patent enough to be enjoyed.

### XXXIX

The specific elements are divided into three divisions—  
 “(1) Subtle body; (2) those which are born of father and mother; and (3) gross substances or inorganic matter.....”



It (subtle body) becomes 'specific' by the aggregation of the subtle elements which in themselves are 'non-specific' or diversified." (Davies, p. 76). But, according to वाच०, सूक्ष्मशरीरं शान्तशोण्डैरिन्द्रियैरन्वितन्नाद्विशेषः (Kār. 40);—the subtle body is called specific because it is endowed with the sense-organs possessed of the qualities of calmness, violence and delusion.

## XL

पूर्वोत्पन्नम्—According to वाच०, each Spirit is endowed with a subtle-body at the beginning of the creation. But according to सां. सू. सप्तशैकं लिङ्गम् (III. 9), there is an aggregate of subtle-bodies which is created in the beginning. Cf. विज्ञान०. लिङ्गशरीरं, तद्य सगर्दी समष्टिरूपमेकमेव भवति, इत्यर्थः. Then, how do the subtle bodies separate? To this, the सूत्र replies—व्यक्तिभेदःकर्मविशेषान् (III. 10)—they are separated or differentiated according to particular actions. On this विज्ञान० comments—यद्यपि सगर्दी हिरण्यगर्भोपाधिरूपमेकमेव लिङ्गम्, तथापि तस्य पथाद्भयक्तिभेदो व्यक्तिरूपेणांशतो वानात्वमपि भवति । But, is not this idea of हिरण्यगर्भ foreign to सांख्य ?

According to this कारिका, the number of the constituents of लिङ्गशरीर is eighteen, but according to सूत्र, it is seventeen. विज्ञान० has ingeniously removed this discrepancy by saying—अद्भुतस्य च बुदावेवान्तर्भावः ।

## XLI

A distinction should be made between लिङ्ग and लिङ्गशरीर. The latter is the vehicle of the former, which consists of thirteen principles, *viz.*, intellect, ego, mind, five organs of sense and five organs of action, and which is referred to as अद्भुतमान. पुरुषः in the authority quoted by वाच०.

The reading of गौड० and माडर is विना भविष्येः, whileas वाच० has विना विशेषः. वाच० calls the सूक्ष्मशरीर as विशेष in Kārikā XL.

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इमं पितृ लल मोर नित्यं विषयानुपभुञ्ज कुठ च मा शडाम् । यदि विदितं ते कपिलमर्तं तन्प्राप्स्यसे मोक्षसार्थ्यं च ॥ This verse is more of tirade against the मांख्य philosophy than an exposition.

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In para 185, read भूतान्याकाशानिजानलमहित्वाविरूपाणि

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## XL

पूर्वोत्पन्नम्—According to वाच०, each Spirit is endowed with a subtle-body at the beginning of the creation. But according to सां. म. सप्तदशैकं लिङ्गम् ( III. 9 ), there is an aggregate of subtle-bodies which is created in the beginning. Cf. विज्ञान० लिङ्गशरीरं, तच्च सर्गात्ता समष्टिरूपमेकमेव भवति, इत्यर्थः. Then, how do the subtle bodies separate? To this, the सूत्र replies—व्यक्तिभेदःकर्मविशेषान् ( III. 10 )—they are separated or differentiated according to particular actions. On this विज्ञान० comments—एवमपि सर्गात्ता हिरण्यगर्भोपाधिरूपमेकमेव लिङ्गम्, तथापि तस्य पश्चाद्रूपव्यक्तिभेदो व्यक्तिरूपेणांशतो भानात्त्वमपि भवति । But, is not this idea of हिरण्यगर्भ foreign to सांख्य ?

According to this कारिका, the number of the constituents of लिङ्गशरीर is eighteen, but according to सूत्र, it is seventeen. विज्ञान० has ingeniously removed this discrepancy by saying—अद्वयत्वात् च बुद्धावेवान्तर्भावः ।

## XLI


A distinction should be made between लिङ्ग and लिङ्गशरीर. The latter is the vehicle of the former, which consists of thirteen principles, viz., intellect, ego, mind, five organs of sense and five organs of action, and which is referred to as अद्भुतमात्रः पुरुषः in the authority quoted by वाच०.

The reading of गौड० and माडर is विना अविशेषं, whereas वाच० has विना विशेषः. वाच० calls the सूक्ष्मशरीर as विशेष in Kārikā XL

So विना विशेषः means विना मूर्धमः शरीरैः. But this is confusing because, to say that the लिङ्ग (composed of thirteen principles) cannot exist without मूर्धमशरीर (composed of लिङ्ग and पञ्चतन्मात्राः) is not logical. गौड<sup>०</sup>'s explanation is better when he says that लिङ्ग cannot exist without अविशेषः viz., the five subtle elements. चन्द्रिका gives a different opinion of some commentator—'केचिन्तु स्थूलशरीरावश्यकत्वाभिप्रायकमिदमिति वर्णयन्ति । तथा हि, लिङ्गं समुदायात्मकं लिङ्गशरीरं विशेषं स्थूलदेहं विना निराश्रयं सन्न तिष्ठति, किन्तु स्थूलशरीरमाभित्यजं तिष्ठति । अतो न लिङ्गशरीरेण स्थूलशरीरस्यान्यपासिदिति मात्रः ॥

### XLIII

According to वाच<sup>०</sup> and जय<sup>०</sup> dispositions may be divided like this—



The प्राकृतभावः, which are innate, are of four kinds, viz., धर्म, ज्ञान, वैराग्य and ऐश्वर्य. They belong to कपिष्ठ only. Those depending on the instruments (करणाश्रयिणः) are eight viz., धर्म, ज्ञयर्म, ज्ञान, अज्ञान, वैराग्य, अर्वाग्य, ऐश्वर्य and भर्तृश्वर्य. Those dispositions which depend on the effect or body (कार्याश्रयिणः) are also eight, viz., five when the body is in the womb and three, i. e., childhood, youth and old age, when the body is outside the womb. गौड<sup>०</sup> and माडर, however, divide the भावः into three kinds—सांसिद्धिक, प्राकृत and वैकृत. धर्म, ज्ञान, वैराग्य and ऐश्वर्य are born along with कपिष्ठ, so they are सांसिद्धिक or cognate in his case; but they come to सनक, सनन्दन, सनातन and सनरकुमार (the four sons of ब्रह्मन्) after their birth, and are therefore, प्राकृत or natural in their case. The वैकृत or acquired dispositions reside in ordinary human beings and depend upon the instruments and the effected body.

## XLIV and XLV

According to माडर, the मूह्यशरीर rises to the eight states by practising virtue. The states are ब्राह्म, प्राज्ञापत्य, ऐन्द्र, विज्य, गान्धिर्वे, वाध, राधन and पैशाध गौड० gives सौम्य for विज्य, and याध has been dropped in Wilson's text and ours, but is given in the Benares edition. By practising vice, the मूह्यशरीर sinks to the five states of पशु, पक्षी, मृग, सर्पमृद and म्पावर. The प्राकृतिकबन्ध, according to वाच०, is due to the identification of the Spirit with प्रकृति itself; but माडर includes the eight kinds of evolvents (प्रकृतिस) in this bondāgē. The वैकारिकबन्ध, according to वाच०, is the identification of the Spirit with the विकारस of प्रकृति (i. e. the evolutes); but according to माडर, this bondage is brought about by making the eight states, viz., the ब्राह्म, प्राज्ञापत्य and others, as the *summum bonum*. These three kinds of bondages are explained by वाच० at length in his तत्त्वव्याख्ये on योगभाष्य I. 24.

The word प्रकृति in प्रकृतिलयः, stands for महदहङ्कारभूतेन्द्रियाणि, according to वाच०; but, according to गौड० and माडर, the word denotes प्रधानबुद्धयहङ्कारेतन्मात्राः

## XLVI

For the criticism of Keith, see Sovani (p. 424). This creation of intellect or "the conduct of the human understanding" (Davies, p. 84), distinguished by Ignorance, Incapacity, Contentment and Attainment, is divided into fifty kinds.

गौड० and माडर illustrate all these four states by means of an example of post. There is विपर्यय, when you are in doubt, whether you are seeing a man or a post. There is भ्रमन्ति, when even after seeing the post clearly, you are not entirely free from the doubt. There is तुष्टि, when you do not want to remove the doubt as to the identity of the post. There is सिद्धि when you succeed in establishing the correct identity of the

post The explanation of वाच० is better. विषयं is that which obstructs the path of the Spirit to liberation. "Incapacity (अशक्ति) arises from the imperfection of senses Acquiescence or Contentment (तुष्टि) is a passive state of intellect Perfection (सिद्धि) means perfect knowledge, not completeness in moral virtue." (Davies, pp. 84-85).

### XLVII

विषयं or अविद्या is of five kinds :—अविद्या, अस्मिता, राग, द्वेष and अभिनिवेश, which, are called तमस, मोह, महामोह, तामिस and अन्यतामिस by the कारिका.

### XLVIII

तमस or अविद्या is of eight kinds and arises on account of identifying the Spirit with Nature, Intellect, Ego, and the five subtle elements.

मोह or अस्मिता is also of eight kinds The gods and the rest consider the eight varieties of Attainment or सिद्धि as the *summum bonum*.

महामोह or राग is of ten kinds and arises from the attachment to the objects of five senses; these objects are ten, five belonging to gods and five to human beings

तामिस or द्वेष is of eighteen kinds, and arises from the hatred towards one or the other of the ten objects of sense ( mentioned above ) and the eight varieties of Attainment or सिद्धि.

अन्यतामिस or अभिनिवेश is also of eighteen kinds and arises from the fear of losing the eight सिद्धि or the ten objects of sense. Or it may be the fear of death which might obstruct the enjoyment of these eighteen objects. Cf. स चायमभिनिवेशः द्वेषः स्वरमवाही कृमेरपि जातमात्रस्य प्रत्यक्षानुमानागमैरभेमाभितो मरणशम उच्छेददृष्टयान्मरुः पूर्वजन्मानुभूतं मरणदुःखमनुभाषयति (व्यासभाष्य on यो. सू. II. 9) " मरणशमोऽन्यतामिस इत्यन्ते । " ( जय० p. 51 )

Thus, there are 62 kinds of विषयं.

## XLIX

The quotation in वाच०, enumerating the list of the injuries to organs, is found with a variant ( घृषताः for मन्दताः ) in the सांख्यसंग्रह ( Chow. S. S. No. 246, p 77 ). गौड० uses प्रमुक्ति ( or paralysis ) for कुड, and उपजिह्विका for जडता Cf. " निह्वया जात्यम्." in जय०, p. 52. माडर and गौड० adopt गुदावर्त for उदावर्त ( =obstruction of bowels).

## L

माडर ( and not गौड०, as S N. S says, page 91, 1n ) reads आध्यात्मिक्यः in place of आध्यात्मिकाः. आध्यात्मिकाः is grammatically wrong, as आध्यात्मिक is derived from अध्यात्म + क्तृ (" अध्यात्मादेशभिष्यते " वार्तिक on पाणिनि IV. 3. 60). आत्मनि = अध्यात्मं, is an अव्ययीभाव compound in the sense of locative case, according to " अव्ययं विभक्तिः " पाणिनि II. 1. 6. Then the feminine termination क्तीप् ( and not ट्प् ) is added to आध्यात्मिक by the स्र् of पाणिनि, " द्विद्वान् " IV. 1 15 and the form will be आध्यात्मिकी.

The names of external varieties of Contentment vary with different commentators :—

	वाच०	जय०	माडर	गौड०
1.	पात्यम्	सुतात्यम्	तात्यम्	सुतमः
2.	सुपात्यम्	सुपात्यम्	सुतात्यम्	पात्यम्
3.	पातपात्यम्	lost	सुनेत्रम्	सुनेत्रम्
4.	अनुत्तमांभः	अनुत्तमांभः	समरीचम्	अनुत्तमांभसिकम्
5.	उत्तमांभः	उत्तमांभः	उत्तमांभसिकम्	भारीकम्

If अर्जन, रञ्जन, क्षय, भोग ( or संग, according to गौड० ) and हिंसा are named in the order given above, then गौड० calls the last two as भारीक and अनुत्तमांभसिक respectively—, which is against the order observed by other commentators. My teacher, the late Mahāmahopādhyāya P. Rāmavātāra Śarma has tried to explain these varieties of तुष्टि as follows :—  
 यथाऋतदुःखपात्रप्रापितृत्वात् पात्रस्थये तुष्टिः । ..... अर्जनशोपदर्शनेऽपि


कदाचिद्भोगाभिव्ययेण प्रवृत्तिः स्यात्, रक्षणप्रयत्नस्य तु प्रवृत्तेरन्तितरामसंभव इति तदीयायास्तुष्टेः सुपारता, क्षयं भावयन्ः कदाचिन् प्रवृत्तिः कदाचिद्प्रवृत्तिः इति तदीया तुष्टिः पागापाराख्या ( read पागापाराख्या ? ), भोगे रोगंभये भावयन्-स्तुष्टिः स्वायंपरेति तस्या वतरेतराम्भस्त्वम्, हिंसाशेषतन्त्रास्तुष्टेस्तु कार्त्स्न्य-मूलकन्वाद्गतमाहभस्त्वम् ॥ बालराम, pp. 219-220.

## LI

No commentator has given the names of असिद्धिः जय<sup>०</sup> which gives them—तासां असिद्धीनां गोषुष्णमानरमित्यागः (!) संज्ञाः—, has a defective reading.

वाच<sup>०</sup> criticises the view of some writer in para 237. This view, as has been shown by me in my article (" Jayamaṅgalā and other commentaries on the Sāṅkhya-Kārikās", Indian Historical Quarterly, Vol. V, in, p. 429 ), belongs to जय<sup>०</sup>, this point is of great importance for the question of the relative chronology of the different commentaries. I have discussed it in my article referred to above.

Following is the scheme of the division of सिद्धिः according to वाच<sup>०</sup>



The last three are the effects of all the remaining five together.



While वाच° construes अहुश as निवारक and refers by it to विपर्यय, अशक्ति and तुष्टि, विज्ञान° (on सॉ. व. III. 44) explains अहुश as आकषेक and refers by it to the three मिदिस, viz. ऊह शब्द and अध्वयन, leaving सुहृत्प्रति and दान as of secondary importance. He criticises वाच° as follows—कश्चित्वेतासामष्टिसिद्धिनामहुशो निवारकः पूर्वशिविधो विपर्ययाशक्तिःतुष्टिरूपो भवति बन्धकत्वमिति व्याचष्टे तत्र। तुष्ट्यभावस्याशक्तितया बाधिर्यादिवत् मिदिविरोधितालाभेन तुष्ट्यतुष्टयो. सिद्विविरोधित्वमभवान्. In reply to this it may be said that तुष्टि and अतुष्टि are not mutually contradictory, but positive धर्मस. See Sovani p. 427.

## LII

The word लिङ्ग has been explained as महत्तत्त्वं बुद्धिरिति by विज्ञान (on सॉ. व. III 45). But this is not correct. वाच° is right in explaining it as referring to the objects of senses and the two bodies—subtle and gross. Davies remarks :—“Some commentators make the *linga* itself to be *Buddhi* (intellect) and *bhāvas* to be its conditions. The former interpretation (*i e.* वाच° H) is preferable, for the *linga*, though formed of intellect and other internal organs, is yet something different from them. It is, moreover, conditioned by the state of a former life, which is due to ‘intellect’.” (p. 90)

## LIV

सर्वत्रियाल means where सर्व predominates. It may be asked why this state should not be the human goal, why should men hanker after मोक्ष? To this the सूत्र replies.—आवृत्तिस्तत्राप्तुत्तरोत्तरयोऽनियोगादेयः (सॉ. व. III 52). विज्ञान explains it as—तत्राप्तुत्तरोत्तरयोऽनियोगाद्भोऽनियोगोऽनियोगोऽनियोगोऽनियोगो देय इत्यर्थ. This very idea is expressed in the next कारिका.

According to गौड° there are sixteen forms of creations—“that is, apparently, each of the four classes of beings

proceeds from four modifications of nature; or from the invisible principles, from the subtile rudiments, from conditions or dispositions of intellect and from the gross elements" (Wilson, p. 220). It seems that गौड<sup>०</sup> takes देव, मातृप and तयंग्मोन (= two, जङ्गम and स्थावर), and divides each of them into four classes, *vis*, अभौतिक, लिङ्ग, भाव and भूत.

## LV

पतञ्जलि also expresses the same idea—'परिणामतापसंस्कार दुःखंशुण्डवृत्तिविशेषाच्च दुःखमेव सर्वं विवेकिनः' (यो. सू. II. 15). Compare also, समानं जरामरणं दुःखम्' (सां. सू. III. 53).

स्वभावेन is explained by चन्द्रिका as स्वत एव सर्गो दुःखरूपः, विवेकिनामिति शेषः।

माडर reads अत्र in place of तत्र, and समासेन in place of स्वभावेन in the text. The former term he explains as विषु लोकेण and the latter as संक्षेपेण.

## LVI

The illustration of a cook cited by वाच<sup>०</sup> and the (सां. सू. III 63)—विविक्तबोधात् मृष्टिनिवृत्तिः प्रथानस्य सूदवन् पाके, has got this disadvantage that सूद is चेतन. The illustration of गौड<sup>०</sup> *vis*, यथा कश्चिन् स्वार्थं त्यक्त्वा मित्रकायाणि करोति, has the same disadvantage. The second illustration of गौड<sup>०</sup>, *vis*., तथा चोक्तं कुम्भवन् प्रथानं पुरुषार्थं कृत्वा निवर्तते, is better, because कुम्भ is non-intelligent.

चन्द्रिका quotes two योगसूत्रs in support of the purport of this वारिका—"तदर्थं एव दृश्यस्यात्मा" (II 21) and "कृतार्थं प्रति नद-मप्यनष्टं तदन्यतापारणत्वान्" (II 22).

## LVII

साध्यप्रभिधार । The syllogism of the प्रतिपदिन् is चेतनानभिहितं अचेतनं प्रवृत्तिशून्यम्, अचेतनत्वान्, रथादिदन् ।

Now, the साध्य is प्रवृत्तिगत्यम्. The सिद्धान्तिन् says that we can show a case which is the reverse of your syllogism. That is,

चेतनानधिष्ठितं अचेतनं अपि प्रवृत्तियुक्तम्, अचेतनत्वाद्, क्षरिवत् ।

Here we have साध्यव्यभिचार. Now, the प्रतिपादिन् says that your case does not bring about the साध्यव्यभिचार, because, even in your case we shall assume ईश्वर as the cause of प्रवृत्ति. To this the सिद्धान्तिन् replies:—Your argument is not sound, because a चेतन or प्रेक्षावान् can act only with the motive of स्वार्थ or कर्तव्य. But, it would be absurd to impute any motive to God, much less these two motives.

माडर, गौड<sup>०</sup> and जय<sup>०</sup>, interpret this कारिका as illustrating the प्रवृत्ति and निवृत्ति ( of प्रथान ) both, while as वाच<sup>०</sup> speaks of प्रवृत्ति only.

## LVIII

भ्रातृमुक्थ्य means इच्छा; but it is only a blind instinct or activity, which is the nature of the three गुणसु in साध्य philosophy. It is not the इच्छा of the नैयायिकसु according to whom it is the quality of a sentient being.

## LXI

This कारिका has given rise to a great controversy. With whom should we construe the word मे ? Is it प्रवृत्ति which feels that there is nothing सुहृत्तर than प्रवृत्ति or is it प्रवृत्ति itself which feels that there is nothing सुहृत्तर than myself ? The first meaning is adopted by माडर ; वाच<sup>०</sup> and गौड would seem to mean that it is the author of the कारिका who feels that there is nothing सुहृत्तर than प्रवृत्ति.

The next difficulty is about the meaning of the term सुहृत्तरता जय<sup>०</sup> explains it by 'subtlety', वाच<sup>०</sup> and माडर, by 'bashfulness', and गौड<sup>०</sup> by 'enjoyability'.

Again, in the 59th कारिका, प्रकृति is compared to a नदी but here to a कुलवधु.

As to the existence of another कारिका on the basis of गाँड०, see my foot-note to the text of the कारिका and introduction

“ पुनर्न दर्शनमुपैति पुरुषस्य ”—वाच० explains it as—अप्रमत्तां यथेनां परपुरपान्तगणि न पुनः पश्यन्ति । This is not a good interpretation. गाँड० is much nearer the mark when he says—अहमनेन परपुरनेन दृष्टास्मीत्यस्य पुंसः पुनर्दर्शनं नोपैति ।

## LXII

यथा जयपराजयो भृत्यगर्ता etc. ( वाच० ) is evidently derived from व्यासभाष्य—“ यथा जय. पराजयो वा योद्धुषु धर्तमान. स्वामिनि व्यप-दिश्यते ” ( यो. सू 1 24 )

## LXIV

The word तत्त्वाभ्यास, according to जय०, गाँड० and माडर, means the अभ्यास or practice of the twenty-five तत्त्वः, वाच० clarifies this अभ्यास as तत्त्वविषयज्ञानभ्यास, which leads to the realisation of the distinction between पुरुष and प्रकृति

The following scheme shows the different interpretations of the phrases नास्मि, न मे and नाहम्, as given by various commentators,—

	वाच०	माडर	गाँड०	जय०
नास्मि	अहं क्रियावान् नास्मि ।	नास्मि तत्त्वानि ।	नाहमेव भवामि ।	सूक्ष्मशरीरे भातिके च न भवामि, अपि तु प्रकृतिः ।
न मे	न मे स्वामित्वास्ति ।	न मे तत्त्वानि ।	न मम शरीरम्, यतोऽहमन्यः, शरीरमन्यन् ।	न ममेदमपि तु प्रकृतेः ।
नाहम्	अहं कर्ता न	नाहं तत्त्वानाम् ।	अहंशरीररहितोऽहम् ।	भाष्यहं प्रकृतिः ।

The quotation—"निष्पन्नमूर्तार्थं, etc., " given by वाच०, is also found in this तत्रवेगारदी on पौ. सू. I, 50, where, वाच० reads न बाधोऽज्ञादिमत्त्वेऽपि in place of न बाधोऽयत्नवत्त्वेऽपि. The meaning of the verse is—निष्पन्नः यो मूर्तार्थः, तदुपलक्षितः स्वभावे यस्य, तस्य ज्ञानाय विपर्ययः, अयत्नवत्त्वेऽपि न बाधः, बुद्धेस्तत्त्वज्ञानतः । निष्पन्नः = free from all (the) flaws (of प्रकृति, etc., according to the बौद्धs). मूर्तार्थः = truth (आद्यपरिज्ञान, according to the बौद्धs). विपर्ययः = contradictions (in the shape of प्रकृतिज्ञान, according to the बौद्धs). अयत्नवत्त्वेऽपि, etc., = although there is no effort to free this आद्यपरिज्ञान from the flaws of प्रकृतिज्ञान, yet this आद्यपरिज्ञान is not contradicted because बुद्धि is partial to it. वाच०'s introduction here favours the reading अनादिमत्त्वेऽपि, which will mean—"although विपर्ययज्ञाना is अनादि."

### LXVI

" एवं विवेक्यादिमपि प्राकृत्यविवेकज्ञानेन 'पर्ययैश्च' इति मन्वते " ( वाच०, para 271 ) = on account of ignorance, the Spirit thinks that as the enjoyable products of Nature, *viz.* sound and the rest, are for my sake, so the discriminative knowledge brought about by Nature ( and hence a product of Nature ) is also for my sake.

प्रयोजनं ज्ञानि मर्त्यम्—The idea is that भोग and विवेक are for the purpose of the Spirit ( *i. e.*, पुरुषार्थः ). They urge the Nature into activity. But, after the Spirit has enjoyed the products of Nature and has attained the discriminative knowledge, there remains no other purpose of the Spirit. भोग and अनाद्यं are no more पुरुषार्थः. So, in the case of this particular Spirit, भोग and अनाद्यं cannot urge the Nature into activity.

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## LXXVII

The ten मौलिकाध्यायः are—

( १ ) प्रधानास्तित्व, ( २ ) प्रधानिकत्व, ( ३ ) प्रधानस्य अर्धत्वम् (= विषयता ), ( ४ ) प्रधानस्य अन्यता (= पुष्पाद्भेदः ), ( ५ ) प्रधानस्य पारार्थ्यम्, ( ६ ) अविद्यम् (= पुरुषबहुत्वम् ), ( ७ ) विद्येता (= पुरुषान् प्रकृतेः ), ( ८ ) योगः (= पुरुषेण सह प्रकृत्याः ), ( ९ ) शेषशक्तिः (= संस्कारवशात् स्थूलसूक्ष्मशीरद्रूप-स्थितिः ) and ( १० ) अकर्तृत्वम् (= पुरुषस्य ) For this quotation and राजवार्तिक, see introduction

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